The Effects of Feedback on Perseverative Errors in Preschool Aged Children

Research using the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) showed that young children are usually able to sort accurately by an initial rule but are unable to switch to a new rule when the two rules conflict. In 2 experiments, the DCCS was modified to study the effects of feedback on 3- to 5-year-old children in a problem-solving task. In Experiment 1, half of the children in each of two age groups (36 to 44 months and 52 to 60 months) were administered the DCCS task using the standard (no feedback) procedure and the other half received feedback on their post-switch responses. Children who received feedback were able to categorize according to the new (correct) rule, whereas the children in the younger age group who did not receive feedback continued to perseverate. Experiment 2 with 3-year-olds replicated the results from Experiment 1 but found that children's successful performance with feedback on the card-sorting task did not lead to improved performance on the post-switch phase of a subsequent DCCS task. Successful performance under conditions of feedback in both studies implies that 3-year-olds are capable of shifting their response mode from one rule to an alternate rule under conditions that offer clear guidance. Poor performance on the standard version is interpreted to be a reflection of the inability to monitor their own task performance in the absence of clear contextual cues.     

Integrating velocity,time, and distance information: A developmental study

The development of understanding the relationships between velocity, time, and distance was investigated in three tasks. In each task, values of two dimensions were given, and 5-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults had to infer values of the third dimension. These inferences were made in all age groups. The integration rules were found to depend upon age and task. In the distance = time × velocity task, all age groups obeyed the normative multiplication rule. In the time = distance ÷ velocity task, the two older age groups obeyed the normative division rule, but the 5-year-olds shifted to a simpler subtraction rule. In the velocity = distance ÷ time task, which was the most difficult, the two older age groups simplified to use of a subtraction rule, and the 5-year-olds simplified even further to use of a distance-only rule. The knowledge level revealed for young children contrasts sharply with results from previous studies using Piagetian choice tasks, which apparently investigate selective attention to one dimension rather than conceptual understanding of relations.     

What makes the windows task difficult for young children: rule inference or rule use?

The windows task is difficult for young children. In this task, a child is shown two boxes with windows revealing that one is empty, whereas the other contains a treat. The child is asked to point to a box for an opponent to look in. The child then "wins" the contents of the other box (the treat). To pass the task, the child must use a rule such as "point to the empty box." But crucially, because the child is not told this rule by the experimenter, he or she must first infer it. Therefore, the windows task has two distinct requirements: (a) infer the rule "point to the empty box" and, once the rule is inferred, (b) use the rule by holding it in mind while inhibiting the prepotent response of pointing to the treat. In this study, the authors sought to determine which of these two requirements was responsible for poor performance on the windows task. They compared the performance of 3(1/2)-year-olds (N=40) on four tasks: the standard windows task, a version of the windows task that required rule use but not rule inference, and two versions of the day-night task that also required rule use but not rule inference. The relative performance on these four tasks and the pattern of correlations among them suggested that children had difficulty in inferring a rule that enables them to pass the task, whereas they had little difficulty in using the rule. Little evidence was obtained to suggest that the standard windows task requires inhibition.     

Color-object interference: Further tests of an executive control account

Young children are slower in naming the color of a meaningful picture than in naming the color of an abstract form (Stroop-like color-object interference). The current experiments tested an executive control account of this phenomenon. First, color-object interference was observed in 6- and 8-year-olds but not in 12- and 16-year-olds (Experiment 1). Second, meaningful pictures did not interfere in 5- to 7-year-olds’ manual sorting of objects on the basis of color (Experiment 2) or in their naming the number of colored objects in the display, that is, subitizing (Experiment 3). These findings provide support for the view that color-object interference results from the children’s immature inhibition of the prepotent but irrelevant task of object naming.     

Social transmission of disinhibition in young children

The present study examined whether young children's behaviors in the Dimensional Change Card Sorting task can be influenced by their observation of another person performing the task. Experiment 1 showed that after children watched an adult sorting cards according to one rule, although the children were instructed to sort the cards according to a new rule, most 3-year-olds made perseverative errors and used the observed, old rule to sort the cards instead of the new rule. However, only some 4-year-olds and few 5-year-olds made the same mistake. Experiments 2, 3 and 4 showed that the younger children took into consideration social pragmatic information displayed by the adult model when deciding to use the old rule or the new rule. When the model appeared to know that she sorted the cards incorrectly (Experiments 2 and 3), or was uncertain whether she sorted cards correctly (Experiment 4), most 3-year-olds no longer committed perseverative errors. When the adult model was confident about her sorting or oblivious to her sorting errors, most 3-year-olds made perseverative errors. These results taken together suggest that social observation can lead to disinhibitions. In other words, disinhibition can be transmitted socially from one person to another.     

