Improving sleep with mindfulness and acceptance: A metacognitive model of insomnia

While there is an accumulating evidence to suggest that therapies using mindfulness and acceptance-based approaches have benefits for improving the symptoms of insomnia, it is unclear how these treatments work. The goal of this paper is to present a conceptual framework for the cognitive mechanisms of insomnia based upon mindfulness and acceptance approaches. The existing cognitive and behavioral models of insomnia are first reviewed and a two-level model of cognitive (primary) and metacognitive (secondary) arousal is presented in the context of insomnia. We then focus on the role of metacognition in mindfulness and acceptance-based therapies, followed by a review of these therapies in the treatment of insomnia. A conceptual framework is presented detailing the mechanisms of metacognition in the context of insomnia treatments. This model proposes that increasing awareness of the mental and physical states that are present when experiencing insomnia symptoms and then learning how to shift mental processes can promote an adaptive stance to one's response to these symptoms. These metacognitive processes are characterized by balanced appraisals, cognitive flexibility, equanimity, and commitment to values and are posited to reduce sleep-related arousal, leading to remission from insomnia. We hope that this model will further the understanding and impact of mindfulness and acceptance-based approaches to insomnia.     

Counseling Clients with Chronic Pain: A Religiously Oriented Cognitive Behavior Framework

The experience of chronic pain is largely influenced by core schemas and cognitive processes, including those that are religious in nature. When these schemas are negative, they contribute to the exacerbation of pain and related problems. A framework is presented for the identification of problematic religious schemas and their modification through cognitive behavior strategies.     

Thinking graphically: Connecting vision and cognition during graph comprehension

Task analytic theories of graph comprehension account for the perceptual and conceptual processes required to extract specific information from graphs. Comparatively, the processes underlying information integration have received less attention. We propose a new framework for information integration that highlights visual integration and cognitive integration. During visual integration, pattern recognition processes are used to form visual clusters of information; these visual clusters are then used to reason about the graph during cognitive integration. In 3 experiments, the processes required to extract specific information and to integrate information were examined by collecting verbal protocol and eye movement data. Results supported the task analytic theories for specific information extraction and the processes of visual and cognitive integration for integrative questions. Further, the integrative processes scaled up as graph complexity increased, highlighting the importance of these processes for integration in more complex graphs. Finally, based on this framework, design principles to improve both visual and cognitive integration are described.     

Towards a postconscious processes model of mental control: A conceptual analysis

A new perspective on mental control is proposed that conceptually links conscious and automatic processes through a complementary postconscious activity that is rooted in the cognitive mechanism of priming. It is argued that the alterable structure of underlying mental representations connects these processes to produce a level of intentional regulation that would normally prove beneficial but in a few rare cases could prove detrimental. This hypothetical process is reflected in our empirical knowledge of mental control and related phenomena such as prospective memory. The new perspective maintains the traditional models' structure of conscious and automatic processing but, in an effort to expand our knowledge in the field, it redefines the relationship between these two processes so that it fits into a more accountable theoretical framework.     

The functional‐cognitive framework as a tool for accelerating progress in cognitive neuroscience: On the benefits of bridging rather than reducing levels of analyses

The subject matter of neuroscience research is complex, and synthesising the wealth of data from this research to better understand mental processes is challenging. A useful strategy, therefore, may be to distinguish explicitly between the causal effects of the environment on behaviour (i.e. functional analyses) and the mental processes that mediate these effects (i.e. cognitive analyses). In this article, we describe how the functional‐cognitive (F‐C) framework can accelerate cognitive neuroscience and also advance a functional treatment of brain activity. We first highlight that cognitive neuroscience can particularly benefit from the F‐C approach by providing an alternative to the problematic practice of reducing cognitive constructs to behavioural and/or neural proxies. Next, we outline how functional (behaviour–environment) relations can serve as a bridge between cognitive and neural processes by restoring mental constructs to their original role as heuristic tools. Finally, we give some examples of how both cognitive neuroscience and traditional functional approaches can mutually benefit from the F‐C framework.     

