The role of Social Value Orientation in response to an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game

Two studies examined the influence of Social Value Orientation (SVO) on the decision to accept or reject an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game (UG). In both studies, participants with different SVOs (Prosocials, Individualists and Competitors), measured about 3 weeks prior to the UG, responded to an offer of “$8 for Proposer, $2 for Participant”, believing it came from a human Proposer. In both studies Prosocials accepted the offer more frequently than Individualists and Competitors, who did not differ. Further, we found that SVO differences in positive emotions in response to the offer (Study 1), and positive cognitions toward the offer and the proposer (Study 2) underlie the SVO effect on UG decision, suggesting a role for SVO differences in the utilization of emotion regulation strategies. Implications of the present findings for “altruistic punishment” and “emotions/self-regulation” accounts as motivators of UG decisions are discussed.     

The consequences of mimicry for prosocials and proselfs: Effects of social value orientation on the mimicry–liking link

People often mimic each other's behaviors. As a consequence, they share each other's emotional and cognitive states, which facilitates liking. Mimicry, however, does not always affect liking. In two studies, we investigate whether the mimicry–liking link is influenced by people's social value orientations. More specifically, we examine whether prosocials and proselfs are differently affected when being mimicked or not. Prosocials and proselfs indicated their liking for the interaction partner after being or not being mimicked in a face‐to‐face interaction. The results of two studies showed that prosocials rated the interaction partner as less likeable when they were not mimicked than when they were mimicked. Proselfs, however, were not affected by mimicry. These results show that people's social motives play a role in whether or not the effects of mimicry on liking occur: Proselfs are less sensitive to the mimicry acts of others. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When do primes prime? The moderating role of the self-concept in individuals’ susceptibility to priming effects on social behavior

Using cooperative behavior in economic decision-making settings, we predicted and found that people’s susceptibility to priming influences is moderated by two factors: people’s chronic accessibility to a behavioral repertoire and people’s self-concept activation. In Experiment 1, we show that individuals highly consistent in their social value orientation (SVO) assimilate their behavior to their dispositions rather than to the primes, whereas the opposite effect is obtained among individuals with a low consistent SVO. In Experiment 2, we show that low consistent SVO individuals become less susceptible to priming influences when their self-concept is activated. These studies shed new light on individuals’ susceptibility to priming influences on social behavior.     

线索类型对阈下注视线索效应的影响

实验结合连续闪烁抑制范式和线索化范式, 通过操纵直视面孔和斜视面孔的呈现方式, 考察了动静线索类型对注视线索效应的影响。结果表明：两种线索在阈上条件都能产生注视线索效应, 且动态线索诱发的效应更大; 无意识条件下有且仅有动态注视线索能诱发注视线索效应。这说明眼睛运动是产生阈下注视线索效应的必要条件; 眼睛运动会增强阈上注视线索效应, 静态注视线索效应依赖于意识。研究结果支持了社会知觉与心理理论交互模型。     

Group transformation: How demonstrability promotes intra-group cooperation in social dilemmas

Intra-group cooperation in a social dilemma is increased after a group has discussed and reached a decision, especially if the dilemma is easily understood (‘demonstrable’). This paper examines how demonstrability affects the decision of a group that consists entirely of participants who are initially non-cooperative. Thirty-eight 6-person groups with unanimous prior preference for cooperation or non-cooperation discussed a prisoner’s dilemma before making a group decision. When demonstrability was low groups reflected the prior (either cooperative or non-cooperative) preferences of their members. When demonstrability was high we found that groups showed no effect of prior preference. Specifically, groups of prior non-cooperators made more cooperative group decisions and subsequently their members remained cooperative when asked to express preferences individually. The combined advantages of group process and high demonstrability for facilitating optimal cooperation are discussed.     

