Some psychological effects associated with positive and negative thinking about stressful event outcomes: was Pollyanna right?

This study investigated psychological effects associated with tendencies to focus one's thinking on positive versus negative outcomes of concluded stressful events, called respectively, positive and negative thinking. Four questions were addressed: (a) whether positive and negative thinking benefit or reduce psychological well-being, (b) whether these effects are transitory or enduring, (c) whether they are limited to thoughts about an event's impact on oneself or generalize to thoughts about an event's external consequences, and (d) whether tendencies to think positively or negatively about prior stressors influence psychological vulnerability to the impact of future ones. College students completed an event-outcome appraisal questionnaire designed to make salient positive and negative thoughts about the outcomes of recent stressful events. Subjects' well-being was then assessed both immediately after the salience manipulation and again 8 weeks later. Positive thinking increased the well-being that subjects reported immediately after their thoughts were assessed, but was unrelated to the well-being they reported after an 8-week delay. This suggests that although thinking positively about past event outcomes may temporarily lead to perceptions of increased well-being while the thoughts are salient, it has no enduring influence. In contrast, negative thinking was associated with lower reported well-being not only when the thoughts were salient but after a delay as well. Psychological effects associated with both types of thinking were due mostly to self-relevant thoughts rather than to externally relevant ones. Negative thinking about prior stressor outcomes appeared to increase vulnerability to the impact of later ones on several aspects of well-being. Overall, results for negative thinking are consistent with evidence reported after an 8-week delay. This suggests that although thinking positively effects that persist over time. However, positive thinking does not seem to have beneficial effects that continue once these thoughts are no longer salient.     

Are Individuals Always Aware of Their Trauma-Related Intrusive Thoughts? A Study of Meta-Awareness

Individuals are not always aware of their mental content. We tested whether lack of awareness occurs in those who have experienced trauma, with and without posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). We also examined the role of proposed cognitive mechanisms (working memory and inhibition) in explaining unnoticed intrusions. Individuals with PTSD (n = 44), and varying levels of symptoms (high posttraumatic stress [PTS]: n = 24; low PTS: n = 37) reported on intrusive thoughts throughout a reading task. Intermittently, participants responded to probes about whether their thoughts were trauma related. Participants were “caught” engaging in unreported trauma-related thoughts (unnoticed intrusions) for between 24 and 27% of the probes in the PTSD and high PTS groups, compared with 15% of occasions in the low PTS group. For trauma-related intrusions only, participants lacked meta-awareness for almost 40% of probes in the PTSD group, which was significantly less than that observed in the other groups (～60%). Contrary to predictions, working memory and response inhibition did not predict unnoticed intrusions. The results suggest that individuals who have experienced significant trauma can lack awareness about the frequency of their trauma-related thoughts. Further research is warranted to identify the mechanisms underpinning the occurrence of unnoticed intrusions.     

Unnoticed intrusions: Dissociations of meta-consciousness in thought suppression

The current research investigates the interaction between thought suppression and individuals’ explicit awareness of their thoughts. Participants in three experiments attempted to suppress thoughts of a prior romantic relationship and their success at doing so was measured using a combination of self-catching and experience-sampling. In addition to thoughts that individuals spontaneously noticed, individuals were frequently caught engaging in thoughts of their previous partner at experience-sampling probes. Furthermore, probe-caught thoughts were: (i) associated with stronger decoupling of attention from the environment, (ii) more likely to occur under cognitive load, (iii) more frequent for individuals with a desire to reconcile, and (iv) associated with individual differences in the tendency to suppress thoughts. Together, these data suggest that individuals can lack meta-awareness that they have begun to think about a topic they are attempting to suppress, providing novel insight into the cognitive processes that are involved in attempting to control undesired mental states.     

Depression and mental control: the resurgence of unwanted negative thoughts

In three experiments we examined depressed individuals' mental control abilities and strategies. Experiment 1 revealed that although depressed college students were initially successful in suppressing negative material, they eventually experienced a resurgence of unwanted negative thoughts. Analysis of subjects' stream-of-consciousness reports indicated that this resurgence was associated with the use of negative thoughts as distracters from the unwanted item. In Experiment 2 depressed subjects acknowledged that positive distracters were more effective than negative ones in suppressing negative thoughts. This acknowledgement suggests that depressed subjects in Experiment 1 did not deliberately focus on negative distracters but that those thoughts automatically occurred because they were highly accessible. Experiment 3 demonstrated that depressed subjects' use of positive distracters could be increased somewhat when we provided such distracters and made them easily accessible. Taken together, the findings suggest that depression involves an enhanced accessibility of interconnected negative thoughts that can undermine mental control efforts.     