When seeing is knowing: the role of visual cues in the dissociation between children's rule knowledge and rule use

The Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task requires children to switch from sorting cards based on shape or color to sorting based on the other dimension. Typically, 3-year-olds perseverate, whereas 4-year-olds flexibly sort by different dimensions. Zelazo and colleagues (1996, Cognitive Development, 11, 37-63) asked children questions about the postswitch rules and found an apparent dissociation between rule knowledge and rule use, namely that 3-year-olds demonstrate accurate knowledge of the postswitch rules despite sorting cards incorrectly. Here, we show that children's success with these questions is grounded in their use of available visual cues; children who fail sorting use the target cards to correctly answer questions, and when the cards are unavailable they guess. This suggests that there might not be a dissociation between children's rule knowledge and rule use in the DCCS.     

Precueing imminent conflict does not override sequence-dependent interference adaptation

Interference effects are largely reduced after cognitive conflicts in previous trials. This sequence-dependent interference adaptation is often seen as a consequence of strategic executive control. We sought to investigate whether sequential modulations are comparable with cue-induced strategic adjustments in spatial interference tasks. If so, reliable cues indicating the next compatibility condition should override effects caused by prior events. To this end, cues were introduced in a spatial stimulus-response compatibility task and a Simon task that either indicated the upcoming trial compatibility (rule cues) or the target position, which was not related to the S-R rule (position cues). The proportion of valid cues was either completely or predominantly valid. In both tasks cueing benefits for absolutely reliable rule cues were clearly present. Remarkably, sequential modulations were not influenced by effective rule cueing and vice versa. Even absolutely reliable information about prospective control demands did not cancel out sequence-dependent interference adaptation. In addition, the contingent negative variation—an event-related brain potential in the cue-target interval that is related to response preparation and readiness—showed additive effects of preceding compatibility and cue reliability. The present results indicate that processes underlying sequence-dependent interference adaptation differ from cue-induced strategic processes of cognitive control.     

Relations as rules: the role of attention in the Dimensional Change Card Sort task

Preschoolers are typically unable to switch sorting rules during the Dimensional Change Card Sort task. One explanation for this phenomenon is attentional inflexibility (Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003). In 4 experiments with 3- to 4-year-olds, we tested this hypothesis by examining the influence of dimensional salience on switching performance. Results from these experiments demonstrated that it was more difficult for children to redirect attention from attribute-based rule sets, such as color and shape, than from spatial relational rule sets. Overall, these findings point to a role for attention in performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sort task.     

The height + width = area of a rectangle rule in five-year-olds: effects of stimulus distribution and graduation of the response scale.

This study attempts to account for disparities between the Anderson and Cuneo (1978), Leon (1982), and Lautrey, Mullet, and Paques (1989) studies in regard to children's area judgment. Two task variables were manipulated: stimulus distribution (biased/unbiased) and the type of response scale (graduated/ungraduated). Three age groups (5, 6, and 7 year olds) were tested. The mean integration pattern for 5-year-olds presented a negatively biased stimulus distribution, and an ungraduated response scale was highly convergent and suggested the use of a centration rule (replication of the Lautrey et al. results). When 5-year-olds were presented with an unbiased stimulus distribution and a graduated scale, the integration pattern was only slightly convergent (as in Leon). The effects of two factors (age and graduation) were significant and combined additively: The older the child, the more graduated the response scale and the more the integration pattern tended to form three ascending parallel lines (the Anderson & Cuneo results).     

Age-related differences in reaction time task performance in young children

Performance of reaction time (RT) tasks was investigated in young children and adults to test the hypothesis that age-related differences in processing speed supersede a “global” mechanism and are a function of specific differences in task demands and processing requirements. The sample consisted of 54 4-year-olds, 53 5-year-olds, 59 6-year-olds, and 35 adults from Russia. Using the regression approach pioneered by Brinley and the transformation method proposed by Madden and colleagues and Ridderinkhoff and van der Molen, age-related differences in processing speed differed among RT tasks with varying demands. In particular, RTs differed between children and adults on tasks that required response suppression, discrimination of color or spatial orientation, reversal of contingencies of previously learned stimulus-response rules, and greater stimulus-response complexity. Relative costs of these RT task differences were larger than predicted by the global difference hypothesis except for response suppression. Among young children, age-related differences larger than predicted by the global difference hypothesis were evident when tasks required color or spatial orientation discrimination and stimulus-response rule complexity, but not for response suppression or reversal of stimulus-response contingencies. Process-specific, age-related differences in processing speed that support heterochronicity of brain development during childhood were revealed.     

