On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth

An intuitive argument for scientific realism suggests that our successes in predicting and intervening would be inexplicable if the theories that generate them were not approximately true. This argument faces many objections, some of which are briefly addressed in this paper, and one of which is treated in more detail. The focal criticism alleges that appeals to success cannot deliver conclusions that parts of science are true in the sense of truth-as-correspondence that realists prefer. The paper responds to that criticism, in versions proposed by Michael Williams, Michael Levin, and, especially, Paul Horwich, by arguing that critics typically stop at a shallow level of psychological explanation. If we probe more deeply we discover a genuine explanatory role for correspondence truth.     

Importance and Explanatory Relevance: The Case of Mathematical Explanations

A way to argue that something (e.g. mathematics, idealizations, moral properties, etc.) plays an explanatory role in science is by linking explanatory relevance with importance in the context of an explanation. The idea is deceptively simple: a part of an explanation is an explanatorily relevant part of that explanation if removing it affects the explanation either by destroying it or by diminishing its explanatory power, i.e. an important part (one that if removed affects the explanation) is an explanatorily relevant part. This can be very useful in many ontological debates. My aim in this paper is twofold. First of all, I will try to assess how this view on explanatory relevance can affect the recent ontological debate in the philosophy of mathematics—as I will argue, contrary to how it may appear at first glance, it does not help very much the mathematical realists. Second of all, I will show that there are big problems with it.     

MMPI-Rorschach Interrelationships: Proposed Criteria for Evaluating Explanatory Models

An extensive empirical literature, spanning 50 years and 45 published investigations, leads to the conclusion that the Rorschach and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) bear little or no meaningful relationship to each other. An inherent tension exists between these empirical findings and the widespread clinical practice of integrating MMPI and Rorschach results. At least three perspectives have been advanced concerning the relationship between these two instruments. One view holds that variables from the two measures will demonstrate significant patterns of convergence only in carefully designed research studies that involve specific, well-constructed and theoretically derived predictions. A second view postulates that although variables from the Rorschach and MMPI do not bear a high intercorrelation with each other, these variables may be combined to contribute significantly to the prediction of outcome variance. In this view, the combined use of the two instruments yields clinically useful increases in incremental validity not achievable by the use of either instrument in isolation. A third approach is reflected in the proposition that although the MMPI and Rorschach do not produce significant interrelationships under general conditions, meaningful relationships may be yielded under specific psychometric conditions, for example, under conditions in which the response styles are consistently displayed across those two instruments. This article will review research evidence related to each of these perspectives, with particular emphasis on the importance of clearly specifying the criteria to be applied in evaluating these models. The concepts of parsimony and heuristic value are proposed for these evaluation purposes.     

Explanatory style across the life span: evidence for stability over 52 years

Analyzed explanatory style across the life span. 30 Ss whose average age was 72 responded to questions about their current life and provided diaries or letters written in their youth, an average of 52 years earlier. A blind content analysis of explanatory style derived from these 2 sources revealed that explanatory style for negative events was stable throughout adult life (r = .54, p less than .002). In contrast, there appeared to be no stability of explanatory style for positive events between the same 2 time periods. These results suggest that explanatory style for negative events may persist across the life span and may constitute an enduring risk factor for depression, low achievement, and physical illness.     

Childhood stuttering and dissociations across linguistic domains

The purpose of this investigation was to evaluate the possible presence of dissociations in the speech and language skills of young children who do (CWS) and do not stutter (CWNS) using a correlation-based statistical procedure [Bates, E., Appelbaum, M., Salcedo, J., Saygin, A. P., & Pizzamiglio, L. (2003). Quantifying dissociations in neuropsychological research. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 25, 1128-1153]. Participants were 45 preschool CWS and 45 CWNS between the ages of 3;0 and 5;11 (years;months), with the two groups matched by age, gender, race, and parental socioeconomic status. Children participated in a parent-child interaction for the purpose of disfluency analysis and responded to four standardized speech-language tests for subsequent analyses as main dependent variables. Findings indicated that CWS were over three times more likely than CWNS to exhibit dissociations across speech-language domains, with 44 cases of dissociation for CWS and 14 for CWNS across 10 possible comparisons. Results suggest that there may be a subgroup of CWS who exhibit dissociations across speech-language domains, which may result in a greater susceptibility to breakdowns in speech fluency. EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: The reader will be able to: (1) summarize findings from previous studies examining differences in speech and language performance between children who do and do not stutter; (2) describe what is meant by "dissociations" in the speech and language skills of young children who do and do not stutter; and (3) discuss three hypotheses that could account for the present findings that suggest CWS, more often than CWNS, exhibit dissociations in their speech-language system.     

Mind-Wandering and Childhood ADHD: Experimental Manipulations across Laboratory and Naturalistic Settings

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - The conceptual overlap between mind-wandering and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)-related impairments is considerable, yet little...     

Firearm Violence across the Lifespan: Relevance and Theoretical Impact on Child and Adolescent Educational Prospects

Firearm violence in United States has been a persistent concern for decades particularly in light of mass shootings. Firearm violence is increasingly viewed as a public health crisis, and results in a heavy financial burden to society. In light of the continuous challenges associated with firearm violence, limited research in the area, it is necessary to examine current trends regarding firearm deaths and injuries. Extant data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Web-based Inquiry Statistics Query and Reporting System fatal and nonfatal injury reports were used for this study. Available data were examined in light of age groups across the life span, region, gender, and minority status for both fatalities and injuries related to firearms. Strategies for reducing firearm fatalities, particularly among children and youth, are also discussed.     

