Understanding Brute Facts

Brute facts are facts that have no explanation. If we come to know that a fact is brute, we obviously don’t get an explanation of that fact. Nevertheless, we do make some sort of epistemic gain. In this essay, I give an account of that epistemic gain, and suggest that the idea of brute facts allows us to distinguish between the notion of explanation and the notion of understanding.I also discuss Eric Barnes’ (1994) attack on Friedman’s (1974) version of the unification theory of explanation. The unification theory asserts that scientific understanding results from minimizing the number of brute facts that we have to accept in our view of the world. Barnes claims that the unification theory cannot do justice to the notion of being a brute fact, because it implies that brute facts are gaps in our understanding of the world. I defend Friedman’s theory against Barnes’ critique.     

灵魂何在

存在于世界上的一切事物,包括所有生物,毫无例外都是以物质为基础的.整个宇宙也是物质的,在我们的星球之外,如果还有其他生命形式存在,也必然是物质的.     

Do Brute Facts Need to Be Civilised? Universals in Classical Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Analytic Ontology

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - A vital point of dispute within both classical Indian thought and contemporary analytic ontology is the following: which facts are brute so...     

How Morality Can Be Absent from Moral Arguments

What is a moral argument? A straightforward answer is that a moral argument is an argument dealing with moral issues, such as the permissibility of killing in certain circumstances. I call this the thin sense of ‘moral argument’. Arguments that we find in normative and applied ethics are almost invariably moral in this sense. However, they often fail to be moral in other respects. In this article, I discuss four ways in which morality can be absent from moral arguments in the thin sense. If these arguments suffer from an absence of morality in at least one of these ways, they are not moral arguments in what I will call the thick sense of ‘moral argument’. Because only moral arguments in the thick sense could possibly qualify as proper responses to moral problems, the absence of morality in thin arguments means that these arguments will fail to give us a reason to do whatever they claim that we ought to do, even if we see no independent reason to question the truth of the premises or the logical validity of the argument.     

Can Consequentialism Be Reconciled with Our Common-Sense Moral Intuitions?

Philosophical Studies -     

You Can Get Here From There

This paper is a review of my development from psychology intern and research assistant to the psychoanalytic tester and theoretician David Rapaport at the Menninger Clinic in the 1940s, through my career in psychological testing, my psychoanalytic training in the Western New England Institute, and my working successively at the Austen Riggs Center, Yale Department of Psychiatry, Yale Student Mental Health Center, Cornell Department of Psychiatry, and eventually private practice in New York City. During this period, I rose to the academic rank of Professor and the analytic position of Training Analyst. I have written extensively: first on testing, then more or less in turn on psychoanalytic ego psychology, action language for psychoanalysis, feminist issues, narrative in psychoanalysis, and the contemporary Kleinians of London. This memoir traces the intellectual continuity that characterizes these writings and my continuing development as a psycho-analyst—my first ambition and great love.     

You Can Get Here From There

We introduce 3 studies of the empirical correlates of the MMPI–2 Restructured Clinical (RC) Scales: a study by Arbisi, Sellbom, and Ben-Porath (2008/this issue) that expands the range of correlates of the RC scale in mental health settings; an investigation by Sellbom, Ben-Porath, Baum, Erez, and Gregory (2008/this issue) of the empirical correlates of the scales in a forensic setting; and a study by Forbey and Ben-Porath (2008/this issue) examining convergent and discriminant validities of the RC scale in a nonclinical setting. To serve as a general introduction to the 3 new empirical studies presented in this special section, we begin with a review of the existing literature on the RC scales and briefly describe these studies.     

为什么要有道德

"为什么要有道德"是伦理学的基本问题.这个问题可以分为社会为什么要有道德和个人为什么要有道德.经过分析我们发现,后面一个问题原来是无解的.这样,与其追问有道德的目的不如探究有道德的原因,以及有道德的后果,这些都有助于我们重新思考道德教育和道德进步.