Why did I do that? Explaining actions activated outside of awareness

We review the latest research investigating how people explain their own actions when they have been activated nonconsciously. We will discuss evidence that when nonconsciously activated behavior is unexpected (e.g., norm- violating, against self -standards), negative affect arises and triggers confabulations aimed to explain the behavior. Nonconsciously activated behaviors may provide a window into everyday confabulation of (erroneous) explanations for behavior, which may also affect self-knowledge. Implications for self-concept formation and intentionality are discussed.     

Why Do Conceptual Analysts Disagree?

The practice of a priori conceptual analysis requires that the concept being analyzed be available in the analyst's mind. The difficulties of analysis and the existence of disagreements among analysts are explained by distinguishing the implicit knowledge we have of these concepts from the explicit knowledge we seek. This view of disagreement assumes that those who disagree are typically attempting to analyze a single shared concept. In this paper, reasons are developed for replacing this guiding assumption with the alternative assumption that members of a conceptual community often have similar, but not identical, concepts. Adopting this alternative requires that we rethink the nature and aims of conceptual analysis.     

Why do Qualia and the Mind Seem Nonphysical?

In this article, I discuss several of the factors that jeopardize our understanding of the nature of qualitative experiences and the mind. I incorporate the view from neuroscience to clarify the naïve view from the first person perspective. I suggest that the most misleading factor in the understanding the nature of the mind and conscious processes is the transparency of experiences and the imperceptibility of the neurobiological processes that realize them. Transparency reflects the biological advantages provided to organisms by avoiding the proliferation of superfluous sensing and the regress implied in sensing the sensors and analyzers ad infinitum. The downside of simplicity and the price for biological efficiency is that through introspection, we cannot perceive the inner workings of the brain. Thus, the view from the first person perspective creates the pervasive illusion that the mind is nonphysical. Sensing the environment requires encoding information into neural surrogates, which I conceive as contingent processes that when incorporated into conscious processes become qualitative experiences. They are cognitive shortcuts with a variable degree of isomorphism, which partially falsify reality. Thus, the what-it-is-like is not the what-it-is. The first person perspective seemings should be corrected by the objective approach provided by neuroscience. To compensate for the contingency of experiences, organisms learn to rely on the aboutness of associated phenomenal concepts. Experiences have high biological value, because even in the absence of language, they allow organisms to make intelligent choices. Qualia are also necessary to ground words and language, which are essential to develop higher forms of cognition.     

Why Do People Engage in Collective Action? Revisiting the Role of Perceived Effectiveness

Research has shown limited support for the notion that perceived effectiveness of collective action is a predictor of intentions to engage in collective action. One reason may be that effectiveness has been in terms of whether the action will influence key decision makers. We argue that the effectiveness of collective action might be judged by other criteria, such as whether it influences third parties, builds an oppositional movement, and expresses values. Two hundred and thirty one attendees at a rally rated the effectiveness of the rally and their intentions to engage in future collective action. For those participants who were not members of an organization, intentions were linked to the perceived effectiveness of the rally in expressing values and influencing the public. For those who were members of an organization, intentions were linked only to the effectiveness of the rally in building an oppositional movement.     

Why do fear and anger look the way they do? Form and social function in facial expressions

The origins of the appearances of anger and fear facial expressions are not well understood. The authors tested the hypothesis that such origins might lie in the expressions' resemblance to, respectively, mature and babyish faces in three studies. In Study 1, faces expressing anger and fear were judged to physically resemble mature and babyish faces. Study 2 indicated that characteristics associated specifically with babyishness are attributed to persons showing fear, whereas characteristics associated with maturity are attributed to persons showing anger. In Study 3, composite faces were used to minimize the possibility that the attributions were based on associations to the anger and fear emotions alone rather than to the physical resemblance of the expressions to static facial appearance cues. These results suggest that fear and anger expressions may serve socially adaptive purposes for those who show them, similar to the social adaptations associated with a babyish or mature facial appearance.     

Does Living in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction

Large samples of students in the Midwest and in Southern California rated satisfaction with life overall as well as with various aspects of life, for either themselves or someone similar to themselves in one of the two regions. Self-reported overall life satisfaction was the same in both regions, but participants who rated a similar other expected Californians to be more satisfied than Midwesterners. Climate-related aspects were rated as more important for someone living in another region than for someone in one's own region. Mediation analyses showed that satisfaction with climate and with cultural opportunities accounted for the higher overall life satisfaction predicted for Californians. Judgments of life satisfaction in a different location are susceptible to a focusing illusion: Easily observed and distinctive differences between locations are given more weight in such judgments than they will have in reality.     

