Children’s first and second-order false-belief reasoning in a verbal and a low-verbal task

We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief tasks. In this study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people.     

Empathy and feedback processing in active and observational learning

The feedback-related negativity (FRN) and the P300 have been related to the processing of one’s own and other individuals’ feedback during both active and observational learning. The aim of the present study was to elucidate the role of trait-empathic responding with regard to the modulation of the neural correlates of observational learning in particular. Thirty-four healthy participants completed an active and an observational learning task. On both tasks, the participants’ aim was to maximize their monetary gain by choosing from two stimuli the one that showed the higher probability of reward. Participants gained insight into the stimulus–reward contingencies according to monetary feedback presented after they had made an active choice or by observing the choices of a virtual partner. Participants showed a general improvement in learning performance on both learning tasks. P200, FRN, and P300 amplitudes were larger during active, as compared with observational, learning. Furthermore, nonreward elicited a significantly more negative FRN than did reward in the active learning task, while only a trend was observed for observational learning. Distinct subcomponents of trait cognitive empathy were related to poorer performance and smaller P300 amplitudes for observational learning only. Taken together, both the learning performance and event-related potentials during observational learning are affected by different aspects of trait cognitive empathy, and certain types of observational learning may actually be disrupted by a higher tendency to understand and adopt other people’s perspectives.     

Self-deception requires vagueness

The paper sets out to reveal conditions enabling diagnostic self-deception, people’s tendency to deceive themselves about the diagnostic value of their own actions. We characterize different types of self-deception in terms of the distinction between intervention and observation in causal reasoning. One type arises when people intervene but choose to view their actions as observations in order to find support for a self-serving diagnosis. We hypothesized that such self-deception depends on imprecision in the environment that allows leeway to represent one’s own actions as either observations or interventions. Four experiments tested this idea using a dot-tracking task. Participants were told to go as quickly as they could and that going fast indicated either above-average or below-average intelligence. Precision was manipulated by varying the vagueness in feedback about performance. As predicted, self-deception was observed only when feedback on the task used vague terms rather than precise values. The diagnosticity of the feedback did not matter.     

Self-other differences in children's perceptions about the causes of important events

Three studies examined differences between children's (ages 8-15) beliefs about the effectiveness of multiple internal and external causes for producing outcomes in their own lives versus in those of their peers. Differences specific to the school domain were found: Starting at age 11 or 12, children perceived internal causes as more important for others than for themselves; and only beliefs about the self related to perceived control. More strikingly, a sample of gifted children, who presumably receive social feedback that they are different from their peers, reported that (a) they exerted more control and possessed more ability than their peers and (b) other children knew less about the causes of school performance and had to rely more on effort and powerful others; only beliefs about the self correlated to cognitive performance. These results suggest that self-other differences are produced by both developmental change and environmental opportunities.     

Effects of Age and Control Beliefs on Resource Allocation During Reading Abstract

Past work suggests that a strong sense of control over one's cognitive ability is associated with higher levels of cognitive performance and that control beliefs may be even more important in later life, due to age-related declines in cognitive processes. However, less is known about the effects of control beliefs on encoding strategies, and whether these effects are comparable for younger and older adults. Participants were divided into high- (HC) and low- control (LC) beliefs groups based on their scores on the Personality in Intellectual-Aging Contexts Inventory. Participants then read relatively easy and difficult passages word-by-word on a computer for subsequent recall. The data suggest that among older, but not younger adults, control beliefs are particularly important when reading difficult passages. Findings as they relate to models of self-regulation and to implications for everyday functioning are discussed.     

Children’s prior experiences of their successes and failures modulate belief alignment

ABSTRACT

An ability to flexibly learn from others while at other times relying upon one’s own judgements is an important adaptive human capacity. The present research investigated how others’ epistemic states and prior experience of their own independent ability in a given task modulate young children’s selective learning. In particular, we asked whether 4-year-old children’s judgement concerning the location of a hidden object is modulated both by an informant’s knowledge states and by the absence/presence of a prior experience with a particular task. We found that the children were more likely to align their judgement according to the informant’s verbal report when the informant was knowledgeable than when she was ignorant – but only when they had explicitly experienced their own incapability to accurately guess an object’s location. The findings suggest that 4-year-old children are able to combine their own experience with others’ input to make their judgement.     

