行为经济学中的损失规避

损失规避是指,人们总是强烈倾向于规避损失：一定数额的损失所引起的心理感受,其强烈程度约相当于两倍数额的获益感受。这种强烈的心理与行为倾向广泛存在于风险与非风险领域,在该两个领域中损失规避的研究范式也不同。损失规避常见于经济和消费等领域,可用于解释行为决策中有悖于规范化理论的诸多现象,如禀赋效应、现状偏差、股权溢价之迷和赢者的诅咒等。然而,损失规避的机制研究还存在许多尚未解决的问题,如损失规避的本质以及适用条件。今后的研究不仅要注重认知角度和情感依恋,还要结合认知过程来研究损失规避的性质和内在机制,以期帮助人们认识、预测及干预由损失规避造成的经济损失和非理性决策。     

Bringing (Contingent) Loss Aversion Down to Earth — A Comment on Gal & Rucker's Rejection of “Losses Loom Larger Than Gains”

Although we disagree with some of Gal and Rucker's (2018 – this issue) specific evidence and with their overstated conclusion regarding loss aversion, their overarching message makes a worthwhile contribution. In particular, loss aversion is less robust and universal than has been assumed while its most prominent empirical support — the endowment effect and the status quo bias — is susceptible to multiple alternative explanations. Instead of accepting loss aversion as true unless proven otherwise, we should treat it like other decision properties and psychological accounts that are contingent on various moderators and call for an analysis of psychological mechanisms. In this commentary, we suggest that gatekeepers, such as reviewers, tend to favor loss aversion and other widely accepted tendencies, while demanding a much higher support‐threshold for alternative or newer accounts. Although building on prior theories and concepts is of course important, the bias in favor of incumbent assumptions can impede scientific progress, bar new ideas from the literature, and reinforce well‐established but contingent notions that may apply under some conditions but not others.     

The Loss of Loss Aversion: Paying Attention to Reference Points

We agree with Gal and Rucker ( 2018 , in press) that loss aversion is not as firmly established as typically assumed. We affirm, however, the more general principle put forward within Prospect Theory (D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, 1979), which is that reference points increase people's sensitivity to objective changes in value. We show how the literatures on counterfactual thought, social comparison, and goal pursuit are consistent with the notion that reference points increase sensitivity to change in value, while not being consistent with loss aversion. We then examine, within the framework of Regulatory Focus theory (E. T. Higgins, 1997, 1998), how different reference points combine with characteristics of the actor and the situation to give rise to loss aversion (more sensitivity to negative outcomes than to positive outcomes) as well as to the reverse pattern (more sensitivity to positive outcomes than to negative outcomes). Our review suggests that the status quo, even when used as a reference point, is not necessarily neutral. It also suggests that anchor points other than the status quo may serve as reference points and that people may use more than one reference point simultaneously. More generally, we call for a critical examination of the “bad is stronger than good” principle.     

安于现状偏差的心理机制、影响因素及应用启示

安于现状偏差是指个体在决策时,倾向于不作为、维持当前或者以前的决策的一种现象。安于现状偏差包括内源的安于现状偏差与外源的安于现状偏差。目前研究者对这一现象的解释主要有两种:损失规避与后悔理论。安于现状偏差的影响因素主要包括备择项的数目、决策者的情绪以及认知与动机特征等。安于现状偏差有利于认识日常决策行为,而且在销售、管理与公共政策等实践领域有着重要的研究价值。未来的研究则需要从安于现状偏差与其他决策现象之间的关系,安于现状偏差的产生根源及其应用研究的拓展等方面来进一步探讨。     

Gain/Loss Asymmetry and Riskless Choice: Loss Aversion in Choices among Job Finalists

Tversky and Kahneman (1991) extended the notions of reference points and gain/loss asymmetry to multiattribute choice tasks having alternatives that cannot be assigned explicit probabilities. Two experiments were designed to test these propositions in the context of choices among job finalists. In the first experiment, undergraduates (N= 82) were provided with attribute information on two job candidates, along with (incomplete) attribute information on a previous job incumbent. The results showed that the relative standing of the job finalists was evaluated from the reference point of the incumbent's performance on the non-missing attributes. Candidates representing the status quo (i.e., no change in performance on the non-missing attributes) were preferred over candidates representing a loss. However, candidates representing a gain were not preferred over candidates representing the status quo. In the second experiment, undergraduates (N= 74) received assessor training and then watched a demonstration of performance in one of two work samples. Participants told that the demonstration was one of excellent performance strongly preferred the status quo candidate (i.e., the one that performed equally well on the demonstration work sample). However, participants told that the example was one of poor performance were indifferent between the status quo and gain candidate. We conclude that the gain/loss asymmetry commonly found in risky choice can also be found in riskless choice tasks such as choosing among job finalists.     

