Sex differences in restoring justice: The down payment effect

It was proposed that harmdoers who psychologically suffer (e.g., experience remorse, guilt) through victimizing another will be viewed as having already taken a step toward righting the injustice caused the victim. Consequently, they should be asked to make fewer reparations and assigned a lesser fine than those harmdoers who do not express guilt or remorse. Male and female subjects read scenarios depicting an accident in which the harmdoer either admitted or did not admit responsibility (Experiment 1) or expressed various degrees of remorsefulness (Experiment 3). Both investigations indicated that a show of remorse or of a remorseful gesture (i.e., assuming responsibility) can partially vindicate harmdoers by requiring them to make fewer reparations to a victim (Experiment 1) or pay less of a fine (Experiment 3) among females only. Thus psychological damages incurred in a wrongful act can serve as a “down payment” toward restoring justice. In corroboration with these findings of sex differences, Experiment 2 revealed that females consider to a greater extent than males reasons such as a harmdoer's feelings when assigning a fine.     

Persistent overconfidence despite practice: The role of task experience in preschoolers’ recall predictions

In three experiments, preschoolers’ ability to predict their picture recall was examined. Children studied 10 pictures, predicted how many they would recall, and then attempted to recall them. This study-prediction-recall trial was repeated multiple times with new pictures on each trial. In Experiment 1, children were overconfident on the initial trial, and this overconfidence persisted across three trials. In Experiment 2, children predicted either their own performance or another child’s performance. Their predictions were overconfident across all trials regardless of whether they made predictions for themselves or for another child, suggesting that wishful thinking cannot fully account for their overconfidence. In Experiment 3, some children postdicted their previous recall performance prior to making each prediction. Although their postdictions were quite accurate, their predictions were still overconfident across five trials. Preschoolers’ overconfidence was remarkably resistant to the repeated experience of recalling fewer pictures than the children had predicted. Even asking them to report the number that they recalled on a previous trial, which they could do accurately, did not cause them to lower their predictions across trials.     

Can unpredicted outcomes be intended? The role of outcome-beliefs in children's judgments of intention

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one's action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding outcome. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inaccurate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.     

Cold and lonely: does social exclusion literally feel cold?

Metaphors such as icy stare depict social exclusion using cold-related concepts; they are not to be taken literally and certainly do not imply reduced temperature. Two experiments, however, revealed that social exclusion literally feels cold. Experiment 1 found that participants who recalled a social exclusion experience gave lower estimates of room temperature than did participants who recalled an inclusion experience. In Experiment 2, social exclusion was directly induced through an on-line virtual interaction, and participants who were excluded reported greater desire for warm food and drink than did participants who were included. These findings are consistent with the embodied view of cognition and support the notion that social perception involves physical and perceptual content. The psychological experience of coldness not only aids understanding of social interaction, but also is an integral part of the experience of social exclusion.     

Props,not pictures,are worth a thousand words: verbal accessibility of early memories under different conditions of contextual support

When they are tested nonverbally, even young children demonstrate long-term recall. There have been few studies of whether early memories later are verbally accessible; the results of those that exist are mixed. Inconsistencies may be due to differences in the contextual cues provided at the time of recall. In two experiments, children 13–20 months were exposed to multi-step sequences and tested for nonverbal recall after 3–6 months. At age 3 years, they were tested verbally, under varying conditions of contextual support: in the original laboratory with event-related props versus at home with photographs of the props (Experiment 1), and at home with props (Experiment 2). Children younger than 20 months at initial experience of the events did not demonstrate verbal recall. Children who were 20 months at the initial exposure recalled verbally, as long as they had physical props as cues, regardless of whether testing took place at home or in the laboratory. This research informs the conditions under which memories from very early childhood later can be recalled verbally. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Working hours, job stress, work satisfaction, and accident rates among medical practitioners and allied personnel

Predictors of accident behavior among German medical staff revealed that work-related injuries/accidents experienced during a recent 12-month period were significantly related to working hours per week, distance from home to practice, number of dependent children, gender, and job-related stress. The average yearly number of car accidents was predicted by age and number of working hours. Furthermore, driving accidents going to or coming from work during the last year was determined by working climate, hours of work, length of lunchtime break, distance traveled to and from work, number of dependent children, and gender. Physicians working in excess of 48 hours per week displayed significantly more driving accidents but not work-related accidents, and they reported significantly higher levels of job-related stress than those colleagues working fewer than 48 hours per week. The implications of these results are discussed in the framework on risk management in the health services.     