Fairness considerations: Increasing understanding of intentionality during adolescence

The development of fairness considerations in decision making is not well understood. Here we tested the hypothesis that increased understanding of intentionality during adolescence underlies increased fairness considerations in social decision making. We conducted three experiments using an adapted version of the Ultimatum Game with participants during four stages of adolescence: 9, 12, 15, and 18 years of age. Participants made or evaluated monetary offers, and we manipulated the intentionality context of offers. Results show that strategic thinking is already present at 9 years of age. There was no age difference in fairness of offers when the responder could not reject an offer (Experiment 1), but when they could reject an offer there was an age-related increase in taking into account the perspective and intentionality of other players when making offers (Experiment 2) and evaluating offers (Experiment 3). Taken together, the results demonstrate a linear developmental transition in fairness considerations that may have important implications for our understanding of social interactions during adolescence.     

注意资源对正常人消极情绪偏向的影响

本研究以正常人为研究对象,分别采用词汇判断任务和后掩蔽范式,以两个行为实验考察了阈上/阈下两种情况下,注意资源的多少对消极情绪偏向的影响.结果发现,在阈上条件下,只有当注意资源缺乏时,才能出现消极情绪偏向;在阈下条件下,无论注意资源多少,都没有出现消极情绪偏向.表明消极情绪偏向在正常人中的出现不是"无条件的",而是受到注意资源多少的影响.     

Anxiety and the interpretation of ambiguous information: beyond the emotion-congruent effect

The authors investigated how anxiety influences the use of contextual information in the resolution of ambiguity. Participants heard ambiguous homophones (threat/neutral, positive/neural, and neutral/neutral) with related contextual information. State anxiety was manipulated experimentally. The interpretations of anxious participants were influenced by context to a greater extent than those of control participants. Some mood-incongruent effects were observed where anxious participants were more likely to adopt neutral interpretations of potentially threatening stimuli. Effects were observed in a spelling task (Experiments 1 and 2) and in a lexical decision task (Experiment 3), with supraliminal, and subliminal presentation of contextual cues, and with 2 different anxiety-induction procedures. Results show how anxiety affects both the content and the process of resolution of ambiguity.     

Social Beliefs and Visual Attention: How the Social Relevance of a Cue Influences Spatial Orienting

We are highly tuned to each other's visual attention. Perceiving the eye or hand movements of another person can influence the timing of a saccade or the reach of our own. However, the explanation for such spatial orienting in interpersonal contexts remains disputed. Is it due to the social appearance of the cue—a hand or an eye—or due to its social relevance—a cue that is connected to another person with attentional and intentional states? We developed an interpersonal version of the Posner spatial cueing paradigm. Participants saw a cue and detected a target at the same or a different location, while interacting with an unseen partner. Participants were led to believe that the cue was either connected to the gaze location of their partner or was generated randomly by a computer (Experiment 1), and that their partner had higher or lower social rank while engaged in the same or a different task (Experiment 2). We found that spatial cue‐target compatibility effects were greater when the cue related to a partner's gaze. This effect was amplified by the partner's social rank, but only when participants believed their partner was engaged in the same task. Taken together, this is strong evidence in support of the idea that spatial orienting is interpersonally attuned to the social relevance of the cue—whether the cue is connected to another person, who this person is, and what this person is doing—and does not exclusively rely on the social appearance of the cue. Visual attention is not only guided by the physical salience of one's environment but also by the mental representation of its social relevance.     

Social Value Orientation Moderates the Effects of Intuition versus Reflection on Responses to Unfair Ultimatum Offers

We investigated whether social value orientation (SVO) moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective information processing on responses to unfair offers. We measured SVO one week prior to an ultimatum game experiment in which participants had to accept or reject a series of 10 ultimatum offers including very low (unfair) ones. Before making these decisions, participants mentally contrasted their individual goals with the obstacle of pondering at length or acting in a hasty way; then they made the plan to adopt an intuitive or a reflective mode of processing (intuitive and reflective condition, respectively), or made no such plans (control condition). Participants with rather high (prosocial) SVO scores were more likely to accept unfair offers in the reflective than the intuitive condition. This effect also evinced for a subset of selfish individuals; however, the majority with rather low (selfish) scores made similar decisions in both conditions. This pattern of results suggests that SVO moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective modes of processing on responses to low ultimatum offers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social Value Orientation and information search in social dilemmas: An eye-tracking analysis

