Age effects in perception of time

Despite the widespread belief that the subjective speed of the passage of time increases with age, empirical results are controversial. In this study, a combination of questionnaires was employed to assess subjective time perception by 499 subjects, ages 14 to 94 years. Pearson correlations and nonlinear regression analyses on a variety of questionnaires and the age of the participants show that the momentary perception of the passage of time and the retrospective judgment of past periods of time are a function of chronological age; however, small-to-moderate effects accounted for at most 10% of the variance. Results generally support the widespread perception that the passage of time speeds up with age. These results are discussed in the context of models of prospective and retrospective time judgment, but interpretations have to be treated with caution given methodological limitations.     

Congruity Effects in Time and Space: Behavioral and ERP Measures

Two experiments investigated whether motion metaphors for time affected the perception of spatial motion. Participants read sentences either about literal motion through space or metaphorical motion through time written from either the ego-moving or object-moving perspective. Each sentence was followed by a cartoon clip. Smiley-moving clips showed an iconic happy face moving toward a polygon, and shape-moving clips showed a polygon moving toward a happy face. In Experiment 1, using an explicit judgment task, participants judged smiley-moving cartoons as related to ego-moving sentences about space and about time, and shape-moving cartoons as related to object-moving sentences. In Experiment 2, participants viewed the same stimuli, but the cartoons were task-irrelevant. Event-related brain potentials revealed an early attentional effect of congruity on cartoons following sentences about space, and a later semantic effect on cartoons following sentences about time. Results are most consistent with accounts that posit differences in the processing of novel and conventional metaphors.     

道德概念垂直空间隐喻对空间关系判断的影响

本研究通过三个实验考察道德概念垂直空间隐喻对空间关系判断的影响。涉及的空间关系判断包括上下关系判断、远近关系判断和距离判断。研究结果显示：（1）上下判断中,在空间上方时,道德词的反应快于不道德词;在空间下方时,不道德词的反应快于道德词;（2）远近判断中,在空间上方时,个体更倾向于将道德词判断为"远",即道德词更偏上;在空间下方时,没有显著的偏向;（3）在距离判断中,个体对道德词的判断出现显著的向上偏移,对不道德词的判断则出现显著的向下偏移。由此得出结论：道德概念的垂直空间隐喻会影响个体对空间关系的判断,具体来说是"道德是上"的隐喻会导致空间关系判断产生"向上"的偏移效应;而"不道德是下"的隐喻则会导致空间关系判断产生"向下"的偏移效应。     

Positive perception of time and its association with successful ageing / Percepción positiva del tiempo y su relación con el envejecimiento exitoso

Abstract

The objective of this study was to explore the relationship between perception of time and indicators of successful ageing. The study evaluated preference in temporal orientation, perception of speed of the passage of time and a wide range of psychosocial well-being and health indicators. The sample consisted of 1,178 people aged over 60 years from the ELES longitudinal study, which was representative of the Spanish population. Results showed that: (a) the majority of people of all ages are oriented to the present, although as they become older there is a shift towards the past; (b) orientation to the present implies higher levels of well-being and health, as opposed to orientation to the past; and (c) a perception of a faster passage of time is associated with well-being. In conclusion, the way in which older people perceive time is an indicator of adaptation, well-being and health.     

重中之“重”——具身视角下重的体验与表征

关于重要性的隐喻存在于多种文化之中。近年来的实证研究表明, 重要性的隐喻建立在重量的身体体验之上。重量的身体经验会影响对目标对象重要性的评估, 重要性的概念表征也会影响身体的重量感知。重量的身体体验与重要性的概念可能存在着共同的神经基础, 并构成一种相互作用的关系。具身视角下的概念表征理论和隐喻理论为解释这一现象提供了理论依据。未来的研究需要进一步探索重量隐喻涉及的范围, 以及重量隐喻形成的语言文化差异。     

时间分解效应及其对跨期决策的影响

本文基于经典的分解效应, 提出并证实了一种影响人们判断与决策中时间知觉的新因素--时间分解效应。共包括两个研究, 分别在“时间够用”判断与跨期决策中检验了该效应的存在性与稳固性。实验结果表明：(1)相比未分解条件, 分解条件下的被试判断给定时间内完成某项任务的时间更够用, 即时间知觉更长。该效应受到任务难度的调节, 在较简单的任务中时间分解效应更显著; (2)在跨期决策中, 分解操纵增大了人们对较大较远的收益(larger & later, LL)选项中时间延迟的知觉, 证实了时间分解效应。此外, 还发现时间分解效应会导致人们在跨期决策中更偏好较小较近的收益(smaller & sooner, SS)选项, 对时间延迟的知觉中介了这一过程。总之, 本研究不仅在理论上提出了一种新的分解效应, 同时对现实生活中的决策(如计划制定等)有重要的应用价值。     

Heavy-heartedness biases your weight perception

ABSTRACT

Heavy-heartedness (light-heartedness), among more than two hundred metaphors related to the heart, indicates negative (positive) affects. Although these metaphors are generally understood rhetorically, this study explores whether there is any literal connection between either of these two states and one’s perception of weight. Participants who recalled a heavy-heartening (vs. light-heartening) past event estimated more weight of an object (Study 1). While watching weightlifting and pole-vaulting competition clips, people in heavy-hearted (vs. light-hearted) states predicted that players’ success is less likely (Study 2). However, this result was not observed while people in both states watched non-weight-related games, such as golf-putting and pool. The findings are congruous with embodied cognition theory and the role of metaphors in our life.     

