Moving Beyond Computational Cognitivism: Understanding Intentionality,Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind

The emergence of the Cognitive Sciences, in the middle of the 20th Century, was initially based on an abstract model of the mind: the computer metaphor. The human mind was understood in analogy to the digital computer, as a rule-based, symbol processor. As a consequence, the human being was envisioned as logically-rationally guided, radically disembodied and isolated from culture. Over the last few decades, several disciplines, such as Biology, Mathematics, Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience, have begun to address the study of intentionality, intersubjectivity and natural cognition. Searching for a better understanding of these complex issues, a number of approaches have been developed with the promise of capturing the specific qualities of human cognition, radically omitted from a computationalist view of mind. Nevertheless, since these research programs are rather recent, concrete methodological designs and empirical approaches in the form of experimentally testable hypotheses are still scarce. This special issue brings together several perspectives in order to propose alternative research approaches in the topics of Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind. We believe it is necessary to discuss and advance towards explicit empirical frames in the form of actual experiments, specific predictions and formal models. The essays presented here constitute an attempt to move in this direction, with the specific aim of reconsidering the study of some forgotten properties of brain and mind.     

早期儿童关于图画与其所指物间关系的理解--利用两可图进行的考察

先前的研究表明,在3岁或更早儿童的观念中,二维图画与其所指物之间的关系是严格的一一对应的。本实验采用两可图对这一推断进行了检验,结果进一步证实了这一推断。实验还表明,儿童对二维图画的多重解释能力并不意味着一般意义上的心理理论的获得。数据显示,总体而言儿童对两可图的多重解释能力的形成时间稍早于完成错误信念任务能力的形成时间,但是尚不能确定两者之问是否有承继关系。     

意向性分析:从胡塞尔到塞尔

在当代西方哲学界,塞尔的意向性分析经常被认为在追随或重复胡塞尔的工作。塞尔本人固然不同意这样的说法,但如果对两人的意向性分析进行详细的对比考察,就会发现,塞尔的确在很多方面重复了胡塞尔的工作。不过,胡塞尔和塞尔的意向性分析在结论上的惊人相似掩饰不了其哲学方法上的根本差异:前者运用的是"先验还原"和"本质直观"的现象学方法,后者运用的是分析哲学的"逻辑分析"方法。将这两种根本不同的哲学方法,用于讨论同一个哲学问题,却可以得出大致相同的结论,这足以表明:现象学传统和分析哲学传统之间的关系完全可以是一种非竞争性的甚至是互补性的关系。     

Discussion: Application of Psychoanalytic Developmental Understanding to Three Early Intervention Programs

Discussion is made of the application of psychoanalytic developmental understanding to three early intervention programs. One program that was highly ambitious in its aim of preventing aggressive behavior in children attending elementary school was effective but may have attempted to achieve too much. One, involving an assistance program in a public school for boys who had lost their fathers, was extremely successful in helping the boys to express and deal with their feelings verbally rather than through undesirable behavior. The third program provided services for very young children that developmentally were extremely useful to them. Discussion is made of the value of these programs not only to the children involved but also to the teachers and mental health care personnel who worked with them.     

文本内容和图文顺序对图片理解的影响

给同一张图片配以两段不同内容的文本,并将文本与图片按照文先图后、图文同时、图先文后三种不同的顺序分别呈现给6组共90名大学生被试阅读,以考察被试对图片中不同涵义的理解效果。结果表明:1)文本内容效应显著。图片中与文本内容相关的涵义得到了更深的加工,与本文内容不相关的涵义得到了更少的加工。2)在对图片中与被试先前经验的自然预期相符的涵义的加工上,图文顺序与文本情境之间存在显著的交互作用;在对图片中非自然预期涵义的加工上,图文顺序与文本情境之间不存在显著的交互作用。     

The Power of Pictures: Vertical Picture Angles in Power Pictures

Conventional wisdom suggests that variations in vertical picture angle cause the subject to appear more powerful when depicted from below and less powerful when depicted from above. However, do the media actually use such associations to represent individual differences in power? We argue that the diverse perspectives of evolutionary, social learning, and embodiment theories all suggest that the association between verticality and power is relatively automatic and should, therefore, be visible in the portrayal of powerful and powerless individuals in the media. Four archival studies (with six samples) provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis and indicate that a salience power context reinforces this effect. In addition, two experimental studies confirm these effects for individuals producing media content. We discuss potential implications of this effect.     

Intentionality in Reference and Action

This essay asks whether there is a relation between action-serving and meaning-serving intentions. The idea that the intentions involved in meaning and action are nominally designated alike as intentionalities does not guarantee any special logical or conceptual connections between the intentionality of referential thoughts and thought-expressive speech acts with the intentionality of doing. The latter category is typified by overt physical actions in order to communicate by engaging in speech acts, but also includes at the origin of all artistic and symbolic expression such cerebral and linguistic doings as thinking propositional thoughts. There are exactly four possibilities by which meaning and action intentionalities might be related to be systematically investigated. Meaning-serving and action-serving intentionalities, topologically speaking, might exclude one another, partially overlap with one another, or subsume one in the other or the other in the one. The theoretical separation of the two ostensible categories of intendings is criticized, as is their partial overlap, in light of the proposal that thinking and artistic and symbolic expression are activities that favor the inclusion of paradigm meaning-serving intentions as among a larger domain of action-serving intentions. The only remaining alternative is then developed, of including action-serving intentions reductively in meaning-serving intentions, and is defended as offering in an unexpected way the most cogent universal reductive ontology in which the intentionality of doing generally relates to the specific intentionality of referring in thought to the objects of predications, and of its artistic and symbolic expression.     

