Problematic Self-Efficacy Inferences in Beginning Psychotherapy Supervisees: Identification and Management

We contend that a particular form of self-efficacy beliefs — specifically referred to as relation-inferred self-efficacy beliefs — often gets activated in beginning supervisees, can potentially pose supervision problems from the outset and, consequently, is best addressed by supervisors early on. Relation-inferred self-efficacy beliefs refer to what supervisees think or infer that their supervisor is thinking about their therapeutic efficacy; because beginning supervisees often have doubts about their own therapeutic efficacy, they can make incorrect inferences about what their supervisor is thinking of them, and supervision can be accordingly affected. In this brief report, relation-inferred self-efficacy beliefs are elaborated upon, their significance for the trajectory of beginning supervisee development is considered, and some supervisor actions that can aid in alleviating the impact of those beliefs on beginning supervisees are identified. We view it as important that supervisors (a) hold supervisee problematic relation-inferred self-efficacy beliefs in mind as a likely supervision reality, (b) strive to proactively address their possible emergence through supervisee education at supervision’s onset and through including the topic in the body of the supervision agreement, (c) be sensitive to cues that may indicate the emergence of such problematic inferred beliefs during the course of supervision, (d) sensitively inquire about those cues and, if confirmed, be open to discussing their implications with beginning supervisees, (e) fully carry out discussion about those beliefs so as to allay supervisees’ inference concerns, and (f) because addressing those problematic beliefs is not a one-and-done affair, be ready to re-address them as need arises.

     

Cognitive organization of favorable and unfavorable beliefs about performing a behavior

Intentions to perform behaviors are influenced by beliefs about their consequences, but researchers have not addressed how such beliefs are cognitively organized. In 3 experiments, the authors tested the hypothesis that beliefs are organized according to whether they are favorable or unfavorable in regard to performing a behavior. In Experiment 1, a group of U.S. students first read a list of beliefs favorable and unfavorable to going to a vacation resort and then listed their beliefs about condom use. In Experiment 2, another group of U.S. students listed their beliefs about condom use. In Experiment 3, a 3rd group of U.S. students listed their beliefs about a novel behavior (asking the experimenter for candy). The results of all 3 experiments were consistent with the hypothesis that people cognitively organize their beliefs according to whether they are favorable or unfavorable to the behavior in question.     

Ethical Beliefs Toward Academic Dishonesty: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Undergraduate Students in Ukraine and the United States

Little work has been done on beliefs toward academic misconduct in Ukraine. This study explored the beliefs of Ukrainian students toward various forms of academic misconduct and compared the results to the U.S. undergraduate students (N?=?270). Twenty-two forms of cheating, plagiarism, and questionable academic behaviors were grouped in five categories: unilateral cheating, collective cheating, falsification gaining favoritism, and performing extra work to receive better grades. Cross-cultural comparisons of beliefs were pivotal in this study. Results indicated that, in general, Ukrainian students are less likely to believe that academic misconduct is wrong compared to their U.S. counterparts, as well as seem to have different beliefs on what is and isn’t academic misconduct. Recommendations are proposed to help students change their beliefs and to reduce academic dishonesty. These recommendations also have application purposes outside of Ukraine.     

Immoral Beliefs

In this paper, I argue that there exists a class of immoral beliefs. These beliefs are immoral not for the usual reasons, i.e. because of their tendency to cause harm, their immoral acquisition, or the fact that they involve unjustified moral judgments. Rather, the class of beliefs to which I wish to draw attention includes beliefs that do not even have any moral content, but whose non‐moral content is still morally significant. These beliefs are immoral because holding them constitutes an immoral condition of the belief‐holder. This usually involves a moral failure of the belief‐holder. We may object to such beliefs for all of the usual reasons, but I wish to draw attention to their objectionable content based on the kind of character they represent a person as having. 1     

Cognitive Organization of Favorable and Unfavorable Beliefs About Performing a Behavior

Abstract

Intentions to perform behaviors are influenced by beliefs about their consequences, but researchers have not addressed how such beliefs are cognitively organized. In 3 experiments, the authors tested the hypothesis that beliefs are organized according to whether they are favorable or unfavorable in regard to performing a behavior. In Experiment 1, a group of U.S. students first read a list of beliefs favorable and unfavorable to going to a vacation resort and then listed their beliefs about condom use. In Experiment 2, another group of U.S. students listed their beliefs about condom use. In Experiment 3, a 3rd group of U.S. students listed their beliefs about a novel behavior (asking the experimenter for candy). The results of all 3 experiments were consistent with the hypothesis that people cognitively organize their beliefs according to whether they are favorable or unfavorable to the behavior in question.     

