Procedural Justice and Sanctions in Social Dilemmas: The Moderating Effects of Group Feedback and Identification

An experimental study investigated the role of sanctioning systems in shaping individual contributions in step‐level public good dilemmas. It was predicted and found that procedural justice of the sanctioning system (i.e., accurate vs. inaccurate evaluations of contributions) influenced contributions. Specifically, when group members identified strongly with the group, procedural justice exerted influence only when the group failed in establishing the public good. In contrast, when group members did not identify strongly with the group, procedural justice of the sanction only exerted influence if the group succeeded. These findings suggest that integrating the social dilemma and procedural justice literature may be beneficial for understanding the conditions that determine the effectiveness of sanctioning systems.     

Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments about moral dilemmas

We report the results of two experiments that show that participants rely on both emotion and reason in moral judgments. Experiment 1 showed that when participants were primed to communicate feelings, they provided emotive justifications not only for personal dilemmas, e.g., pushing a man from a bridge that will result in his death but save the lives of five others, but also for impersonal dilemmas, e.g., hitting a switch on a runaway train that will result in the death of one man but save the lives of five others; when they were primed to communicate thoughts, they provided non-emotive justifications for both personal and impersonal dilemmas. Experiment 2 showed that participants read about a protagonist's emotions more quickly when the protagonist was faced with a personal dilemma than an impersonal one, but they read about the protagonist's decision to act or not act equally quickly for personal and impersonal dilemmas.     

惩罚和社会价值取向对公共物品两难中人际信任与合作行为的影响

通过两个计算机情境模拟实验, 采用“取消惩罚”范式, 引入社会价值取向变量, 发现惩罚对人际信任和合作行为具有消极影响, 具体表现为当惩罚取消后, 经历过惩罚的被试的人际信任水平显著低于无惩罚条件被试的水平。惩罚对博弈者合作行为的影响在社会价值取向不同的博弈者之间存在显著差异：经历过惩罚的亲社会型被试在惩罚取消阶段的合作程度显著低于惩罚存在阶段的合作程度, 并且显著低于无惩罚条件被试的相应水平。惩罚通过亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平对合作程度产生间接负效应, 即惩罚程度越强, 亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平越低, 进而使其合作程度也下降。     

The give-or-take-some dilemma: An empirical investigation of a hybrid social dilemma

We describe and empirically investigate a hybrid social dilemma that merges give-some and take-some dilemmas by allowing individuals to choose to either give or to take resources from a shared resource pool. Study 1 finds that (a) group size increases the inequality among group members and the likelihood of creating the public good, while reducing the amount of wasted resources; (b) larger bonuses increase provision rates; and (c) asymmetry in the wealth distribution of the group members induces higher levels of inequality of the final outcomes. Following the logic of appropriateness, players with high (low) endowments were more likely to give toward (take from) the shared resource. Study 2 finds that the tendency of the players with high (low) endowments to give (take) is amplified as the difference between endowment levels increased, and the players’ behavior is correlated with, and predictable from, independent judgments of what is perceived as appropriate.     

When emotions of others affect decisions in public good dilemmas: An instrumental view

The present research examines whether the emotional display (i.e. anger vs. guilt) of another group member affects people's decision‐making in a public good dilemma. In two experiments we investigated whether the expressed emotion is particularly informative when communicated by a group member who is highly instrumental in reaching the provision point. A first experiment demonstrated that participants were more likely to exit the group when anger as opposed to guilt was communicated, but especially when the group member displaying the emotion was able to contribute many endowments to the public good. Expected justice (based on past inferences) in the group mediated this effect, suggesting that communicated anger signals more than guilt that the group will not set out to achieve fairness. In agreement with this, a second experiment showed that when it was not possible to exit the group, participants preferred to install a democratic leader more when a wealthy group member communicated anger as opposed to guilt. Additionally, this study provided experimental evidence that a communicated emotion is only used for subsequent decision‐making when more explicit information (i.e. a promise to contribute) is absent. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