Young and older adults' beliefs about effective ways to mitigate age-related memory decline

This study investigated whether young and older adults vary in their beliefs about the impact of various mitigating factors on age-related memory decline. Eighty young (ages 18-23) and 80 older (ages 60-82) participants reported their beliefs about their own memory abilities and the strategies that they use in their everyday lives to attempt to control their memory. Participants also reported their beliefs about memory change with age for hypothetical target individuals who were described as using (or not using) various means to mitigate memory decline. There were no age differences in personal beliefs about control over current or future memory ability. However, the two age groups differed in the types of strategies they used in their everyday life to control their memory. Young adults were more likely to use internal memory strategies, whereas older adults were more likely to focus on cognitive exercise and maintaining physical health as ways to optimize their memory ability. There were no age differences in rated memory change across the life span in hypothetical individuals. Both young and older adults perceived strategies related to improving physical and cognitive health as effective means of mitigating memory loss with age, whereas internal memory strategies were perceived as less effective means for controlling age-related memory decline.     

Effects of feedback on the overestimated capacity to detect lies and the underestimated ability to tell lies

People tend to overestimate their capacity to detect lying in others and to underestimate their own ability to tell lies. These biases were demonstrated in a sample of 60 police officers. In a lie‐detection task, the officers evaluated their accuracy as high and were overconfident in their judgements. In fact, their performance was below chance level. Participants also received false feedback about their performance. When the feedback suggested that they had performed better than they thought, this further enhanced their perceived lie‐detection capacity and also increased their belief in their ability to conceal their own lies. When the feedback suggested they had performed worse than they thought, their ratings of both lie detection and their lie‐telling abilities were lowered. Results are discussed in terms of anchoring, availability, and the self‐assessment bias. On a practical level, the tendency of police interrogators to overestimate their ability to detect deception could change suspicion into certainty and increase the risk of a false confession. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Two‐year‐olds’ understanding of self‐symbols

This study investigated 48 2.5‐year‐olds’ ability to map from their own body to a two‐dimensional self‐representation and also examined relations between parents’ talk about body representations and their children's understanding of self‐symbols. Children participated in two dual‐representation tasks in which they were asked to match body parts between a symbol and its referent. In one task, they used a self‐symbol and in the other they used a symbol for a doll. Participants were also read a book about body parts by a parent. As a group, children found the self‐symbol task more difficult than the doll‐task; however, those whose parents explicitly pointed out the relation between their children's bodies and the symbols in the book performed better on the self‐symbol task. The findings demonstrate that 2‐year‐old children have difficulty comprehending a self‐symbol, even when it is two‐dimensional and approximately the same size as them, and suggest that parents’ talk about self‐symbols may facilitate their understanding.     

Encouraging performance monitoring promotes proactive control in children

Monitoring progression towards one's goals is essential for efficient cognitive control. Immature performance monitoring may contribute to suboptimal cognitive control engagement in childhood, potentially explaining why children engage control reactively even when proactive control would be more effective. This study investigated whether encouraging children to actively monitor their performance results in more mature control engagement. Electroencephalography data were collected while children and adults performed a flanker task in three conditions in which they were provided no feedback, standard feedback, or were asked to estimate their own feedback. Both age groups accurately estimated their own feedback. Critically, feedback estimation promoted online performance monitoring and proactive engagement of attention and inhibition during the flanker period in children. These findings indicate that proactive control engagement in childhood can be effectively supported by encouraging performance monitoring.     

