Solving the Interface Problem Without Translation: The Same Format Thesis

In this article, we propose a new account concerning the interlock between intentions and motor representations (henceforth: MRs), showing that the interface problem is not as deep as previously proposed. Before discussing our view, in the first section we report the ideas developed in the literature by those who have tried to solve this puzzle before us. The article proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we address the views by Butterfill and Sinigaglia, and Mylopoulos and Pacherie, respectively, and argue that both solutions entail a translation between representational formats, which both accounts aim to avoid. In Section 4, we present our brand‐new claim, according to which intentions and MRs partially share the same motor format, inasmuch as executable action concepts are naturally represented in the agent's motor system together with the action's outcomes. Indeed, since intentions are constituted by executable action concepts and since there is evidence that action concepts are represented (and, thus, built) in the same motor format as action outcomes, the interlock between intentions and MRs no longer constitutes a problem. Then, in Section 5, we report empirical evidence in support of our claim, and before concluding, in Section 6 we briefly clarify our relations with two very recent accounts that criticized the proposals by Mylopoulos and Pacherie and Butterfill and Sinigaglia: Shepherd's and Burnston's. Finally, in Section 7, we offer some remarks about the philosophical idea defended here. The basic insight is that interface without translation is possible because action concepts are such stuff as MRs are made on.     

自然物体分类的ERP研究

对事物进行分类的能力是人类的一种基本认知功能。该文主要就近年来自然物体分类的事件相关电位（ERP）研究情况进行综述。首先介绍与自然物体分类有关的ERP早晚期成分;接着讨论了快速视觉分类的加工机制,认为前馈机制在这种复杂分类任务的视觉加工过程中起重要作用;最后详细介绍了两个分离的视觉加工机制,认为自然物体的视觉分类在不同时程涉及不同机制：即首先是任务无关的早期知觉加工过程,其次是任务相关的、类别无关的加工机制,与被试的决策有关。也讨论了这两个分离的加工过程涉及的神经基础。     

多元表征假设：概念表征机制的新观点

传统的认知主义认为概念表征是与主体的感知系统无关的抽象符号。而具身理论则认为,概念表征以主体的感觉、知觉运动系统为基础的,感知系统在概念表征中具有中心作用。然而,具身性假设无法恰当的解释抽象概念表征这一问题。这种局限性说明主体的概念系统可能具有多元表征机制：既包括感知表征以加工与身体经验相关的具体知识,也包括抽象符号表征以加工与身体经验无关的抽象知识。来自病理学、认知神经科学和行为实验的实证研究证明了不同类型的概念会涉及不同的表征机制,证实了多元表征存在的合理性。今后的研究应探讨各种表征机制之间的关系等问题。     

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): a framework for perception and action planning

Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing. On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning. On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task. We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference. Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes--cognitive structures we call event codes. We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data.     

The contextual action relationship between a tool and its action recipient modulates their joint perception

Facilitatory effects have been noted between tools and the objects that they act upon (their “action recipients”) across several paradigms. However, it has not been convincingly established that the motor system is directly involved in the joint visual processing of these object pairings. Here, we used the attentional blink (AB) paradigm to demonstrate privileged access to perceptual awareness for tool–action recipient object pairs and to investigate how motor affordances modulate their joint processing. We demonstrated a reduction in the size of the AB that was greater for congruent tool–action recipient pairings (e.g., hammer–nail) than for incongruent pairings (e.g., scissors–nail). Moreover, the AB was reduced only when action recipients followed their associated tool in the temporal sequence, but not when this order was reversed. Importantly, we also found that the effect was sensitive to manipulations of the motor congruence between the tool and the action recipient. First, we observed a greater reduction in the AB when the tool and action recipient were correctly aligned for action than when the tool was rotated to face away from the action recipient. Second, presenting a different tool as a distractor between the tool and action recipient target objects removed any benefit seen for congruent pairings. This was likely due to interference from the motor properties of the distractor tool that disrupted the motor synergy between the congruent tool and action recipient targets. Overall, these findings demonstrate that the contextual motoric relationship between tools and their action recipients facilitates their visual encoding and access to perceptual awareness.     