Thought listing and endorsement measures of self-referential thinking in test anxiety

Abstract

The primary purpose of the present study was to examine cognitive reactions of high and low test-anxious subjects while performing a task of extreme difficulty. A sample of 44 subjects (28 females, 16 males) attempted a difficult analogies task and then reported their thoughts during the task. Subjects also completed the Sarason Test Anxiety Scale and several other self-report measures of their cognitive reactions to the task. Thought listings were classified according to their referent (self, task, or unrelated) and their valence (positive, negative, or neutral). Correlational analyses were then performed with the various measures and revealed an association between test anxiety and reports of negative thoughts involving the self. Test anxiety was not related significantly to the number of thoughts involving the task nor to actual performance on the task. However, test-anxious subjects did report more negative expectancies for their performance and greater cognitive interference during the task. Negative self-expectancies were also related to more negative self thoughts, fewer positive self thoughts, and fewer positive task-related thoughts. The results are interpreted as further evidence for both the role of negative self-related cognitions in the experience of test anxiety and the usefulness of unstructured measures in anxiety research.     

Effect of aerobic exercise on negative affect, positive affect, stress, and depression.

Three groups of subjects, 15 Longer-term Exercisers, 14 Short-term Exercisers, and 18 Nonexercisers completed questionnaires designed to measure negative affect associated with thoughts, negative affect associated with day-to-day experiences, positive affect associated with thoughts, and positive affect associated with day-to-day experiences, depression, and stress. All the subjects also provided a rating of their over-all general stress. The Longer-term Exercisers reported more positive affect associated with their thoughts and day-to-day experiences than the Nonexercisers. There also was a trend for the Longer-term Exercisers to report less over-all stress than the Nonexercisers.     

Coerced Confessions,Judicial Instruction,and Mock Juror Verdicts1

The present research assessed whether judicial instruction can curb jurors' inappropriate use of coerced-confession evidence. In Experiment 1, subjects read an auto theft trial in which the defendant had confessed on his own initiative (no constraint), after an offer of leniency (positive constraint), or after a threat of punishment (negative constraint). Subjects then received an instruction that simply directed them to ignore a coerced confession (short form), another that additionally defined both positive and negative inducement as coercive and hence unreliable (long form), or no instruction at all. As previously reported (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1980), subjects fully discounted the negatively constrained confession but not the positively induced one which, although judged involuntary, produced a high percentage of guilty verdicts. Neither form of instruction significantly reduced this latter tendency. In Experiment 2, subjects read an assault case involving a voluntary or positively coerced confession and one of four types of instruction. The positive coercion bias was replicated. An instruction that stressed both the unreliability and unfairness of an induced confession decreased voluntariness judgments but failed to lower the conviction rate. The theoretical basis for and practical implications of this phenomenon are discussed, and future research directions are proposed.     

Scanning two memorized lists

Subjects were timed as they decided whether singly presented probe words belonged to one or the other of two memorized lists, or to neither list. Each list varied in length from one to four words. Reaction times increased linearly with the combined number of words in the two lists. When there was no a priori basis for distinguishing the lists, the slope of the function for positive test probes was 33–35 msec per word higher than that for negative probes. The slope for negative probes was 58 msec per word in one experiment and 46 msec per word in another. This suggests that subjects first scanned the combined lists exhaustively to determine whether the probe was present; if it was not, they made a negative response, and if it was, they scanned again to determine which list it was in. When the words in the two lists were conceptually distinct (one list representing animate and the other inanimate objects), the difference in slope was reduced to only 6 msec per word, suggesting that the second scan was all but eliminated.     

Meta-awareness, perceptual decoupling and the wandering mind

Mind wandering (i.e. engaging in cognitions unrelated to the current demands of the external environment) reflects the cyclic activity of two core processes: the capacity to disengage attention from perception (known as perceptual decoupling) and the ability to take explicit note of the current contents of consciousness (known as meta-awareness). Research on perceptual decoupling demonstrates that mental events that arise without any external precedent (known as stimulus independent thoughts) often interfere with the online processing of sensory information. Findings regarding meta-awareness reveal that the mind is only intermittently aware of engaging in mind wandering. These basic aspects of mind wandering are considered with respect to the activity of the default network, the role of executive processes, the contributions of meta-awareness and the functionality of mind wandering.     

Causal attributions of married couples: when do they search for causes? What do they conclude when they do?

