Agency, subjective time, and other minds

Intentional binding refers to a temporal attraction in the perceived times of actions and effects. So far, it has solely been investigated using judgments of the perceived time of actions or their effects. The authors report 3 experiments using an alternative method: the estimation of a time interval between a voluntary action and its subsequent effect. Interval estimates were obtained for intervals bounded by different kinds of actions and effects: The actions were either performed by the participants themselves or by the experimenter. The effects, in turn, were movements either applied to the body of the participant or to the experimenter. First, the results validated interval estimation as a method for exploring action awareness. Second, intentional binding was stronger for self-generated compared with observed actions, indicating that private information about the action contributes to action awareness. In contrast, intentional binding did not depend on whether a somatic effect was applied to the participant's or to another person's body. Third, for self-generated actions, external events gave rise to a stronger intentional binding than did somatic effects. This finding indicates that intentional binding especially links actions with their consequences in the external world.     

Subjective agency and awareness of shared actions

Voluntary actions and their distal effects are intimately related in conscious awareness. When an expected effect follows a voluntary action, the experience of the interval between these events is compressed in time, a phenomenon known as ‘intentional binding’ (IB). Current accounts of IB suggest that it serves to reinforce associations between our goals and our intention to attain these goals via action, and that IB only occurs for self-generated (i.e., intentional) actions. We used a novel approach to study IB in the context of shared intentions and actions. Pairs of participants judged the time of occurrence of actions and events attributed either to oneself or to another agent. We found that IB and subjective agency are not mutually predictive when an action can be attributed to only one of two ‘co-intending’ agents. Our results pose a complication for the prevailing view that IB and subjective agency reflect a common mechanism.     

Time in action contexts: learning when an action effect occurs

Action effects do not occur randomly in time but follow our actions at specific delays. The ideomotor principle (IMP) is widely used to explain how the relation between actions and contingently following effects is acquired and numerous studies demonstrate robust action-effect learning. Yet, little is known about the acquisition of temporal delays of action effects. Here, we demonstrate that participants learn that action effects occur at specific delays. Participants responded slower to action effects that occurred earlier than usual. In addition, participants often prematurely responded before the effect when it occurred later than expected. Thus, in contrast to biases of time perception in action contexts (e.g., Haggard, Trends Cogn Sci 9:290–295, 2005; Stetson et al., Neuron 51:651–659, 2006), participants learn and exploit temporal regularities between actions and effects for behavioral control.     

Re-construction of action awareness depends on an internal model of action-outcome timing

The subjective time of an instrumental action is shifted towards its outcome. This temporal binding effect is partially retrospective, i.e., occurs upon outcome perception. Retrospective binding is thought to reflect post-hoc inference on agency based on sensory evidence of the action – outcome association. However, many previous binding paradigms cannot exclude the possibility that retrospective binding results from bottom-up interference of sensory outcome processing with action awareness and is functionally unrelated to the processing of the action – outcome association. Here, we keep bottom-up interference constant and use a contextual manipulation instead. We demonstrate a shift of subjective action time by its outcome in a context of variable outcome timing. Crucially, this shift is absent when there is no such variability. Thus, retrospective action binding reflects a context-dependent, model-based phenomenon. Such top-down re-construction of action awareness seems to bias agency attribution when outcome predictability is low.     

Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action

The experience of causation is a pervasive product of the human mind. Moreover, the experience of causing an event alters subjective time: actions are perceived as temporally shifted towards their effects [Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382-385]. This temporal shift depends partly on advance prediction of the effects of action, and partly on inferential “postdictive” explanations of sensory effects of action. We investigated whether a single factor of statistical contingency could explain both these aspects of causal experience. We studied the time at which people perceived a simple manual action to occur, when statistical contingency indicated a causal relation between action and effect, and when no such relation was indicated. Both predictive and inferential “postdictive” shifts in the time of action depended on strong contingency between action and effect. The experience of agency involves a process of causal learning based on statistical contingency.     

