On neuropsychoanalytic metaphysics

Neuropsychoanalysis focuses on the neural counterparts of psychoanalytically interesting phenomena and has left the difference in the metaphysical presuppositions between neuroscience and psychoanalysis unexamined. The authors analyse the logical possibilities concerning the relation between the brain and the mental unconscious in terms of the serial, parallel, epiphenomenalist and Kantian conceptions, and conclude that none of them provides a satisfactory ground for neuropsychoanalysis. As far as psychoanalytic explanations refer to the mental unconscious, they cannot be verified with the help of neuroscience. Neither is it possible to form a picture of how a neuro-viewpoint might be of help for psychoanalytic theorizing. Neuropsychoanalysis has occasionally been seen as a reductionist affair, but the authors suggest that neuropsychoanalysts themselves lean on the hybrid conception, which combines neuroscientific and psychoanalytic viewpoints. The authors state arguments in favour of the interfield conception of neuropsychoanalysis that takes seriously the metaphysical tensions between neuroscience and psychoanalysis.     

脑的感知觉无意识加工及其研究进展

该文从无意识加工与认知、脑结构,神经网络的关系等三个层面,阐述了近年来认知神经科学在无意识研究方面的进展。主要就无意识与意识的相互转化、无意识加工与认知层次、脑结构之间的关联性、突触的联结方式等问题进行了讨论,并对认知神经科学如何研究无意识与意识问题提出展望,     

Intracranial EEG power spectra and phase synchrony during consciousness and unconsciousness

Power density spectra and phase synchrony measurements were taken from intracranial electrode grids implanted in epileptic subjects. Comparisons were made between data from the waking state and from the period of unconsciousness immediately following a generalised tonic–clonic seizure. Power spectra in the waking state resembled coloured noise. Power spectra in the unconscious state resembled coloured noise from 1 to about 5 Hz, but at higher frequencies changed in two out of three subjects to resemble white noise. This boosted unconscious gamma power to a higher level than conscious gamma power. For both gamma and beta passbands, synchrony measurements showed more widespread phase synchrony in the unconscious than the conscious state. We conclude that neither gamma activity per se nor phase synchrony per se are neural correlates of consciousness.     

人工语法学习中意识加工的渐进发展

内隐学习研究致力于探讨学习活动的意识加工程度, 当前相关的研究逻辑从传统的意识二分观转向渐进意识假设。本研究通过对人工语法范式进行改造, 并借鉴加工分离程序的有关思想, 在学习阶段引入双重测量任务, 并根据双重任务成绩计算分离出相应学习时段的意识与无意识成分的贡献分数, 从而考察在内隐学习过程中两种加工成分的动态变化特征。研究结果支持渐进意识假设, 在学习进程中, 无意识成分和意识成分都呈现出渐进发展的趋势; 而随学习的深入, 两种成分呈现出不同的变化模式, 中后期意识加工快速增长, 无意识加工则保持平缓发展, 渐进意识系统整体呈现向外显学习推进的发展态势。     

Unconscious processing modulates creative problem solving: Evidence from an electrophysiological study

Previous behavioral studies have identified the significant role of subliminal cues in creative problem solving. However, neural mechanisms of such unconscious processing remain poorly understood. Here we utilized an event-related potential (ERP) approach and sandwich mask technique to investigate cerebral activities underlying the unconscious processing of cues in creative problem solving. College students were instructed to solve divergent problems under three different conditions (conscious cue, unconscious cue and no-cue conditions). Our data showed that creative problem solving can benefit from unconscious cues, although not as much as from conscious cues. More importantly, we found that there are crucial ERP components associated with unconscious processing of cues in solving divergent problems. Similar to the processing of conscious cues, processing unconscious cues in problem solving involves the semantic activation of unconscious cues (N280–340) in the right inferior parietal lobule (BA 40), new association formation (P350–450) in the right parahippocampal gyrus (BA 36), and mental representation transformation (P500–760) in the right superior temporal gyrus (BA 22). The present results suggest that creative problem solving can be modulated by unconscious processing of enlightening information that is weakly diffused in the semantic network beyond our conscious awareness.     