In this study, we examined when and whether married people engage in attributional activity or form causal attributions to explain their partners' behavior. We used an indirect probe to better approximate naturally occurring cognitive activity. We also examined the content of spouses' causal attributions, using both direct and indirect probes. Spouses were asked about frequent as well as infrequent relationship events, and about partner behaviors that had positive or negative impacts on the recipient. Husbands in unsatisfying relationships reported more attributional thoughts than did happily married husbands, whereas wives in the two groups did not differ. Behaviors having negative impacts elicited more attributional activity than did positive behaviors. Behavioral frequency and impact interacted in ways contrary to predictions. Finally, distressed couples were particularly likely to report distress-maintaining attributions and were particularly unlikely to report relationship-enhancing attributions, compared with their nondistressed counterparts.     

Does Writing About Suicidal Thoughts and Feelings Reduce Them?

To assess whether writing with cognitive change or exposure instructions reduces depression or suicidality, 121 undergraduates screened for suicidality wrote for 20 minutes on 4 days over 2 weeks. They were randomly assigned to reinterpret or to write and rewrite traumatic events/emotions, or to write about innocuous topics. The three groups (N = 98) who completed pre-, post-, and 6-week follow-up were not different on suicidality or depression. All subjects reported fewer automatic negative thoughts over the 2 weeks; they also reported higher self-regard but more health center visits at follow-up. Suicidal thoughts may be more resistant than physical health to writing interventions.     

Tracking the train of thought from the laboratory into everyday life: An experience-sampling study of mind wandering across controlled and ecological contexts

In an experience-sampling study that bridged laboratory, ecological, and individual-differences approaches to mind-wandering research, 72 subjects completed an executive-control task with periodic thought probes (reported by McVay & Kane, 2009) and then carried PDAs for a week that signaled them eight times daily to report immediately whether their thoughts were off task. Subjects who reported more mind wandering during the laboratory task endorsed more mind-wandering experiences during everyday life (and were more likely to report worries as off-task thought content). We also conceptually replicated laboratory findings that mind wandering predicts task performance: Subjects rated their daily-life performance to be impaired when they reported off-task thoughts, with greatest impairment when subjects’ mind wandering lacked metaconsciousness. The propensity to mind wander appears to be a stable cognitive characteristic and seems to predict performance difficulties in daily life, just as it does in the laboratory     

Distress and recurrence of intrusive thoughts in younger and older adults

The current study incorporated a life span perspective into existing theories of intrusive thoughts to examine age-related differences in the difficulty controlling intrusive thoughts, the distress following intrusive thought recurrences, and the meanings assigned to these recurrences. Younger (N = 51) and older (N = 49) community adults were randomly assigned to suppress (i.e., keep out of mind) or monitor an intrusive thought. Participants rated their positive and negative affect throughout engagement with the intrusive thought, and they also rated the meanings they gave to recurrences of their everyday intrusive thoughts. The results demonstrated that older adults tended to perceive greater difficulty with controlling the intrusive thought than younger adults despite the fact that they did not differ in the actual recurrence of the intrusive thought. With regard to distress, older adults experienced steadier levels of positive affect than younger adults throughout engagement with the intrusive thought. However, older adults also reported greater residual negative affect after engaging with the intrusive thought than younger adults. Finally, older and younger adults appeared to assign meanings to recurrences of intrusive thoughts in line with age-relevant concerns. Specifically, older adults were prone to interpret the recurrence of intrusive thoughts as a sign of cognitive decline, but they were less likely than younger adults to see intrusive thoughts as a sign of moral failure. Together, these results highlight a range of potential risk and protective factors in older adults for experiencing emotion dysregulation after intrusive thoughts.     

Does fear of coercion keep people away from mental health treatment? Evidence from a survey of persons with schizophrenia and mental health professionals

Mental health consumer advocates have long argued that involuntary treatment frightens persons with mental disorder and thus deters them from voluntarily seeking help. We surveyed 85 mental health professionals and 104 individuals with schizophrenia spectrum conditions to assess their experience with and perceptions of involuntary treatment and other treatment mandates. Of the clinicians, 78% reported that overall they thought legal pressures made their patients with schizophrenia more likely to stay in treatment. Regarding involuntary outpatient commitment, 81% of clinicians disagreed with the premise that mandated community treatment deters persons with schizophrenia from seeking voluntary treatment in the future. Of the consumer sample, 63% reported a lifetime history of involuntary hospitalization, while 36% reported fear of coerced treatment as a barrier to seeking help for a mental health problem-termed here "mandated treatment-related barriers to care." In bivariate analyses, reluctance to seek outpatient treatment associated with fear of coerced treatment (mandated treatment-related barriers to care) was significantly more likely in subjects with a lifetime history of involuntary hospitalization, criminal court mandates to seek treatment, and representative payeeship. However, experience with involuntary outpatient commitment was not associated with barriers to seeking treatment. Recent reminders or warnings about potential consequences of treatment nonadherence, recent hospitalization, and high levels of perceived coercion generally were also associated with mandated treatment-related barriers to care. In multivariable analyses, only involuntary hospitalization and recent warnings about treatment nonadherence were found to be significantly associated with these barriers. These results suggest that mandated treatment may serve as a barrier to treatment, but that ongoing informal pressures to adhere to treatment may also be important barriers to treatment.     