Perceptual span,visual span,and visual attention span: Three potential ways to quantify limits on visual processing during reading

Many lines of evidence have revealed limitations of the human visual system, most notably that only a portion of available information is processed in a single glance. A degree of conceptual confusion has emerged, however, regarding the underlying concepts or mechanisms explaining limited visual processing in reading; perceptual span, visual span, or visual attention span. While the original definitions of these three concepts are clear and well-differentiated, they are routinely used inconsistently in the literature. The primary goal of the present review is to re-specify these three concepts in terms of what they correspond to and how they are determined. Further, we investigate whether these three spans refer to vision-related measurements and/or are based on general cognitive abilities. This review should lead to a better understanding of the involvement of visual functions in reading performance.     

Experts see it all: configural effects in action observation

Biological motion perception is influenced by observers’ familiarity with the observed action. Here, we used classical dance as a means to investigate how visual and motor experience modulates perceptual mechanism for configural processing of actions. Although some ballet moves are performed by only one gender, male and female dancers train together and acquire visual knowledge of all ballet moves. Twenty-four expert ballet dancers (12 female) and matched non-expert participants viewed pairs of upright and inverted point light female and common dance movements. Visual discrimination between different exemplars of the same movement presented upright was significantly better in experts than controls, whilst no differences were found when the same stimuli were presented upside down. These results suggest expertise influences configural action processing. Within the expert group, effects were stronger for female participants than for males, whilst no differences were found between movement types. This observer gender effect could suggest an additional role for motor familiarity in action perception, over and above the visual experience. Our results are consistent with a specific motor contribution to configural processing of action.     

On the relationship between visual imagery and visual perception: Evidence from priming studies

Two priming experiments using a perceptual identification task were conducted to explore the functional and representational overlap between visual imagery and visual perception. The first experiment included a study phase in which primes were either perceived or imaged objects and a perceptual identification test task in which targets were parts of studied and non-studied objects. Imagery primed identification when subjects were instructed to count the parts of the imaged objects in the study phase but not when they were instructed to focus on the global shape of the imaged objects. This result suggests that imagery involves perceptual representations identical to those involved in perception. It also suggests that the representational overlap between imagery and perception depends on the type of images generated, as some images may consist in global shapes only, whereas others may consist in detailed, multi-part shapes. In the second experiment, we used whole objects as target stimuli which provided subjects with more information to identify masked targets and thereby reduced top-down processing. Priming from imagery fell beneath significance, suggesting that this sort of priming is elicited in a large part by a transfer of top-down processes from study to test.     

Mechanisms of selection for the control of hand action

Most attention research has viewed selection as essentially a perceptual problem, with attentional mechanisms required to protect the senses from overload. Although this might indeed be one of several functions that attention serves, the need for selection also arises when one considers the requirement of actions rather than perception. This review examines recent attempts to determine the role played by selective mechanisms in the control of action. Recent studies looking at reach-to-grasp responses to target objects in the presence of distracting objects within a three-dimensional space are discussed. The manner in which motor aspects of the reach-to-grasp response might be influenced by distractors is also highlighted, rather than merely addressing the perceptual consequences of distractors. The studies reviewed here emphasize several factors highlighting the importance of studying selective processes within three-dimensional environments from which attention and action have evolved.     

The Mind's Eye Mapped Onto the Brain's Matter

Research on visual mental imagery has been fueled recently by the development of new behavioral and neuroscientific techniques. This review focuses on two major topics in light of these developments. The first concerns the extent to which visual mental imagery and visual perception share common psychological and neural mechanisms; although the research findings largely support convergence between these two processes, there are data that qualify the degree of overlap between them. The second issue involves the neural substrate mediating the process of imagery generation. The data suggest a slight left-hemisphere advantage for this process, although there is considerable variability across and within subjects. There also remain many unanswered questions in this field, including what the relationship is between imagery and working memory and what representational differences, if any, exist between imagery and perception.     

