Conceptualization and measurement of millennial's social signaling and self‐signaling for socially responsible consumption

Social responsibility has rapidly gained popularity among consumers specifically among millennials born 1980 to 2000. Millennials are characterized by their willingness to get involved with social and political initiatives. Motivations for social responsibility are not completely unselfish in that individuals receive personal gain when providing support for others. This research proposes that socially responsible (SR) consumption has both social signaling and self‐signaling abilities. The scales for measuring millennial's social signaling and self‐signaling for SR consumption were developed to reflect the evolving nature of both social responsibility and the millennial generation. In‐depth interviews (n = 12) were used to generate scale items and an exploratory factor analysis was used to assess the dimensionality of the scales. Results were subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis that examined convergent and discriminant validity. Nomological validity testing was also performed. The social signaling for SR consumption scale was a one‐dimensional factor structure whereas the self‐signaling for SR consumption scale had two factors. These scales provide a tool for marketers and researchers to develop relevant SR initiatives aimed at millennials.     

Effects of hypothesis and assigned task on question selection strategies

Semin and Strack (1980) demonstrated that the findings obtained by Snyder and Swann (1978) with respect to an hypothesis-confirming strategy in social interaction were due to the assigned task, and not to a person's hypothesis. In our first experiment we replicated Semin and Strack's results. In a second experiment, employing a more effective manipulation of the subject's hypothesis, support was obtained for an effect of the hypothesis factor. It was concluded that both an assigned task effect and an hypothesis effect can be demonstrated in the laboratory and probably exist in reality.     

AN APT PUNISHMENT FOR TOM JOAD: (RE)IDENTIFYING TOM JOAD FOR A MORAL JUDGMENT BASED ON THE PRA

Our basic intuition seems to suggest that the moral biography of an individual matters in our treatment of the individual. We do keep criminal records on file, and we do care about the moral progress of individuals. At times our desire to fix responsibility seems too strong, and in our zeal we invent a definite, metaphysical character on which to pin crimes. However, some moral philosophers have tried to redirect our attention to affix responsibility in a way that attends to actions, deeds done. Two ways to affix responsibility have been reviewed—the SR and the PRA. In the case of Tom Joad we could arrive at the conviction that Tom was responsible through use of either the SR or the PRA. In the end the difference was not that one method held Tom culpable and one exculpated him. The difference was seen in the way the PRA included the earlier commission of the same crime in its evaluation of responsibility. To include in the evaluation of Tom's murder of George the earlier murder of Herb is to entertain a definite theory about the relation of Herb's murderer to George's murderer. I have suggested one possible candidate for that theory, Derek Parfit's theory of person stages.     

The influence of responsibility and guilt on naive hypothesis-testing

Three experiments were used to investigate individuals' hypothesis-testing process as a function of moral perceived utilities, which in turn depend on perceived responsibility and fear of guilt. Moral perceived utilities are related to individuals' moral standards and specifically to people's attempt to face up to their own responsibilities, and to avoid feeling guilty of irresponsibility. The results showed that responsibility and fear of guilt in testing hypotheses involved a process defined as prudential mode, which entails focusing on and confirming the worst hypothesis, and then reiterating the testing process. In particular, the results showed that responsible and guilt-fearing individuals: (1) tended to search prudentially for examples confirming the worst hypothesis and to search for counter-examples falsifying the positive hypothesis; (2) focused on the worst alternative, and tended to confirm it; (3) prudentially kept up the testing process, even if faced with initial positive evidence. Our discussion of the results emphasises how people are largely pragmatic in their hypothesis testing, using efficient cognitive strategies that focus on error minimisation rather than on truth detection. In a context of responsibility and guilt, the errors are linked to people's failure to face up to their own responsibilities, and are thus moral errors.     