Psychic reality and the nature of consciousness

In this paper we make the case for a psychoanalytically informed reconsideration of the phenomena of consciousness. Classically, following Freud, who viewed consciousness as merely a reflection or perception of unconscious mental activity, psychoanalysts have tended to regard a focus on conscious experience as potentially reductionistic and at risk of overlooking the mind's deeper structures. We describe the case of Mr K, a patient who experienced disturbances of consciousness that forced us to consider the possibility that the capacity to experience ourselves as conscious, intentional agents in a coherent world of objects is not merely a modality of perception but rather a maturational and developmental achievement that to some degree depends on adequate experiences of caregiving and is vital in ensuring the possibility of human communication. As such, it is a capacity that is vulnerable to experiences of neglect and maltreatment. We suggest that as well as compromising the capacity to think about one's own and other people's feelings, such experiences may have the further adverse consequence of leading the individual to experience and risk becoming conscious of certain dangerously maladaptive, destructive states of mind which in normal development remain inaccessible to conscious experience. Phenomenologically, such states of mind are experienced as fragmentation and disturbances of consciousness. We discuss the clinical implications of these reflections and the limitations they place on psychoanalytic work in the context of their impact on the work with Mr K.     

Identifying neural correlates of consciousness: the state space approach

This article sketches an idealized strategy for the identification of neural correlates of consciousness. The proposed strategy is based on a state space approach originating from the analysis of dynamical systems. The article then focuses on one constituent of consciousness, phenomenal awareness. Several rudimentary requirements for the identification of neural correlates of phenomenal awareness are suggested. These requirements are related to empirical data on selective attention, on completely intrinsic selection and on globally unconscious states. As an example, neuroscientific findings on synchronized gamma activity are categorized according to these requirements.     

无意识元认知调控下的策略转换

通过两位数乘法算式答案判别任务研究无意识元认知调控下策略转换的的认知加工特征。整个算式答案判别任务分为两种策略使用情境：一种为只可以使用尾数策略的任务情境;另一种为既可以使用尾数策略,又可以使用奇偶策略的任务情境。实验结果表明：1）无意识元认知具有高选择性、高效性和高潜力,能在策略使用情境转变之后,快速察觉并选择使用更为简单、高效的奇偶策略;2）尾数策略使用的强大思维定势阻止奇偶策略的意识化,致使绝大多数被试未能发现任务情境的变化而在内隐状态下使用了奇偶策略;3）策略在内隐或外显状态下使用具有同等效力,策略内隐使用具有高效性和高潜力。     

Unconscious fantasy: a reconsideration of the concept

Despite general agreement about the clinical importance of unconscious fantasy, the concept itself has remained unclear. After reviewing Freud's work on the subject, the conceptual dilemma is specified: where in current psychoanalytic theory do we place this important, dynamically repressed, structuralized mental content? Three conceptual paths have been followed in attempting to deal with this problem. The first emphasizes the structural, tripartite model, discarding topographic concepts. The second replaces the structural model with a schema model borrowed from academic psychology. The third combines the structural and topographic models. None of these approaches is entirely satisfactory and without problems. Because of their central role in mental life, unconscious fantasies deserve careful definition. They should be distinguished from conscious fantasies and daydreams as well as from the process of fantasizing. They are differentiated from other varieties of unconscious content by their enduring quality and their organized, storylike quality reflecting the distortions typical of the primary process. As dynamically unconscious templates from the childhood past, they shape subsequent compromise formations and are relatively impervious to new experience. The development of psychoanalytic theory from a macrostructural to a microstructural emphasis is discussed in relation to the unconscious fantasy concept.     

The Unconsciously Constructed Virtual Other

Neuroscience has confirmed Freud's assertion of the primacy of unconscious process in relation to conscious experience. However, unconscious process, for many neuroscientists, is viewed as something that is devoid of meaning. This paper suggests that there are different levels of unconscious process. This conceptualization of unconscious process may help to reconcile the psychoanalytic assumption of a meaningful unconscious with the conception that unconscious process is a meaningless code, a belief held by most neuroscientists. To effect this reconciliation we must return to Freud's earlier theory of unconscious process as described in his Interpretation of Dreams. A dream-like unconscious process, employing metaphor, unconsciously organizes our affective experiences while we are awake.     

