Aesthetic Terms,Metaphor, and Categories: a Reply to De Clercq

In his paper, “Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor and the Nature of Aesthetic Properties”, Rafael De Clercq claims to (i) offer a category-based explanation of the metaphorical uninterpretability of aesthetic terms, and (ii) establish that the concept of an aesthetic property is fully analyzable in non-aesthetic terms. Both would be interesting and noteworthy achievements if accomplished. However, I argue in this discussion piece that he fails to achieve either goal.     

The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature

Books reviewed:
Malcolm Budd, The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, 158 pp. No price. Reviewed by Colin Lyas, University of Lancaster Furness College Bailrigg Lancaster LA1 4YG     

隐喻识别心理过程的无差别性及意义

本文从计算角度探讨隐喻识别问题.首先模拟人类隐喻思维过程构建了"识别、分析、释义"三阶段隐喻机器理解模式,并提出了隐喻识别心理过程的无差别性假设,即不同隐喻句皆通过句内成分之间指称或搭配之异常来触发人们的辨识.该假设直观地体现为人们在识别不同隐喻句时,反应时无明显差异,而在解释隐喻含义时,反应时则表现出明显差异.该假设得到了反应时对比实验结果的支持.隐喻识别心理过程的无差别性为隐喻计算提供了一种新的解决思路和方法.     

Towards a Medical Aesthetic and its Performative Nature

Beyond the techniques and instruments it employs, medicine has an intrinsic value that enables it to be interpretative, dramatic, and above all, real. In this essay, the aesthetic that emerges through the medical examination is thoroughly discussed. The piece deconstructs the qualities of the medical examination in a manner that facilitates medical practice to be perceived as an art form. The signifiers found in a medical diagnosis and its aesthetic consequences are reviewed. The nature of the diagnosis positions medical practice as a dramatic art.     

Aesthetic Properties as Powers

Realist positions about aesthetic properties are few and far between, though sometimes developed by analogy to realism about secondary properties such as colours. By contrast, I advance a novel realist position about aesthetic properties, which is based on a disanalogy between aesthetic properties and colours. Whereas colours are usually perceived as relatively steady features of external objects, aesthetic properties are perceived as unsteady properties: as powers that objects have to cause a certain experience in the observer. Following on from this observation, I develop a realist account of aesthetic properties as causally efficient powers. Beauty is not merely in the mind of the observer; it is a power of an object to bring about a certain effect, as much instantiated in the object as its fragility or poisonousness. To show how such a view can be made ontologically respectable, I draw on recent ‘dispositionalist’ accounts of powers in philosophical metaphysics. I then offer two arguments in favour of this view. First, the view matches the phenomenology of aesthetic judgement. Second, the view offers an explanation of how it is that critics can demand agreement with their aesthetic judgements.     

Xujing (Emptiness and Stillness) in Daoism,Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature,and Environmental Ethics

In this article,I will examine the concept of xujing虛靜 (emptiness and stillness) in Daoism and its relationship with the aesthetic appreciation of nature and environmental ethics.Firstly,I will examine the Chinese philosophical understanding of nature through the concept of qi.I point out that qi is characterized by four interrelated features,which are emptiness,creativity,vitality,and stillness.Xujing are also aesthetically appreciated as the objective features of qi.Secondly,I will discuss why,as the objective features of qi,xujing are considered to be features that have aesthetic value.I argue that empathy is the reason why emptiness as the objective feature of qi is regarded as having aesthetic value.Thirdly,I will discuss how the aesthetic concept of emptiness helps contribute to the construction of place-based environmental ethics.     

The Affective Experience of Aesthetic Properties

It is widely agreed upon that aesthetic properties, such as grace, balance, and elegance, are perceived. I argue that aesthetic properties are experientially attributed to some non‐perceptible objects. For example, a mathematical proof can be experienced as elegant. In order to give a unified explanation of the experiential attribution of aesthetic properties to both perceptible and non‐perceptible objects, one has to reject the idea that aesthetic properties are perceived. I propose an alternative view: the affective account. I argue that the standard case of experiential aesthetic property attribution is affective experience.