Gibbard on meaning and normativity

The paper is a critique of Allan Gibbard’s impressively crafted monograph Meaning and Normativity. The book relies on a subtle form of logical empiricism, developing a normative verificationist semantics within a subjective Bayesian framework. I argue that the resulting account of synonymy is too fine-grained, since it counts clearly synonymous words in different languages as non-synonymous. For similar reasons, Gibbard’s account of analytic implication relies on postulating untenable connections between semantics and epistemology. I conclude that one of the main obstacles to robust realism about normativity and morality, the supposed conceptual connections between normative language and action, is a myth.     

Two kinds of a priori infallibility

On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, while Burge (1986, 1988, 1996) and Lewis (1996) have recently affirmed the a priori infallibility of some category (ii) propositions. In this paper, I take aim at rationalist infallibilism by calling into question the a priori infallibility of both analytic and synthetic propositions. The upshot will be twofold: first, rationalist infallibilism unsurprisingly emerges as a defective epistemological doctrine, and second, more importantly, the case for the a priori infallibility of one or both categories of propositions turns out to lack cogency.     

Li Zehou and Moritz Schlick on the Roots of Beauty

Beginning from the Enlightenment view that beauty or art is ＂useless,＂ the attempts to explain how aesthetic experience and judgment are possible presented by Moritz Schlick and Li Zehou are examined, compared and contrasted. The paper treats three main subjects, the anthropological origins of beauty, the origins of aesthetic judgments and the problem of the purpose or function of beauty or aesthetic experience. In the first--the historical-causal roots of beauty--the problem discussed is how to account for aesthetics in light of the practical needs and pursuits of human beings. For Schlick, the problem is couched in terms of how aesthetic experience can be made consistent with natural selection. The second main subject-the philosophical roots of beauty-is a discussion of the origin in the sense of justification of aesthetic judgments. And the third examines the problem of assigning some purpose to aesthetic feelings and attitudes. An apparent contrast is made, and perhaps resolved, between the respective views of Schlick and Li.     

On Brentano's objections to Kant's theory of knowledge

The main purpose of this essay is to examine Brentano's rejection of Kant's theory of a priori concepts and synthetic a priori judgments. The essay begins by recalling the views of Descartes and Locke about the acquisition of knowledge, since Brentano regards them as on the whole correct or, at least, as pointing in the right direction and since he regards Kant's epistemology as obscurantist and reactionary (Section 1). There follows a brief characterization of Brentano's conception of knowledge as based on self-evident inner perception and analytic propositions, i.e. propositions which are true ex terminis (Section 2). Next some aspects of Kant's epistemology are compared with corresponding features of Brentano's doctrine (Section 3). In the light of this comparison the validity of Brentano's criticisms is examined (Section 4). In conclusion an independent view of the function of concepts and of their relation to perception is briefly outlined and contrasted with the views of Kant and Brentano (Section 5).     

Merleau-Ponty's Modification of Phenomenology: Cognition,Passion and Philosophy

This paper problematizes the analogy that Hubert Dreyfus has presented between phenomenology and cognitive science. It argues that Dreyfus presents Merleau-Ponty's modification of Husserl's phenomenology in a misleading way. He ignores the idea of philosophy as a radical interrogation and self-responsibility that stems from Husserl's work and recurs in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. The paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the phenomenological reduction. It shows that his critical idea was not to restrict the scope of Husserl's reductions but to study the conditions of possibility for the thetic acts. Merleau-Ponty argued, following Husserl's texts, that the thetic acts rest on the basis of primordial pre-thetic experience. This layer of experience cannot, by its nature, be explicated or clarified, but it can be questioned and unveiled. This is the recurrent task of phenomenological philosophy, as Merleau-Ponty understands it.     

Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the natural attitude

In this paper I will give a systematic account of Husserl's notion of the natural attitude in the development from its first presentation in Ideas I (1913) until Husserl's last years. The problem of the natural attitude has to be dealt with on two levels. On the thematic level, it is constituted by the correlation of attitude and horizon, both stemming from Husserl's theory of intentionality. On the methodic level, the natural attitude is constituted by three factors: naturalness, naivety and normality. I shall conclude by sketching out a possible motivation for leaving the natural attitude and thus for entering the sphere of phenomenology.     