The effects of task instructor status on prospective memory performance in preschoolers

The present study applied a 2 × 2 experimental design to assess prospective memory (PM) development across preschool age and to examine the effect of task instructor status (researcher vs. significant other) on PM performance in 80 preschool children. Participants were required to name pictures (ongoing task [OT]), and to remember to refrain from naming but instead give a different response to certain target cues (PM task). Although the OT was of comparable difficulty for both age groups (as indicated by no performance differences), results still indicated significantly higher PM performance in 5-year-olds than in 3-year-olds, confirming the age-related increase of PM capacities between 3 and 5 years. Furthermore, results showed a performance-enhancing effect of significant others as task instructors on both age-groups. Post-hoc analysis revealed that 3-year-olds instructed by a significant other still performed marginally worse than 5-year-olds instructed by a researcher, underlining the finding that substantial changes of PM capacities take place during early childhood.     

Speech disfluencies in nonstutterers Syntactic complexity and production task effects

The differences in the number of disfluencies of 3-, 5-, and 7-year-old nonstuttering children were investigated as syntactic complexity was varied in three different syntactic constructions: 1) simple affirmative declarative with copula + ing (SAAD), 2) future (FUT), and 3) passive (PAS) within a sentence imitation and a sentence-modeling task. The subjects repeated 30 sentences from the imitation task stimuli and produced response constructions from 30 pictures from the modeling task stimuli. The 3-year-olds exhibited significantly more disfluencies than the 5-year-olds, and the 5-year-olds produced significantly more disfluencies than the 7-year-olds. All three age groups produced significantly more disfluencies on the modeling task than on the imitation task. A significant complexity effect was demonstrated for the PAS construction. Results are compared to previous research findings and discussed with reference to hypothesized linguistic complexity and task difficulty.     

Developmental changes in application of the majority rule in group decisions

This study examined age-related changes in the child's application of the principle of majority rule in group decisions. Following a problem posed by Moessinger (1981), we enquired whether children routinely apply the majority rule when the majority consists of a shifting (variable) set of members across decisions, and alternate between majority and minority when the majority and minority is fixed, i.e. consists of the same individuals each time. In Geneva, Moessinger found that 8-year-olds failed to discriminate between fixed and shifting majorities, while most 13-year-olds (75 per cent) did so. An altered replication was conducted in Australia modifying Moessinger's procedure to control for extraneous variables such as ‘set’ and the need for variety in choice. It was found that on the task 7 per cent of 8-year-olds, 20 per cent of 10-year-olds, 32 per cent of 12-year-olds, and 39 per cent of 14-year-olds discriminated on a behavioural criterion between fixed and shifting majorities. Ten per cent of 8-year-olds, 40 per cent of 10-year-olds, 52 per cent of 12-year-olds, and 55 per cent of 14-year-olds made the discrimination on Moessinger's cognitive ‘reason’ criterion. The results show that development of the conceptual distinction between fixed and shifting majorities is gradual and continuous.     

Switching between spatial stimulus-response mappings: a developmental study of cognitive flexibility

Four different age groups (8-9-year-olds, 11-12-year-olds, 13-15-year-olds and young adults) performed a spatial rule-switch task in which the sorting rule had to be detected on the basis of feedback or on the basis of switch cues. Performance errors were examined on the basis of a recently introduced method of error scoring for the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Barcelo & Knight, 2002). This method allowed us to differentiate between errors due to failure-to-maintain-set (distraction errors) and errors due to failure-to-switch-set (perseverative errors). The anticipated age differences in performance errors were most pronounced for perseverative errors between 8-9 years and 11-12 years, but for distraction errors adult levels were not reached until 13-15 years. These findings were interpreted to support the notion that set switching and set maintenance follow distinct developmental trajectories.     

Matching and naming objects by shape or function: age and context effects in preschool children

Three experiments tested preschoolers' use of abstract principles to classify and label objects by shape or function. Three- and 4-year-olds were instructed to match objects by shape or function. Four-year-olds readily adopted either rule, but 3-year-olds followed only the shape rule. Without a rule, 4-year-olds tended to match by shape unless object function was shown during matching (Experiment 2). Three-year-olds' ability to use a function rule was tested in several conditions (re-presenting functions; reminders to "use the rule"; repeating rule on every trial). None induced consistent function matching (Experiment 3). Supplemental memory and verbal tasks showed that 3-year-olds have trouble using function as an abstract basis of comparison. Naming data, however, show that preschoolers are learning that object labels are based on function. The results show preschoolers' growing flexibility in adopting abstract generalization rules and growing knowledge of conventions for extending words.     