情绪面孔的意识神经相关物及其无意识自动加工：来自事件相关电位的证据

意识的神经相关物尚有争议, 且个体能否无意识自动检测视觉环境变化尚不清楚。本研究采用非注意视盲范式操控视觉意识, 并引入具有社会信息的情绪面孔, 探讨意识的神经相关物以及视觉意识与自动检测变化机制的关系。在A阶段, 部分被试对任务无关的情绪面孔处于无意识水平; 在B阶段, 所有被试对任务无关的情绪面孔处于意识水平; 在C阶段, 所有被试对任务相关的情绪面孔处于意识水平。结果显示, 任务无关的情绪面孔的意识过程诱发视觉意识负波(visual awareness negativity, VAN)、晚期正成分(late positivity, LP)和晚期枕区正成分(late occipital positivity, LOP)。此外, 无意识的情绪面孔能诱发视觉失匹配负波(visual mismatch negativity, vMMN), 且其幅值不受意识影响, 但是受任务相关性调制。这些结果提示对情绪面孔的视觉意识在不同的时间进程上有不同的ERP指标——VAN反映早期知觉经验, 而LP和LOP反映晚期意识过程, 而且面孔情绪信息的自动加工独立于视觉意识, 但是受视觉注意调制。     

ANALYTIC MIND USE AND INTERPSYCHIC COMMUNICATION: DRIVING FORCE IN ANALYTIC TECHNIQUE,PATHWAY TO UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL LIFE

Developed from established psychoanalytic knowledge among different psychoanalytic cultures concerning unconscious interpsychic communication, analysts' use of their receptive mental experience—their analytic mind use, including the somatic, unconscious, and less accessible derivatives—represents a significant investigative road to patients' unconscious mental life, particularly with poorly symbolized mental states. The author expands upon this tradition, exploring what happens when patients unconsciously experience and identify with the analyst's psychic functioning. The technical implications of the analyst's “instrument” are described, including the analyst's ego regression, creation of inner space, taking mind as object, bearing uncertainty and intense affect, and self‐analysis. Brief case vignettes illustrate the structure and obstacles to this work.     

阈下知觉研究中觉知状态测量方法的发展与启示

该文对近百年来围绕阈下知觉研究一直争论不休的觉知状态的测量方法进行了全面回顾,通过比较和分析在主观阈限和客观阈限以及不断改进后的其它觉知阈限测量方法条件下所获得的实验结果,并结合有关意识和无意识之间关系的理论假设,认为这种状况本身就否定了有关意识与无意识关系的排它观点。今后的研究应该跳出这一陷阱,并从无意识知觉如何影响有意识的行为以及阈下知觉的神经活动指标等方面开辟研究的新途径。     

人格特质对意识提取和无意识提取影响的实验研究

运用加工分离程序,该研究考察了神经质和内外倾对意识提取和无意识提取的影响,结果表明:1)被试的意识提取和无意识提取均存在显著个体差异;2)当意识与无意识分离以后,所有被试的无意识提取贡献都显著大于意识提取;3)神经质被试对正性词以及内外倾被试对外向词的无意识提取均有明显个体差异;4)内—外倾被试对相关特质词的意识提取的个体差异不如无意识提取显著。     

Nietzsche on the Nature of the Unconscious

Abstract

This paper argues that Nietzsche develops a novel and compelling account of the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states: he argues that conscious mental states are those with conceptual content, whereas unconscious mental states are those with nonconceptual content. I show that Nietzsche’s puzzling claim that consciousness is ‘superficial’ and ‘falsifying’ can be given a straightforward explanation if we accept this understanding of the conscious/unconscious distinction. I originally defended this view in my ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization’ (2005, European Journal of Philosophy 13: 1–31); since then, the view has come under criticism on several fronts. Brian Leiter and others suggest that there is not enough textual evidence for the view. In addition, Leiter, Mattia Riccardi and Tsarina Doyle argue that, rather than aligning the conscious/unconscious distinction with the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction, Nietzsche endorses a higher-order thought model of consciousness. Riccardi also objects that Nietzsche must treat some unconscious mental states as conceptual. In this essay, I defend the interpretation in light of these objections. I provide new textual evidence for the interpretation, show that Nietzsche extracted aspects of the view from Schopenhauer’s work on consciousness, consider the possibility that Nietzsche endorses a higher-order thought theory, and respond to Riccardi’s objection.     