Who is causing what? The sense of agency is relational and efferent-triggered

The sense of agency ("I did that") is a basic feature of our subjective experience. Experimental studies usually focus on either its attributional aspects (the "I" of "I did that") or on its motoric aspects (the "did" aspect of "I did that"). Here, we combine both aspects and focus on the subjective experience of the time between action and effect. Previous studies [Haggard, P., Aschersleben, G., Gehrke, J., & Prinz, W. (2002a). Action, binding and awareness. In W. Prinz, & B. Hommel (Eds.), Common mechanisms in perception and action: Attention and performance (Vol. XIX, pp. 266-285). Oxford: Oxford University Press] have shown a temporal attraction in the perceived times of actions and effects, but did directly not study the relation between them. In three experiments, time estimates of an interval between an action and its subsequent sensory effect were obtained. The actions were either voluntary key press actions performed by the participant or kinematically identical movements applied passively to the finger. The effects were either auditory or visual events or a passive movement induced to another finger. The results first indicated a shortening of the interval between one's own voluntary action and a subsequent effect, relative to passive movement conditions. Second, intervals initiated by observed movements, either of another person or of an inanimate object, were always perceived like those involving passive movements of one's own body, and never like those involving active movements. Third, this binding effect was comparable for auditory, somatic and visual effects of action. Our results provide the first direct evidence that agency involves a generalisable relation between actions and their consequences, and is triggered by efferent motor commands.     

Motor execution affects action prediction

Previous studies provided evidence of the claim that the prediction of occluded action involves real-time simulation. We report two experiments that aimed to study how real-time simulation is affected by simultaneous action execution under conditions of full, partial or no overlap between observed and executed actions. This overlap was analysed by comparing the body sides and the movement kinematics involved in the observed and the executed action. While performing actions, participants observed point-light (PL) actions that were interrupted by an occluder, followed by a test pose. The task was to judge whether the test pose depicted a continuation of the occluded action in the same depth angle. Using a paradigm proposed by Graf et al., we independently manipulated the duration of the occluder and the temporal advance of the test pose relative to occlusion onset (occluder time and pose time, respectively). This paradigm allows the assessment of real-time simulation, based on prediction performance across different occluder time/pose time combinations (i.e., improved task performance with decreasing time distance between occluder time and pose time is taken to reflect real-time simulation). The PL actor could be perceived as from the front or back, as indicated by task instructions. In Experiment 1 (front view instructions), evidence of action simulation was obtained for partial overlap (i.e., observed and performed action corresponded either in body side or movement kinematics), but not for full or no overlap conditions. The same pattern was obtained in Experiment 2 (back view instructions), ruling out a spatial compatibility explanation for the real-time pattern observed. Our results suggest that motor processes affect action prediction and real-time simulation. The strength of their impact varies as a function of the overlap between observed and executed actions.     

Biases in social comparisons: Optimism or pessimism?

Social comparisons typically lead to two kinds of biases: A comparative optimism bias (i.e., a tendency for people to view themselves as more likely than others to be the beneficiaries of positive outcomes) or a comparative pessimism bias (i.e., a tendency for people to view themselves as less likely than others to be such beneficiaries); rarely are people fully calibrated in terms of how they compare to others. However, there is little systematic research on the factors that determine when a comparative optimism versus pessimism bias will occur, how they can be attenuated and whether such attenuation is always desirable. In this paper, we report four studies which demonstrate the following key results: First, we show that perceived level of control over the outcome drives whether a comparative optimism or pessimism bias will occur (Study 1). Second, an increase in perceived similarity between self and a comparison target person attenuates the comparative optimism bias in domains that people view as highly controllable (Study 2a) and attenuates the comparative pessimism bias in domains that people view as less controllable (Study 2b). Finally, we show that people are willing to work harder when they experience more comparative optimism in higher control scenarios and when they experience less comparative pessimism in lower control scenarios, illustrating that motivating people to strive harder for positive outcomes can result from exacerbated or attenuated bias, depending on the context (Study 3).     

Effects of self-generated versus experimenter-provided cues on the representation of future events

Most experimental studies of prospection focused on episodic forms of future events prompted by means of verbal cues. However, there is evidence suggesting that future events differ considerably according to whether they are produced in response to external, experimenter-provided verbal cues or they are self-generated. In the present study, we compared the quality, the phenomenal characteristics, the temporal distribution, and the content of imagined events prompted by experimenter-provided cues (i.e., cue-words and short verbal sentences) or elicited by means of verbal cues that were self-generated in an autobiographical fluency task. The results showed that future events prompted by means of self-generated cues contained fewer event-specific details than future events prompted by experimenter-provided cues. However, future events elicited by means of self-generated and by experimenter-provided cues did not differ with respect to their phenomenal characteristics. The temporal distribution and the thematic content of future representations were also affected by the type of cue used to elicit prospection. These results offer a holistic view of the properties of future thinking and suggest that the content and the characteristics of envisioned future events may be affected by the method used to elicit prospection.     

What makes an event: Temporal integration of stimuli or actions?

