Two faces of desert

There are two broadly competing pictures of moral responsibility. On the view I favor, to be responsible for some action is to be related to it in such a way that licenses attributing certain properties to the agent, properties like blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Responsibility is attributability. A different view understands being responsible in terms of our practices of holding each other responsible. Responsibility is accountability, which “involves a social setting in which we demand (require) certain conduct from one another and respond adversely to one another’s failures to comply with these demands” (Watson, Philos Top 24:227–248, 1996). My concern here is the relation between moral responsibility and desert. Plausibly, if someone is morally responsible for something wrong then they deserve blame, and it is on the basis of them being morally responsible and its being wrong that they deserve blame. In this paper, I try to make progress toward understanding why it would follow that being morally responsible for something supports a desert claim. I propose to do this by exploring how the “two faces” of responsibility should proceed. An important upshot is that we gain a new currency by which to evaluate extant theories of responsibility that might favor one or the other conception: do they carry plausible desert commitments? To illustrate this benefit, I argue that accountability theory carries implausible implications for deserved praise.     

Past decisions do affect future choices: An experimental demonstration

This paper demonstrates experimentally that the mere fact that an alternative was chosen in the past increases the likelihood that it will be re-chosen in the future, when new alternatives are being offered. The experimental design consists of a new variation of the free-choice paradigm that is immune to Chen and Risen’s (2010) criticism of how results have been interpreted in previous studies of post-decision effects. An additional experiment indicates that once participants have chosen a particular alternative they view its characteristics more positively. I suggest that the new design can be used to study various aspects of the effect of past decisions on future ones. In the present paper, I apply it to show that the allocation of limited resources among various uses may be biased in favor of a particular use if it was preferred to another in a previous situation.     

When forewarning backfires: Paradoxical effects of elaborating social feedback on entrapment in a losing course of action

Entrapment occurs if people persist with losing courses of action. In two experiments, we show how elaborating social feedback (i.e., premature praise or forewarning regarding the chosen course of action) can have paradoxical effects on entrapment. The participants acted as head of a translation department and had to choose one out of four possible translation strategies for their employees. After choosing, they read four arguments (presumably written by former participants) which were either all in favor of the strategy chosen, all against it, or mixed. Half of the participants only read these arguments, whereas the other half elaborated on them by providing written comments (Experiment 1). The results showed that elaborating on other persons' arguments led to stronger entrapment, independently of whether the arguments were positive or negative. This pattern was due to biased argument processing: Whereas confirming thoughts were generated for positive arguments, negative arguments were refuted. Experiment 2 confirmed that this biased argument processing caused subsequent entrapment. These results indicate that elaborating any type of argument can lead to heightened entrapment and, hence, forewarning can backfire. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism and the Consequences of Belief

John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility for consequences is inconsistent with this subjective element of their theory, and that the subjective element may be retained only if they are willing to implausibly restrict their account of responsibility for consequences. I end by discussing the broad significance of the failure of the subjective element for their overall approach to moral responsibility.     

Action history influences eye movements

Recent research has revealed that simple actions can have a profound effect on subsequent perception – people are faster to find a target that shares features with a previously acted on object even when those features are irrelevant to their task (the action effect). However, the majority of the evidence for this interaction between action and perception has come from manual response data. Therefore, it is unknown whether action affects early visual search processes, if it modulates post-attentional-selection processes, or both. To investigate this, we tracked participants’ spontaneous eye movements as they performed an action effect task. In two experiments we found that participants looked more quickly to the colour of an object they had previously acted on, compared to if they had viewed but not acted on the object, showing that action influenced early visual search processes. Additionally, there was evidence for post-selection effects as well. The results suggest that prior action affects both pre-selection and post-selection processes – spontaneously guiding attention to, and maintaining it on, objects that were previously important to the observer.     