Interpretive sensory-access theory and conscious intentions

It is typically assumed that while we know other people's mental states by observing and interpreting their behavior, we know our own mental states by introspection, i.e., without interpreting ourselves. In his latest book, The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge, Peter Carruthers [2011. The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues against this assumption. He holds that findings from across the cognitive sciences strongly suggest that self-knowledge of conscious propositional attitudes such as intentions, judgments, and decisions involves a swift and unconscious process of self-interpretation that utilizes the same sensory channels that we employ when working out other people's mental states. I provide an overview of Carruthers’ book before discussing a pathological case that challenges his account of self-knowledge and mentioning empirical evidence that undermines his use of a particular kind of data in his case against introspection of conscious attitudes.     

Disability versus futility in rationing health care services: defining medical futility based on permanent unconsciousness--PVS,coma, and anencephaly

All societies must ration health care services in the face of unlimited demand. The concept of medical futility may appear to be an uncontroversial means by which to ration services. Depending upon how it is applied, however, limiting services based on alleged medical futility may violate prohibitions against disability-based discrimination. In particular, use of medical futility to require removal of life-sustaining interventions has been held to violate the Americans with Disabilities Act. The ADA protects both people with disabilities who are conscious and people in unconscious states, such as permanent vegetative state (PVS), coma, and anencephaly. Ultimately, as the number of people in permanently unconscious states increases, our society will have to recognize that consciousness is an essential characteristic defining human beings and determining whether a legal right to unlimited life-sustaining intervention should apply. This article proposes to define medical futility to preclude life-sustaining interventions after a stated period of permanent unconsciousness and to redefine the end of life consistently as neocortical death.     

The unconscious

A discussion of the unconscious leads naturally to Freud and to a theory on subjectivity we may designate as de-centred. The unconscious reminds us that not only do we not know ourselves. In the core of our subjectivity, we have to acknowledge the notion of otherness. Re-reading Freud's text, The Unconscious, from 1915, the current author emphasises the character and function of the unconscious as radically different from what we know about conscious processes. This allows for the concept of the preconscious, which the author links to Winnicott's intermediary area and Green's tertiary processes. Taking as point of departure Freud's differentiation of word presentation and thing presentation, the author points to Freud's introduction of the term thing-cathexies of the object as designating the primal psychic representation. The Freudian perspective is broadened, encompassing the notion of otherness as discussed by Laplanche and Aulagnier. Concluding the paper, the author draws some implications for psychoanalytic technique, focusing especially on transference.     

无意识活动与静息态脑能量消耗

静息态脑活动的研究关注个体在清醒、静卧、闭眼时脑的活动情况,大量实验证明静息状态下大脑仍进行着持续不断的信息加工活动,并且消耗大量能量。本文在阐述无意识活动特性以及总结静息态脑能量消耗研究的基础上,提出用无意识活动解释静息态脑能量消耗的观点,强调在研究无意识活动的心理意义的同时,还要研究无意识活动的神经机制及其生理表现。     

What is unconsciousness in a fly or a worm? A review of general anesthesia in different animal models

All animals are rendered unresponsive by general anesthetics. In humans, this is observed as a succession of endpoints from memory loss to unconsciousness to immobility. Across animals, anesthesia endpoints such as loss of responsiveness or immobility appear to require significantly different drug concentrations. A closer examination in key model organisms such as the mouse, fly, or the worm, uncovers a trend: more complex behaviors, either requiring several sub-behaviors, or multiple neural circuits working together, are more sensitive to volatile general anesthetics. This trend is also evident when measuring neural correlates of general anesthesia. Here, we review this complexity hypothesis in humans and model organisms, and attempt to reconcile these findings with the more recent view that general anesthetics potentiate endogenous sleep pathways in most animals. Finally, we propose a presynaptic mechanism, and thus an explanation for how these drugs might compromise a succession of brain functions of increasing complexity.