A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Help-Seeking Processes Among Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence

This paper suggests a conceptual framework for understanding the processes of help-seeking among survivors of intimate partner violence (IPV). A cognitive theory from general literature on help-seeking in “stigmatizing” situations suggests three relevant processes or stages of seeking help in the IPV context: defining the problem, deciding to seek help, and selecting a source of support. Individual, interpersonal, and sociocultural factors that influence decision-making at each of these stages are discussed and illustrated with case examples.     

Neural evidence supports a novel framework for spatial navigation

The spatial knowledge used for human navigation has traditionally been separated into three categories: landmark, route, and survey knowledge. While behavioral research has retained this framework, it has become increasingly clear from recent neuroimaging studies that such a classification system is not adequate for understanding the brain. This review proposes a new framework, with a taxonomy based on the cognitive processes and subprocesses involved in spatial navigation. The neural correlates of spatial memory can inform our understanding of the cognitive processes involved in human navigation, and conversely, the specific task demands of an experiment can inform the interpretation of neuroimaging results. This review examines the neural correlates of each cognitive process separately, to provide a closer inspection of each component of spatial navigation. While landmark, route, and survey knowledge are still important components of human navigation, the neural correlates are not neatly ascribed to these three categories. The present findings provide motivation for a more detailed examination of the cognitive processes engaged during wayfinding.     

Parameters, Predictions, and Evidence in Computational Modeling: A Statistical View Informed by ACT-R

Model validation in computational cognitive psychology often relies on methods drawn from the testing of theories in experimental physics. However, applications of these methods to computational models in typical cognitive experiments can hide multiple, plausible sources of variation arising from human participants and from stochastic cognitive theories, encouraging a "model fixed, data variable" paradigm that makes it difficult to interpret model predictions and to account for individual differences. This article proposes a likelihood-based, "data fixed, model variable" paradigm in which models are treated as stochastic processes in experiments with participant-to-participant variation that can be applied to a broad range of mechanistic cognitive architectures. This article discusses the implementation and implications of this view in model validation, with a concrete focus on a simple class of ACT-R models of cognition. This article is not intended as a recipe for broad application of these preliminary, proof-of-concept methods, but as a framework for communication between statisticians searching for interesting problems in the cognitive modeling sphere, and cognitive modelers interested in generalizing from deterministic to stochastic model validation, in the face of random variation in human experimental data.     

A dual‐system framework to understand preference construction processes in choice

Building on the dual-system theory of judgment, we propose an intuitive and deliberate framework for understanding the effects of preference construction in choice. We argue that while certain choice effects can be attributed primarily to rapid, unintentional, and intuitive processing, others arise from intentional and deliberate processing. We use this distinction to group choice effects previously identified in the literature, discuss evidence in support of the dual-system framework of preference construction, and propose new research directions. Since the defining property of intuitive versus deliberate mental processes is the degree to which they engage working memory, the proposed framework sheds light on how these previously identified effects will change with conditions such as the availability of cognitive resources. We conclude by calling for additional research to explore the interplay between intuitive and deliberate processing to determine which processes are implicated in generating a preference, as well as research on new moderators of choice effects based on the difference in the amount of willful information processing that underlies decision making.     

Understanding vulnerability for depression from a cognitive neuroscience perspective: A reappraisal of attentional factors and a new conceptual framework

We propose a framework to understand increases in vulnerability for depression after recurrent episodes that links attention processes and schema activation to negative mood states, by integrating cognitive and neurobiological findings. Depression is characterized by a mood-congruent attentional bias at later stages of information processing. The basic idea of our framework is that decreased activity in prefrontal areas, mediated by the serotonin metabolism which the HPA axis controls, is associated with an impaired attenuation of subcortical regions, resulting in prolonged activation of the amygdala in response to stressors in the environment. Reduced prefrontal control in interaction with depressogenic schemas leads to impaired ability to exert attentional inhibitory control over negative elaborative processes such as rumination, leading in turn to sustained negative affect. These elaborative processes are triggered by the activation of negative schemas after confrontation with stressors. In our framework, attentional impairments are postulated as a crucial process in explaining the increasing vulnerability after depressive episodes, linking cognitive and biological vulnerability factors. We review the empirical data on the biological factors associated with the attentional impairments and detail how they are associated with rumination and mood regulation. The aim of our framework is to stimulate translational research.     

