Young Children's Understanding of the Conditions for Knowledge Acquisition

We report 3 studies directed to children's understanding of how evidence leads to knowledge. The studies as a whole span a range of ages (4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds), a variety of sources of information (perception, communication, and inference), and a number of targets or recipients of the information (adult, child, baby, and self). Perception proved to be the easiest source to understand, and inference was the most difficult. There was no difference in the accuracy of judgments for the self and judgments for others. Judgments were least accurate for the baby, primarily because children tended to overestimate babies' ability to acquire knowledge from communication or inference. Although performance in general improved with age, the tendency to overestimate the baby was greatest among the oldest children. The results are discussed in terms of children's understanding of 2 contributors to knowledge formation: situational (the nature and adequacy of the informational source) and individual (the cognitive readiness of the recipient of the information).     

Children's Representation of Child and Adult Knowledge

Do children think that adult knowledge subsumes or only partially overlaps child knowledge? Sixty-four 4- and 6-year-old children were asked either whether a child and an adult know the answers to questions tapping adult- and child-specific knowledge (Experiment 1) or to whom each question should be addressed (Experiment 2). Children were also asked directly about the existence of child-specific knowledge. The experiments provided converging evidence that beliefs about child-specific knowledge are relatively limited among 4-year-olds but become well articulated by age 6. The findings contribute to understanding the development of children's beliefs about the relation between knowledge and age.     

The Effects of Accuracy Motivation on Children's and Adults' Event Recall,Suggestibility, and Their Answers to Unanswerable Questions

This study investigated children's and adults' event recall accuracy and suggestibility effects when participants' accuracy motivation was manipulated. A total of 240 participants (6-, 7-, and 8-year-olds, and adults) were shown a video and later asked 4 types of questions: answerable questions, both open-ended and strongly misleading, and unanswerable questions, both open-ended and strongly misleading. Participants were either (a) rewarded with a token for every correct answer (high accuracy motivation, Free Report Plus Incentive condition), (b) explicitly given the option of answering with "don't know" when unsure (medium accuracy motivation, Free Report condition), or (c) asked to provide an answer to every question, even when they were not sure or had to guess or both (low accuracy motivation, Forced Report condition). The condition with the high accuracy motivation yielded the highest recall accuracy scores for answerable open-ended and misleading questions. For unanswerable questions, even the youngest age group was able to increase the number of appropriate "don't know" answers when highly motivated to be accurate, but a misleading question format undermined these abilities. The results highlight important interactions between social (accuracy motivation) and cognitive factors (metacognitive monitoring processes) in children's formal interviewing.     

Knowing How to Project Objects: Probing the Generality of Children's Action Knowledge

Previous work on the development of intuitive knowledge about trajectories has shown a dissociation between young children's aimed throwing actions, in which they are highly sensitive to the physical laws of motion, and their explicit judgments, in which they exhibit misconceptions. This research investigated the generality of children's action knowledge by having the participants project a ball with a sling. Instead of adjusting sling stretch, and hence sling force, correctly as a function of both the release height and the target distance, 5- and 6-year-olds (Experiment 1, N = 32) and, without flight feedback, even most 7- to 10-year-olds (Experiment 2, N = 96) considered distance only and ignored the height dimension. Similarly, children's judgments of the required sling stretch tended to follow a distance-only rule, especially with children younger than 9 years of age. These results show that young children's action knowledge exhibited in throwing does not generalize to arbitrary means of force production. They further suggest that there is no developmental trend toward such generalization in the age range examined.     

