Disowning one's seen real body during an out-of-body illusion

Under normal circumstances, we experience that our center of awareness is located behind our eyes and inside our own body. To learn more about the perceptual processes that underlie this tight coupling between the spatial dimensions of our consciously perceived self and our physical body, we conducted a series of experiments using an 'out-of-body illusion'. In this illusion, the conscious sense of self is displaced in the testing room by experimental manipulation of the congruency of visual and tactile information and a change in the visual perspective. We demonstrate that when healthy individuals experience that they are located in a different place from their real body, they disown this body and no longer perceive it as part of themselves. Our findings are important because they reveal a relationship between the representation of self-location in the local environment and the multisensory representation of one's own body.     

Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness

Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components—body ownership and self-location—are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.     

Infant and adult perceptions of possible and impossible body movements: An eye-tracking study

This study investigated how infants perceive and interpret human body movement. We recorded the eye movements and pupil sizes of 9- and 12-month-old infants and of adults (N=14 per group) as they observed animation clips of biomechanically possible and impossible arm movements performed by a human and by a humanoid robot. Both 12-month-old infants and adults spent more time looking at the elbows during impossible compared with possible arm movements, irrespective of the appearance of the actor. These results suggest that by 12months of age, infants recognize biomechanical constraints on how arms move, and they extend this knowledge to humanoid robots. Adults exhibited more pupil dilation in response to the human's impossible arm movements compared with the possible ones, but 9- and 12-month-old infants showed no differential pupil dilation to the same actions. This finding suggests that the processing of human body movements might still be immature in 12-month-olds, as they did not show an emotional response to biomechanically impossible body movements. We discuss these findings in relation to the hypothesis that perception of others' body movements relies upon the infant's own sensorimotor experience.     

Can we talk to robots? Ten-month-old infants expected interactive humanoid robots to be talked to by persons

As technology advances, many human-like robots are being developed. Although these humanoid robots should be classified as objects, they share many properties with human beings. This raises the question of how infants classify them. Based on the looking-time paradigm used by [Legerstee, M., Barna, J., & DiAdamo, C., (2000). Precursors to the development of intention at 6 months: understanding people and their actions. Developmental Psychology, 36, 5, 627-634.], we investigated whether 10-month-old infants expected people to talk to a humanoid robot. In a familiarization period, each infant observed an actor and an interactive robot behaving like a human, a non-interactive robot remaining stationary, and a non-interactive robot behaving like a human. In subsequent test trials, the infants were shown another actor talking to the robot and to the actor. We found that infants who had previously observed the interactive robot showed no difference in looking-time between the two types of test events. Infants in the other conditions, however, looked longer at the test event where the second experimenter talked to the robot rather than where the second experimenter talked to the person. These results suggest that infants interpret the interactive robot as a communicative agent and the non-interactive robot as an object. Our findings imply that infants categorize interactive humanoid robots as a kind of human being.     

The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action

Kinesthesis pertains to the perception of moving body parts, while the sense of agency refers to the experience of controlling one’s action-effects. Based on previous work, we hypothesized that the sense of agency would decrease in joint action with a robot compared to a human partner. Pairs of participants were jointly manipulating two interconnected haptic devices enabling them to feel each other’s forces. Unbeknown to participants, their partner was sometimes replaced by a robot. The sense of agency was assessed using intentional binding, which refers to a contraction of perceived time between an action and its effect for intentional actions, and participants’ judgment of their contribution to joint action. Participants judged their contribution as higher when they were initiating action and when they were paired with the robot. By contrast, intentional binding occurred only with a human partner. This outcome supports the hypothesis that human-robot joint action hinders intentional binding.     

