Negative Stereotyping of Obesity in Children: The Role of Controllability Beliefs

This study investigated the extent of negative stereotyping of obesity (compared to negative stereotyping of height) in children and its relationship with the perception of obesity as controllable. Questionnaires measuring negative stereotyping and controllability beliefs about weight (and height) were completed by 96 children from Grades 4 to 6. Consistent negative stereotyping of obesity was found for both child and adult targets, regardless of the child's own gender, age, or weight, Likewise, children uniformly believed obesity to be largely under volitional control. The degree of controllability assigned to obesity was positively correlated with the extent of negative stereotyping. It was concluded that control beliefs may provide a vehicle for changing the strong negative attitudes displayed toward fat people.     

Social categories guide young children’s preferences for novel objects

To whom do children look when deciding on their own preferences? To address this question, 3‐year‐old children were asked to choose between objects or activities that were endorsed by unfamiliar people who differed in gender, race (White, Black), or age (child, adult). In Experiment 1, children demonstrated robust preferences for objects and activities endorsed by children of their own gender, but less consistent preferences for objects and activities endorsed by children of their own race. In Experiment 2, children selected objects and activities favored by people of their own gender and age. In neither study did most children acknowledge the influence of these social categories. These findings suggest that gender and age categories are encoded spontaneously and influence children’s preferences and choices. For young children, gender and age may be more powerful guides to preferences than race.     

The development of communication: When a bad model makes a good teacher

Five experiments were conducted on what 6-year-old children learn about communication by switching listener and speaker roles with competent and incompetent adults and peers. Experiment I demonstrated that children become better communicators to adults after listening to competent adults, competent peers, and incompetent peers, but not incompetent adults. The age of the listener was shown to have an effect in Experiment II, with children becoming less effective communicators when speaking to a peer after listening to an incompetent peer but better communicators when speaking to an adult after listening to an incompetent peer. Experiments III, IV, and V were designed to determine why children do not improve or deteriorate after listening to incompetent adults. It is not deficient memory: Children remember well the ambiguous messages of adults (Experiment IV). It is not implicit demands to be polite to an adult (Experiment III). It is that children think the ambiguous messages of an adult are competent (Experiment V). Mixing the authority and prestige of an adult with incompetent messages leads the child to ignore the adult's behavior as a standard for his or her own performance. These results suggest that social learning of communication skills might occur best when the child can learn what not to do by interacting with peers and what to do when interacting with adults.     

Gender stereotypes of parents with two-year-olds and beliefs about gender differences in behavior

A sample of British parents of two-year-olds was asked about gender-related adult roles, beliefs about gender differences in children's behavior, and whether they perceived their own child in terms of gender-specific behaviors. The majority of the children were perceived as conforming to gender stereotypes, and in particular, boys were seen this way by fathers. Parents cited as evidence behavior that corresponds closely to the content of adult sex role inventories. The parents were not positive about changes in the traditional gender-related work/child care division of labor.     

Planning in the preschool years: The emergence of plans from general event knowledge

A framework for conceptualizing the relationship between event knowledge and planning is proposed, and two experiments are reported that examined children's ability to draw on event knowledge in planning. Preschool children were asked to plan and execute shopping trips to a pretend grocery store. Half of the children planned for two events on successive trials (Level 1, single-goal planning) and half of the children planned for two events simultaneously (Level 2, multiple-event planning). The amount of external support for planning was also manipulated. In Experiment 1, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were presented with either a clustered or interleaved display. In Experiment 2, 3- and 4-year-olds were given adult assistance in plan construction. Results indicated that children's planning becomes more complex and flexible with age. Older children also rely less on external supports for planning. However, when external support was provided, 3- and 4-year-olds displayed higher-level planning abilities. Results are discussed in terms of the roles of event knowledge and external support in the early development of planning skills.     

Mothers' beliefs and children's long-term cognitive change: A developmental task interpretation

A longitudinal study was used to explore the following hypotheses concerning the relation between mothers' beliefs, their use of high distancing utterances and children's cognitive development: (1) beliefs moderate the impact of high-distancing utterances on children's development, and (2) beliefs reflect mothers' normative expectations that motivate themselves and their children to try to satisfy them. The participants consisted of 34 children and their mothers and teachers. Results for the motherchild dialogues indicated that the distancing–cognitive performance relationship was strongest for children whose mothers had the most positive beliefs. In addition, mothers' beliefs about a 4-year-old child were more strongly related to children's cognitive performance at ages 6 and 10 than to cognitive performance at age 4. Characteristics of both verbal parent–child and verbal teacher–child interactions at age 4 supported a developmental task interpretation of these findings.     

Children's differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion

Two experiments investigated children's implicit and explicit differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion. In Experiment 1, 8- to 9-year-olds' (n = 88) explicit understanding of the subjectivity of opinions was found to be limited, but their conformity to others' judgments on a matter of opinion was considerably lower than their conformity to others' views regarding an ambiguous fact. In Experiment 2, children aged 6, 8, or 10 years (n = 81) were asked to make judgments either about ambiguous matters of fact or about matters of opinion and then heard an opposing judgment from an expert. All age groups conformed to the opposing judgments on factual matters more than they did to the experts' views on matters of opinion. However, only the oldest children explicitly recognized that opinions are subjective and cannot be "wrong." Implications of these results for models of children's reasoning about epistemic states are discussed.     