社会困境中同伴行为、合作信念对合作变化的影响

本研究采用连续式公共物品困境,考察不同类型的个体在同伴遵守和违反均等规范两种条件下合作的前后变化及其可能的机制。结果发现：（1）依据行为决策对被试进行的分类与其社会价值取向之间不存在相关;（2）一人违反均等条件下被试的合作水平高于多人违反均等条件下的合作水平;（3）高贡献者在前后两次互动中维持较高的合作水平和信念水平;（4）低贡献者第二次决策时比第一次决策时更合作,这可能是由于他们的合作信念提高。     

财富越多，责任越大：资金数量和来源对公共物品困境中第三方惩罚的影响

本研究探讨了公共物品困境中,初始资金的数量和来源如何影响第三方对成员贡献值的评价及惩罚。行为结果发现了“贵族责任效应”,即在同等贡献值条件下,相比于获得较少初始资金的成员,第三方会更重地惩罚获得较多初始资金的成员。当初始资金是随机分配而非通过个人努力获得时,该效应更强。在神经层面上,发现初始资金的数量和来源调节了第三方评估贡献值时所诱发的FRN和P3成分。其中FRN波幅与惩罚力度显著相关。本研究揭示了初始资金数量和来源如何调节第三方对成员贡献的评估及相关惩罚决策。     

Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas

Sanctioning systems in social dilemmas are often meant to increase trust in others and to increase cooperation. We argue, however, that sanctioning systems may also give people the idea that others act in their own self-interest and undermine the belief that others are internally motivated to cooperate. We developed the “Removing The Sanction” paradigm and a new trust manipulation, and showed in three experiments that when there is a sanction on defection, trust in others being internally motivated to cooperate is undermined: Participants who had experienced the presence of a sanctioning system trusted fellow group members less than participants who had not. In a similar vein, the sanction undermined cooperation when trust was initially high. The implications of these paradoxical findings are discussed.     

The effect of decision timing on the willingness to costly reward cooperation and punish noncooperation: Sanctioning the past,the present,or the future

Numerous studies have demonstrated that sanctions can promote cooperation. However, it is important to know not only that sanctions can work but also under what conditions people are actually willing to sanction cooperation positively (i.e., reward) or noncooperation negatively (i.e., punish). In this article, we demonstrate that people use sanctions less often and sanction more mildly when they decide about sanctioning before (instead of after) the occurrence of others' (non)cooperation (Experiments 1 and 2), regardless of whether they decide directly afterwards or after a time delay (Experiment 2). Moreover, we reveal that beforehand (as compared with afterwards) people have not yet formed clear sanctioning preferences (Experiment 3). These findings corroborate our reasoning that the decision environment beforehand induces nonconsequential reasoning and thereby hampers people's willingness to sanction. We discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of our work.     

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma-where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma- where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

Beyond egoism and group identity: empathy toward the other and awareness of others in a social dilemma

In three experiments, participants were faced with a social dilemma in which they could benefit themselves, the group, or other group members as individuals. The results showed that participants who felt high empathy toward a certain individual allocated more resources to the target of empathy, but without reducing the collective good. Then, we adapted the measure of empathy developed by Batson and colleagues (Batson, Ahmad, et al., 1999; Batson, Batson, et al., 1995) to the Spanish context. The results of Experiment 3 supported the existence of a new process: awareness of other individuals present in the social dilemma. It is proposed that this process is independent of those typically studied in research of this field: self-interest, group identification, and the empathy for a specific individual.     

Decision-induced focusing in social dilemmas: give-some, keep-some, take-some, and leave-some dilemmas

Previous research on asymmetric social dilemmas has suggested that public good dilemmas evoke different choice behaviors than do resource dilemmas. The authors propose that these differences reflect a differential focus that is dependent on the way decisions are generally presented in the dilemma types. In agreement with this, the results of 2 experimental studies suggest that, in public good dilemmas, group members are less focused on the consequences of their actions for the final outcome distribution when deciding how many endowments they give to the public good than when deciding how many endowments they keep for themselves. In resource dilemmas, group members are less focused on the final outcome distribution when deciding how many endowments they leave in the collective resource than when deciding how many endowments they take.     