Why did he do it? attribution of obedience and the phenomenon of dispositional bias

Two studies are reported which demonstrate the influence of perceptual or ‘perspective’ variables in mediating attribution processes. In both studies subjects first observed a re-enactment of Milgram's (1963) experiment of obedience in which a ‘teacher’ obeys an experimenter's request to deliver dangerously high levels of shock. They were then asked to make judgements concerning the magnitude of situational forces acting upon the teacher and also to make inferences about his personality dispositions. Study I showed that passage of time can lead observers to assume more situational control when they were required to think and write about the witnessed re-enactment of the Milgram situation compared with observers who had no time to contemplate or who were prevented from doing so. Study II did not support the notion that focus of attribution is a simple function of what one pays attention to, or a function of the differing perspectives which actors and observers employ. Both of these results seriously challenge Jones and Nisbett's (1972) contention that the differences in attribution tendencies between actors and observers arise from the difference in perspective, Moreover, considerable evidence suggests that changes in situational and dispositional attributions may not follow a simple ‘zero-sum’ model, and that subjects seem to be unwilling to treat the two sources of control as if they were inversely correlated.     

Why do the effects of delaying reinforcement in animals and delaying feedback in humans differ? A working-memory analysis

Animal research has shown that reinforcement is substantially less effective when it is delayed, but in studies of human motor learning delays in providing feedback typically have much less effect. One possible explanation is that in human research participants know the response to be learned and can thus focus on it during the delay; that is not the case in experiments on animals. We tested this hypothesis using a task in which participants had minimal information on what movement was correct and found that, as in animal experiments, participants learned only when feedback was immediate. A second experiment confirmed that the effects of the delay depended on how many responses had to be held in working memory: the greater the memory load, the poorer the learning. The results point to the importance of activity during a delay on learning; implications for the teaching of motor skills are discussed.     

Why do the effects of delaying reinforcement in animals and delaying feedback in humans differ? A working-memory analysis

Animal research has shown that reinforcement is substantially less effective when it is delayed, but in studies of human motor learning delays in providing feedback typically have much less effect. One possible explanation is that in human research participants know the response to be learned and can thus focus on it during the delay; that is not the case in experiments on animals. We tested this hypothesis using a task in which participants had minimal information on what movement was correct and found that, as in animal experiments, participants learned only when feedback was immediate. A second experiment confirmed that the effects of the delay depended on how many responses had to be held in working memory: the greater the memory load, the poorer the learning. The results point to the importance of activity during a delay on learning; implications for the teaching of motor skills are discussed.     

Why Do People Save? Attitudes to,and Habits of Saving Money in Britain

This study investigates the relationship between demographic (age, sex, education, vote, and income), psychological beliefs (alienation, Protestant Work Ethic, and conservatism), and attitudes toward, as well as habits of, saving money, in Britain. Over 250 people from a variety of backgrounds completed a number of standardized self-report measures. A factor analysis of the attitude toward saving scale revealed five clearly interpretable factors, which were later computed into five subscale scores. Analysis of variance showed that age and education most differentiated subjects' attitudes toward saving. A canonical correlational analysis showed age, vote, income, and alienation were clearly related to various attitude toward saving factors. Analysis of the saving habits questionnaire showed that sex, age, and income were among the most important discriminators of saving habits. These results are discussed in terms of economic socialization and various social policy decisions are considered.     

Reasonable Partiality and the Agent’s Point of View

It is argued that reasonable partiality allows an agent to attach value to particular objects of attachment via recognition of the value of the holding of that relation between agent and object. The reasonableness of partiality is ensured by a background context set by the agents virtues, notably justice. It is argued that reasonable partiality is the only view that is compatible with our best account of the nature of self-knowledge. That account rules out any instrumental relationship between moral demands and moral character, but that familiar claim is given an unfamiliar explanation. Instrumentality depends on a prior objectification of the self and it is that kind of objectification that, in the ethical case, represents a form of ethical evasion. Self-knowledge is transparent, incomplete and essentially connected with first person endorsement. The transparency condition is that knowledge of ones state of mind is taken transparently to its object. More specifically, ethical transparency is the feature that my virtues do not exhibit themselves to me in self-knowledge, but take me transparently to the way in which they saliently represent the world as containing evaluative properties calling for various forms of response. It is concluded that reasonable partiality grounded in the nature of the virtues is the only reflective account of morality compatible with the most plausible account of the nature of self-knowledge. The demands of impartiality are incompatible with a condition of having a personal point of view, namely, that a self can stand in a non-alienated relation to itself via its capacity for self-knowledge.     

Why do People Blame Victims of Abuse? The Role of Stereotypes of Women on Perceptions of Blame

Stereotyping research suggests that traditional women (e.g., housewives) are seen as warm and weak, whereas nontraditional women (e.g., career women) are seen as lacking warmth but competent. We expected a nontraditional female abuse victim to be perceived as less warm than a traditional victim, and thus be blamed more in an abuse scenario. In an experiment, 118 Midwestern United States college students read a marital conflict in which the husband perpetrated high levels of psychological abuse. The victim’s gender role and reaction to the abuse each were manipulated. As expected, when the victim was nontraditional or she reacted negatively to the abuse (e.g., yelled back), she was rated more negatively and blamed more due to her lack of warmth.     