My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic

We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents’ beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs (‘no preferences’), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own (‘my preferences’), and the special case that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are exactly as their own (‘preference refinement’). This multi-agent belief interaction is frame characterizable. We provide examples for introspective agents. We investigate which of these forms of belief interaction are preserved under three common forms of belief revision.     

When 2–3% really matters: The (un)importance of religiosity in psychotherapy

Previous research suggests that clients’ religious beliefs are commonly excluded from therapeutic practice. Often, this exclusion is attributed to practitioners’ lack of knowledge or appropriate skills. Such analyses, however, have little regard for the interactional aspects of the therapist/client encounter. Drawing upon work within discursive social psychology, we argue that the exclusion of religious beliefs does not reflect therapists’ lack of knowledge or awareness but can more usefully be seen as the discursive accomplishment of marginalizing clients’ beliefs. Six practising psychotherapists were interviewed about religious beliefs within the therapeutic process. Participants construct religious beliefs as important but relevant only to restricted categories of clients. They rework religious beliefs as compatible with accepted practice, or construct particular groups of clients as incompatible with the process. Training and other requirements are reformulated in terms of spiritual beliefs rather than religious beliefs. These constructions display awareness of religious beliefs while marginalizing their relevance in practice. Inclusion of clients’ religious beliefs to best effect will require more psychotherapy to engage more constructively with religion than it does at present.     

The separate roles of the reflective mind and involuntary inhibitory control in gatekeeping paranormal beliefs and the underlying intuitive confusions

Intuitive thinking is known to predict paranormal beliefs, but the processes underlying this relationship, and the role of other thinking dispositions, have remained unclear. Study 1 showed that while an intuitive style increased and a reflective disposition counteracted paranormal beliefs, the ontological confusions suggested to underlie paranormal beliefs were predicted by individual differences in involuntary inhibitory processes. When the reasoning system was subjected to cognitive load, the ontological confusions increased, lost their relationship with paranormal beliefs, and their relationship with weaker inhibition was strongly accentuated. These findings support the argument that the confusions are mainly intuitive and that they therefore are most discernible under conditions in which inhibition is impaired, that is, when thinking is dominated by intuitive processing. Study 2 replicated the findings on intuitive and reflective thinking and paranormal beliefs. In Study 2, ontological confusions were also related to the same thinking styles as paranormal beliefs. The results support a model in which both intuitive and non‐reflective thinking styles and involuntary inhibitory processes give way to embracing culturally acquired paranormal beliefs.     

Relations of familiarity with reasoning strategies in conspiracy beliefs

The prevalence and resilience of conspiracy beliefs suggest that such beliefs may derive in part from general information-processing mechanisms. Two predictions were tested: conspiracy beliefs would increase as familiarity with the conspiracy increased, and conspiracy beliefs would rest in part on the perception of the alleged conspirators' motive. Participants read condensed versions of four real-life conspiracy theories of varying familiarity, rated their belief in the conspiracies, and explained their ratings. Although belief was not associated with familiarity, participants used different justifications for their beliefs about familiar and unfamiliar conspiracies, relying prominently on motive when the conspiracy was unfamiliar. Preliminary data suggested that participants' beliefs in conspiracies may have been equally strong when they reasoned only in terms of motive as when they reasoned in terms of documented evidence. An additional finding suggested also that beliefs in conspiracies may increase as affiliation with the victim of the alleged conspiracy increases.     

Beliefs About Emotion: Links to Emotion Regulation,Well-Being,and Psychological Distress

People differ in their implicit beliefs about emotions. Some believe emotions are fixed (entity theorists), whereas others believe that everyone can learn to change their emotions (incremental theorists). We extend the prior literature by demonstrating (a) entity beliefs are associated with lower well-being and increased psychological distress, (b) people's beliefs about their own emotions explain greater unique variance than their beliefs about emotions in general, and (3) implicit beliefs are linked with well-being/distress via cognitive reappraisal. These results suggest people's implicit beliefs—particularly about their own emotions—may predispose them toward emotion regulation strategies that have important consequences for psychological health.     