Actual Existence, Identity and Ontological Priority

The paper first distinguishes ontological priority from epistemological priority and unilateral ontic dependence. Then explications of ontological priority are offered in terms of the reducibility of the actual existence or identity of entities in one ontological category to the actual existence or identity of entities in another. These explications lead to incompatible orders of ontological priority for individuals, properties of individuals and states of affairs. Common to those orders is, however, that the primacy of the category of individuals is abandoned. This primacy is challenged in the paper also by epistemological arguments, and an onto-anthropological explanation is offered for the very common but false idea that individuals are ontological prior to all other kinds of entities. Finally ontological priority is discussed with respect to a fully specified system of ontological categories. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The neuropsychological correlates of cognitive insight in healthy participants

Cognitive insight is the ability to monitor and correct one's own erroneous convictions. The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) assesses two sub‐dimensions of cognitive insight: self‐reflectiveness (SR), which is the attitude of questioning one's own judgments; and self‐certainty (SC), which is the unwillingness to modify and correct one's own convictions. There is little information about cognitive insight in healthy participants (HP). Here we investigated the socio‐demographic and neuropsychological correlates of cognitive insight in 50 HP who were administered the BCIS and a comprehensive neuropsychological battery. The global BCIS R‐C index correlated positively with age and WCST perseverative errors. SR correlated positively with age. These data support the hypothesis that a less self‐reflective and more self‐confident style is cognitively functional in HP. Thus, what has been found malfunctioning in mental illnesses is adaptive in HP. Future studies should consider a wider range of factors that might affect this complex construct. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of lay beliefs about group transgressions in acceptance of responsibility for ingroup harm-doing

Denial of responsibility by perpetrator groups is the most common response to group-based transgressions. Refusal to acknowledge responsibility has dire consequences for intergroup relations. In this research we assessed whether shifting lay beliefs about group-based transgressions in general influences acceptance of responsibility for a specific ingroup transgression. In two experimental studies we manipulated lay beliefs about group transgressions as reflecting either a group's stable character (i.e., a global defect construal) or a specific characteristic (i.e., a specific defect construal). Specific defect construals (compared to global defect construals) increased acceptance of ingroup responsibility by increasing group malleability beliefs, but reduced acceptance of ingroup responsibility by reducing the ingroup's perceived moral failure. These effects were moderated by ingroup superiority in Study 1, but not Study 2. We draw implications for our understanding of mechanisms of denial of responsibility, identity threat, and coping with this threat.     

Effects of social value orientation on expecting and learning others' orientations

The influence of an individual's own social value orientation on the orientation expected from others and on the learning of others' social orientations was examined. The subjects (N = 148) were classified according to theirown social value orientation. The orientations they generally expected from others were assessed as well. Each subject learned the choices of five other persons, representing the orientations altruism, cooperation, equality, individualism, and competition. With respect to subjects' expectations of others' orientations the triangle hypothesis was not fully supported: only individualists expected their orientation in high frequencies. The false consensus hypothesis received more support. Generally an orientation was expected more frequently by subjects who themselves had that particular orientation than by subjects with other orientations. With regard to the learning of others' orientations support was found for the predictions derived from the triangle and the false consensus hypothesis. Cooperators and individualists were the best overall learners, followed by egalitarian and maximum subjects, and at the lowest level competitors. In addition, nearly every orientation was learned better by subjects who had that orientation than by subjects with a different orientation.     

Reexamining Bases of Power From an Attributional Perspective1

Four replications of Rodrigues' (1995) study on genotypical similarities of Raven's (1965) power taxonomy are reported. Rodrigues found that compliance induced by reward, informational, and referent power is perceived as more internal and controllable than compliant behavior induced by expert, legitimate, and coercive power. The replications included 4 new aspects: (a) subjects are highly ego-involved in the hypothetical situation presented; (b) subjects are actors rather than observers; (c) subjects are from another culture; and (d) subjects are asked to play the role of a supervisor and apply sanctions to the person who complied as a result of the influence attempt, thus affording an empirical testing of Weiner's (1995) thought-affect-action sequence when responsibility judgments are made. The results of all 5 studies, with a total of 570 subjects, support Rodrigues' (1995) findings and confirm Weiner's (1995) hypothesis     