Previous work has demonstrated that Social Value Orientation (SVO) is related to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. However, little is known concerning the underlying processes. In two eye-tracking studies investigating decisions in money allocation tasks (Experiment 1) and Public Good Dilemmas (Experiment 2), we show that differences in SVO are accompanied by consistent differences in information search. Decision time, number of fixations, the proportion of inspected information, the degree of attention towards the others’ payoffs, and the number of transitions from and towards others’ payoffs gradually increase with absolute SVO deviation from a pure selfish orientation. Overall these effects seem to be similar for individuals caring positively (i.e., cooperative) or negatively (i.e., competitive) about others. The fact that changes are gradual instead of abrupt indicates that differences in SVO seem to be related to gradual changes in weights given to outcomes for self and others.     

阈下奖励调节认知控制的权衡

本研究采用奖励版的AX-CPT任务, 通过控制奖励线索和反馈的呈现方式, 设置出基线、阈上奖励、阈下奖励三种条件, 考察习得的奖励联结和奖励动机能否以潜意识的方式影响认知任务的表现和认知控制的权衡。结果显示：奖励线索只在阈上呈现时提高AX序列的任务表现; 与基线条件相比, 阈上和阈下奖励条件下认知控制的权衡均偏向主动性控制, 且这种偏向在两者间无显著差异。这表明习得的阈下奖励线索可以调节认知控制的权衡, 使被试像阈上奖励时那样偏向主动性控制。     

Neural correlates of subliminal and supraliminal letter processing--an event-related fMRI study

One problem of interpreting research on subconscious processing is the possibility that participants are weakly conscious of the stimuli. Here, we compared the fMRI BOLD response in healthy adults to clearly visible single letters (supraliminal presentation) with the response to letters presented in the absence of any behavioural evidence of visibility (subliminal presentation). No letter catch trials served as a control condition. Forced-choice responses did not differ from chance when letter-to-background contrast was low, whereas they were almost 100% correct when contrast was high. A comparison of fMRI BOLD signals for supraliminal and subliminal letters with the control trials revealed a signal increase in left BA 37 (fusiform gyrus). Comparison of supraliminal with subliminal letters showed a significant increase in the right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44, partly extending to BA 9 and BA 45, as well as BA 46). Finally, a comparison of subliminal with supraliminal letters showed increases in the left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) and the right extrastriate cortex (BA 19).     

Unconscious reward cues increase invested effort,but do not change speed–accuracy tradeoffs

While both conscious and unconscious reward cues enhance effort to work on a task, previous research also suggests that conscious rewards may additionally affect speed–accuracy tradeoffs. Based on this idea, two experiments explored whether reward cues that are presented above (supraliminal) or below (subliminal) the threshold of conscious awareness affect such tradeoffs differently. In a speed–accuracy paradigm, participants had to solve an arithmetic problem to attain a supraliminally or subliminally presented high-value or low-value coin. Subliminal high (vs. low) rewards made participants more eager (i.e., faster, but equally accurate). In contrast, supraliminal high (vs. low) rewards caused participants to become more cautious (i.e., slower, but more accurate). However, the effects of supraliminal rewards mimicked those of subliminal rewards when the tendency to make speed–accuracy tradeoffs was reduced. These findings suggest that reward cues initially boost effort regardless of whether or not people are aware of them, but affect speed–accuracy tradeoffs only when the reward information is accessible to consciousness.     