To change or not to change: A matter of decision maker’s role

The status quo effect derived from loss aversion is common in decision making. However, we propose that advisors (vs. personal decision makers) are less susceptible to such an effect because they are less loss-averse. The difference in loss aversion between personal decision makers and advisors is reflected in both the query order and content. Compared to advisors, personal decision makers produce more queries favoring the status quo, at an earlier time, than those favoring the new option. As hypothesized, the status quo effect was observed among personal decision makers, but not among advisors (Studies 1 and 2). Query order and content were found to mediate the impact of decision maker’s role on the status quo effect (Study 2). When personal decision makers and advisors made queries in the same order (Study 3) or of the same content (Studies 4a and 4b), the difference between self–other decision making disappeared.     

Conflict and Loss Aversion in Multiattribute Choice: The Effects of Trade-Off Size and Reference Dependence on Decision Difficulty

Two experiments assess the type and amount of conflict influencing decision difficulty in hypothetical scenarios where subjects chose between two alternatives made to appear relatively attractive (approach–approach conflicts) or relatively unattractive (avoidance-avoidance conflicts), each involving attribute trade-offs across alternatives (embedded approach–avoidance conflicts). In Experiment 1, independent of information processing demands, decisions are more difficult when alternatives are unattractive and/or attribute trade-offs are large. Reference states that change the relative attractiveness of the alternatives increase or decrease decision difficulty in a manner consistent with loss aversion: Superior reference states increase decision difficulty more than inferior reference states reduce it. Experiment 2 further tests the reference dependence of decision difficulty by varying the nature of the reference state (stated comparators, as in Experiment 1, or endowments) as well as its extremity. Endowed reference states affect decision difficulty more than reference states that are stated comparators. Moreover, consistent with loss aversion, inferior reference states that are twice as extreme as superior reference states reduce decision difficulty about as much as the superior reference states increase it. The results demonstrate that decisions can be made easier or harder by way of reference dependence, and that the loss aversion so prevalent in preference formation generalizes to perceptions of decision difficulty in multiattribute settings.     

Self–other decision making and loss aversion

In eight studies, we tested the prediction that making choices for others involves less loss aversion than making choices for the self. We found that loss aversion is significantly lessened among people choosing for others in scenarios describing riskless choice (Study 1), gambling (Studies 2 and 3), and social aspects of life, such as likeably and status (Studies 4a–e). Moreover, we found this pattern in relatively realistic conditions where people are rewarded for making desirable (i.e., profitable) choices for others (Study 2), when the other for whom a choice is made is physically present (Study 3), and when real money is at stake (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, we found loss aversion is moderated when factors associated with self–other differences in decision making are taken into account, such as decision makers’ construal level (Study 4a), regulatory focus (Study 4b), degree of information seeking (Study 4c), omission bias (Study 4d), and power (Study 4e).     

Loss Aversion,Intellectual Inertia,and a Call for a More Contrarian Science: A Reply to Simonson & Kivetz and Higgins & Liberman

Higgins and Liberman (2018) and Simonson and Kivetz (2018) offer scholarly and stimulating perspectives on loss aversion and the implications for the sociology of science of its acceptance as a virtual law of nature. In our view, Higgins and Liberman (2018) largely complement our conclusion that the empirical evidence does not support loss aversion. Moreover, in alignment with our call for a contextualized perspective, they provide an excellent discourse on how a more nuanced view of reference points and consumers’ regulatory focus enriches our understanding of the psychological impact of losses and gains. Simonson and Kivetz (2018) approached our perspective with skepticism, and, while they retain some skepticism, they express agreement on the larger point that loss aversion has been accepted too uncritically. Both commentaries point to a need for a critical reevaluation of prevailing paradigms. Here, we build on these perspectives, as well as our experience working on the topic of loss aversion, to call for structural changes to facilitate scholarly debate on science's status quo.     

Economic decision biases and fundamental motivations: how mating and self-protection alter loss aversion

Much research shows that people are loss averse, meaning that they weigh losses more heavily than gains. Drawing on an evolutionary perspective, we propose that although loss aversion might have been adaptive for solving challenges in the domain of self-protection, this may not be true for men in the domain of mating. Three experiments examine how loss aversion is influenced by mating and self-protection motives. Findings reveal that mating motives selectively erased loss aversion in men. In contrast, self-protective motives led both men and women to become more loss averse. Overall, loss aversion appears to be sensitive to evolutionarily important motives, suggesting that it may be a domain-specific bias operating according to an adaptive logic of recurring threats and opportunities in different evolutionary domains.     

Reference Points and Omission Bias

Subjects were asked to evaluate the choice of options leading to known outcomes, or to say how they would feel about a chance outcome, in hypothetical decisions. We independently manipulated the value of the status quo and the assignment of the better or worse outcome to an act or an omission. Acts leading to the worse outcome were always considered worse than omissions leading to the worse outcome. This act-omission difference was reduced or reversed for the better outcome. Most experiments showed an overall bias toward omissions (combining better and worse). Little evidence was found for greater omission bias for losses relative to the status quo than for gains. A bias toward maintaining the status quo itself was found, however, independently of omission bias. Most of the results can be explained by norm theory and by loss aversion, but other possible accounts are inconsistent with the results.     