Suppressing thoughts of past events: Are repressive copers good suppressors?

We investigated the ability of individuals with a “repressive coping style” to strategically control thoughts of events from their past, which made them feel either proud or embarrassed, within the thought suppression paradigm. We examined whether (low) anxiety and (high) defensiveness interacts to influence suppression success over and above anxiety and defensiveness alone using low anxious, repressor, high anxious, and defensive high anxious groups. For the emotionally positive “proud event”, all groups avoided event‐related thoughts when instructed to suppress. For the emotionally negative “embarrassed event”, repressors reported fewer event‐related thoughts than all other groups, even when not instructed to suppress. Repressors also reported the lowest level of suppression effort and showed no “rebound”. We discuss repressors' memory performance in terms of their natural tendency to avoid negative self‐referent material, and thought and memory control in everyday life.     

Self-report may underestimate trauma intrusions

Research examining maladaptive responses to trauma routinely relies on spontaneous self-report to index intrusive thoughts, which assumes people accurately recognize and report their intrusive thoughts. However, “mind-wandering” research reveals people are not always meta-aware of their thought content: they often fail to notice shifts in their attention. In two experiments, we exposed subjects to trauma films, then instructed them to report intrusive thoughts during an unrelated reading task. Intermittently, we asked whether they were thinking about the trauma. As expected, subjects often spontaneously reported intrusive thoughts. However, they were also “caught” engaging in unreported trauma-oriented thoughts. The presence and frequency of intermittent probes did not influence self-caught intrusions. Both self-caught and probe-caught intrusions were related to an existing tendency toward intrusive cognition, film-related distress, and thought suppression attempts. Our data suggest people may lack meta-awareness of trauma-related thoughts, which has implications for theory, research and treatment relating to trauma-related psychopathology.     

Resting RSA is associated with natural and self-regulated responses to negative emotional stimuli

Resting respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) was assessed among 111 adult participants. These individuals were then asked to watch a positive or negative affective film in either a natural manner or while exaggerating their facial response. Facial reactions to the film were video-recorded and subsequently rated in terms of facial affect. Participants also self-reported the valence of their emotional experience. Results from regression analyses revealed that persons with low resting RSA behaviorally evidenced a more negative facial response to the negative film under natural-watch conditions. Low RSA individuals were also less able to modulate (i.e., amplify) their facial response to the negative film. In terms of self-report measures, persons in the exaggerate condition reported more positive affect to the positive film than did those in the natural-watch condition. Results suggest that cardiac vagal control is inversely associated with negative facial expression but positively associated with facial regulation ability to negative stimuli.     

Motor control accuracy: a consequential probe of individual differences in emotion regulation

Two studies (total N = 147) sought to model emotion-regulation processes in cognitive-motoric terms. Hostile or nonhostile thoughts were primed and, immediately following, individuals held a joystick as accurately as possible on a presented visual target. Study 1 revealed that the activation of hostile thoughts impaired motor control at low levels of agreeableness but facilitated motor control at high levels of agreeableness, consistent with emotion-regulation views of this trait. Study 2 did not assess the trait of agreeableness but rather sought to determine whether better motor control following activated hostile thoughts would predict lesser reactivity to stressors in an experience-sampling protocol. It did, and relevant results are reported for daily anger, negative affect, and positive affect. In addition, and consistent with the agreeableness findings of Study 1, better motor control that follows hostile thoughts predicted greater empathy on high-stress days. Motor control probes of the present type thus appear consequential in understanding emotion-regulation processes and successes in emotion regulation.     

Does How I Feel About It Matter? The Role of Affect in Cognitive and Behavioral Reactions to an Illness Diagnosis

Individuals often have low rates of compliance with treatment recommendations. We examined the role that experienced affect at the time of illness diagnosis might play in influencing thoughts and feelings relating treatment compliance. Participants were randomly assigned to receive a positive, neutral, or negative affect induction after imagining they were diagnosed with kidney cancer. They then reported on thoughts and feelings about the illness and the treatment regimen. Participants also reported interest in additional information about the illness and behavioral intentions for complying with the treatment regimen. Affect significantly influenced interest in information and behavioral intentions. Both effects were mediated by the influence of affect on participants' self-efficacy beliefs. These mediational findings support a mood-as-resource interpretation of the role of affect in treatment compliance.