A heart rate analysis of developmental change in feedback processing and rule shifting from childhood to early adulthood

Over the course of development, the ability to switch between different tasks on the basis of feedback cues increases profoundly, but the role of performance monitoring remains unclear. Heart rate indexes can provide critical information about how individuals monitor feedback cues indicating that performance should be adjusted. In this study, children of three age groups (8-10, 12-14, and 16-18 years) performed a rule change task in which sorting rules needed to be detected following positive or negative feedback. The number of perseverative errors was lower for 16- to 18-year-olds than for 8- to 10-year-olds, and 12- to 14-year-olds performed at an intermediate level. Consistent with previous findings, heart rate slowed following feedback indicating a rule change, and the magnitude of slowing was similar for all age groups. Thus, 8- to 10-year-olds are already able to analyze feedback cues. In contrast, 12- to 14-year-olds and 16- to 18-year-olds, but not 8- to 10-year-olds, showed heart rate slowing following performance errors, suggesting that with age children are increasingly able to monitor their performance online. Performance monitoring may therefore be an important contributor to set-shifting ability.     

Complexity effects on the children's gambling task

The children's gambling task (CGT [Kerr, A., & Zelazo, P. D. (2004). Development of “Hot” executive function: The children's gambling task. Brain and Cognition, 55, 148–157]) involves integrating information about losses and gains to maximize winnings when selecting cards from two decks. Both cognitive complexity and control (CCC) theory and relational complexity (RC) theory attribute younger children's difficulty to task complexity. In CCC theory, identification of the advantageous deck requires formulation of a higher-order rule so that gains and losses can be considered in contradistinction. According to RC theory, it entails processing the ternary relation linking three variables (deck, magnitude of gain, magnitude of loss). We designed two less complex binary-relational versions in which either loss or gain varied across decks, with the other held constant. The three closely matched versions were administered to 3–5-year-olds. Consistent with complexity explanations, children in all age groups selected cards from the advantageous deck in the binary-relational versions, but only 5-year-olds did so on the ternary-relational CGT.     

Switching between tasks and responses: a developmental study

Task switching requires the ability to flexibly switch between task rules and responses, and is sensitive to developmental change. We tested the hypothesis that developmental changes in task switch performance are associated with changes in the facilitating or interfering effect of the previously retrieved stimulus-response (S-R) association. Three age groups (7-8-year-olds, 10-12-year-olds and 20-25-year-olds) performed a two-choice reaction time (RT) task in which spatially compatible or incompatible responses were required. The RT costs associated with switching between tasks were larger when responses were repeated than when responses were alternated. Younger children showed a greater cost than adults when switching between tasks but repeating responses. This age difference decreased when the interval between the previous response and the upcoming stimulus increased. Switch costs were larger when switching to the compatible task than to the incompatible task, but this effect did not differ between age groups. These findings suggest that young children build up stronger transient associations between task sets and response sets, which interfere with their ability to switch to currently intended actions. A similar pattern has previously been observed for older adults (Mayr, 2001), suggesting a common contributor to task switching deficits across the life span.     

Negative priming effect after inhibition of weight/number interference in a Piaget-like task

Piagetian tasks have more to do with the child's ability to inhibit interference than they do with the ability to grasp their underlying logic. Here we used a chronometric paradigm with 11-year-olds, who succeed in Piaget's conservation-of-weight task, to test the role of cognitive inhibition in a priming version of this classical task. The experimental design was such that the misleading strategy “number-equals-weight” to inhibit on the prime (a Piaget-like item with weight/number interference) became a congruent strategy to activate on the probe (a subsequent item where weight and number covaried). A negative priming effect of 142 ms was observed for the prime-probe sequence. This result is consistent with the prediction that success on Piaget-like tasks (the prime) requires an inhibition process.     

Adjustments to recent and frequent conflict reflect two distinguishable mechanisms

In conflict paradigms such as the Eriksen flanker task, interference has been found to be reduced under conditions of recent and/or frequent cognitive conflict. Using a modified flanker task, we investigated the interplay of conflict recency and conflict frequency by comparing the interference reductions following conflict trials under conditions in which conflict was either frequent or infrequent overall, while controlling for stimulus and response feature repetitions to rule out nonattentional accounts. The reduction of flanker interference after a conflict trial was attenuated when overall conflict was frequent. This result is consistent with models assuming that processing adjustments occur gradually in response to conflict strength, such as the connectionist model of Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001), in which both recency and frequency modulations are brought about by the same mechanism. By decomposing response times into initiation times and movement times, we revealed that frequent conflict delayed response initiation but sped up movement. Moreover, whereas frequent conflict reduced interference in both components, interference reduction after individual conflict trials was confined to movement times. Taken together, these results suggest that different mechanisms underlie the two kinds of modulation.