A cognitive development framework

Prominent stage theories of cognitive development show evidence of a structure in which each stage contains a number of subsidiary levels. Comparisons of the stages in these theories have commonly been made through the established links with stages of Piaget’s theory. In response to Kagan’s criticism of Piaget’s theory, features of these developmental theories were used in this paper as the basis for a general framework of interactive stages and levels of cognitive operations. Some implications of the proposed framework in relation to cognitive development theories and directions for further research are examined. Further application of this framework could help to identify commonalities in cognitive operations across different contents, contexts and cultures.     

A cognitive development framework

Prominent stage theories of cognitive development show evidence of a structure in which each stage contains a number of subsidiary levels. Comparisons of the stages in these theories have commonly been made through the established links with stages of Piaget’s theory. In response to Kagan’s criticism of Piaget’s theory, features of these developmental theories were used in this paper as the basis for a general framework of interactive stages and levels of cognitive operations. Some implications of the proposed framework in relation to cognitive development theories and directions for further research are examined. Further application of this framework could help to identify commonalities in cognitive operations across different contents, contexts and cultures.     

Explanatory pluralism in cognitive science

This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that "framework debate" in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled by these points to explore existing literature on the topic. Despite this literature, pluralism has garnered very little attention from broader cognitive science. We end by briefly considering what it might mean for theoretical cognitive science.     

A Review and Taxonomy of Choice Architecture Techniques

We present a taxonomy of choice architecture techniques that focus on intervention design, as opposed to the underlying cognitive processes that make an intervention work. We argue that this distinction will facilitate further empirical testing and will assist practitioners in designing interventions. The framework is inductively derived from empirically tested examples of choice architecture and consists of nine techniques targeting decision information, decision structure, and decision assistance. An inter‐rater reliability test demonstrates that these techniques can be used in an intersubjectively replicable way to describe sample choice architectures. We conclude by discussing limitations of the framework and key issues concerning the use of the techniques in the development of new choice architectures. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delusions and theories of belief

Cognitive neuropsychiatry is a branch of cognitive psychology that seeks to explain neuropsychiatric symptoms in terms of disruptions or damage to normal cognitive processes. A key objective of this approach is to use insights derived from the study of pathological symptoms to inform accounts of premorbid cognitive systems. Delusions, in particular, can be considered to represent dysfunction of the cognitive processes underlying belief formation, so studying delusions may provide unique insights into nonpathological belief. While this approach has provided compelling accounts for a range of delusions in terms of putative cognitive dysfunctions, it is less clear that it has achieved progress in its reciprocal goal of informing understanding of belief more generally. In this review, we trace the origins of the cognitive neuropsychiatric approach and consider the reasons for the lack of progress. We propose a tentative framework to overcome these challenges and suggest directions for future research.     

A Multidimensional Approach to Apathy after Traumatic Brain Injury

Apathy is commonly described following traumatic brain injury (TBI) and is associated with serious consequences, notably for patients’ participation in rehabilitation, family life and later social reintegration. There is strong evidence in the literature of the multidimensional nature of apathy (behavioural, cognitive and emotional), but the processes underlying each dimension are still unclear. The purpose of this article is first, to provide a critical review of the current definitions and instruments used to measure apathy in neurological and psychiatric disorders, and second, to review the prevalence, characteristics, neuroanatomical correlates, relationships with other neurobehavioural disorders and mechanisms of apathy in the TBI population. In this context, we propose a new multidimensional framework that takes into account the various mechanisms at play in the facets of apathy, including not only cognitive factors, especially executive, but also affective factors (e.g., negative mood), motivational variables (e.g., anticipatory pleasure) and aspects related to personal identity (e.g., self-esteem). Future investigations that consider these various factors will help improve the understanding of apathy. This theoretical framework opens up relevant prospects for better clinical assessment and rehabilitation of these frequently described motivational disorders in patients with brain injury.     