The influence of listener perception of the speaker on recognition memory

Results are reported for an experiment which examined the influence of listener perception of speaker intention on sentence recognition. Given the same passage and recognition sentences, subjects displayed different false recognition patterns of test items depending on which of two speakers with opposing viewpoints the passage was attributed to. It is argued that the reconstructive process of memory is based on information from the context (e.g., the speaker's perceived intentions) as well as on the actual words used. Retention of different aspects of a meassage is seen to rely on information from different sources. Specifically, the results of the study indicate that retention of meaning involving the speaker's predictions, opinions, etc., is influenced by the listener's perception of the speaker.     

Triggering Individual Emergence: Inspiration of Banathy,the Visionary

This paper examines how metaphors can play a key role in triggering individual emergence. Metaphor is referenced in two main ways: the enthalpy metaphor is used to provide understanding of, and guide, the process of effective conversation. Metaphor is also interpreted very broadly to define those images, analogies, concepts, models, and theories that define our understanding of the world and our perception. It is our perception that must change if we are to improve the future. The paper examines how sharing of appropriate metaphor through conversation can lead to collective emergence; and similarly, how integral conversation-with-self triggered by metaphors in (1) conversation with others, (2) other external stimuli, and (3) internal thought processes, can trigger individual emergence. The paper examines which of the three sources of trigger may be singly/jointly or sequentially the most powerful in their effect of triggering individual emergence, and under what context. The model presented is evaluated for the process of emergence of the paper. The reader is invited to participate in furthering the evaluation process. The author's own individual emergence is recognized as stemming from ongoing association with, and inspiration of, Bela Banathy, to whom the work is dedicated.     

Stimulus needs are a moving target: 240 additional matched literal and metaphorical sentences for testing neural hypotheses about metaphor

As the cognitive neuroscience of metaphor has evolved, so too have the theoretical questions of greatest interest. To keep pace with these developments, in the present study we generated a large set of metaphoric and literal sentence pairs ideally suited to addressing the current methodological and conceptual needs of metaphor researchers. In particular, the need has emerged to distinguish metaphors along three dimensions: the grammatical class of their base terms, the sensorimotor features of their base terms, and the syntactic form in which the base terms appear. To meet this need, we generated nominal metaphors (and matched literal sentences) using entity nouns as the base terms, with the intention that they be used in concert with already published sets of predicate metaphors or nominal metaphors using event nouns. Using the results of three norming experiments, we provide 120 pairs of closely matched metaphoric and literal sentences that are characterized along 14 dimensions: 11 at the sentence level (length, frequency, concreteness, familiarity, naturalness, imageability, figurativeness, interpretability, ease of interpretation, valence, and valence judgment reaction time), and three related to the base term (visual, motion, and auditory imagery). These items extend previously published stimuli, filling an extant gap in metaphor research and allowing for tests of new behavioral and neural hypotheses about metaphor.     

Why There Cannot be Any Such Thing as “Time Travel”

Extending work of Wittgenstein, Lakoff and Johnson I suggest that it is the (spatial) metaphors we rely on in order to conceptualise time that provide an illusory space for time‐travel‐talk. For example, in the “Moving Time” spatialisation of time, “objects” move past the agent from the future to the past. The objects all move in the same direction – this is mapped to time always moving in the same direction. But then it is easy to imagine suspending this rule, and asking why the objects should not start moving in the opposite direction. This is one way of generating the idea of time‐travel “back” into the past. Time‐travel‐talk essentially involves the unaware projection of fragments of our time‐talk – taken from powerful conceptual metaphors – onto the nature of reality itself. Understanding this dissolves away the charm and attractions of such talk.     

Dedicated and intrinsic models of time perception

Two general frameworks have been articulated to describe how the passage of time is perceived. One emphasizes that the judgment of the duration of a stimulus depends on the operation of dedicated neural mechanisms specialized for representing the temporal relationships between events. Alternatively, the representation of duration could be ubiquitous, arising from the intrinsic dynamics of nondedicated neural mechanisms. In such models, duration might be encoded directly through the amount of activation of sensory processes or as spatial patterns of activity in a network of neurons. Although intrinsic models are neurally plausible, we highlight several issues that must be addressed before we dispense with models of duration perception that are based on dedicated processes.     

Linking Metaphor and Dreams in Clinical Practice

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to weave together selected aspects from the theoretical domains of metaphor and dreams. With respect to dreams, the paper draws on theorists who argue for the continuity hypothesis of dreaming. Of particular interest is the symbolic value that may be placed on the manifest dream. Establishing the significance of the manifest dream is an important step toward linking its imagery with our daytime figurative language in a meaningful way. Further, the notion that dreams symbolically capture our self-state lends support to the idea that there may be thematic correspondence between our dreams and metaphors. This may be most apparent when we compare dominant metaphors with recurring dreams.     