Conceptions of objects across categories: Childhood patterns resemble those of adults

Studies of category‐specific disorders have suggested that categories of living and non‐living things vary in the properties that are most salient to recognition. Studies of the object features generated by normal adults have also revealed different patterns of responses to different categories. These adult patterns are likely to originate in childhood, but there are few reports of children's verbal conceptions of objects, and none at present of objects from different categories. This paper investigates the development of object conceptions, in a large group of children, aged 3 years 7 months to 11 years 6 months, in response to ‘What is a — ?’ questions directed to 72 objects, selected from two categories of living things (animals and fruit/vegetables) and two categories of artifacts (implements and vehicles). Proportions of perceptual‐to‐functional features provided by the children to living and non‐living things varied with the range of features defined as functions, just as studies of adults have found. Apart from the distribution of superordinate responses, which were significantly more salient to living than to non‐living categories, no other property separated the two categories. Only the category of implements could be distinguished from the other categories on the basis of the features generated. It is argued that the perceptual‐functional theory of category‐specific disorders receives little support from this study, but that in general the distribution of features generated by young children is similar to that produced by normal adults.     

Truth Values and the Value of Truth

This paper explores the ways in which truth is better than falsehood, and suggests that, among other things, it depends on the kinds of proposition to which these values are attached. Ordinary singular propositions like "It is raining" seem to fit best the bivalent "scheme" of classical logic, the general proposition "It is always raining" is more appropriately rated according to how often it rains, and a "practically vague" proposition like "The lecture will start at 1" is appropriately rated according to its nearness to exactness. Implications for logic of this "rating system" are commented on.     

Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap

Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes an explanatory problem - an explanatory gap - but does not imply the existence of immaterial mental properties. Levine introduced this notion of the explanatory gap almost two decades ago. Purple Haze allows Levine to situate the explanatory gap in a broader philosophical context. He engages with those who hold that the explanatory gap is best understood as implying anti-materialist metaphysical conclusions. But he also seeks to distance himself from contemporary naturalistic philosophical theorizing about consciousness by arguing that reductive and eliminative theories of consciousness all fail. Levine's work is best seen as an attempt to firmly establish a definite status for the mind-body problem, i.e. that the mind-body problem is a real, substantive epistemological problem but emphatically not a metaphysical one. Because Levine's work is tightly focused upon contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy of mind, there is little discussion of the broader conceptual background to the mind-body problem. My aim here is to place Levine's work in a broader conceptual context. In particular, I focus on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality in the belief that doing so will allow us better to understand and evaluate Levine's arguments and their place in contemporary theorizing about mentality and consciousness.     

Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost

In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we show that once the appropriate repairs have been made, the resultant definition is equivalent to a version of the supervaluation definition suggested in J Philos 72:690–716, 1975 and discussed in detail in J Symb Log 51(3):663–681, 1986. The upshot of this is a philosophical justification for the simple supervaluation approach and fresh insight into its workings.     

Psychoanalysis and the hermeneutic turn: a critique of Narrative Truth and Historical Truth

Through a discussion of Donald Spence's Narrative Truth and Historical Truth, a critical introduction to the hermeneutic or interpretive perspective is presented. Spence's book has generally been assumed to offer a hermeneutic reformulation of psychoanalysis. However, its presuppositions are incompatible with fundamental tenets of contemporary hermeneutic thought, as expressed in the philosophies of Heidegger, Gadamer, and the later Wittgenstein. Spence's basic assumptions are classically empiricist and positivistic. His vision of human experience is essentially associationistic and Humean; it treats experience as involving two processes, the passive reception of raw sense data and a subsequent projection of meaningful interpretation. Spence advocates the gathering of brute data while denying or downplaying the epistemological value of theorizing and of interpretive understandings. These assumptions are contrasted with those of the hemeneutic philosophers. Unlike these philosophers, Spence tends to dichotomize coherence and correspondence theories of truth. As a result, he wavers between relativism (regarding therapeutic interpretations) and objectivism (regarding scientific knowledge).     

Modeling Lifelong Learning: Collaborative Teaching across Disciplinary Lines

Most courses in colleges and universities are taught by only one instructor. This is often necessitated by the financial exigencies of educational institutions, but is also due to an academic tradition in which the ideal is a single expert teaching in a single discipline. The rapidly changing realities of both the higher education and job markets, however, have called the traditional ideal into question. Interdisciplinary collaborative teaching is one way to adapt to the needs of twenty‐first‐century students, by modeling lifelong learning for students and inviting instructors to be more deliberately reflective about disciplinary assumptions, learning styles, and pedagogies.     

Knowledge Argument: Scientific Reasoning and the Explanatory Gap

It is easy to accept that scientific reasoning cannot determine the characteristics of subjective experiences in cases like Broad’s archangel or Jackson’s Mary. The author questions why this seems to be evident and discusses the differences between these cases and ordinary scientific work, where future states of studied systems can be predicted in phenomenal terms. He concludes that important limitations of scientific reasoning are due to the inadequacy of human sensorial apparatus for representing physical reality. Such inadequacies were more evident in Mary’s case, but are always present, and entail the existence of the explanatory gap.     

Evaluating the Evidence for the General Factor of Personality across Multiple Inventories

A general factor of personality (GFP) has been proposed as the apex of a personality trait hierarchy that explains covariance among the lower-order factors measured by various personality inventories. In this study we evaluated the GFP hypothesis across several personality inventories, unlike most previous research in which the GFP has been derived from individual instruments in isolation. Exploratory analyses did not produce substantial evidence for the existence of a single cross-instrument higher-order factor of factors and efforts to specify a range of GFP-inspired models in a confirmatory framework led to significant estimation difficulties and poor fit to the data. Overall these results fail to support a common GFP that is positioned at the top of a personality trait hierarchy.