The cognitive underpinnings of creative thought: A latent variable analysis exploring the roles of intelligence and working memory in three creative thinking processes

The field of creativity has largely focused on individual differences in divergent thinking abilities. Recently, contemporary creativity researchers have shown that intelligence and executive functions play an important role in divergent thought, opening new lines of research to examine how higher-order cognitive mechanisms may uniquely contribute to creative thinking. The present study extends previous research on the intelligence and divergent thinking link by systematically examining the relationships among intelligence, working memory, and three fundamental creative processes: associative fluency, divergent thinking, and convergent thinking. Two hundred and sixty five participants were recruited to complete a battery of tasks that assessed a range of elementary to higher-order cognitive processes related to intelligence and creativity. Results provide evidence for an associative basis in two distinct creative processes: divergent thinking and convergent thinking. Findings also supported recent work suggesting that intelligence significantly influences creative thinking. Finally, working memory played a significant role in creative thinking processes. Recasting creativity as a construct consisting of distinct higher-order cognitive processes has important implications for future approaches to studying creativity within an individual differences framework.     

When family considerations influence work decisions: Decision-making processes

The work–family literature has provided an abundance of evidence that various family factors are linked to various work decisions, suggesting that the “family-relatedness” of work decisions is a prevalent phenomenon (Greenhaus & Powell, 2012). However, the cognitive processes by which such linkages occur have received little attention. We offer a framework by which to examine individuals' decision-making processes when they take family considerations into account in their work decisions. The framework suggests stages through which individuals proceed when making a work decision that takes family considerations into account and cognitive processes that influence how they proceed through each stage.     

Neural-network models of learning and memory: leading questions and an emerging framework

Real-time neural-network models provide a conceptual framework for formulating questions about the nature of cognition, an architectural framework for mapping cognitive functions to brain regions, a semantic framework for defining terms, and a computational framework for testing hypotheses. This article considers key questions about how a physical system might simultaneously support one-trial learning and lifetime memories, in the context of neural models that test possible solutions to the problems posed. Model properties point to partial answers, and model limitations lead to new questions. Placing individual system components in the context of a unified real-time network allows analysis to move from the level of neural processes, including learning laws and rules of synaptic transmission, to cognitive processes, including attention and consciousness.     

A functional-cognitive framework for attitude research

In attitude research, behaviours are often used as proxies for attitudes and attitudinal processes. This practice is problematic because it conflates the behaviours that need to be explained (explanandum) with the mental constructs that are used to explain these behaviours (explanans). In the current chapter we propose a meta-theoretical framework that resolves this problem by distinguishing between two levels of analysis. According to the proposed framework, attitude research can be conceptualised as the scientific study of evaluation. Evaluation is defined not in terms of mental constructs but in terms of elements in the environment, more specifically, as the effect of stimuli on evaluative responses. From this perspective, attitude research provides answers to two questions: (1) Which elements in the environment moderate evaluation? (2) What mental processes and representations mediate evaluation? Research on the first question provides explanations of evaluative responses in terms of elements in the environment (functional level of analysis); research on the second question offers explanations of evaluation in terms of mental processes and representations (cognitive level of analysis). These two levels of analysis are mutually supportive, in that better explanations at one level lead to better explanations at the other level. However, their mutually supportive relation requires a clear distinction between the concepts of their explanans and explanandum, which are conflated if behaviours are treated as proxies for mental constructs. The value of this functional-cognitive framework is illustrated by applying it to four central questions of attitude research.