概率水平与模糊性对短视损失规避的影响

短视损失规避是指如果投资者频繁地评估其投资回报,那么他就会经常改变其投资决策,进而减少对风险资产的投入。本文采用实验法探讨了任务概率水平以及模糊性对短视损失规避的影响。结果发现短视损失规避只存在于中等损失概率任务中,说明该现象并非普遍存在;当概率模糊时,高损失概率任务中出现短视损失规避,而低损失概率任务中则出现反向的短视损失规避,说明模糊性能扩展“短视”起作用的概率范围。     

行为决策中模糊规避研究的回顾与展望

模糊规避是指在相同奖赏的情况下,决策者会偏好有精确概率的事件而不是从主观上判断具有相同模糊概率的事件。自从Ellsberg提出模糊规避的概念以来,模糊规避已在行为决策研究的多个领域得到广泛验证。本文梳理了近五十年来关于模糊规避的研究文献,系统分析了模糊规避的研究范式、心理机制和影响因素,同时提出了未来的研究展望。     

The Impact of Culture on Loss Aversion

Based on the literature on the relationship between culture, emotion, and loss aversion, we derive that culture can influence the degree of loss aversion. To test our hypotheses, we conduct a standardized survey in 53 countries worldwide that includes the questions from the Hofstede survey on cultural dimensions as well as lottery questions on loss aversion. The results show that individualism, power distance, and masculinity increase loss aversion as predicted, whereas the impact of uncertainty avoidance is less significant. Moreover, we also find a relation between the distribution of major religions in a country and loss aversion. In comparison, the connection of loss aversion to macroeconomic variables seems to be much smaller. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consequences of Regret Aversion 2: Additional Evidence for Effects of Feedback on Decision Making

We discuss the effects of anticipated and experienced regret on decision making under uncertainty. In previous research, using the standard, context-free, gamble paradigm, we found that decision makers anticipate the regret they can experience as a result of post-decisional feedback on forgone outcomes (Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996). In the present research we move away from the gamble paradigm, on to richer contexts. In Experiments 1 and 2, involving investment decision making and decision making in the ultimatum game, it is shown that the expectation of feedback on forgone outcomes influences decision making and can promote more risk seeking behavior. Experiment 3 focused on effects of retrospective regret and shows that actual feedback on foregone outcomes influences the experience of regret and subsequent decision making. The results of these studies support our earlier work on regret aversion.     

Losses Induce Consistency in Risk Taking Even Without Loss Aversion

It is posited that because of the attentional effect of losses, individuals would show more behavioral consistency in risk‐taking tasks with losses, even in the absence of loss aversion. In two studies, the consistency of risky choices across different experience‐based tasks was evaluated for gain, loss, and mixed (gain loss) tasks. In both studies, losses facilitated the consistency across tasks: the correlation between risk‐taking choices in different tasks increased when the tasks involved frequent losses. Study 2 also showed a positive effect of losses on temporal consistency. Losses increased the correlation between risk‐taking levels across two sessions that were 45 days apart. Also in Study 2, losses induced consistency between experiential risk‐taking choices and self‐reported ratings of risky behavior. In both studies, the positive effect of losses on consistency was observed even when the average participant did not exhibit loss aversion. Taken together, the results indicate that losses increase the consistency of risk‐taking behavior and suggest that this is due to the effect of losses on attention. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal correction for guessing in multiple-choice tests

Subjects’ decisions in multiple-choice tests are an interesting domain for the analysis of decision making under uncertainty. When the test is graded using a rule that penalizes wrong answers, each item can be viewed as a lottery where a rational examinee would choose whether to omit (sure reward) or answer (take the lottery) depending on risk aversion and level of knowledge. We formalize students as heterogeneous decision makers with different risk attitudes and levels of knowledge. Building on IRT, we compute the optimal penalty given students’ optimal behavior and the trade-off between bias and measurement error. Although MCQ examinations are frequently used, there is no consensus as to whether a penalty for wrong answers should be used or not. For example, examinations for medical licensing in some countries include MCQ sections with penalty while in others there is no penalty for wrong answers. We contribute to this discussion with a formal analysis of the effects of penalties; our simulations indicate that the optimal penalty is relatively high for perfectly rational students but also when they are not fully rational: even though penalty discriminates against risk averse students, this effect is small compared with the measurement error that it prevents.     

损失规避的产生根源

损失规避是指由损失引发的负效用大于由等量收益引发的正效用的现象, 其产生根源能够从神经经济学和进化心理学两个方向进行解释。损失规避的脑机制分为两个系统：主观价值评价系统主要包括纹状体和前额皮层, 与主观价值的评估有关; 情绪唤醒系统主要包括杏仁核和脑岛, 与厌恶等消极情绪有关。在进化心理学的视角下, 通过回顾有关动物决策行为的研究来探索损失规避行为的进化历史, 并结合相关进化理论总结该行为产生的进化原因。未来可探索与行为损失规避相关的神经递质, 进一步研究损失规避的产生根源。