Before the Two Cultures: Merging the Canons of the History of Science and Philosophy

This article argues that early modern philosophy should be seen as an integrated enterprise of moral and natural philosophy. Consequently, early modern moral and natural philosophy should be taught as intellectual enterprises that developed hand in hand. Further, the article argues that the unity of these two fields can be best introduced through methodological ideas. It illustrates these theses through a case study on Scottish Newtonianism, starting with visions concerning the unity of philosophy and then turning to a discussion of how methodological ideas figure in those visions. Finally, the article argues that methodological considerations can serve as good starting points to introduce and discuss central topics and canonical figures of the early modern period.     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

Contemporary Philosophy of Science in Italy: An Overview

The paper analyses the development of some themes in the contemporary philosophy of science in Italy. Section 1 reviews the dabate on the legacy of neopositivism. The spread of the philosophy of Popper is outlined in Section 2, with particular regard to the problem of the vindication of induction. Section 3 deals with the debate on the incommensurability thesis, while Section 4 examines its consequences on the possible relationships between historical and epistemological studies of science. The last section is devoted to one of the most recent trends in the Italian philosophy of science: the resumption of Aristotelian dialectics. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Hermeneutical Philosophy and Pragmatism: A Philosophy of Science

Two philosophical traditions with much in common, (classical) pragmatism and (Heidegger's) hermeneutic philosophy, are here compared with respect to their approach to the philosophy of science. Both emphasize action as a mode of interpreting experience. Both have developed important categories – inquiry, meaning, theory, praxis, coping, historicity, life-world – and each has offered an alternative to the more traditional philosophies of science stemming from Descartes, Hume, and Comte. Pragmatism's abduction works with the dual perspectives of theory (as explanation) and praxis (as culture). The hermeneutical circle depends in addition on the lifeworld as background source of ontological meaning and resource for strategies of inquiry. Thus a hermeneutical philosophy of research involves three components: lifeworld (as ontological and strategic), theory (as explanatory), and praxis (as constitutive of culture). This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Inferentialist Philosophy of Language and the Historiography of Philosophy

This article considers the implications of inferentialist philosophy of language for debates in the historiography of philosophy. My intention is to mediate and refine the polemics between contextualist historians and ‘analytic’ or presentist historians. I claim that much of Robert Brandom's nuanced defence of presentism can be accepted and even adopted by contextualists, so that inferentialism turns out to provide an important justification for orthodox history of philosophy. In the concluding sections I argue that the application of Brandom's theory has important limits, and that some polemics by contextualists against presentists are therefore justified.     

The History of Sexual Anatomy and Self-Referential Philosophy of Science

This essay is a case study of the self‐destruction that occurs in the work of a social‐constructionist historian of science who embraces a radical philosophy of science. It focuses on Thomas Laqueur's Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud in arguing that a history of science committed to the social construction of science and to the central theses of Kuhnian, Duhemian, and Quinean philosophy of science is incoherent through self‐reference. Laqueur's text is examined in detail in order to make the main point; a similar phenomenon in the work of the feminist historian of science Evelyn Fox Keller is then briefly discussed.     

Experimental Philosophy: A Methodological Critique

This article offers a critique of research practices typical of experimental philosophy. To that end, it presents a review of methodological issues that have proved crucial to the quality of research in the biobehavioral sciences. It discusses various shortcomings in the experimental philosophy literature related to (1) the credibility of self‐report questionnaires, (2) the validity and reliability of measurement, (3) the adherence to appropriate procedures for sampling, random assignment, and handling of participants, and (4) the meticulousness of study reporting. It argues that the future standing of experimental philosophy will hinge upon improvements in research methods.     

International Union of History and Philosophy of Science Division of Logic,Methodology and Philosophy of Science Bulletin no. 15

International Union of History and Philosophy of Science Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science Bulletin no. 15     

Scheffler Revisited on the Role of History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teacher Education

Twenty-five years ago Israel Scheffler argued for the inclusion of philosophy of science in the preparation of science teachers. It was part of his wider argument for the inclusion of courses in the philosophy of the discipline in programmes that are preparing people to teach that discipline. For the most part Scheffler's suggestion, at least as far as science education is concerned, went unheeded. Pleasingly, in recent times there has been some rapprochement between these fields. This paper will restate parts of Scheffler's argument, it will develop some additional considerations pertaining to it, and it will set the discussion in the context of contemporary debate about science, science education and teacher training. With changed time and circumstances, Scheffler' arguments might find more adherents than when they were initially proposed. My revision of Scheffler's argument has two planks: first pedagogical, second professional.     

Pragmatism and Philosophy of Science: A Critical Survey

After delineating the distinguishing features of pragmatism, and noting the resources that pragmatists have available to respond effectively as pragmatists to the two major objections to pragmatism, I examine and critically evaluate the various proposals that pragmatists have offered as a solution to the problem of induction, followed by a discussion of the pragmatic positions on the status of theoretical entities. Thereafter I discuss the pragmatic posture toward the nature of explanation in science. I conclude that pragmatism has (a) a generally compelling solution to Hume’s problem of induction; (b) no specific position on the status of theoretical entities, although something like the non‐realism of the sort developed by van Fraassen seems a defensible candidate for most pragmatists in general, even though there are non‐trivial objections to van Fraassen’s position; and (c) central to the pragmatic conception of scientific explanation is the abandonment of our common conception of truth as a necessary condition for sentences to provide adequate explanations, and a drift in the direction of a contextualist account of explanation.     

International Union of History and Philosophy of Science Division of Logic,Methodology and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS/DLMPS)

International Union of History and Philosophy of Science Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS/DLMPS)Bulletin no. 16     

人类学:科学与哲学

设定人类学是一门科学根据哈里斯所说 ,博厄斯 以很简明的方式表述这个论题 :“人类学是一门科学 ,而科学是历史”。[1] 马林诺夫斯基 则寻求一种关于文化的科学的定义。在他死后发表的一部题为《科学的文化理论》的文本中 ,[2 ] 他为人文学者提供了一种关于“科学”的最低限度的定义 ,从而使科学得以有别于抽象思想和常识。“科学的论述不同于常识的表述 ,首先 ,在于一位某门科学的学者会以一种学术上合规则、有条理的方式 ,很为深入地扩展考察的完整性与精密性 ;其次 ,在于经过科学训练的心智 ,会将问题的探究循着和问题相关的思路推进 ,…