Explaining Public Attitudes towards the Integration of Muslims in British Society: The ‘Solidarity of the Religious’?

There has been growing concern in recent years about the integration of Muslims and the emergence of ‘Islamophobia’ in Britain. But there has been a lack of research into the sources of public opinion towards Muslims in British society. This article contributes to emerging research in this area by using a nationally representative survey to examine public opinion towards Muslims’ efforts to integrate into British society. It examines the relative impact of social, religious, and attitudinal variables. Religious affiliation has no impact, while greater religious salience and pro-religion attitudes on religious–secular policy issues are related to positive views of Muslims’ efforts to integrate. Women and the university-educated are more positive in their assessments. A traditionalist view of Christianity, socially authoritarian beliefs, and anti-immigrant bias are related to negative views of Muslims’ efforts to integrate. Overall, the findings lend support to the ‘solidarity of the religious’ perspective and should encourage further investigation into attitudes towards religious groups in Britain.     

Religion and Human Cloning: An Exploratory Analysis of the First Available Opinion Data

Human cloning has recently entered the public sphere as a contentious issue and religious groups have spoken out in opposition to these technologies. To date, there has been no research to specifically determine whether the laity agrees with the positions of the leadership or to more generally sort out the views of the religious public on the issue of cloning. In this article I examine two relatively unknown public opinion polls that included questions on both cloning and the religious identity, practices, and beliefs of the respondent. I find that evangelicals are more opposed to cloning than the rest of the public and are more likely to see cloning as a religious issue. I explore these relationships further with a survey from one denomination and find that it is not ignorance of science that results in opposition to cloning, but—at least for the evangelicals—a desire to keep religion and science distinct. I conclude with suggestions for how future researchers can build upon this first limited opinion data.     

Are Muslims a Distinctive Minority? An Empirical Analysis of Religiosity,Social Attitudes,and Islam

Scholarly and public discourses on Muslim immigrants in Europe have questioned if Islam is an impediment to sociocultural adaptation and whether Muslims are a distinctive group in their religiosity and social values. We use a new survey of 480 British Muslims in conjunction with the British Social Attitudes Survey to examine differences between Muslim and non‐Muslim Britons on religiosity (practice, belief, salience) and moral and social issues regarding gender, abortion, and homosexuality. Muslims are more religious than other Britons, including both British Christians and religious “nones.” Muslims also are more conservative than other Britons across the range of social and moral attitudes. Multivariate analysis shows, however, that much of the difference on moral issues is due to socioeconomic disadvantage and high religiosity among Muslims. Although being a highly religious group in an otherwise secular country renders Muslims distinctive, factors that predict social conservatism among all Britons—high religiosity and low SES—apply similarly to Muslims.     

The dynamics of Orthodox and Muslim religiosity in Russia, 1989–2012

In this article I focus on the changing religious consciousness and behaviour of Orthodox Christians in Russia over the period from 1989 to 2012, comparing these where appropriate with the situation among Muslims. In the first part of the article I identify three periods in the development of attitudes to religion between 1989 and 2011: from 1989 to the mid-1990s; from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s; and from the mid-2000s to 2011. In the second part I survey attitudes to religion among the Russian population from 2011 from a range of perspectives. In the third part I look in more detail at the religious practice of Russians from 2011, using the concept of votserkovlennost’ (‘enchurchedness’) as developed by the sociologist Valentina Chesnokova. My data are derived from public opinion surveys, particularly surveys conducted in 2006, 2011 and 2012.     

Religious Appeals and Implicit Attitudes

This article explores the effects of religious appeals by politicians on attitudes and behavior. Although politicians frequently make religious appeals, the effectiveness of these appeals and the mechanisms of persuasion are unknown. This article explores the possibility that religious language can affect political attitudes through implicit processes. Because religious attachments are formed early in the lives of many Americans, religious language may influence citizens without their awareness. Implicit and explicit attitudes are related but distinct constructs, and implicit attitudes may have behavioral implications in the political realm. I test these hypotheses experimentally, relying on a widely used implicit measure, the Implicit Association Test. I find that a Christian religious appeal affects implicit attitudes and political behavior among people who currently or previously identify as Christian. Furthermore, an explicit preference for less religion in politics does not moderate implicit effects.     