The effects of interacting in repeated events on children's eyewitness memory and source monitoring

Accurate eyewitness memory of an event may be affected by exposure to and degree of involvement with other related events. In this study, we investigated whether interacting in a related video event affected children's accounts of a real-life target event, and whether interacting in the target event affected memory for different details within the target event. Four-, 6-, and 9-year-old children interacted with an adult who made a puppet. Half of the children in each age group also interacted with a video of a similar event (interactive condition) and half sat and watched the video without interacting (watch condition). When asked non-misleading questions a week later, children in the interactive condition confused the two events more than those in the watch condition. The 4-year-olds in the interactive condition reported a higher rate of confusions in free recall than the 4-year-olds in the watch condition. There were no effects of interaction on responses to misleading questions. The 6- and 9-year-olds were more accurate at answering questions related to actions they themselves had performed than actions performed by the experimenter, although this pattern was reversed for the 4-year-olds. The results are discussed in terms of children's eyewitness memory. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Young children’s developing conception of knowledge and ignorance: work in progress

When do children acquire an understanding of knowledge and ignorance? We analyzed the early development of children’s spontaneous references to knowing and not knowing and conclude that 2-year-olds talk explicitly and cogently about their own knowledge as well as that of an interlocutor. Two-year-olds also admit their own ignorance. Moreover, consistent with their realization that an informant may know what they do not, 2-year-olds ask many information-seeking questions. Finally, we discuss children’s receptivity and skepticism, especially toward the counterintuitive claims of an adult. We conclude that children’s conception of knowledge and ignorance begins early but undergoes protracted refinement.     

Guided by Intention: Preschoolers' Imitation Reflects Inferences of Causation

Object use is a ubiquitous characteristic of the human species, and learning how objects function is a fundamental part of development. In this article the authors examine the role that intentionality plays in children's understanding of causal relationships during observational learning of object use. Children observed demonstrations in which causally irrelevant and causally relevant actions were performed to achieve a desired goal. The intentionality of these actions was manipulated using verbal markers. Irrelevant actions were performed either intentionally (“There!”) or accidentally (“Whoops! I didn't mean to do that!”). Three-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, but not 2-year-olds, were less likely to imitate causally irrelevant actions performed accidentally than when they were performed intentionally. This suggests that older children used intentionality to guide causal inference and perceived intentional actions as causally effective and accidental actions as causally ineffective. Findings are discussed from an evolutionary perspective in relation to the cultural transmission of tool-use knowledge.     

College Students' Attitudes Toward Children's Nurturance and Self‐Determination Rights1

Increasing attention is being paid to children's rights issues in policy and law. However, there is little recent research examining adults’ attitudes toward children's rights. This is an important question given that children's rights are unlikely to be fulfilled if they are not supported by the adults involved in their lives. Attitudes toward nurturance and self‐determination rights were examined in 461 undergraduate students from the United States and Canada. Students were asked to think of a “target child” (8, 10, 12, 14, or 16 years) when answering the questions. Students strongly endorsed nurturance rights, but were generally unsupportive of children's rights to self‐determination. Canadians showed greater support for self‐determination than did Americans. In both groups, endorsement increased significantly with the age of the target child. Commenting on factors they considered when responding to the items, participants perceived children's rights as dependent on personal, interpersonal, and societal factors.     

An age-related dissociation between knowing rules and using them

Four experiments examined children's ability to use their knowledge to guide their behavior in a dimensional change (color-shape) card sort. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were told to sort cards first by one dimension (e.g., color: “Yellow ones go here; green ones go there”) and then by the other. The majority of 3-year-olds continued to use the preswitch rules on the postswitch phase, despite expressing knowledge of the postswitch rules by pointing to the appropriate location when asked about each rule. Experiment 2 found that this dissociation between knowledge and its use occurs even after a single preswitch trial. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that the dissociation also occurs when verbal rather than manual responses are required. Together, the findings indicate that knowing rules is sometimes insufficient to permit their use. According to the cognitive complexity and control theory, the growth of reflection between 3 and 5 years of age underlies increases in control over thought and action by allowing children to integrate incompatible pairs of rules into a single rule system.     