In this article, we ask what serves as the “glue” that temporarily links information to form an event in an active observer. We examined whether forming a single action event in an active observer is contingent on the temporal presentation of the stimuli (hence, on the temporal availability of the action information associated with these stimuli), or on the learned temporal execution of the actions associated with the stimuli, or on both. A partial-repetition paradigm was used to assess the boundaries of an event for which the temporal properties of the stimuli (i.e., presented either simultaneously or temporally separate) and the intended execution of the actions associated with these stimuli (i.e., executed as one, temporally integrated, response or as two temporally separate responses) were manipulated. The results showed that the temporal features of action execution determined whether one or more events were constructed; the temporal presentation of the stimuli (and hence the availability of their associated actions) did not. This suggests that the action representation, or “task goal,” served as the “glue” in forming an event in an active observer. These findings emphasize the importance of action planning in event construction in an active observer.     

Remembering pride and shame: Self-enhancement and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory

People's self-images are grounded in autobiographical memories and, in particular, in the phenomenological experience associated with remembering. The desire to increase or maintain the positivity of the self-image (i.e., the self-enhancement motive) might thus play an important role in shaping memory phenomenology. This study examined this hypothesis by asking participants to recall positive and negative events that involve self-evaluations (i.e., pride and shame) and positive and negative events that involve evaluations about others (i.e., admiration and contempt); various phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensory details, feeling of re-experiencing) were assessed using rating scales. The results show a positivity bias (i.e., subjectively remembering positive events with more details than negative events) for events that involve self-evaluations but not for events that involve evaluations of others. In addition, this bias was stronger for people high in self-esteem. It is concluded that biases affecting the phenomenology of autobiographical memory are part of the arsenal of psychological mechanisms people use to maintain a positive self-image.     

Associations Between Social Anxiety and Affective and Empathic Forecasts: A Replication and Extension in a Mechanical Turk Sample

People often overestimate the intensity and duration of their future emotions, referred to as an impact bias. Impact biases have been documented in predictions people make about their own emotions, as well as the others’ emotions (i.e., affective and empathic forecasting, respectively). Recent studies have shown that negative impact biases may be stronger, and positive impact biases may be attenuated, in individuals with symptoms of social anxiety. The current study sought to replicate and extend these findings in a Mechanical Turk (MTurk) sample. MTurk is a particularly interesting online platform for such research because of the unusually high prevalence of social anxiety among MTurk users. Within a computer-based survey, 93 MTurk users read vignettes in which a second-person narrator elicited either disgust, anger, or happiness from another person. After each vignette, participants predicted how the narrator (i.e., affective forecasts) and the other person (i.e., empathic forecasts) would feel. Overall, results confirmed the existence of associations between social anxiety symptoms and negative affective and empathic forecasting biases, though no significant relations were found between social anxiety symptoms and positive forecasting biases. Negative affective and empathic forecasting biases were significantly correlated. Age and gender were also examined as potential predictors and moderators of hypothesized effects. Though younger age and female gender were associated with specific forecast ratings, controlling for these variables did not alter the associations between social anxiety and affective or empathic forecasts and no moderation effects were found. Overall, results provide additional support for the relevance of impact biases to social anxiety and suggest that they may be useful targets of intervention.     

Bias and learning in temporal binding: Intervals between actions and outcomes are compressed by prior bias

It has consistently been shown that agents judge the intervals between their actions and outcomes as compressed in time, an effect named intentional binding. In the present work, we investigated whether this effect is result of prior bias volunteers have about the timing of the consequences of their actions, or if it is due to learning that occurs during the experimental session. Volunteers made temporal estimates of the interval between their action and target onset (Action conditions), or between two events (No-Action conditions). Our results show that temporal estimates become shorter throughout each experimental block in both conditions. Moreover, we found that observers judged intervals between action and outcomes as shorter even in very early trials of each block. To quantify the decrease of temporal judgments in experimental blocks, exponential functions were fitted to participants’ temporal judgments. The fitted parameters suggest that observers had different prior biases as to intervals between events in which action was involved. These findings suggest that prior bias might play a more important role in this effect than calibration-type learning processes.     