Asynchrony in Attitudes Toward Abortion and Gay Rights: The Challenge to Values Alignment

Political commentators tend to assume that Americans who share a particular religious affiliation think similarly about values issues and that values questions are aligned. Although religious affiliation is a strong predictor of attitudes toward abortion and gay rights, there is differentiation within denominational subgroups with respect to both; for example, while majorities of mainline Protestants and Catholics favor gay marriage, many of their respective co‐religionists do not. Further, aggregate survey data shows asynchrony in within‐group attitudes on abortion and gay rights; for example, whereas Hispanic Catholics are more likely to support gay marriage than legal abortion, black Protestants are more likely to support legal abortion than gay marriage. Abortion and gay equality are discrete issues and give rise to divergent attitudes based on the lived reality of different ethnoreligious groups. These findings challenge the utility of the construct of the “values voter,” and underscore that abortion and gay rights should be recognized as separate public policy domains.     

Cooperative Coalitions on the Religious Right and Left: Considering the Resilience of Sectarianism

Theory in the sociology of religion suggests that a prerequisite for cooperative coalitions among religious groups on political matters is a decline in sectarianism. In analyses of survey data I show that sectarianism has receded for the religious left but not the religious right. Groups that would comprise the religious right are less likely to want the other conservative religious groups to have an influence on public opinion, while groups on the left are less opposed to other liberal groups having influence. It is particularly clear that conservative Protestants are wary of the influence of Catholics. I also conduct exploratory analyses to examine who, among the members of the religious groups who would comprise the religious right, is more sectarian. I find that while demographics are largely nondeterminative, those who are supportive of religiously-based politics are the least sectarian.     

Beyond Establishment and Separation: Political Liberalism, Religion and Democracy

Does John Rawls??s political liberalism require the institutional separation between state and religion or does it allow space for moderate forms of religious establishment? In this paper I address this question by presenting and critically evaluating Cécile Laborde??s recent claim that political liberalism is ??inconclusive about the public place of religion?? and ??indeterminate about the symbolic dimensions of the public place of religion??. In response to Cécile Laborde, I argue that neither moderate separation nor moderate establishment, intended as regimes of religious governance that fix specific interpretations of principles of social and economic justice, are compatible with Rawls??s political liberalism. Furthermore, I claim that a state can ensure that both its religious and non-religious citizens enjoy a sense of self-respect and identification with their polity by leaving issues of symbolic establishment and separation open to democratic debate. I conclude that Rawls??s political liberalism transcends the standard distinction between moderate establishment and moderate separation and leaves the public place of religion open to the democratic contestation of ordinary legislative politics.     

Protestant Clergy and the Culture Wars: An Empirical Test of Hunter's Thesis

Examinations of culture wars typically assess the attitudes of the American public. This study instead focuses on culture wars among religious elites—clergy—and tests three aspects of the culture wars thesis: (1) whether religious elites are engaged in culture wars, (2) whether clergy attitudes are polarized on these issues, and (3) whether religious authority or religious affiliation is more salient in creating culture wars cleavages. Using data from a large random sample of Protestant clergy, we find a substantial amount of engagement in culture wars by all types of Protestant clergy. The amount of polarization is more attributable to views of religious authority (i.e., biblical inerrancy) than to religious tradition. Moreover, polarization among clergy is somewhat more evident on culture wars issues than on other social and political issues. These findings are generally supportive of the culture wars thesis and should help return examinations of culture wars back to where they were originally theorized to be waged: among elites.     

Race,Religion, and Anti‐Poverty Policy Attitudes

Using the 2008 National Politics Study, the present study indicates that while African Americans are more likely than whites to hear sermons about poverty and other political issues, hearing such sermons more consistently associates with support for anti‐poverty government programs among non‐Hispanic whites than among both African Americans and Hispanics. The racially/ethnically marginalized status of blacks and Hispanics may contribute to these groups being more receptive than whites to religious messages emphasizing social inequality. The contrasting racial experiences of dominance and marginalization may also help explain why hearing politicized sermons is more meaningful to the progressive social welfare attitudes of whites than to African Americans and Hispanics. This expectation is rooted in the heightened variability of perspectives among whites and their religious organizations regarding the government's role in aiding the economically disadvantaged. Conversely, the vast majority of blacks and Hispanics support the government helping individuals who fallen upon hard times. The greater variability in opinion among whites may also allow for greater differences in opinion to emerge between whites who attend relative to those outside of religious congregations led by clergy emphasizing spiritual and political solidarity with the poor than is the case for African Americans and Hispanics.     