Children's memory for a personally experienced event: Implications for testimony

This study was prompted by an interest in children's abilities to testify in legal settings. Based on the fundamental premise that children cannot provide accurate testimony about events that cannot be remembered, this investigation focused on 3- and 6-year-olds' memory of a salient, personally experienced event. The event selected was that of a visit to the doctor for a physical examination. Children at both ages remembered most of the features of the check-up at an immediate memory test, although the older children performed somewhat better than younger children. In addition, the performance of the 3-year-olds decreased over delay intervals of 1 and 3 weeks, whereas that of the 6-year-olds remained constant over this period. Moreover, at all assessment points the older children provided more information in response to open-ended general questions than did the younger children. Both groups of children were quite good at giving accurate responses to misleading questions, although the 3-year-olds performed below the level of 6-year-olds. The need for further controlled studies of children's memory capabilities is discussed.     

“That Really Hurt,Charlie!” Investigating the Role of Sympathy and Moral Respect in Children's Aggressive Behavior

The authors examined the role of sympathy and moral respect in children's overt aggression, and the subtypes of proactive and reactive aggression, in an ethnically diverse sample of 5-, 7-, and 10-year-olds (N = 110). Aggressive behaviors were measured through teacher reports and peer nominations. Sympathy was assessed through teacher reports. Children reported on their moral respect within an interview procedure where they were asked for their feelings of respect toward hypothetical peers who displayed morally relevant behaviors. Results revealed that sympathy and moral respect were both negatively related to overt aggression and to the proactive aggression subtype, but unrelated to the reactive aggression subtype. The authors discuss the implications of the findings in relation to developmental research on the affective antecedents of children's aggressive behavior.     

Does the use of dolls facilitate children's memory of visits to the doctor?

Age differences in children's recall of salient experiences have frequently been documented, but these findings have routinely been based on studies in which verbal interviews have been employed. Because verbal interview protocols may underestimate the memory of young children, the purpose of this research was to compare the effectiveness of such an interview with two alternative protocols that involved the use of a doll. Using these contrasting protocols, 3-and 5-year-old children were asked to remember the details of a routine physical examination. Neither doll protocol facilitated 3-year-olds' recall of the features of the check-up. In contrast, 5-year-olds who were asked to demonstrate with a doll what happened in their examination showed enhanced recall. The inclusion of a doll had no effect on older or younger children's provision of elaborative detail about their visits to the doctor. Various measures of individual differences (e. g. temperament, language skill) predicted some aspects of the children's recall and elaboration. The findings are discussed in terms of the cognitive skills necessary for effective use of dolls in the assessment process, and are related to problems associated with interviewing young children who are involved in legal proceedings.     

Does drawing facilitate older children's reports of emotionally laden events?

Although it is well‐established that drawing about an event increases the amount of verbal information that young children provide during an interview, it is unclear whether drawing continues to facilitate children's reports as they get older. In the present experiment, 90 children, ranging from 5‐ to 12‐years old, were asked to draw and tell or to just tell about emotional events they had experienced. Children of all ages reported more information when asked to draw and tell rather than to tell only. Drawing had no negative effect on the accuracy of children's accounts. Drawing also increased the number of open‐ended questions and minimal responses that interviewers used. We conclude that drawing may be a useful tool in clinical and forensic settings with children of all ages; it increases the amount of information that children report and the number of appropriate questions that interviewers ask. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

My future self: Young children's ability to anticipate and explain future states

Two experiments examine preschool-aged children's ability to anticipate physiological states of the self. One hundred and eight 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were presented with stories and pictorial scenes designed to evoke thought about future states such as thirst, cold, and hunger. They were asked to imagine themselves in these scenarios and to choose one item from a set of three that they would need. Only one of the items could be used to address the future state. In both experiments, developmental differences were obtained for correct item choices and types of verbal explanations. In Experiment 2, the performance of the 3- and 4-year-olds was negatively affected by introducing items that were semantically associated with the scenarios but did not address the future state, whereas the 5-year-olds’ performance was not. Results are discussed with respect to children's understanding of the future, theory of mind, and inhibitory control skills.     