On Not Giving Up the World – Davidson and the Grounds of Belief

Abstract

What is the relation between our beliefs, or thoughts in general, and the perceptual experience of the world that gives rise to those beliefs? Donald Davidson is usually taken to have a well‐known answer to this question that runs as follows: while our beliefs are, at least in part, caused by our experience, such experience does not thereby count as providing a rational ground for those beliefs; our beliefs are thus evidentially grounded in other beliefs, but not in the experience that gives rise to them. John McDowell, among others, has challenged this Davidsonian picture on the grounds that it actually severs the connection between beliefs and their proper evidential grounds. Against such a view, this paper argues the Davidsonian position grounds belief in the specificity of our own locatedness in the world, and in the more general and prior embeddedness of belief in the world that is a part of the very concept of belief.     

Delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs

Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by a car accident believes that his father was replaced by an imposter or another patient with schizophrenia believes that “The Organization” painted the shops on a street in red and green to convey a message, these beliefs are not merely false or irrational. They are pathological. What makes delusions pathological? This paper explores the negative features because of which delusional beliefs are pathological. First, I critically examine the proposals according to which delusional beliefs are pathological because of (1) their strangeness, (2) their extreme irrationality, (3) their resistance to folk psychological explanations or (4) impaired responsibility-grounding capacities of people with them. I present some counterexamples as well as theoretical problems for these proposals. Then, I argue, following Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, that delusional beliefs are pathological because they involve some sorts of harmful malfunctions. In other words, they have a significant negative impact on wellbeing (=harmful) and, in addition, some psychological mechanisms, directly or indirectly related to them, fail to perform the jobs for which they were selected in the past (=malfunctioning). An objection to the proposal is that delusional beliefs might not involve any malfunctions. For example, they might be playing psychological defence functions properly. Another objection is that a harmful malfunction is not sufficient for something to be pathological. For example, false beliefs might involve some malfunctions according to teleosemantics, a popular naturalist account of mental content, but harmful false beliefs do not have to be pathological. I examine those objections in detail and show that they should be rejected after all.     

Ethno-culture, anxiety, and irrational beliefs

Ellis, Beck, and others in the cognitive therapy tradition maintain that there is a strong correlation between irrational beliefs and nonpsychotic mental health problems such as anxiety. Numerous studies have found that irrational beliefs are correlated with high trait anxiety. In a multi-cultural sample (n = 250; 46.7% Caucasian, 23.6% Asian, 23.6% multi-cultural, and 6.1% of other ethno-cultural backgrounds), these findings are replicated. Profile analysis (MANOVA) results reveals significant relationships between high trait anxiety and seven of the ten irrational beliefs scales on Jones' Irrational Belief Test. Asians are found to be the most anxious, and the relationship between ethno-culture and irrational beliefs was significant on three of the ten scales, with Asians having more irrational beliefs than Caucasians or multi-cultural individuals. However, no interaction is found between anxiety and ethno-culture in their relationship to irrational beliefs. Thus, these results reveal that there are ethno-cultural differences in anxiety and irrational beliefs. Clinical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Ethno-culture, anxiety, and irrational beliefs

Ellis, Beck, and others in the cognitive therapy tradition maintain that there is a strong correlation between irrational beliefs and nonpsychotic mental health problems such as anxiety. Numerous studies have found that irrational beliefs are correlated with high trait anxiety. In a multi-cultural sample (n = 250; 46.7% Caucasian, 23.6% Asian, 23.6% multi-cultural, and 6.1% of other ethno-cultural backgrounds), these findings are replicated. Profile analysis (MANOVA) results reveals significant relationships between high trait anxiety and seven of the ten irrational beliefs scales on Jones' Irrational Belief Test. Asians are found to be the most anxious, and the relationship between ethno-culture and irrational beliefs was significant on three of the ten scales, with Asians having more irrational beliefs than Caucasians or multi-cultural individuals. However, no interaction is found between anxiety and ethno-culture in their relationship to irrational beliefs. Thus, these results reveal that there are ethno-cultural differences in anxiety and irrational beliefs. Clinical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Does my daughter like math? Relations between parent and child math attitudes and beliefs