Minority Opinions: Antecedents and Benefits of Expression

A great deal of social psychological research has focused on antecedents of conformity to the majority. The present article, however, reviews the various conditions under which people express minority opinions. First, minority opinion expression is especially pronounced among individuals who hold either strong attitudes or attitudes that deviate from the majority in a direction consistent with the desirable group attitude. Second, minority opinion expression increases to the extent that highly‐identified group members believe that expressing minority opinions will promote their group’s welfare, or to the extent that one’s membership in a particular social category entitles him/her to speak up. Third, minority opinion expression increases when people’s motives to have a unique or clearly defined sense of self are salient. It is argued that these sources of minority opinion expression can help shed light on the functional value of such opinions for individuals.     

Public Opinion on Church-State Issues in a Changing Environment

The recent waves of Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, and other non-Judeo-Christian immigrants in American cities have increased religious diversity. This article examines changes in public attitudes on church-state issues in the Washington, D.C. metro area—a region that has experienced significant religious diversification. We find that between 1993 and 2000, aggregate support for public displays of Christianity decreased in the Washington area, and support for free exercise of minority religions increased. Yet the changing structure of church-state attitudes suggests that many residents are beginning to think of religious issues in a more polarized way.     

Faith,Race‐Ethnicity,and Public Policy Preferences: Religious Schemas and Abortion Attitudes Among U.S. Latinos

Research has demonstrated that white conservative Protestants are more opposed to abortion than their Catholic counterparts. At the same time, conservative Protestantism has made significant inroads among U.S. Latinos. This study augments existing research on religion and racial‐ethnic variations in abortion attitudes by comparing levels of support for legalized abortion among Catholic and conservative Protestant Latinos. Data are drawn from a nationally representative sample of U.S. Latinos. Significantly greater opposition to abortion is found among religiously devout conservative Protestant Latinos when compared with their Catholic counterparts. Latino Catholicism, which functions as a near‐monopolistic, highly institutionalized faith tradition among Hispanics, produces weaker antiabortion attitudes than those exhibited in Latino conservative Protestantism. Among Latinos, conservative Protestantism operates as a niche voluntaristic faith. These factors produce a religious schema that yields robust antiabortion attitudes. This study has important implications for understanding the intersection of race‐ethnicity, religion, and public policy preferences.     

Acceptance of Evolution and Support for Teaching Creationism in Public Schools: The Conditional Impact of Educational Attainment

Public acceptance of evolution remains low in the United States relative to other Western countries. Although advocates for the scientific community often highlight the need for improved education to change public opinion, analyses of data from a national sample of American adults indicate that the effects of educational attainment on attitudes toward evolution and creationism are uneven and contingent upon religious identity. Consequently, higher education will only shift public attitudes toward evolution and away from support for teaching creationism in public schools for those who take non‐“literalist” interpretive stances on the Bible, or to the extent that it leads to fewer people with literalist religious identities.     

Social identity complexity and outgroup tolerance

Social identity complexity refers to the way in which individuals subjectively represent the relationships among their multiple ingroup memberships. More specifically, individuals with low social identity complexity see their ingroups as highly overlapping and convergent, whereas those with high complexity see their different ingroups as distinct and cross-cutting membership groups. The present study tested the hypothesis that perceived overlap among ingroup memberships would be negatively related to ingroup inclusiveness and tolerance for outgroups, such that individuals with high overlap (low complexity) would be less tolerant and accepting of outgroups in general than those with low overlap (high complexity). Results from a telephone interview survey of adult residents of the state of Ohio supported this hypothesis. Individual differences in complexity of perception of their national, religious, occupational, political, and recreational social identities were systematically related to their attitudes toward ethnic outgroups and diversity.     