The Blicket Within: Preschoolers' Inferences About Insides and Causes

Four experiments examined children's inferences about the relation between objects' internal parts and their causal properties. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds recognized that objects with different internal parts had different causal properties, and those causal properties transferred if the internal part moved to another object. In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds made inferences from an object's internal parts to its causal properties without being given verbal labels for objects or being shown that insides and causal properties covaried. Experiment 3 found that 4-year-olds chose an object with the same internal part over one with the same external property when asked which object had the same causal property as the target (which had both the internal part and external property). Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that 4-year-olds made similar inferences from causal properties to internal parts, but 3-year-olds relied more on objects' external perceptual appearance. These results suggest that by the age of 4, children have developed an understanding of a relation between an artifact's internal parts and its causal properties.     

Selective,but Only if It Is Free: Children Trust Inaccurate Individuals More when Alternative Sources Are Costly

The present research examines the effect of the costliness of an information source on children's selective learning. In three experiments (total N = 112), 4‐ to 7‐year‐olds were given the opportunity to acquire and endorse information from one of two sources. One source, a computer, was described as always accurate; the other source, a puppet, had a history of either accuracy or inaccuracy. For some children, learning from the computer required giving away stickers. The costliness of the computer clue reduced children's use of this source across all experiments, but its effect on children's use of the puppet varied based on the puppet's accuracy and the type of information learned. Children's trust in the puppet was above chance regardless of the cost of the computer when they were learning generalizable semantic information and the puppet had a history of accuracy. When the puppet was inaccurate or when children learned episodic information, the costliness of the computer significantly increased children's trust in the puppet. Hence, attaching a cost to a preferred knowledge source reduces children's selectivity and increases their trust in sources that they would not otherwise see as desirable. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Keeping the reader's mind in mind: Development of perspective-taking in children's dictations

This study investigated when children can take the perspective of their reader if the information-processing demands of writing are removed by means of dictation to a scribe. Participants (N = 96) aged 5, 6 and 7 years dictated letters to an addressee who possessed requisite content knowledge, and then revised the letter or dictated a new letter to an addressee who lacked this knowledge (counterbalanced). Results showed that 19% of 5-year-olds, 41% of 6-year-olds, and 72% of 7-year-olds considered their reader's missing knowledge. Children's awareness of their reader's knowledge was neither related to performance on higher-order theory of mind tasks, nor to measures of executive function. Significantly greater perspective-taking was demonstrated in children's new letters than revised letters. However, although revision is considered a late-developing skill, half of even the 5-year-olds were able to make revisions (albeit few revisions demonstrated actual perspective-taking). Findings have significant implications for the emergent-literacy curriculum.     

Detecting children's true and false denials of wrongdoing: Effects of question type and base rate knowledge

One common and unfortunately overlooked obstacle to the detection of sexual abuse is non-disclosure by children. Non-disclosure in forensic interviews may be expressed via concealment in response to recall questions or via active denials in response to recognition (e.g., yes/no) questions. In two studies, we evaluated whether adults' ability to discern true and false denials of wrongdoing by children varied as a function of the types of interview question the children were asked. Results suggest that adults are not good at detecting deceptive denials of wrongdoing by children, even when the adults view children narrate their experiences in response to recall questions rather than provide one word answers to recognition questions. In Study 1, adults exhibited a consistent “truth bias,” leading them toward believing children, regardless of whether the children's denials were true or false. In Study 2, adults were given base-rate information about the occurrence of true and false denials (50% of each). The information eliminated the adults' truth bias but did not improve their overall detection accuracy, which still hovered near chance. Adults did, however, perceive children's denials as slightly more credible when they emerged in response to recall rather than recognition questions, especially when children were honestly denying wrongdoing. Results suggest the need for caution when evaluating adults' judgments of children's veracity when the children fail to disclose abuse.