Thinking about memories for everyday and shocking events: Do people use ease-of-retrieval cues in memory judgments?

Extant research shows that people use retrieval ease, a feeling-based cue, to judge how well they remember life periods. Extending this approach, we investigated the role of retrieval ease in memory judgments for single events. In Experiment 1, participants who were asked to recall many memories of an everyday event (New Year's Eve) rated retrieval as more difficult and judged their memory as worse than did participants asked to recall only a few memories. In Experiment 2, this ease-of-retrieval effect was found to interact with the shocking character of the remembered event: There was no effect when the event was highly shocking (i.e., learning about the attacks of September 11, 2001), whereas an effect was found when the event was experienced as less shocking (due either to increased distance to "9/11" or to the nonshocking nature of the event itself). Memory vividness accounted for additional variance in memory judgments, indicating an independent contribution of content-based cues in judgments of event memories.     

Impact of perceived value on casual mobile game loyalty: The moderating effect of intensity of playing

The retention rate of mobile game players is one of the subjects that spark most interest in the industry, as many abandon the games only a few hours after downloading them. This study examines the antecedents of loyalty towards mobile games from the perspective of perceived value and explores the moderating effect of intensity of playing. The results revealed that hedonic value (i.e., perceived enjoyment and perceived attractiveness) and, to a lesser extent, utilitarian value (i.e., effort expectancy and perceived usefulness) are crucial in the loyalty that players feel towards mobile games. Intensity of playing weakens the relationship between perceived usefulness, perceived enjoyment and loyalty intention. Based on the findings, theoretical and practical implications are provided.     

Sex differences in restoring justice: The down payment effect

It was proposed that harmdoers who psychologically suffer (e.g., experience remorse, guilt) through victimizing another will be viewed as having already taken a step toward righting the injustice caused the victim. Consequently, they should be asked to make fewer reparations and assigned a lesser fine than those harmdoers who do not express guilt or remorse. Male and female subjects read scenarios depicting an accident in which the harmdoer either admitted or did not admit responsibility (Experiment 1) or expressed various degrees of remorsefulness (Experiment 3). Both investigations indicated that a show of remorse or of a remorseful gesture (i.e., assuming responsibility) can partially vindicate harmdoers by requiring them to make fewer reparations to a victim (Experiment 1) or pay less of a fine (Experiment 3) among females only. Thus psychological damages incurred in a wrongful act can serve as a “down payment” toward restoring justice. In corroboration with these findings of sex differences, Experiment 2 revealed that females consider to a greater extent than males reasons such as a harmdoer's feelings when assigning a fine.     

When sanctions fail to increase cooperation in social dilemmas: considering the presence of an alternative option to defect

Previous social dilemma research has shown that sanctioning defection may enhance cooperation. The authors argue that this finding may have resulted from restricting participants to two behaviors (cooperation and defection). In this article, the authors introduce the concept of a "social trilemma" (a social dilemma in which an alternative option to defect is present) and tested the effect of a sanction. The authors show that a sanction only increased cooperation and collective interests in the traditional social dilemma. In a social trilemma, the sanction failed because it caused some people to choose the alternative option to defect. Moreover, the results indicate that this was especially the case when people did not expect fellow group members to cooperate. In this case, the sanction even worked counterproductive because it decreased collective interests. It is concluded that allowing individuals to consider alternative options to defect can reveal the potential detrimental effects of sanctioning systems for the collective.     