Changes in Anxiety Control Beliefs Following a Brief CBT Treatment and Their Association With Anxiety Symptom Reduction

Anxiety control beliefs (i.e., beliefs regarding one’s ability to cope with external, fear-inducing threats and internal reactions to those perceived threats) have been found to negatively predict anxiety symptoms in children and adults and to be modifiable by cognitive-behavioral therapy for anxiety disorders. The current study examines whether changes in anxiety control beliefs were seen following a brief, intensive treatment for specific phobias, and whether those changes were associated with improvements in the targeted phobia and comorbid anxiety disorder symptoms. Participants were 135 children and adolescents (M age = 9.01 years, 49% male) who received one-session treatment (OST) with or without parental involvement for their primary specific phobia. Results indicated that self-reported anxiety control beliefs significantly increased following treatment and that these increases significantly predicted reductions in specific phobia severity and symptoms of comorbid anxiety disorders 6 months and 1 year following treatment. Findings illustrate that involvement in a single 3-hour OST was associated with changes in anxiety control beliefs and demonstrate the potential importance of targeting control beliefs in pediatric anxiety treatment.     

The Role of Excess Cognitive Capacity in the Relationship Between Job Characteristics and Cognitive Task Engagement

A model is presented in which two categories of individual differences, differences related to task capacity and differences related to task motivation, are proposed to influence the relationship between task characteristics and cognitive task engagement. It is proposed that task characteristics will interact with the performer’s task capacity to influence the excess cognitive capacity available to the task performer. To the degree one’s capabilities meet or exceed the demands of the job, excess cognitive capacity is more likely. The relationship between excess cognitive capacity and cognitive task engagement is then moderated by factors influencing one’s task motivation, and by cognitive and physical interventions if the excess capacity is actively utilized in a safe manner. If the excess cognitive capacity is safely utilized, or if task motivation is high, cognitive task engagement is more likely. Implications of the model for human resource management are discussed.     

Conflicting perspectives mediate the relation between parents’ and preschoolers’ self-referent mental state talk during collaboration

We examined the relations between the referent of parents and preschoolers’ mental state talk during a collaborative puzzle-solving task (N = 146 dyads; n = 81 3-year-olds, n = 65 4-year-olds). The results showed that parents’ references to their own knowledge and beliefs (self-referent cognitive talk), and references to their child’s knowledge and beliefs (child-referent cognitive talk) were both related to children’s (primarily self-referent) cognitive talk. We then tested whether any of the observed relations could be explained by the presence of conflicting perspectives within the collaborative interaction. Mediational analyses revealed that conflicting perspectives mediated the positive relation between parents’ production of self-referent cognitive talk and child cognitive talk. By contrast, the positive relation between parents’ production of child-referent cognitive talk and child cognitive talk did not depend on the presence of this type of conflict. These findings highlight an important mechanism through which parents’ references to their own mind might promote children’s developing mental state talk in collaborative contexts.     

Physician Bayesian updating from personal beliefs about the base rate and likelihood ratio

Whether humans can accurately make decisions in line with Bayes’ rule has been one of the most important yet contentious topics in cognitive psychology. Though a number of paradigms have been used for studying Bayesian updating, rarely have subjects been allowed to use their own preexisting beliefs about the prior and the likelihood. A study is reported in which physicians judged the posttest probability of a diagnosis for a patient vignette after receiving a test result, and the physicians’ posttest judgments were compared to the normative posttest calculated from their own beliefs in the sensitivity and false positive rate of the test (likelihood ratio) and prior probability of the diagnosis. On the one hand, the posttest judgments were strongly related to the physicians’ beliefs about both the prior probability as well as the likelihood ratio, and the priors were used considerably more strongly than in previous research. On the other hand, both the prior and the likelihoods were still not used quite as much as they should have been, and there was evidence of other nonnormative aspects to the updating, such as updating independent of the likelihood beliefs. By focusing on how physicians use their own prior beliefs for Bayesian updating, this study provides insight into how well experts perform probabilistic inference in settings in which they rely upon their own prior beliefs rather than experimenter-provided cues. It suggests that there is reason to be optimistic about experts’ abilities, but that there is still considerable need for improvement.     