Correcting socially introduced false memories: The effect of re-study

This study examined whether participants could utilize re-study and perceptual elaboration to correct erroneous suggestions from their partner in the social contagion of memory paradigm. Participants studied household scenes and then collaboratively recalled the scenes with a confederate who interjected erroneous items. Before completing subsequent individual recall and recognition tests, participants were allowed to re-study the original items and/or to generate perceptual details of the items. Across two experiments, participants who re-studied the original material were less likely to incorporate the confederate's misleading suggestions. Re-study reduced false recall and recognition and increased veridical recall and recognition (Experiment 1) and the effect was especially pronounced with longer re-study episodes (Experiment 2). Items generated on the perceptual elaboration test offered no corrective benefit above and beyond the effects of re-study. These data demonstrate that participants can rely on self-initiated correction processes engaged during re-study to reduce socially suggested false memories.     

Don’t make me angry,you wouldn’t like me when I’m angry: Volitional choices to act or inhibit are modulated by subliminal perception of emotional faces

Volitional action and self-control—feelings of acting according to one’s own intentions and in being control of one’s own actions—are fundamental aspects of human conscious experience. However, it is unknown whether high-level cognitive control mechanisms are affected by socially salient but nonconscious emotional cues. In this study, we manipulated free choice decisions to act or withhold an action by subliminally presenting emotional faces: In a novel version of the Go/NoGo paradigm, participants made speeded button-press responses to Go targets, withheld responses to NoGo targets, and made spontaneous, free choices to execute or withhold the response for Choice targets. Before each target, we presented emotional faces, backwards masked to render them nonconscious. In Intentional trials, subliminal angry faces made participants more likely to voluntarily withhold the action, whereas fearful and happy faces had no effects. In a second experiment, the faces were made supraliminal, which eliminated the effects of angry faces on volitional choices. A third experiment measured neural correlates of the effects of subliminal angry faces on intentional choice using EEG. After replicating the behavioural results found in Experiment 1, we identified a frontal-midline theta component—associated with cognitive control processes—which is present for volitional decisions, and is modulated by subliminal angry faces. This suggests a mechanism whereby subliminally presented “threat” stimuli affect conscious control processes. In summary, nonconscious perception of angry faces increases choices to inhibit, and subliminal influences on volitional action are deep seated and ecologically embedded.     

Deciding to defect: the effects of video-game violence on cooperative behavior

This experiment examined the effect of video-game violence on cooperative decision making. Participants (N= 48) were randomly assigned to play either a violent or a nonviolent version of the video game Doom in dyads. Following the video-game task, participants were separated and given an opportunity to choose to cooperate with their partner for mutual gain, withdraw from the interaction, or exploit their partner for their own benefit. Participants in the violent condition were significantly more likely to choose to exploit their partners than participants in the nonviolent condition. These findings suggest that playing violent video games may undermine prosocial motivation and promote exploitive behavior in social interactions.     

无意识自我控制目标启动对自我损耗的补偿效应

本研究基于对无意识目标启动的研究,采用阈上、阈下启动方式探讨无意识目标启动对自我损耗的补偿作用。实验1发现,阈上无意识目标启动能够有效提高自我控制,促进自控表现。实验2发现,阈下无意识目标启动对自我损耗存在补偿效应。上述结果提示,通过无意识启动方式激活自我控制目标,可以克服自我损耗的不良效应,且无需意识参与。     

价值取向对自我他人决策时公平规范执行的影响

社会价值取向反映了人们对自己和他人分配结果的一种稳定偏好,影响着个体对提议公平性的认知及规范执行。同时,自我-他人决策差异也是影响规范执行的重要因素,但目前尚不清楚价值取向和社会距离如何影响公平规范执行。本研究选取了20名合作者和20名个人主义者,使用单次匿名最后通牒博弈任务,考察了资产分配情景中价值取向对自我-他人决策时公平规范执行的影响。结果表明：（1）相比自我决策条件,合作者在替他人决策时更多的接受不公平提议,而公平提议的接受率不受社会距离的调节;个人主义者的提议接受率则不受社会距离和提议类型的交互影响;（2）合作者替他人决策时的接受阈限显著高于自我决策,而个人主义者在自我决策和替他人决策时的接受阈限无显著差异。这些结果表明价值取向能够调节自我-他人决策时,人们对不公平提议的规范执行。