The role of affective touch in whole-body embodiment remains equivocal

Previous studies have highlighted that affective touch delivered at slow velocities (1–10 cm/s) enhances body-part embodiment during multisensory illusions, yet its role towards whole-body embodiment is less established. Across two experiments, we investigated the role of affective touch towards subjective embodiment of a whole mannequin body within the full body illusion, amongst healthy females. Participants perceived affective touch to be more pleasant than non-affective touch, but this did not enhance subjective embodiment within the illusion and no interaction between synchrony (Experiment 1), or congruency (Experiment 2), and the velocity of touch was observed. Finally, the perceived pleasantness of touch was not modulated by subthreshold eating disorder psychopathology, as measured by means of a self-report questionnaire. Therefore, the present findings suggest that enhancement of embodiment due to affective touch may be body-part specific, and not generalise to greater ownership towards a whole body.     

Six-month-old infants perceive the hollow-face illusion

In this study we investigated infants' perception of the hollow-face illusion. 6-month-old infants were shown a concave mask under monocular and binocular viewing conditions and the direction of their reaches toward the mask was recorded. Adults typically perceive a concave mask as convex under monocular conditions but as concave under binocular conditions, depending on viewing distance. Based on previous findings that infants reach preferentially toward the parts of a display that are closest to them, we expected that, if infants perceive the hollow-face illusion as adults do, they would reach to the center of the mask when viewing it monocularly and to the edges when viewing it binocularly. The results were consistent with these predictions. Our findings indicated that the infants perceived the mask as convex when viewing it with one eye and concave when viewing it with two eyes. The results show that 6-month-old infants respond to the hollow-face illusion. Our finding suggests that, early in life, the visual system uses the constraint, or assumption, that faces are convex when interpreting visual input.     

Self awareness and the body image

What mental representations give us the sense of our body as a unique object in the world? We investigated this issue in the context of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), an illusion of body image in which a prosthetic hand brushed synchronously, but not asynchronously, with one’s own hand is perceived as actually being one’s hand. We conducted a large-scale study of the RHI, and used psychometric analysis to reveal the structure of the subjective experience of embodiment [Longo et al. (2008). What is embodiment? A psychometric approach. Cognition,107, 978-998]. Here, we use this dataset to investigate the relation between incorporation of a rubber hand into the body image and the perceived similarity between the participant’s hand and the rubber hand. Objective similarity (as measured by skin luminance, hand shape, and third-person similarity ratings) did not appear to influence participants’ experience of the RHI. Conversely, incorporation of the rubber hand into the body image did affect the similarity that participants perceived between their own hand and the rubber hand. Participants who had experienced the RHI perceived their hand and the rubber hand as significantly more similar than participants who had not experienced the illusion. That is, embodiment leads to perceived similarity, but perceived similarity does not lead to embodiment. Furthermore, similarity ratings following the illusion were selectively correlated with some components of embodiment, but not with others. These results suggest an important role of a mental body image in the perception of the relation between the self and others.     

Growing old: A psychoanalyst’s point of view1

With the help of clinical examples, the author shows that psychoanalysis or psychotherapy after the age of 70 can be a fascinating experience, one that enables patients to reconstruct their internal history in such a way that their final years can be given their rightful place in the overall journey through life. Often it will be a matter of going beyond the conflict between paralysing time with the illusion of keeping death at bay and taking the transient nature of life into account in order to perceive its true flavour. We can grow old passively, juxtaposing different periods of our life without linking them together, thereby creating the illusion of time without end; or we can grow old actively, integrating the different phases of our life into a coherent historical narrative. This representation of time leaves the door open for experiences which the author calls ‘small seconds of eternity’. We can all experience such moments when we are deeply moved – joyfully or painfully – by something, so that we perceive another quality of time that goes beyond its chronological dimension without all the same negating it. Helping elderly people to identify these seconds of eternity and catch hold of them can be an invaluable experience for them. Perhaps we need to see our life unfold through the chronology of its different phases in order to discover, second by second, how to express on an everyday basis something of which we have had an inkling in some second of eternity.     