A Realist Analysis of the Relationship between Logic and Experience

I undertake to explain how the well known laws of formal logic – Barbara Syllogism, modus ponens, etc. – relate to experience by developing Edmund Husserl's critique ofFormalism and Psychologism in logical theory and then briefly explaining his positive views of the laws of logic. His view rests upon his understanding of the proposition as a complex, intentional property. The laws of formal logic are, on his view (and mine), statements about the truth values of propositions as determined by their formal character and relationships alone. The laws thus understood explain how algorithms set up to mirror them can accomplish what they do to advance knowledge, even though they operate purely mechanically. Further, they explain the proper sense in which formal laws "govern," and may guide, processes of actual thinking. Husserl's theory is a realist theory in the sense that, on his interpretation, the laws of pure or formal logic hold true regardless of what any individual, culture or species may or may not think, or even if no thinking ever occurs. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

On the Rationality of our Response to Testimony

The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the testifier's character and the truth of the proposition testified to. These beliefs provide reasons for our responses. Thus, we usually do have reasons, in the sense of propositions believed, for accepting testimony and these reasons can provide evidence for the testimonial beliefs we form.     

Repugnant Accuracy

Accuracy‐first epistemology is an approach to formal epistemology which takes accuracy to be a measure of epistemic utility and attempts to vindicate norms of epistemic rationality by showing how conformity with them is beneficial. If accuracy‐first epistemology can actually vindicate any epistemic norms, it must adopt a plausible account of epistemic value. Any such account must avoid the epistemic version of Derek Parfit's “repugnant conclusion.” I argue that the only plausible way of doing so is to say that accurate credences in certain propositions have no, or almost no, epistemic value. I prove that this is incompatible with standard accuracy‐first arguments for probabilism, and argue that there is no way for accuracy‐first epistemology to show that all credences of all agents should be coherent.     

Reflective minds and open hearts: Cognitive style and personality predict religiosity and spiritual thinking in a community sample

We examined associations between two psychological constructs, analytic cognitive style and the personality facet ‘Openness to Experience’, and several dimensions of religiosity: religious affiliation, strength of faith and spiritual epistemology. In a relatively large (N = 1093), older community sample (M = 55.4 years), analytic cognitive style was associated with a lower probability of affiliating with a religious denomination and a higher probability of possessing strong religious faith. Overall, openness was also associated with a lack of religious affiliation but was positively related to possessing a spiritual epistemology. A path‐analytic model revealed that openness had a positive relationship to both faith and religious denomination that was mediated by spiritual epistemology, but negative direct relationships with religiosity after the meditational effects were taken into account. Taken together, these results extend previous findings on the effect of cognitive style on religiosity and provide a new perspective on the complex relationship between cognitive and personality factors and different dimensions of religiosity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tales from an apostate

Here I outline an often under‐appreciated position within Anglo‐analytic epistemology, that of the apostate to operative metaphilosophical constraints. To help identify and promote awareness of metaphilosophical apostacy, here, I describe the form of metaphilosophical apostacy that I practice in Anglo‐analytic epistemology (AAE). My apostasy with respect to AAE begins with significant, metaphilosophical divergences or deep senses of incongruence. A metaphilosophical divergence, on my account, refers to conflict at the level of inquiry‐shaping assumptions, constraints, aims, and/or commitments. In this paper, I claim that one way metaphilosophical apostasy emerges in Anglo‐analytic epistemology is when inquiry‐shaping divergences lead to conceptual indifference. Conceptual indifference, on my account, refers to disinterest that can follow from divergent metaphilosophical and/or aspirational aims and goals for one's favored investigations. To be clear, this is a paper for the growing population of epistemologists who find operative metaphilosophical constraints in AAE ill‐fitting.     

Hope as an Intellectual Virtue?

Hope is a ubiquitous feature of human experience, but there has been relatively little scholarship within contemporary analytic philosophy devoted to the systematic analysis of its nature and value. In the last decade, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of hope and, in particular, its role in human agency. This scholarly attention reflects an ambivalence about hope's effects. While the possession of hope can have salutary consequences, it can also make the agent vulnerable to certain kinds of personal risk. The pervasiveness of hope is not a sign of its quality; only a well‐tuned hope can be a virtue. Recently, Nancy Snow has argued that hope can be an intellectual virtue. Framing her account as a contribution to regulative epistemology, she contends that the intellectual virtue of hope can (i) motivate the pursuit of important epistemic ends, (ii) create dispositions that enable the successful pursuit of these aims, and (iii) generate a method for enduring intellectual projects. In this paper, I provide a critical appraisal of Snow's account of hope as an intellectual virtue. One important implication of this critique is that hope can function as an intellectual virtue only to the extent that it has benefitted from the correcting and perfecting influence of other cognitive excellences.     