The Role of Evidence Diversity and Explanation in 4- and 5-Year-Olds’ Resolution of Counterevidence

Three experiments examined whether 4- and 5-year-olds can explicitly revise uncertain beliefs in light of disconfirming evidence. We considered 2 factors that might influence belief revision: a) the type and variability of evidence provided, and b) whether children generated an explanation of their initial hypothesis. When provided with limited observed evidence, children revised their belief about their initial guess greater than chance expectations, but differences were not observed when the quality of the explanation was considered (Experiment 1). In a similar paradigm, children revised their beliefs more often than chance when asked to explain or describe their initial belief when shown more diverse counterevidence (Experiment 2) or when told that their initial belief was incorrect (Experiment 3). Overall, these data suggest that preschoolers have nascent capacities for explicit belief revision in light of counterevidence.     

Adult Attachment Styles, the Desire to Have Children, and Working Models of Parenthood

ABSTRACT College students who had yet to marry and begin a family were asked about their desire to have children and their beliefs and expectations about themselves as parents (Study 1) and the characteristics of their prospective children (Study 2). Persons with more avoidant and anxious-ambivalent models of close adult relationships harbored more negative models of parent-hood and parent-child relationships. These findings indicate that working models of parenting and parent-child relationships form well before marriage and the birth of children and that these models are systematically associated with attachment styles in adult relationships. The findings also suggest ways in which insecure attachments between child and parent may be influenced by the caregiver's models of parenting and parent-child relationships.     

Swedish Legal Professionals' Opinions on Child and Adult Witness Memory‐reporting Capabilities: Using the Method of Indirect Comparisons

Legal professionals' opinions about the memory abilities of child and adult witnesses are important in the legal process. We surveyed 266 legal professionals (Swedish police, prosecutors, and attorneys) and 33 lay judges about their beliefs about child and adult eyewitnesses' recall and metacognitive abilities. Prior research has usually asked for direct comparisons of children and adults but this may be rare in forensic practice. The respondents completed a story questionnaire (about a 9‐ or 45‐year‐old person witnessing an event), allowing indirect, or researcher‐made, comparisons. In contrast to previous research (direct comparisons), our participants mostly rated children and adults to be on an equal level, but within‐group consensus was low. Also, fairly few differences emerged between the groups' beliefs. Finally, the participants' opinions in our study were less in line with results from eyewitness research, compared with previous research using direct comparisons. Implications for legal and research practice are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social grooming in the kindergarten: the emergence of flattery behavior

The present study examined the emergence of flattery behavior in young children and factors that might affect whether and how it is displayed. Preschool children between the ages of 3 and 6 years were asked to rate drawings produced by either a present or absent adult stranger (Experiments 1 and 2), child stranger (Experiments 2 and 3), classmate, or the children's own teacher (Experiment 3). Young preschoolers gave consistent ratings to the same drawing by the person regardless of whether the person was absent or present. In contrast, many older preschoolers gave more flattering ratings to the drawing when the person was present than in the person's absence. Also, older preschoolers displayed flattery regardless of whether the recipient was an adult or a child. However, they displayed flattery to a greater extent towards familiar individuals than unfamiliar ones, demonstrating an emerging sensitivity to social contexts in which flattery is used. These findings suggest that preschoolers have already learned not to articulate bluntly their true feelings and thoughts about others. Rather, they are able to manipulate their communications according to social context.     

Early understanding of perception as a source of knowledge

Two studies investigated preschool children's ability to infer another person's knowledge or ignorance on the basis of that person's recent perceptual experience. In Experiment 1 children were questioned about their own and a puppet's knowledge of a hidden object's color and about their own and the puppet's ability to see the hidden object. Three- and 4-year-olds attributed knowledge and perceptual experience to the person (either themselves or the puppet) who had viewed the hidden object, but not to the person who did not view it. Experiment 2 further investigated 3-year-olds understanding of perception as a source of knowledge. Children were asked to indicate which of two puppets, one who had viewed a hidden object and one who had not, would be able to tell them the object's color. Children chose the correct puppet more often than would be predicted by chance. The results of these experiments suggest that understanding of perception as a source of knowledge is present by the age of 3 years.     

Young Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion

Abstract

In three experiments, children aged 3 to 7 years were tested for their understanding of the impact of beliefs and desires on emotion. Children watched while animal characters were offered various types of container and then predicted their emotional reaction. In Experiment 1, the children (but not the characters) knew that the desirable contents of each container had been removed. The majority of 6-year-olds and a minority of 4-year-olds understood that the characters would be happy with the gift, given their mistaken belief about its contents. In Experiment 2, characters were given containers apparently containing an object they wanted but really containing an object they did not want, or vice versa. Predictions of emotion based on both the desire and the mistaken belief of the characters increased with age. In Experiment 3, characters were given closed containers that might or might not contain an item they wanted. Both 3-and 5-year-olds grasped that the characters' emotional reaction would depend on both their (unconfirmed) beliefs and desires about its content.