The responsibilities of counsellor supervisors: A qualitative study

A study was carried out to investigate whether supervisors of counsellors considered themselves to be clinically responsible for the work of their supervisees, what responsibilities they considered themselves to have for the counsellors' work, and how they managed their responsibilities. The purpose of the study was to enhance the counselling profession's understanding of the responsibility of supervisors and of the supervisory relationship. The study was confined to supervisors working in private practice. Ten experts in the field of counselling and supervision were interviewed, using a semi-structured questionnaire. The interviews were analysed using the 'constant comparative method'. They revealed that the participants would not use the term 'clinical responsibility' to describe their responsibilities. There were mixed views about the nature of the responsibility of the supervisor when supervising counsellors practising independently. The participants indicated a preference to supervise only the most experienced counsellors, with whose practice they were already familiar and in whose work they already had considerable confidence. None of the supervisors interviewed considered themselves to be legally responsible for the counsellors' work. All the participants were aware that the risks associated with counselling in private practice could be considerable and had an acute sense of responsibility for the content of the work. Reluctance to take action against supervisees who were in breach of the code of ethics was expressed. There was scepticism about the requirement for them to have supervision for their supervisory work. Implications for the practice of counselling supervision and for the profession are discussed.     

Biased information processing in the escalation paradigm: information search and information evaluation as potential mediators of escalating commitment

Escalation of commitment denotes decision makers' increased reinvestment of resources in a losing course of action. Despite the relevance of this topic, little is known about how information is processed in escalation situations, that is, whether decision makers who receive negative outcome feedback on their initial decision search for and/or process information biasedly and whether these biases contribute to escalating commitment. Contrary to a widely cited study by E. J. Conlon and J. M. Parks (1987), in 3 experiments, the authors found that biases do not occur on the level of information search. Neither in a direct replication and extension of the original study with largely increased test power (Experiment 1) nor under methodologically improved conditions (Experiments 2 and 3) did decision makers responsible for failure differ from nonresponsible decision makers with regards to information search, and no selective search for information supporting the initial decision or voting for further reinvestment was observed. However, Experiments 3 and 4 show that the evaluation of the previously sought information is biased among participants who were responsible for initiating the course of action. Mediation analyses show that this evaluation bias in favor of reinvestment partially mediated the responsibility effect on escalation of commitment.     

责任归因对“做效应”的调控及其ERP证据

“做效应(action effect)”是指决策中由“做(action)”与“不做(inaction)”行为引起的相同决策后果, 却诱发了不同强度的情绪体验。本研究使用ANSIE量表筛选了责任归因不同倾向的两类被试(极端内控者、极端外控者), 运用ERP技术, 在一项简单赌博实验任务中考察了这两类被试的“做效应”差异及其电生理证据, 旨在探讨责任归因对“做效应”的调控作用。行为结果表明, 无论结果输赢, 极端内控被试的“做”与“不做”行为结果诱发的情绪强度和责任感强度都没有差异, 而极端外控被试的“做”行为诱发的情绪强度和责任感强度都比“不做”行为诱发的明显大; 脑电结果表明, 在FRN和P300上, 极端内控被试的“做”与“不做”行为诱发的FRN和P300波幅之间都没有差异, 而极端外控被试的“做”行为诱发的这两种脑电成分波幅都比“不做”诱发的较大。简言之, “做效应”在极端内控被试身上表现不明显, 而在极端外控被试身上表现明显。“做效应”很可能是由于个体对不同行为导致的相同决策后果的责任归因不同引起的。     

决策过程中的调节匹配效应及其机制

以大学生为被试,运用实验法探讨了决策过程中调节定向与信息搜索模式之间的匹配效应及其机制。结果显示：(1) 促进定向组被试决策时更偏好基于属性的信息搜索模式,而预防定向组被试决策时更偏好基于选项的信息搜索模式;(2)当两种调节定向组被试分别使用各自所偏好的信息搜索模式制定决策时,达成了调节匹配,相比调节不匹配,这种匹配使被试对其所做选择给出了更积极的评价,即出现了调节匹配效应;(3)加工流畅性可以部分地解释这种调节匹配效应。     

Responsibility and Self-Defense: Can We Have It All?

The role of responsibility in our common-sense morality of self-defense is complex. According to common-sense morality, one can sometimes use substantial, even deadly, force against people who are only minimally responsible for posing a threat to us. The role of responsibility in self-defense is thus limited. However, responsibility is still sometimes relevant. It sometime affects how much force you can use against a threatener: less if they are less responsible and more if they are more responsible. Is there a well-motivated theory that can explain both why the role of responsibility is limited and why it is sometimes relevant? It is hard to see what theory could unify these disparate elements of our common-sense morality, and if one cannot be found then we may simply have to revise some of our pre-theoretic beliefs. But it would be an important advantage of a theory if it could justify those beliefs. I will argue that there is a theory of this kind: surprisingly, the familiar rights theory of self-defense, defended by Judith Thomson, can do so if it is suitably supplemented. Along the way I will survey some alternative theories of self-defense and show why they are not up to the task.     