Gender and the Choice of a Science Career: The Impact of Social Support and Possible Selves

This study examined the relationships among perceived social support, beliefs about how one would fare in a science career, and perceptions and choice of a career in science. Participants were 48 men and 33 women from the Midwestern United States who had been identified as gifted in mathematics and science and participated in a high school science enrichment program. They ranged in age from 24 to 28?years old, and the sample was predominantly White (83.3%). Participants completed an online measure approximately 10?years after the program ended examining their sources of support and beliefs about the self as a scientist to see how these variables influence perceptions of a science career and actual career. We expected that the relationship between perceived support from people and current job held would be mediated by participants’ beliefs about their personal life as a scientist in the future. Similarly, we expected that the relationship between a perceived supportive environment and having a science career would be mediated by participants’ beliefs about their career as a scientist in the future. Findings indicated that social support contributed directly to men’s and women’s ability to envision themselves in a future science career, which, in turn, predicted their interest in and motivation for a science career. No significant gender differences were found in the predictors of men’s and women’s perceptions and choice of a science career. Implications for recruitment of students into scientific majors and careers are discussed.     

Sense of agency in continuous action: Assistance-induced performance improvement is self-attributed even with knowledge of assistance

In a task involving continuous action to achieve a goal, the sense of agency increases with an improvement in task performance that is induced by unnoticed computer assistance. This study investigated how explicit instruction about the existence of computer assistance affects the increase of sense of agency that accompanies performance improvement. Participants performed a continuous action task in which they controlled the direction of motion of a dot to a goal by pressing keys. When instructions indicated the absence of assistance, the sense of agency increased with performance improvement induced by computer assistance, replicating previous findings. Interestingly, this increase of sense of agency was also observed even when instructions indicated the presence of assistance. These results suggest that even when a plausible cause of performance improvement other than one’s own action exists, the improvement can be misattributed to one’s own control of action, resulting in an increased sense of agency.     

Reflexively mindblind: Using theory of mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention

People commonly interpret others’ behavior in terms of the actors’ underlying beliefs, knowledge, or other mental states, thereby using their “theory of mind.” Two experiments suggest that using one’s theory of mind is a relatively effortful process. In both experiments, people reflexively used their own knowledge and beliefs to follow a speaker’s instruction, but only effortfully used their theory of mind to take into account a speaker’s intention to interpret those instructions. In Experiment 1, people with lower working memory capacity were less effective than people with larger working memory capacity in applying their theory of mind to interpret behavior. In Experiment 2, an attention-demanding secondary task reduced people’s ability to apply their theory of mind. People appear to be reflexively mindblind, interpreting behavior in terms of the actor’s mental states only to the extent that they have the cognitive resources to do so.     

Stopping anger and anxiety: Evidence that inhibitory ability predicts negative emotional responding

Research has begun to suggest that cognitive ability contributes to emotional processes and responses. The present study sought novel evidence for this hypothesis by examining the relationship between individual differences in the capacity for inhibitory control and responses to a common emotion-induction procedure involving autobiographical memories. Participants first completed a stop-signal task to measure inhibitory control and then underwent an anger, anxiety, or neutral emotion induction. Performance on the stop-signal task predicted emotional responses such that participants with poorer inhibitory control reported larger increases in anger following the anger induction and larger increases in anxiety across emotion induction conditions, relative to better inhibitors. These results suggest that individual differences in cognitive ability may influence the intensity of emotional states induced by common laboratory methods of emotion induction.     

All you need is love: Is the sociometer especially sensitive to one's mating capacity?

Self‐esteem has been proposed to serve as a sociometer, a gauge of one's value as a relationship partner. Based on evolutionary reasoning, we hypothesized that the sociometer is particularly sensitive to “capacity rejection” in the mating domain. Capacity rejection implies that one has low potential to be an acceptable mate now and in the future. In Study 1, participants received no feedback or negative feedback regarding their capacity for being an acceptable mate or friend. Although participants in both mate and friend conditions felt rejected, only those in the mate condition exhibited significantly lower state self‐esteem. In Study 2, we examined sex differences in attributes relevant to mate capacity. Participants were given no feedback or negative feedback regarding their capacity as a mate: Some were told that their low mate capacity is due to their physical attractiveness whereas others were told it is due to their competence and status. Among men, state self‐esteem was lower only after competence and status‐based rejection; among women, state self‐esteem was lower only after physical attractiveness‐based rejection. In both studies, additional results revealed that even while self‐esteem decreased, positive beliefs about the self were maintained, suggesting that feelings and beliefs about the self react differently to rejection. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.