The experiments show that preschool children deploy a theory-like conception of mind in predicting emotional reactions. They understand that the emotional impact of a situation depends not on its objective features but on the beliefs and desires that are brought to it.     

Children's beliefs about instances of mechanical and electrical causation

Two main questions were asked regarding young children's beliefs about causal mediation: What sorts of beliefs about causal mediation are reflected by children's incomplete explanations of causal situations? In particular, do children hold a false belief in action at a distance or do they realize that something must mediate between cause and effect? When presented with a non-visible connection between cause and effect (Experiment I), the children's incomplete (Piagetion Stage 1) explanations either reflected the correct expectation of a mediating connection or else merely reflected identification of the causal agent and no concern one way or another with the issue of causal mediation. This was also the case when the mediating connection was visible and present at the outset (Experiment II). In neither experiment (both of which involved mechanical causation) was there evidence of a false belief in action at a distance. A third experiment involved instances of electrical causation in order to maximize the chances of tapping a false belief. The rationale was that, in their everyday lives, although children do have first-hand experience with the mediating connection in instances of mechanical causation, they do not have such experience with instances of electrical causation. The results from the third experiment were analogous to the results in the other two. It was concluded that, with respect to instances of physical causality, young children do not hold a false belief (in action at a distance) that is later relinquished. Rather, their concerns are, at first, restricted to identifying the causal agent and do not include any beliefs, true or false, about the issue of causal mediation. When they eventually do deal with the question of causal mediation, children hold approximately correct beliefs. In terms of school situations, these findings suggest a shift from providing the child with disconfirming data that will aid him in relinquishing his false beliefs to providing him, instead, with additional data that will supplement his existing, approximately correct beliefs.     

The role of preschoolers' social understanding in evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions

Preschoolers use information from interventions, namely intentional actions, to make causal inferences. We asked whether children consider some interventions to be more informative than others based on two components of an actor’s knowledge state: whether an actor possesses causal knowledge, and whether an actor is allowed to use their knowledge in a given situation. Three- and four-year-olds saw a novel toy that activated in the presence of certain objects. Two actors, one knowledgeable about the toy and one ignorant, each tried to activate the toy with an object. In Experiment 1, either the actors chose objects or the child chose for them. In Experiment 2, the actors chose objects blindfolded. Objects were always placed on the toy simultaneously, and thus were equally associated with the effect. Preschoolers’ causal inferences favored the knowledgeable actor’s object only when he was allowed to choose it (Experiment 1). Thus, children consider both personal and situational constraints on knowledge when evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions.     

The natural emergence of reasoning about the afterlife as a developmental regularity

Participants were interviewed about the biological and psychological functioning of a dead agent. In Experiment 1, even 4- to 6-year-olds stated that biological processes ceased at death, although this trend was more apparent among 6- to 8-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 4- to 12-year-olds were asked about psychological functioning. The youngest children were equally likely to state that both cognitive and psychobiological states continued at death, whereas the oldest children were more likely to state that cognitive states continued. In Experiment 3, children and adults were asked about an array of psychological states. With the exception of preschoolers, who did not differentiate most of the psychological states, older children and adults were likely to attribute epistemic, emotional, and desire states to dead agents. These findings suggest that developmental mechanisms underlie intuitive accounts of dead agents' minds.     

Cognitive and contextual factors in the emergence of diverse belief systems: creation versus evolution

The emergence and distribution of beliefs about the origins of species is investigated in Christian fundamentalist and nonfundamentalist school communities, with participants matched by age, educational level, and locale. Children (n = 185) and mothers (n = 92) were questioned about animate, inanimate, and artifact origins, and children were asked about their interests and natural-history knowledge. Preadolescents, like their mothers, embraced the dominant beliefs of their community, creationist or evolutionist; 8- to 10-year-olds were exclusively creationist, regardless of community of origin; 5- to 7-year-olds in fundamentalist schools endorsed creationism, whereas nonfundamentalists endorsed mixed creationist and spontaneous generationist beliefs. Children's natural-history knowledge and religious interest predicted their evolutionist and creationist beliefs, respectively, independently of parent beliefs. It is argued that this divergent developmental pattern is optimally explained with a model of constructive interactionism: Children generate intuitive beliefs about origins, both natural and intentional, while communities privilege certain beliefs and inhibit others, thus engendering diverse belief systems.     

儿童心理状态推理中的观点偏差

采用知识状态推理和冲突愿望推理任务考察儿童对知识状态和愿望状态推理的偏差。被试为108名3~5岁的儿童,结果表明在知识状态推理任务中,儿童对别人知识状态的推理会受到自己知识状态的影响,表现出自我中心的特点;而在冲突愿望推理任务中,与自己喜欢的情况相比,较小年龄的儿童在自己不喜欢的条件下更容易正确推理别人的愿望,表现出不对称性。因此儿童在对心理状态进行推理时具体表现出什么样的特点具有情境依赖性