As early as age six, girls report higher math anxiety than boys, and children of both genders begin to endorse the stereotype that males are better at math than females. However, very few studies have examined the emergence of math attitudes in childhood, or the role parents may play in their transmission. The present study is the first to investigate the concordance of multiple implicit and explicit math attitudes and beliefs between 6- and 10-year-old children and their parents. Data from implicit association tasks (IATs) reveal that both parents and their children have implicit associations between math and difficulty, but only parents significantly associated math with males. Notably, males (fathers and sons) were more likely than females (mothers and daughters) to identify as someone who likes math (instead of reading), suggesting gender differences in academic preferences emerge early and remain consistent throughout adulthood. Critically, we provide the first evidence that both mothers’ and fathers’ attitudes about math relate to a range of math attitudes and beliefs held by their children, particularly their daughters. Results suggest that girls may be especially sensitive to parental math attitudes and beliefs. Together, data indicate that children entering formal school already show some negative math attitudes and beliefs and that parents’ math attitudes may have a disproportionate impact on young girls.     

Ethical Issues in Counselling and Psychotherapy: The Background

Ethical issues have their roots in the belief systems of individuals and society. Codes of ethics are seen as attempts to ensure that behaviour accords with these belief systems. An outline model is presented which highlights some aspects of beliefs, feelings and conscious and unconscious processes, and their effects upon the conscious behaviours of the individual. Aspects of social change and context are briefly considered, together with the subsequent effects upon beliefs and ethics, and issues of responsibility.     

Beliefs in moral luck: When and why blame hinges on luck

Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making.     

Looks and Perceptual Justification

Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks view of the justification of simple visual beliefs. According to the looks view, such beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning how the relevant things look. Unlike under classical foundationalism, under the looks view as I develop it, these reasons are public. They are public with respect to both their content and possession: with respect to content, they are not about ourselves and our experiences, and with respect to their possession, many people can have the very same looks‐related reasons.     

Irrational Beliefs and Self-Management as Separable Predictors of Anxiety and Depression

Irrational beliefs and self-management are both cognitive-behavioral constructs that are integral in modern Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy and Self-Management Therapy, respectively. Both irrational beliefs and self-management have been linked to anxiety and depression, and there is evidence for their usefulness for these types of distress. This is the first study to consider irrational beliefs and self-management as simultaneous predictors of anxiety and depression. An outpatient clinical sample (n = 51) completed measures of irrational beliefs, self-management, and emotional symptoms. Results indicated that as simultaneous predictors of fear and worry, self-management did not account for any additional variance accounted for by irrational beliefs. However, both irrational beliefs and self-management predicted unique variance in depression, negative affect, and positive affect. Exploratory analyses with single diagnosis (n = 26) and multiple diagnoses (n = 25) subsamples provided some divergent results. These results are discussed in terms of case conceptualization and potential future applications in the treatment of affective disorders, in particular depression.     

Physician Bayesian updating from personal beliefs about the base rate and likelihood ratio

Whether humans can accurately make decisions in line with Bayes’ rule has been one of the most important yet contentious topics in cognitive psychology. Though a number of paradigms have been used for studying Bayesian updating, rarely have subjects been allowed to use their own preexisting beliefs about the prior and the likelihood. A study is reported in which physicians judged the posttest probability of a diagnosis for a patient vignette after receiving a test result, and the physicians’ posttest judgments were compared to the normative posttest calculated from their own beliefs in the sensitivity and false positive rate of the test (likelihood ratio) and prior probability of the diagnosis. On the one hand, the posttest judgments were strongly related to the physicians’ beliefs about both the prior probability as well as the likelihood ratio, and the priors were used considerably more strongly than in previous research. On the other hand, both the prior and the likelihoods were still not used quite as much as they should have been, and there was evidence of other nonnormative aspects to the updating, such as updating independent of the likelihood beliefs. By focusing on how physicians use their own prior beliefs for Bayesian updating, this study provides insight into how well experts perform probabilistic inference in settings in which they rely upon their own prior beliefs rather than experimenter-provided cues. It suggests that there is reason to be optimistic about experts’ abilities, but that there is still considerable need for improvement.