What is embodiment? A psychometric approach

What is it like to have a body? The present study takes a psychometric approach to this question. We collected structured introspective reports of the rubber hand illusion, to systematically investigate the structure of bodily self-consciousness. Participants observed a rubber hand that was stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their own hand and then made proprioceptive judgments of the location of their own hand and used Likert scales to rate their agreement or disagreement with 27 statements relating to their subjective experience of the illusion. Principal components analysis of this data revealed four major components of the experience across conditions, which we interpret as: embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own hand, movement, and affect. In the asynchronous condition, an additional fifth component, deafference, was found. Secondary analysis of the embodiment of runner hand component revealed three subcomponents in both conditions: ownership, location, and agency. The ownership and location components were independent significant predictors of proprioceptive biases induced by the illusion. These results suggest that psychometric tools may provide a rich method for studying the structure of conscious experience, and point the way towards an empirically rigorous phenomenology.     

My body until proven otherwise: Exploring the time course of the full body illusion

Evidence from the Full Body Illusion (FBI) has shown that adults can embody full bodies which are not their own when they move synchronously with their own body or are viewed from a first-person perspective. However, there is currently no consensus regarding the time course of the illusion. Here, for the first time, we examined the effect of visuomotor synchrony (synchronous/asynchronous/no movement) on the FBI over time. Surprisingly, we found evidence of embodiment over a virtual body after five seconds in all conditions. Embodiment decreased with increased exposure to asynchronous movement, but remained high in synchronous and no movement conditions. We suggest that embodiment of a body seen from a first-person perspective is felt by default, and that embodiment can then be lost in the face of contradictory cues. These results have significant implications for our understanding of how multisensory cues contribute to embodiment.     

Cance and luck are not the same

In the mind of many people chance and luck act as real but different causes of events. Even in strictly defined situations as casino gambling, people may perceive influences of luck that help to overcome the negative expectancy defined by the rules of chance. Interviews with gamblers in casinos confirmed this idea. In two experiments it was established that the distinction between chance and luck are also made by ordinary subjects in everyday situations. The results revealed that chance is perceived to operate when an event is surprising, an unexpected coincidence. Luck is perceived when an event implies the escape from negative consequences, or the achievement of something that is important and difficult. The distinction between chance and luck can explain why people are trapped by the illusion of control, even when it is clear that they have no influence on the physical causation determining the outcomes of events. They cannot change the outcome of the roulette wheel, but they can employ their luck, which helps them to place their bets on the winning number.     

具身视角下的社会认知

摘 要：由于第一代认知科学存在着身心剥离的缺憾,具身化作为第二代认知科学的主要特征得到研究者的广泛关注,并且得到了来自神经科学领域的支持。随着研究的深入,具身学派提出,社会认知是否也应是具身的。现有研究发现具身性对个体评价、反应速度、言语理解、人际交往等方面都有不小的作用。但上述以身体模拟为主的证据仍不足以证明社会认知是具身的,具身学派还需解决诸如明确具身的定义、实验论证、明显区别于传统认知观等问题。     

Robots make no effort! Service evaluation and consumer mindset

Considering the growing acceptance of humanoid robots in the service industry, this study aimed to examine their negative impact on service evaluation, as well as the underlying mechanism of perceived effort and the moderating role of consumer mindset. Three experiments that used different service scenarios revealed that humanoid service robots negatively affected service evaluation compared to human employees, and this effect was mediated by decreased perceived effort. Furthermore, this negative impact was attenuated when consumers had a concrete mindset compared to abstract. This work contributes to both consumer service and robot literature by elaborating on the possible adverse influence of replacing human employees with humanoid service robots. It also offers managerial implications for how and when to adopt a robot service in this machine age.     

False memory and the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis: the prototype-familiarity illusion

According to the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis (B. W. A. Whittlesea & L. D. Williams, 1998), people experience a feeling of familiarity when they perceive their processing to be surprising, but for an indefinite reason. This hypothesis has been successful in explaining several illusions of familiarity. Here, it is applied to the prototype-familiarity effect, an illusion of remembering that occurs when people are shown prototype words after studying lists of associates. The experiments showed that studying associates enhances semantic, but not perceptual, processing of prototypes. They also showed that claims of recognizing prototypes can be modified by presenting them in predictive or incongruous contexts at test. The evidence suggests that the effect results from an evaluation process that monitors the coherence of processing.     