小学中高年级儿童情绪理解力的特点研究

对640名小学中高年级儿童情绪理解力的测查表明,儿童能够理解抽象的情绪概念和简单的情绪词汇;会依赖表情、言语及副言语和身体动作线索识别他人的情绪;会依赖内部心理活动、表情和身体动作线索识别自己的情绪;儿童已理解情绪与事件/行为间的因果联系,对积极情绪事件/行为的理解具有社交性和亲社会性的特点,对消极情绪事件/行为的理解具有攻击性和破坏性的特点;在理解自己和他人情绪隐藏能力时存在明显差异。     

Living Being and Speaking Being: Toward a Dialogical Approach to Intentionality

One of the main goals of cognitive science is to shed light on human knowledge. This paper states that, if daily conversations, literature, and private thought, are proper expressions of human behavior, then cognitive sciences ought to elaborate a concept of knowledge suited to this kind of activities. I draw upon the notion of discourse in Bakhtin to specify the attributes of knowing needed to account for human behavior, whose manifestations in everyday life are not reduced to representing objects but essentially oriented toward responding to others. As a central aspect of knowledge, I focus on intentionality and offer a discussion about different aspects of it. Specifically, I examine the difference between intentionality as the faculty of representation (aboutness) and intentionality as the subjective positioning toward contextually relevant ideological perspectives (meaning).

Enough skill to kill: Intentionality judgments and the moral valence of action

Extant models of moral judgment assume that an action’s intentionality precedes assignments of blame. Knobe (2003b) challenged this fundamental order and proposed instead that the badness or blameworthiness of an action directs (and thus unduly biases) people’s intentionality judgments. His and other researchers’ studies suggested that blameworthy actions are considered intentional even when the agent lacks skill (e.g., killing somebody with a lucky shot) whereas equivalent neutral actions are not (e.g., luckily hitting a bull’s-eye). The present five studies offer an alternative account of these provocative findings. We suggest that people see the morally significant action examined in previous studies (killing) as accomplished by a basic action (pressing the trigger) for which an unskilled agent still has sufficient skill. Studies 1 through 3 show that when this basic action is performed unskillfully or is absent, people are far less likely to view the killing as intentional, demonstrating that intentionality judgments, even about immoral actions, are guided by skill information. Studies 4 and 5 further show that a neutral action such as hitting the bull’s-eye is more difficult than killing and that difficult actions are less often judged intentional. When difficulty is held constant, people’s intentionality judgments are fully responsive to skill information regardless of moral valence. The present studies thus speak against the hypothesis of a moral evaluation bias in intentionality judgments and instead document people’s sensitivity to subtle features of human action.     

Individual and Collective Intentionality: Elaborating the Fundamentality-Question

This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is more fundamental. I call it the fundamentality-question. In a first step, I argue that it is really two questions. One is about sense and one about reference. The first is: Can one grasp or understand the concept individual intentionality and, correspondingly, individuality, on the one hand, without grasping or understanding the concept collective intentionality and, correspondingly, collectivity, on the other? The second is: Can the concept individual intentionality and corresponding concept of individuality, on the one hand, refer to something without the concept of collective intentionality and corresponding concept of collectivity referring to something, on the other? Simplifying somewhat, this elaborated fundamentality-question admits of nine answers. In a second step, I pursue a tentative answer to the elaborated fundamentality-question. Given a disambiguation of individuality and, correspondingly, individual intentionality, the answer is the combination of claims that individuality and individual intentionality in one sense is fundamental in reference-dependence but that collectivity and collective intentionality is fundamental in reference-dependence in the other sense of individuality, while collectivity and collective intentionality is in both cases fundamental in sense-dependence.

     

Developmental Accounts of Intentionality: Toward Integration

A variety of developmental accounts of intentionality, arising from disparate theoretical perspectives, can now be found in the literature. This paper argues that this diversity is undermining the ability of developmental psychologists to construct a coherent developmental account of the capacity and that it would be more productive to pursue an integrated approach. To this end, the dominant theoretical positions on the development of intentionality are reviewed and evaluated: intentionality as goal-directedness, a result of parental scaffolding, an innate capacity for intersubjectivity, and behavioral object-directedness. Particular attention is given to comparing three key features of each position: the definition of intentionality adopted, the types of behaviors considered to be evidence of intentionality, and the proposed developmental sequence. The possibility of constructing an integrated approach based on these components is explored.     

Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach

In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of svasa[mdot]vitti (‘self-awareness’, ‘self-cognition’) following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, I argue that it is possible to read Dignāga's (and following him Dharmakīrti's) treatment of svasamvitti as offering something like a phenomenological account of embodied self-awareness.