Using Dynamic Field Theory to extend the embodiment stance toward higher cognition

The embodiment stance emphasizes that cognitive processes unfold continuously in time, are constantly linked to the sensory and motor surfaces, and adapt through learning and development. Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) is a neurally based set of concepts that has turned out to be useful for understanding how cognition emerges in an embodied and situated system. We explore how the embodiment stance may be extended beyond those forms of cognition that are closest to sensorimotor processes. The core elements of DFT are dynamic neural fields (DNFs), patterns of activation defined over different kinds of spaces. These may include retinal space and visual feature spaces, spaces spanned by movement parameters such as movement direction and amplitude, or abstract spaces like the ordinal axis along which sequences unfold. Instances of representation that stand for perceptual objects, motor plans, or action intentions are peaks of activation in the DNFs. We show how such peaks may arise from input and are stabilized by intra-field interaction. Given a neural mechanism for instantiation, the neuronal couplings between DNFs implement cognitive operations. We illustrate how these mechanisms can be used to enable architectures of dynamic neural fields to perform cognitive functions such as acquiring and updating scene representations, using grounded spatial language, and generating sequences of actions. Implementing these DFT models in autonomous robots demonstrates how these cognitive functions can be enacted in embodied, situated systems.     

Effects of nonconscious perception on motor response

The present study reviews the literature on the empirical evidence for the dissociation between perception and action. We first review several key studies on brain-damaged patients, such as those suffering from blindsight and visual/tactile agnosia, and on experimental findings examining pointing movements in normal people in response to a nonconsciously perceived stimulus. We then describe three experiments we conducted using simple reaction time (RT) tasks with backward masking, in which the first (weak) and second (strong) electric stimuli were consecutively presented with a 40-ms interstimulus interval (ISI). First, we compared simple RTs for three stimulus conditions: weak alone, strong alone, and double, i.e., weak plus strong (Experiment 1); then, we manipulated the intensity of the first stimulus from the threshold (T) to 1.2T and 2T, with the second stimulus at 4T (Experiment 2); finally, we tested three different ISIs (20, 40, and 60 ms) with the stimulus intensities at 1.2T and 4T for the first and second stimuli (Experiment 3). These experiments showed that simple RTs were shorter for the double condition than for the strong-alone condition, indicating that motor processes under the double condition may be triggered by sensory inputs arising from the first stimulus. Our results also showed that the first stimulus was perceived without conscious awareness. These findings suggested that motor processes may be dissociated from conscious perceptual processes and that these two processes may not take place in a series but, rather, in parallel. We discussed the likely mechanisms underlying nonconscious perception and motor response to a nonconsciously perceived stimulus.     

The beneficial effect of synchronized action on motor and perceptual timing in children

We examined the role of action in motor and perceptual timing across development. Adults and children aged 5 or 8 years old learned the duration of a rhythmic interval with or without concurrent action. We compared the effects of sensorimotor versus visual learning on subsequent timing behaviour in three different tasks: rhythm reproduction (Experiment 1), rhythm discrimination (Experiment 2) and interval discrimination (Experiment 3). Sensorimotor learning consisted of sensorimotor synchronization (tapping) to an isochronous visual rhythmic stimulus (ISI = 800 ms), whereas visual learning consisted of simply observing this rhythmic stimulus. Results confirmed our hypothesis that synchronized action during learning systematically benefitted subsequent timing performance, particularly for younger children. Action‐related improvements in accuracy were observed for both motor and perceptual timing in 5 years olds and for perceptual timing in the two older age groups. Benefits on perceptual timing tasks indicate that action shapes the cognitive representation of interval duration. Moreover, correlations with neuropsychological scores indicated that while timing performance in the visual learning condition depended on motor and memory capacity, sensorimotor learning facilitated an accurate representation of time independently of individual differences in motor and memory skill. Overall, our findings support the idea that action helps children to construct an independent and flexible representation of time, which leads to coupled sensorimotor coding for action and time.     