Can Instruction in Engineering Ethics Change Students’ Feelings about Professional Responsibility?

How can a course on engineering ethics affect an undergraduate student’s feelings of responsibility about moral problems? In this study, three groups of students were interviewed: six students who had completed a specific course on engineering ethics, six who had registered for the course but had not yet started it, and six who had not taken or registered for the course. Students were asked what they would do as the central character, an engineer, in each of two short cases that posed moral problems. For each case, the role of the engineer was successively changed and the student was asked how each change altered his or her decisions about the case. Students who had completed the ethics course considered more options before making a decision, and they responded consistently despite changes in the cases. For both cases, even when they were not directly involved, they were more likely to feel responsible and take corrective action. Students who were less successful in the ethics course gave answers similar to students who had not taken the course. This latter group of students seemed to have weaker feelings of responsibility: they would say that a problem was “not my business.” It appears that instruction in ethics can increase awareness of responsibility, knowledge about how to handle a difficult situation, and confidence in taking action.     

Hegel on Legal and Moral Responsibility

When Hegel first addresses moral responsibility in the Philosophy of Right, he presupposes that agents are only responsible for what they intended to do, but appears to offer little, if any, justification for this assumption. In this essay, I claim that the first part of the Philosophy of Right, “Abstract Right”, contains an implicit argument that legal or external responsibility (blame for what we have done) is conceptually dependent on moral responsibility proper (blame for what we have intended). This overlooked argument satisfies the first half of a thesis Hegel applies to action in the Encyclopaedia Logic, namely, that the outer must be inner, and thus provides a necessary complement for his more explicit treatment of the second half of that thesis, that the inner must be outer. The claim that agents are only responsible for what they intended to do might appear, at first, to risk conflating legal and moral responsibility and to lack the necessary means to deal with the phenomenon of moral luck, but I argue that if it is properly situated within the whole of Hegel's philosophy of action it can be saved from both of these consequences and so take its place as an essential component of Hegel's full theory of moral responsibility.     

Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me,is it the group or are we all to blame?

According to distributed virtue reliabilism (Palermos, 2020b), epistemic collaborations—such as Transactive Memory Systems and Scientific Research Teams—can be held epistemically responsible at the collective level. This raises the question of whether participants of epistemic collaborations are exempt from being held individually responsible. In response, this paper explores two possible ways in which attributions of individual responsibility may still be appropriate within epistemic collaborations: (I) Individuals can be held epistemically responsible for their individual shortcomings, but no amount of individual epistemic responsibility can replace collective epistemic responsibility. (II) Even if it is denied that participants of epistemic collaborations can be held epistemically responsible at the individual level, they may be held structurally, perhaps morally, and even legally responsible at the individual level for breaking joint commitments necessary for the effective coordination of the epistemic collaboration.     

Frankfurt and the folk: an experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases

An important disagreement in contemporary debates about free will hinges on whether an agent must have alternative possibilities to be morally responsible. Many assume that notions of alternative possibilities are ubiquitous and reflected in everyday intuitions about moral responsibility: if one lacks alternatives, then one cannot be morally responsible. We explore this issue empirically. In two studies, we find evidence that folk judgments about moral responsibility call into question two popular principles that require some form of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. Survey participants given scenarios involving agents that fail to satisfy these principles nonetheless found these agents to be (1) morally responsible, (2) blameworthy, (3) deserving of blame, and (4) at fault for morally bad actions and consequences. We defend our interpretation of this evidence against objections and explore some implications of these findings for the free will debate.     

How We Conceptualize Our Attitudes Matters: The Effects of Valence Framing on the Resistance of Political Attitudes

Three studies tested the valence-framing effect: that merely conceptualizing one's preferences as opposing something will make that preference more resistant to persuasion than will thinking about the same preference in terms of supporting something . In Study 1, participants who were led to conceptualize their political preferences as being against a candidate were more resistant to a counterattitudinal message than were participants who were led to conceptualize the same preference as being in favor of the other candidate. Study 2 showed that this effect was not due to a priming process, while Study 3 provided evidence for the effect's generalizability.     