Collective guilt,moral outrage,and support for helping the poor: A matter of system versus in‐group responsibility framing

We examined how the framing of responsibility for reducing socio‐economic inequality affects individuals' emotional reactions towards the poor and the willingness to engage in prosocial actions. Attribution of responsibility to either the system (government and institutions), the less deprived in‐group, or the disadvantaged out‐group (poor) was measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2). Consistent with our hypotheses, moral outrage was higher than collective guilt when system responsibility for inequalities was put forth, but collective guilt arose to reach the level of moral outrage when in‐group responsibility was emphasized. Moreover, distinguishing between collective guilt for action and for inaction, we found guilt for inaction more difficult and thus less likely to arise, unless responsibility was put on the in‐group. Collective emotions were also found to be negatively linked to system justification motivation illustrating the palliative function of legitimization processes. Finally, moral outrage predicted the willingness to act upon socio‐economic inequalities both when the system's and in‐group's responsibility was emphasized, whereas collective guilt for action (but not for inaction) predicted support for prosocial actions only when the in‐group's responsibility was engaged. These findings suggest that the specific group‐based emotions in response to poverty depend on whether the system or the in‐group is held responsible and differentially predict individuals' commitment to act.     

Depressed Clients' Attributions of Responsibility for the Causes of and Solutions to Their Problems

This study examined the attributions made by depressed clients about responsibility for the causes of and solutions to their problems. A total of 160 university counseling center clients completed the Beck Depression Inventory (A. T. Beck & R. A. Steer, 1987) and instruments measuring attributions of responsibility, internality, stability, and controllability for their problems. Support was obtained for the hypothesis that depressed clients blame themselves more for causing their problems than do nondepressed clients. However, client attributions of responsibility for solving problems were not affected by level of depressive symptoms. Finally, P. Brickman et al.'s (1982) theory of responsibility attributions was found to be modestly related with B. Weiner's (1985) attribution theory.     

Nurses' Evaluations of Patient Attributions for the Cause and Future of Their Illness1

It was hypothesized that evaluations of patients' attributions for the cause and future of their illnesses would be seen as more realistic when these attributions coincided with subjects' views on the cause and future of the patients' illness. It was also thought that of the two, i.e., cause and future attributions, future attributions would be more pertinent for the observer when evaluating the adjustment of the patient. One hundred and twenty-eight female nurses assessed the health interviews of four patients through the use of questionnaires. The first hypothesis was supported in the case of causal attributions, but it was found that patients who accepted responsibility, regardless of nurses' views, were seen as more realistic. The second hypothesis was fully supported with future attributions indicating level of coping and causal attributions indicating level of emotional support needed. These findings have implications for caretakers' perceptions of the adaptiveness, for patients of serious illness, of control attributions.     

Physical Size Stereotyping as a Mediator of Attributions of Responsibility in an Alleged Date-Rape Situation1

This research focuses on male and female observers' attributions of responsibility to a female accuser and a male accused of rape. Observers read 1 of 2 scenarios in which the accuser was either smaller or larger than the accused and then made judgments concerning each person's responsibility for what happened. The data indicated that the larger accuser was considered more responsible than the smaller accuser and the larger accused was perceived to be more responsible than the smaller accused. Females attributed more responsibility and had less sympathy, respect, and liking for the accused, whereas males attributed more responsibility and reported more negative attitudes toward the accuser. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for legal and health-care professionals.     

Coping With Threats to Just‐World Beliefs: Derogate,Blame, or Help?1

The present research investigated Lerner's (1970, 1980) just‐world theory by manipulating victim‐related factors in a scenario and measuring several possible strategies for dealing with the threat to participants' just‐world beliefs created by the victim's intense suffering. Participants read a story about a victim who varied in terms of his character (likeable vs. unlikeable) and behavioral responsibility for causing his accident (high vs. low). The general pattern of results showed that for the unlikeable low‐responsibility victim, the primary response to protect justice beliefs appeared to be character derogation; for the likeable high‐responsibility victim, the primary protective strategy appeared to be blame; and for the likeable low‐responsibility victim, the primary protective strategy appeared to be compensation. Implications for just‐world theory are discussed.     