Do Religious Politicians Take Risks Differently? Evidence From Pakistan

Given popular religiosity, the presence of religious parties, and the politicization of religious issues, it is highly likely that politicians with varying levels of personal religiosity are active in politics. Yet, our knowledge of how politicians’ religiosity influences their political choices is still limited, particularly for developing countries. In this paper, I use data from a survey experiment fielded to Pakistani politicians in 2018 to study whether and how politicians’ personal religiosity influences their political risk preferences. Scholars debate whether religiosity is correlated with higher or lower risk aversion among citizens; however, no study has examined this relationship among politicians. I find that higher religiosity systematically predicts which politicians are more risk-averse and highly religious politicians’ decisions under uncertainty are inconsistent with expected utility maximization and prospect theory. These findings suggest that in contrast to existing assumptions of elite decision-making, politicians’ religiosity systematically influences their risk preferences and choices.     

Religion and Public Opinion Toward Same‐Sex Relations,Marriage, and Adoption: Does the Type of Practice Matter?

This study examines how religion's impact on Americans’ attitudes toward same‐sex practices varies by the type of practice being considered. We theorize that same‐sex romantic and family practices such as sexual relations, marriage, and adoption represent distinct practice types, differing in degrees of legality, cultural legitimacy, and in their internal power dynamics. Consequently, we expect that Americans view each practice type somewhat differently and their opinions on each may be influenced by religion in distinctive ways. Drawing upon national‐level data, we estimate and compare the relative net effects of a comprehensive battery of religious measures on support for gay sex, marriage, and adoption, both for the full sample and across religious traditions. Analyses demonstrate that public opinion toward gay sexual relations is more strongly related to religious practice and theological conservatism compared to attitudes regarding same‐sex marriage or adoption. Moreover, frequent religious practice and conservative theological beliefs about the Bible tend to be more strongly associated with attitudes toward same‐sex relationships for evangelicals, compared to mainline Protestants and, to a lesser extent, Catholics. Findings ultimately affirm that the type of same‐sex practice being considered (sex, marriage, or adoption) serves to moderate religions’ impact on Americans’ support for such practices.     

Pentecostal Affiliation

Although Pentecostal Protestants are often included under the broad term “evangelical Protestant,” research suggests that Pentecostals are distinct from other evangelical Protestants in their religious and secular beliefs and activities. In this research note, we demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of a religious classification that accounts for differences between affiliates of Pentecostal denominations and affiliates of other Protestant denominations. Analysis of nationally representative survey data shows that affiliates of evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal Protestant denominations differ in their levels of education, religious beliefs, attitudes on social issues, and political ideology. These differences are largely congruent with theoretical expectations of differences among Protestant subgroups. The classification of Pentecostal denominations presented in this research note is an important tool for researchers, which can be applied to a wide range of social scientific inquiries.     

MODERN ORTHODOXY IN POST-SECULAR TIMES

Post-secularism in Israel is expressed, among other ways, by the growing public acceptance of identities that are neither religious nor secular. This paper is predicated on research of individuals located on the boundaries of Orthodox Religious Zionism. It explores their attitudes on a range of issues and argues that they reflect their post-secularist identities. In-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with young men and women who chose to abandon the strictures of a Religious Zionist lifestyle as well as those who still remain within its bounds. Various late-modern and post-secular modes of thought and expression were identified in interviewees’ narratives. These included pluralism, relativism, egalitarianism, the personalization of relationships with God, and a disregard for theological arguments based upon scientific findings. It is argued that these attitudes are related to two late-modern social processes: (1) the rise of individual expressivism and (2) the belief in the liberal human-rights ethic. These tendencies cut across the social divide between interviewees who left Religious Zionism and those who chose to remain within the fold, traversing the previously dominant religious–secular social divide and thus serving as yet another indication for the blossoming of new post-secular spaces in Israeli Jewish society.     

None Too Simple: Examining Issues of Religious Nonbelief and Nonbelonging in the United States

Prior research on those who are “not religious” in the traditional, organizational sense has focused on a broad category of people in the United States who do not identify with an established religious tradition. We distinguish three categories of people who are religiously nonbelieving or nonbelonging: atheists, agnostics, and unchurched believers. Examining issues of religious belief and identity, we compare private spiritual life, attitudes on political issues, and stance toward religion in the public sphere for these three categories of nonreligious respondents. Atheists are the most uniformly antireligious. Agnostics, by comparison, are less opposed to religion overall, while unchurched believers display higher levels of personal religiosity and spirituality than atheists or agnostics. While atheists, agnostics, and unchurched believers are similar in their political identification and attitudes related to religiously infused political topics, unchurched believers are as strongly opposed to religion in the public sphere as atheists.