The time course of intentional binding

Stimuli caused by actions (i.e., effects) are perceived earlier than stimuli not caused by actions. This phenomenon is termed intentional binding (IB) and serves as implicit measure of sense of agency. We investigated the influence of effect delay and temporal predictability on IB, operationalized as the bias to perceive the effect as temporally shifted toward the action. For short delays, IB increased with delay (Experiment 1: 200 ms, 250 ms, 300 ms). The initial increase declined for longer delays (Experiment 2: 100 ms, 250 ms, 400 ms). This extends previous findings showing IB to decrease with increasing delays for delay ranges of 250 ms to 650 ms. Further, the hypothesis that IB, that is, sense of agency, might be maximal for different delays depending on the specific characteristics and context of action and effect, has important implications for human-machine interfaces.     

Remembering pride and shame: self-enhancement and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory

People's self-images are grounded in autobiographical memories and, in particular, in the phenomenological experience associated with remembering. The desire to increase or maintain the positivity of the self-image (i.e., the self-enhancement motive) might thus play an important role in shaping memory phenomenology. This study examined this hypothesis by asking participants to recall positive and negative events that involve self-evaluations (i.e., pride and shame) and positive and negative events that involve evaluations about others (i.e., admiration and contempt); various phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensory details, feeling of re-experiencing) were assessed using rating scales. The results show a positivity bias (i.e., subjectively remembering positive events with more details than negative events) for events that involve self-evaluations but not for events that involve evaluations of others. In addition, this bias was stronger for people high in self-esteem. It is concluded that biases affecting the phenomenology of autobiographical memory are part of the arsenal of psychological mechanisms people use to maintain a positive self-image.     

Narcissus locked in the past: Vulnerable narcissism and the negative views of the past

We examined how the perception of past events might contribute to the understanding of vulnerable narcissism. Across seven samples (N_Grand = 1271), we investigated the association between vulnerable narcissism and individual differences in negative view of the past as well as how both were associated with basic personality traits, intrapersonal (i.e., affect, life satisfaction, and self-esteem) and interpersonal (i.e., anger, and hostility) outcomes, and memory biases of immediate life events and early life traumas. We found that vulnerable narcissism was reliably correlated with a negative view of the past. Additionally, both variables showed similar personality profiles (e.g., high neuroticism) and overlapped in explaining various outcomes, including self-esteem, anger, hostility, recalled traumas, and a negative memory bias.     

Enough skill to kill: Intentionality judgments and the moral valence of action

Extant models of moral judgment assume that an action’s intentionality precedes assignments of blame. Knobe (2003b) challenged this fundamental order and proposed instead that the badness or blameworthiness of an action directs (and thus unduly biases) people’s intentionality judgments. His and other researchers’ studies suggested that blameworthy actions are considered intentional even when the agent lacks skill (e.g., killing somebody with a lucky shot) whereas equivalent neutral actions are not (e.g., luckily hitting a bull’s-eye). The present five studies offer an alternative account of these provocative findings. We suggest that people see the morally significant action examined in previous studies (killing) as accomplished by a basic action (pressing the trigger) for which an unskilled agent still has sufficient skill. Studies 1 through 3 show that when this basic action is performed unskillfully or is absent, people are far less likely to view the killing as intentional, demonstrating that intentionality judgments, even about immoral actions, are guided by skill information. Studies 4 and 5 further show that a neutral action such as hitting the bull’s-eye is more difficult than killing and that difficult actions are less often judged intentional. When difficulty is held constant, people’s intentionality judgments are fully responsive to skill information regardless of moral valence. The present studies thus speak against the hypothesis of a moral evaluation bias in intentionality judgments and instead document people’s sensitivity to subtle features of human action.     

Cognitive biases in three prediction tasks: A test of the cognitive model of depression

Cognitive therapy for depression is based on an assumption that depressed individuals have inaccurate, negative biases. Whether this assumption is accurate remains unresolved. Thus, this study sought to examine the relationship between depressive symptoms and bias in three sets of predictions (i.e., predictions of future life events, how one would be rated by a significant other, and performance on a vocabulary test). Following study announcements made to a subset of people pre-screened for depressive symptoms, 85 participants with widely varying depressive symptoms (17 of whom met diagnostic criteria for depression) made predictions on three judgment tasks and the outcomes for these tasks were assessed. Optimistic/pessimistic biases were related to depressive symptoms for each of the three tasks. Participants with high levels of depressive symptoms and depressed participants exhibited substantial pessimistic bias. Those high in depressive symptoms exhibited significant pessimistic bias on all three tasks. Participants meeting diagnostic criteria for depression exhibited pessimistic bias on two of three tasks. There was no evidence that depressive symptoms were associated with greater accuracy in judgments. Results are largely consistent with cognitive models of depression which postulate that depression is associated with pessimistic biases.