A priori perceptual entitlement,knowledge‐first

Tyler Burge notably offers a truth‐first account of perceptual entitlement in terms of a priori necessary representational functions and norms: on his account, epistemic normativity turns on natural norms, which turn on representational functions. This paper has two aims: first, it criticises Tyler Burge's truth‐first a priori derivation on functionalist and value‐theoretic grounds. Second, it develops a novel, knowledge‐first a priori derivation of perceptual entitlement. According to the view developed here, it is a priori that we are entitled to believe the deliverances of our perceptual belief formation system, in virtue of the latter's constitutive function of generating knowledge.     

Captured by motion: dance, action understanding, and social cognition

In this review article, we summarize the main findings from empirical studies that used dance-related forms of rhythmical full body movement as a research tool for investigating action understanding and social cognition. This work has proven to be informative about behavioral and brain mechanisms that mediate links between perceptual and motor processes invoked during the observation and execution of spatially–temporally coordinated action and interpersonal interaction. The review focuses specifically on processes related to (a) motor experience and expertise, (b) learning and memory, (c) action, intention, and emotion understanding, and (d) audio-visual synchrony and timing. Consideration is given to the relationship between research on dance and more general embodied cognition accounts of action understanding and social cognition. Finally, open questions and issues concerning experimental design are discussed with a view to stimulating future research on social-cognitive aspects of dance.     

Action goal selection and motor planning can be dissociated by tool use

The preparation of eye or hand movements enhances visual perception at the upcoming movement end position. The spatial location of this influence of action on perception could be determined either by goal selection or by motor planning. We employed a tool use task to dissociate these two alternatives. The instructed goal location was a visual target to which participants pointed with the tip of a triangular hand-held tool. The motor endpoint was defined by the final fingertip position necessary to bring the tool tip onto the goal. We tested perceptual performance at both locations (tool tip endpoint, motor endpoint) with a visual discrimination task. Discrimination performance was enhanced in parallel at both spatial locations, but not at nearby and intermediate locations, suggesting that both action goal selection and motor planning contribute to visual perception. In addition, our results challenge the widely held view that tools extend the body schema and suggest instead that tool use enhances perception at those precise locations which are most relevant during tool action: the body part used to manipulate the tool, and the active tool tip.     

Experience,action and representations: Critical realism and the enactive theory of vision

This paper defends a dynamic model of the way in which perception is integrated with action, a model I refer to as ‘the navigational account’. According to this account, employing vision and other forms of distance perception, a creature acquires information about its surroundings via the senses, information that enables it to select and navigate routes through its environment, so as to attain objects that satisfy its needs. This form of perceptually guided activity should be distinguished from other kinds of semi-automatic responses to visual stimuli that do not necessarily involve conscious experiences. It essentially involves inner states, which involve both the awareness of phenomenal qualities, and also a representational component. The navigational account is compared here with the enactive approach to perception, which opposes the view that perceptual experiences are inner states. This paper argues that a full account of perception raises a number of different questions. One central explanatory project concerns questions about the kinds of processes that currently enable a creature to identify and respond appropriately to distant objects: the answer, it is argued, lies in acknowledging the role of conscious inner representations in guiding navigational behaviour through complex environments. The fact that perception and action are interdependent does not conflict with the claim that inner representational states comprise an essential stage in visual processing.

Implicit visual learning and the expression of learning

Although the existence of implicit motor learning is now widely accepted, the findings concerning perceptual implicit learning are ambiguous. Some researchers have observed perceptual learning whereas other authors have not. The review of the literature provides different reasons to explain this ambiguous picture, such as differences in the underlying learning processes, selective attention, or differences in the difficulty to express this knowledge. In three experiments, we investigated implicit visual learning within the original serial reaction time task. We used different response devices (keyboard vs. mouse) in order to manipulate selective attention towards response dimensions. Results showed that visual and motor sequence learning differed in terms of RT-benefits, but not in terms of the amount of knowledge assessed after training. Furthermore, visual sequence learning was modulated by selective attention. However, the findings of all three experiments suggest that selective attention did not alter implicit but rather explicit learning processes.