Freedom of Preference: A Defense of Compatiblism

Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a case of a counterfactual intervener CI with knowledge and power to control an agent so he will do A. He concludes that if the agent prefers to do A and there is no intervention by CI, the agent has acted of his own free will and is morally responsible for doing A, though he lacked an alternative possibility. I consider the consequences for freedom and moral responsibility of CI having a complete plan P for all actions of an agent, Lucky, who luckily has preferences that accord with P, and I extend the argument to all citizens of a land, Luckyland, who are like Lucky. I argue the citizens of Luckyland have free will but lack moral responsibility because of the connection between moral responsibility, reactive attitudes and future action. Furthermore, the presence of CI and his plan P may allow free will but is incompatible with freedom of preference. Preference concerns alternatives excluded by CI. I argue that a special higher order preference for the preference structure, a power preference, ends the regress of higher order preference and explains the first order preference. Causal determinism is compatible with freedom of preference explained by a power preference when a power preference would also explain an alternative preference. The remoteness argument for incompatibility fails because of a lack of transitivity causal explanation. The power preference is the self-explained source of freedom of preference. That basic freedom may be limited by government knowledge of our preferences, even if, like Lucky, our preferences do not provoke intervention and we conform of our own free will.     

Implementation intentions and disengagement from a failing course of action

We explored the consequences of forming implementation intentions that call for action (adjustment of chosen course of action) versus reflection (assessment of the appropriateness of chosen course of action) in situations that activate people's tendency to remain committed to failing courses of action. In Study 1, when negative experiences preceded failure, action and reflection implementation intention participants showed higher rates of disengagement than mere goal intention and no intention participants. However, when positive experiences preceded failure, only action implementation intention participants maintained this high disengagement rate. In Study 2, we observed that time pressure moderated the facilitating effects of action and reflection implementation intentions on disengagement when negative experiences preceded failure. Whereas the effect of action implementation intentions benefited from time pressure, the effect of reflection implementation intentions did not. The present studies construe disengagement as a self-regulation process and highlight the benefits of implementation intentions as a self-regulation tool. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When and why do we want to know? How experienced regret promotes post‐decision information search

The effect of emotional and situational factors on the decision to seek out post‐decision information about un‐chosen alternative was examined in five experiments. Experiment 1 tested participants' willingness to find out the outcome of an un‐chosen investment that was likely to have a higher value than the chosen investment. It was found that participants were more willing to acquire information when they were responsible for the decision. Experiment 2 showed that responsibility affects information seeking, in particular when one suspects that a wrong decision was made. Experiments 3–5 examined the role of regret on information seeking. It was shown that regret about making the wrong investment (Experiment 3), forgetting to send in a lottery ticket (Experiment 4), and missing an opportunity to use a discount card after spending a month in Australia (Experiment 5), mediates the information‐seeking behavior. Experiment 5 also demonstrated that the experience of regret (and not its anticipation) influences post‐decision information seeking even when the information is of no future use. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Agency and responsibility: The personal and the political

In this paper, I review arguments according to which harsh criminal punishments and poverty are undeserved and therefore unjust. Such arguments come in different forms. First, one may argue that no one deserves to be poor or be punished, because there is no such thing as desert-entailing moral responsibility. Second, one may argue that poor people in particular do not deserve to remain in poverty or to be punished if they commit crimes, because poor people suffer from psychological problems that undermine their agency and moral responsibility. Third, one may argue that poor and otherwise marginalized people frequently face external obstacles that prevent them from taking alternative courses of action. The first kind of argument has its place in the philosophy seminar. Psychological difficulties may be important to attend to both in personal relationships and when holding ourselves responsible. Nevertheless, I argue that neither type of argument belongs in political contexts. Moral responsibility scepticism ultimately rests on contested intuitions. Labelling certain groups of people particularly irrational, weak-willed, or similar is belittling and disrespectful; such claims are also hard to prove, and may have the opposite effect to the intended one on people's attitudes. Arguments from external obstacles have none of these problems. Such arguments may not take us all the way to criminal justice reform, but in this context, we can supplement them with epistemic arguments and crime prevention arguments.