网络论坛情境中的人际知觉准确性及影响因素

本研究彩网上自然实验法,以MBTI价格类型量表作为价格评价工具,探讨了网络论坛情境人际知觉准确性最高,J-P维度的知觉准确性次之,E-I维度的知觉准确性最低。（3）相关分析与回归分析的结果表明,影响人际知觉准确性的因素主要来自四个方面：知觉者、知觉对象的判断、以及两者的相似性。     

Perception time measured with the slope-transition paradigm (STP): category, set size, and task manipulations

A perception time measure was obtained with the 'slope-transition paradigm' (STP), which is described in detail. In two experiments with the paradigm, participants viewed two sequential data frames, each presented for a wide range of durations. They made a binary response based on combined information from the two frames. The results showed piecewise linear response-time versus frame-duration functions with a slope-0 branch at short durations, followed by a slope-1 branch. The duration where the two branches met (the slope transition) was interpreted as the end of the perception of frame 1. For longer durations, the participant had completed the perception of frame 1 and was forced to waste time waiting for data from frame 2. In experiment 1, an odd-digit enumeration task was used, and set size and distractor category (even digits versus consonants) were varied. In experiment 2, a same/different task with digits was used and the type of judgment (literal versus parity) was varied. Perception time increased with set size. Distractor category and judgment type affected post-perceptual processes. The perception time measure of the STP is considered in relation to the attentional blink, repetition blindness, and object files.     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds-a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering-that is, interpersonal harm-even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

The Protective Skin of the Analyst’s Case Formulation: Commentary on Paper by Tom Wooldridge

The contours of every psychoanalytic process are shaped by its case formulation. This discussion of Tom Wooldridge’s paper (this issue) of the long-term, psychodynamic treatment of a patient with severe anorexia provides opportunity to demonstrate that formulation derives from aspects of the clinician’s clinical education and personal growth. Wooldridge’s metaphor of the containing functions of the entropic body is extended to include particular paternal functions that an analyst provides his patient and that are suggested in the dialogue of this clinical material. Psychoanalytic case formulation distinguishes it from other aspects of an integrated treatment plan for eating disorder patients; in particular, clinician and patient discover important metaphors and elaborations of personal history that assist in recovery. Thinking through a case from different lenses provides real gratification for the psychoanalyst and a bulwark to assist in potentially life-saving work because of its protective and enriching functions. Drawing upon the metaphors Wooldridge expands upon such as secondary skin formations and the entropic body, I suggest that clinicians who work in the field of eating disorders could draw great benefit from learning more about what psychoanalytic case formulation offers patients. Detailed, evocative case examples such as the one Tom Wooldridge puts forward may be one way to reach this important audience because they bring to life many of the unique features of contemporary psychoanalysis.     

Poor shape perception is the reason reaches-to-grasp are visually guided online

Both judgment studies and studies of feedforward reaching have shown that the visual perception of object distance, size, and shape are inaccurate. However, feedback has been shown to calibrate feedfoward reaches-to-grasp to make them accurate with respect to object distance and size. We now investigate whether shape perception (in particular, the aspect ratio of object depth to width) can be calibrated in the context of reaches-to-grasp. We used cylindrical objects with elliptical cross-sections of varying eccentricity. Our participants reached to grasp the width or the depth of these objects with the index finger and thumb. The maximum grasp aperture and the terminal grasp aperture were used to evaluate perception. Both occur before the hand has contacted an object. In Experiments 1 and 2, we investigated whether perceived shape is recalibrated by distorted haptic feedback. Although somewhat equivocal, the results suggest that it is not. In Experiment 3, we tested the accuracy of feedforward grasping with respect to shape with haptic feedback to allow calibration. Grasping was inaccurate in ways comparable to findings in shape perception judgment studies. In Experiment 4, we hypothesized that online guidance is needed for accurate grasping. Participants reached to grasp either with or without vision of the hand. The result was that the former was accurate, whereas the latter was not. We conclude that shape perception is not calibrated by feedback from reaches-to-grasp and that online visual guidance is required for accurate grasping because shape perception is poor.     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

A method for sensation scaling based on an analogy between perception and judgment

Two techniques for studying judgment are discussed. In the first of these one assumes invariance of perception over different judgment processes and conceives of the properties of one judgment process as known. Then, perceptions may be estimated under this process and utilized in the study of other judgment processes of interest. A second technique disposes of the reliance up on a basic, “known” process and instead suggests that perception be treated as free parameters to be estimated from data. The paper then proceeds to show how this second technique may be used under certain conditions on perception themselves. A concept of sensation is introduced which is thought of as generating percepts in formally the same manner as percepts are thought of as generating judgments. The idea is tried out on the perception of movement time. A simple perception process appears to give a good fit to data.