The role of stimulus comparison in human perceptual learning: effects of distractor placement

Within-subjects procedures were used to assess the influence of stimulus comparison on perceptual learning in humans. In Experiment 1, participants received intermixed (A, A', A, A',…) or blocked (B, B,…, B', B',…) exposure to pairs of similar female faces. In a subsequent same/different discrimination task, participants were more accurate when the test involved A and A' than when it involved B and B' (or novel faces: C and C'). This perceptual learning effect was reduced by placing a visual distractor (*: either another face or a checkerboard) between successive presentations of the faces during the exposure stage (e.g., A - * - A'). The attenuation of the intermixed versus blocked difference was particularly marked when faces were used as the distractor. In Experiment 2, this reduction in perceptual learning was more marked when * was positioned between the pairs of intermixed faces (i.e., A - * - A') than when it preceded and succeeded those faces (i.e., * - A - A' - *). These results provide the first direct evidence that the opportunity to compare stimuli plays a causal role in supporting perceptual learning. They also support the specific view that perceptual learning reflects an interaction between a short-term habituation process, that ordinarily biases processing away from the frequently presented common elements and toward their less frequently presented unique elements, and a long-term representational process that reflects this bias.     

North is up(hill): Route planning heuristics in real-world environments

Navigators use both external cues and internal heuristics to help them plan efficient routes through environments. In six experiments, we discover and seek the origin of a novel heuristic that causes participants to preferentially choose southern rather than northern routes during map-based route planning. Experiment 1 demonstrates that participants who are tasked to choose between two equal-length routes, one going generally north and one south, show reliable decision preferences toward the southern option. Experiment 2 demonstrates that participants produce a southern preference only when instructed to adopt egocentric rather than allocentric perspectives during route planning. In Experiments 3-5, we examined participants’ judgments of route characteristics and found that judgments of route length and preferences for upper relative to lower path options do not contribute to the southern route preference. Rather, the southern route preference appears to be a result of misperceptions of increased elevation to the north (i.e., north is up). Experiment 6 further supports this finding by demonstrating that participants provide greater time estimates for north- than for equivalent south-going routes when planning travel between U.S. cities. Results are discussed with regard to predicting wayfinding behavior, the mental simulation of action, and theories of spatial cognition and navigation.     

When one sees what the other hears: Crossmodal attentional modulation for gazed and non-gazed upon auditory targets

Three experiments investigated the nature of visuo-auditory crossmodal cueing in a triadic setting: participants had to detect an auditory signal while observing another agent’s head facing one of the two laterally positioned auditory sources. Experiment 1 showed that when the agent’s eyes were open, sounds originating on the side of the agent’s gaze were detected faster than sounds originating on the side of the agent’s visible ear; when the agent’s eyes were closed this pat-tern of responses was reversed. Two additional experiments showed that the results were sensitive to whether participants could infer a hearing function on the part of the agent. When no ear was depicted on the agent, only a gaze-side advantage was observed (Experiment 2), but when the agent’s ear was covered (Experiment 3), an ear side advantage was observed only when hearing could still be inferred (i.e., wearing the hat) but not when hearing was inferred to be diminished (i.e., wearing a helmet). The findings are discussed in the context of inferential and simulation processes and joint attention mechanisms.     

Accountability and cooperation in social dilemmas: The influence of others’ reputational concerns

The present study examined the assumption that non-anonymous choices in social dilemmas (i.e., choices for which one is accountable) may influence cooperation, but only to the extent that decision-makers believe that the others will evaluate non-cooperation negatively. Based on a recent review by Kerr (1999), it was expected that under conditions of accountability, decision-makers would cooperate more when they believed that the others within the group were also concerned about their social reputation and therefore were aware of the social norm of cooperation within social dilemmas. As a consequence, it could be expected that non-cooperation by oneself would be evaluated negatively by those others since they seemed to be aware of what ought to be done in a social dilemma (i.e., the norm of cooperation). Results confirmed these predictions and, in addition, also showed that greater willingness to cooperate was associated with stronger feelings of collective concern. The findings are discussed in terms of recent literature on anonymity effects in social dilemmas. This research was part of the second author's master thesis at Maastricht University. The first author was supported by a fellowship of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, no. 016.005.019).