Why do women opt out? Sense of belonging and women's representation in mathematics

Sense of belonging to math-one's feelings of membership and acceptance in the math domain-was established as a new and an important factor in the representation gap between males and females in math. First, a new scale of sense of belonging to math was created and validated, and was found to predict unique variance in college students' intent to pursue math in the future (Studies 1-2). Second, in a longitudinal study of calculus students (Study 3), students' perceptions of 2 factors in their math environment-the message that math ability is a fixed trait and the stereotype that women have less of this ability than men-worked together to erode women's, but not men's, sense of belonging in math. Their lowered sense of belonging, in turn, mediated women's desire to pursue math in the future and their math grades. Interestingly, the message that math ability could be acquired protected women from negative stereotypes, allowing them to maintain a high sense of belonging in math and the intention to pursue math in the future.     

Why Are Judgments Less Consistent in Less Predictable Task Situations?

Subjects made a series of six forecasts for each of four 58-point time-series. The stimulus series were noisy sinusoids of various frequencies. Individual subjects′ forecasts were regressed on to the time period for which they were made. The residual variance in these regressions was greater when the stimulus series were noisier. This effect cannot have arisen from memory overload because simultaneous presentation of all points in the stimulus series meant that there were no memory demands. It cannot have been a side effect of a learning process because presenting each series just once excluded opportunities for learning. It cannot have been caused by deterministic rule switching consequent on feedback about a noisy process because no feedback was presented. Instead it appears that subjects tried to simulate the noise as well as the pattern in the series when making their forecasts. In support of this, similar results were obtained in a second experiment in which subjects were asked to simulate rather than to forecast the series. Two possible reasons for subjects′ simulation of series noise are discussed.     

Why Do People Hurt Themselves?: New Insights Into the Nature and Functions of Self-Injury

ABSTRACT— Nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) is a prevalent but perplexing behavior problem in which people deliberately harm themselves without lethal intent. Research reveals that NSSI typically has its onset during early adolescence; most often involves cutting or carving the skin; and appears equally prevalent across sexes, ethnicities, and socioeconomic statuses. Less is known about why people engage in NSSI. This article presents a theoretical model of the development and maintenance of NSSI. Rather than a symptom of mental disorder, NSSI is conceptualized as a harmful behavior that can serve several intrapersonal (e.g., affect regulation) and interpersonal (e.g., help-seeking) functions. Risk of NSSI is increased by general factors that contribute to problems with affect regulation or interpersonal communication (e.g., childhood abuse) and by specific factors that influence the decision to use NSSI rather than some other behavior to serve these functions (e.g., social modeling). This model synthesizes research from several different areas of the literature and points toward several lines of research needed to further advance the understanding of why people hurt themselves.     

What do I Think of Others in Relation to Myself? Moral Identity and Moral Inclusion in Explaining Prejudice

The aim of this article is to analyze the effect of moral identity on prejudice in conjunction with moral inclusion/exclusion attitudes. In particular, the hypothesis is that even if high moral identity people tend to be less prejudicial than low moral identity people, this result can be explained with reference to moral inclusion/exclusion attitudes. A questionnaire was distributed to 192 Italian subjects. According to the hypothesis, results show that moral identity is negatively correlated with blatant prejudice, but that this effect is completely mediated by the perception of moral inclusion/exclusion with the other groups. These results suggest that it is not how morally you behave (symbolization), or the relevance you give to moral traits for your identity (internalization), that have an effect on prejudice, but rather it is who you include within the moral community within which moral values apply. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do people give? The role of identity in giving

Why do people give to others? One principal driver involves one's identity: who one is and how they view themselves. The degree to which identities are malleable, involve a readiness to act, and help make sense of the world have significant implications determining whether and how much people give. Drawing on the Identity-Based Motivation model (IBM; Oyserman, D. (2009). Identity-based motivation: Implications for action-readiness, procedural-readiness, and consumer behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19.), we provide a tripartite framework to help advance the research on the psychology of giving.     

The More the Better? Effects of Training,Experience and Information Amount in Legal Judgments

In an experimental study involving German lay judges, law students and controls, effects of legal training and experience as well as information amount on legal judgments was investigated. In a three (legal knowledge: legal training versus legal experience versus controls) x two (information amount: high versus low) between‐subjects design, 137 participants judged the premeditation of a perpetrator in eight real‐world cases decided by the German Federal Court of Justice. Judgment congruency with the Court's ruling increased with legal training, but official lay judges showed lower congruency compared with student controls. Additionally, legal training and experience corresponded with higher confidence. Emotional reactions to the legal cases were stronger when more information was given for individuals without legal training but decreased for individuals with training. An information‐processing perspective to explain the observed differences in legal judgments is advanced, and the issue of using untrained individuals in the legal decision making process is discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.