Perception of the stereokinetic illusion by the common marmoset (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Callithrix jacchus</Emphasis>)

Stereokinetic illusions have never been investigated in non-human primates, nor in other mammalian species. These illusions consist in the perception of a 3D solid object when certain 2D stimuli are rotated slowly in the plane perpendicular to the line of sight. The ability to perceive the stereokinetic illusion was investigated in the common marmoset (Callithrix jacchus). Four adult marmosets were trained to discriminate between a solid cylinder and a solid cone for food reward. Once learning criterion was reached, the marmosets were tested in sets of eight probe trials in which the two solid objects used at training were replaced by two rotating 2D stimuli. Only one of these stimuli produced, at least to the human observer, the stereokinetic illusion corresponding to the solid object previously reinforced. At test, the general behaviour and the total time spent by the marmosets observing each stimulus were recorded. The subjects stayed longer near the stimulus producing the stereokinetic illusion corresponding to the solid object reinforced at training than they did near the illusion corresponding to the previously non-rewarded stimulus. Hence, the common marmosets behaved as if they could perceive stereokinetic illusions.     

Sartre and Spinoza on the nature of mind

What surfaces first when one examines the philosophy of mind of Sartre and Spinoza are the differences between them. For Spinoza a human mind is a mode of the divine mind. That view is a far cry from Sartre’s view of human consciousness as a desire never achieved: the desire to be god, to be the foundation of one’s own existence. How could two philosophers, one a determinist and the other who grounds human freedom in the nature of consciousness itself, be seen as having any commonalities worth exploring? How could the noted user of the deductive method and one of the most important phenomenologists of the twentieth century share any philosophical ground at all? I will argue in this paper that despite the very real differences between their two philosophies, there are striking similarities between Sartre’s view of consciousness and Spinoza’s view of the mind. They become apparent when one examines each one’s analysis of the nature of mind and its relationship to itself, the body, and the world. Both are heir to a kind of Aristotelian naturalism. This commonality between them derives from their mutual rejection of Descartes’ substance dualism. I first explore the consequences of that rejection on how each one conceives of the relationship between the mind and its objects. Next I examine their view of the mind’s relation to itself and finally I look at how each one understood the mind’s relationship to the body and the world. The examination of their two views reveals how much they anticipate and support theories of mind defended by contemporary analytic philosophers of mind.     

A visually induced illusion of body tilt in a horizontal plane

Unexpected spontaneous reports of an illusion of body orientation have been observed in previous studies on the effects of a tilted overhead frame on supine observers. The present studies were designed in an attempt to describe and measure this illusion. The findings suggest that when objectively aligned with invisible side walls of the room, some subjects may experience an illusion that they are tilted in a horizontal plane with respect to the room walls in the direction opposite to frame tilt from the longitudinal body axes. The results are discussed in terms of a model of visual-vestibular interactions.     

Shared representations in body perception

The ability to understand events that happen to other people is a characteristic feature of the human mind. Here, we investigate whether the links between mental representation of one's own body and the bodies of other people could form the basis of human social representations. We studied interpersonal body representation (IBR) in a series of behavioural cueing experiments. Subjects responded to tactile events on their own body after a visual event was presented in either the corresponding anatomical location on a model's body, or in a non-corresponding location. We found that reactions were faster when the visual cue was in register with the tactile stimulation. This effect was absent when identical visual events were presented on a non-body control stimulus, suggesting a body specific mechanism for interpersonal registration of purely sensory events. Similar interpersonal systems have been demonstrated previously for the coding of action and emotion, but we believe that our results provide the first behavioural evidence for interpersonal body representation at the purely sensory level. We show that a sensory processing mechanism specific for bodies is automatically activated when viewing another person. Interpersonal body representation may be an important precursor to empathy and theory of mind. In our social world, we understand the percepts of others by registering them against the representations used to perceive our own body, and this mechanism involves an interpersonal somatotopic map.