Examining Family Communication Patterns and Seeking Social Support Direct and Indirect Effects Through Ability and Motivation

Seeking social support remains a relatively understudied aspect of supportive communication. By integrating the literatures on family communication patterns (FCPs) and supportive communication, this study examines dispositional factors that influence support seeking in particular situations. Specifically, communicative ability and motivation to seek support were theorized to mediate the relationship between FCPs and recalled strategies of support seeking. Results from a sample (N = 352) of undergraduate students not only demonstrate that people's FCPs impart different levels of communicative ability and motivation to seek support, but also indirectly influence people's strategies of support seeking. Ability and motivation also directly influence support seeking, and several of these effects are moderated by participants' sex.     

Synchronic and diachronic responsibility

This paper distinguishes between synchronic responsibility (SR) and diachronic responsibility (DR). SR concerns an agent’s responsibility for an act at the time of the action, while DR concerns an agent’s responsibility for an act at some later time. While most theorists implicitly assume that DR is a straightforward matter of personal identity, I argue instead that it is grounded in psychological connectedness. I discuss the implications this distinction has for the concepts of apology, forgiveness, and punishment as well as the way in which this distinction can be used to defend quality of will accounts of responsibility against objections involving psychological manipulation. I argue that the intuition that a manipulated agent is not responsible can be explained by appeal to the conditions of DR and, as such, does not unproblematically shed light on the conditions of SR.     

The Priority Principle from Kant to Frege

In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that “the understanding can make no other use of […] concepts than that of judging by means of them.” Kant's thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: “it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode […] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.” Many interpreters have thought that Frege's priority principle is close to (or at least derivable from) Kant's. I argue that it is not. Nevertheless, there was a gradual historical development that began with Kant's priority thesis and culminated in Frege's new logic.     

Effects of Differential Instructions and Anxiety Level on Discrimination Learning

Seventy-seven nonconserver-conserver dyads and 53 nonconserver-nonconserver dyads were given a conservation of length task which encouraged conflicting judgments from the nonconserving dyad. Ss were boys and girls aged 4 through 8. Control tasks for social dominance/compliance were also administered. All sessions were videotaped. The nonconserver-nonconserver dyads did not tend to produce the correct answer by perspective coordination and showed little posttest gain. Nonconservers who had been paired with conservers showed posttest gain on length, mass, liquid, and number conservation problems. Being the winner of an interaction session was associated with opposing the partner's judgment and with producing justifications in conserver-nonconserver dyads, but only with social compliance in nonconserver-nonconserver dyads. Justifications in support of conservation judgments were invariably by logical principles but very rarely so in support of nonconservation judgments. The results are discussed in terms of the relative importance of cognitive conflict and transmission as crucial social experiences in cognitive development, and in terms of the possibility that nonconservers may lack the notion of objective correctness relative to conservers.     

Freedom,moral responsibility,and the failure of universal defeat

Proponents of manipulation arguments against compatibilism hold that manipulation scope (how many agents are manipulated) and manipulation type (whether the manipulator intends that an agent perform a particular action) do not impact judgments about free will and moral responsibility. Many opponents of manipulation arguments agree that manipulation scope has no impact but hold that manipulation type does. Recent work by Latham and Tierney (2022, 2023) found that people's judgments were sensitive to manipulation scope: people judged that an agent was less free and responsible when a manipulation was existential (impacting at least one but not all agents) than when the manipulation was universal (impacting every agent). This study examines people's judgements about existential and universal manipulation cases that involve both intentional and non-intentional outcomes. We found that manipulation scope also affects people's free will and responsibility judgments in manipulation cases involving both intentional and non-intentional outcomes. Interestingly, we also found that manipulation type influences the effect that manipulation scope has on people's free will judgments but not their moral responsibility judgments, which indicates that people's free will and responsibility judgments can come apart. This puts pressure on the prevalent assumption that judgments about free will and moral responsibility are conceptually bound together.