Concerning Paul Edwards' “Heidegger on Death”: A Criticism

For Husserl, noetics is the most fundamental science and the centrepiece of a phenomenological epistemology. Since in his major works Husserl does not develop noetics systematically but uses its main ideas and achievements often in apparent isolation without clarifying their systematic unity, the significance of noetics is often overlooked. Although Husserl has repeatedly stressed the importance of a phenomenological epistemology, what the concrete theses of such an undertaking are supposed to be often remains obscure. We shall see that the best way to clarify this is by providing a detailed account of Husserl’s noetics as it is developed in Husserl’s lecture courses “Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge” (1906/07) and “Logic and General Theory of Science” (1917/18). This is the main aim of the present paper. We will shed light on the significance, systematic unity, and concrete theses of noetics. Furthermore, I shall show in what way the main theses of noetics are present in Husserl’s other works, even if the term noetics does not even occur. Finally, we will see that some basic ideas of Husserl’s noetics play an important role in current analytic epistemology and we will indicate how a phenomenological epistemology could enrich current debates.     

Epicureans and Stoics on the Rationality of Perception

This paper examines an ancient debate over the rationality of perception. What leads the Stoics to affirm, and the Epicureans to deny, that to form a sense-impression is an activity of reason? The answer, we argue, lies in a disagreement over what is required for epistemic success. For the Stoics, epistemic success consists in believing the right propositions, and only rational states, in virtue of their predicational structure, put us in touch with propositions. Since they identify some sense-impressions as criteria of truth and thus as the basis for epistemic success, the Stoics maintain that sense-impressions must be rational. The Epicureans agree with the Stoics that sense-impressions function as criteria of truth, and also agree broadly on what it means for a state to be rational, but deny that sense-impressions are rational because (1) they think that epistemic success must be supported by a state that is necessarily error-free and (2) accept that rational states can be false. In reconstructing this debate, we refine the standard interpretation of the fundamental difference between Epicurean and Stoic epistemology and also develop parallels with epistemological debates today. One upshot is a more nuanced appreciation of the merits of Epicurean epistemology vis-à-vis the Stoics.     

The Normative Resources of Kierkegaard's Subjectivity Principle

Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle is a critique of modern epistemology that remains normative. These norms result from analysis of subjectivity in terms of its reflexive and constitutional elements. Kierkegaard's epistemology is intrinsically theological and explicates human subjectivity in terms of Christian doctrinal concepts such as revelation, sin and atonement. Here the superiority of Christianity is located not in its propositions as such, but in a way of being that effectuates a certain propositional understanding of the world as it establishes the ground for human subjectivity.     

Hinge Contextualisma

The paper explores a possible connection between epistemic contextualism and hinge epistemology. My basic idea is that Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions play a possibility-governing role, in the sense that they govern our knowledge attributions by determining which possibilities count as relevant alternatives. This is a novel proposal with several theoretical advantages for both hinge epistemology and epistemic contextualism. On the one hand, in order to offer a substantial account of the way in which knowledge attributions work, the contextualist needs more than mere formal tools. She needs to tell us what goes inside the contexts that govern our conversations. On the other hand, the hinge epistemologist cannot be satisfied by mere metaphors (like the hinge metaphor). She needs to tell us how hinges can effectively govern our conversations. I take hinge contextualism to be the answer. With the help of hinges, we can furnish contexts; and with the help of contexts, we can put hinges to work.     

On the scientific standing of psychoanalysis

This paper speaks for the claim that psychoanalysis qualifies as a scientific enterprise. It will derive from the conceptual and evidential structure of psychoanalysis a causal empirical hypothesis that admits of scientific intraclinical testing. Relevant topics from the philosophy of science (especially the nature of causal explanation and the work of Grünbaum) and the psychoanalytic theories of pathogenesis and therapeutic action are discussed in a preliminary way to create a framework for the demonstration. The dynamic unconscious is examined as the core causal concept of psychoanalysis. Taken together with an account of the structure of the mental apparatus, a coherent picture of mental causation (the propagation of an unconscious impulse) comes into view. This leads to the formulation of a set of clinical propositions that unite to generate a causal empirical hypothesis based solely on data from the analytic setting--namely, that the transferences and symptoms that appear in free association in the analytic situation possess an interrelational structure that is theoretically implied and can be statistically confirmed.