When Even Arbitrary Order Becomes Important: Developments in Reliable Temporal Sequencing of Arbitrarily Ordered Events

By late in the first year of life, children show temporally ordered recall of event sequences, the orders of which are constrained by enabling relations; they do not reliably recall arbitrarily ordered events. Using elicited imitation, in two experiments, we examined age-and experience-related changes in young children's recall of events, the orders of which are arbitrary. The changes were found to have implications for the efficacy of verbal reminding and to be related to developments in language. Specifically, on the basis of a single experience, 16-month-olds did not accurately recall arbitrarily ordered event sequences either immediately or after a two-week delay (Experiment 1); 22-month-olds recalled the events immediately, but not after the delay; by 28 months, children recalled the events even after the delay (Experiment 2A). This development was accompanied by changes in the ability to benefit from verbal reminders: 28-month-olds' recall was facilitated by provision of verbal reminders, whereas that of the younger children was not. Moreover, age-related changes in accurate reproduction of lengthy arbitrarily ordered event sequences were found to be related to developments in language (Experiment 2B). Critically, the limitations on 1-year-olds' performance that are overcome with age are not absolute: After three experiences, 16-month-olds accurately recalled the events after a two-week delay; their recall was facilitated by verbal reminders (Experiment 1). The implications of these findings are discussed.     

The effects of individual differences in test anxiety and type of orienting task on levels of organization in free recall

In Experiment 1, high and low test-anxious subjects recalled a list composed of words that could be organized either by taxonomic categories or first letters. High-anxiety subjects showed less recall and conceptual clustering. There was no anxiety difference in alphabetic clustering, but low-anxiety subjects used alphabetic clusters to bridge transitions between conceptual categories more often than did high-anxiety subjects. An initial orienting task which required semantic processing reduced the recall deficit for high-anxiety subjects but not the clustering deficit. Low-anxiety subjects seemed minimally affected by a nonsemantic-orienting task. Experiment 2 used a list that could be organized by associates or rhymes. High-anxiety subjects recalled less and exhibited less clustering of both types. The nonsemantic-orienting task depressed performance for both anxiety levels, though the effect was somewhat greater for high-anxiety subjects. Overall, these results provide little evidence to support the hypothesis that high-anxiety subjects process differently only for semantic content, but methodological limitations preclude unequivocally rejecting that view.     

Remembering remembering

We developed a laboratory analogue of the "forgot-it-all-along" effect that J. W. Schooler, M. Bendiksen, and Z. Ambadar (1997) proposed for cases of "recovered memories" in which individuals had forgotten episodes of talking about the abuse when they were supposedly amnestic for it. In Experiment 1, participants studied homographs with disambiguating context words; in Test 1 they received studied- or other-context words as cues; and in Test 2 they received studied-context cues and judged whether they had recalled each item during Test 1. In Experiment 2, retrieval cues were manipulated on both tests. In Experiment 3, both the studied- and other-context cues corresponded to the same meaning of each homograph. In Experiment 4, Test 1 was free recall, and studied- versus other-context cues were presented in Test 2. Participants more often forgot that they had previously recalled an item if they were cued to think of it differently on the two tests.     

Prior experiences and perceived efficacy influence 3-year-olds' imitation

Children are selective and flexible imitators. They combine their own prior experiences and the perceived causal efficacy of the model to determine whether and what to imitate. In Experiment 1, children were randomly assigned to have either a difficult or an easy experience achieving a goal. They then saw an adult use novel means to achieve the goal. Children with a difficult prior experience were more likely to imitate the adult's precise means. Experiment 2 showed further selectivity--children preferentially imitated causally efficacious versus nonefficacious acts. In Experiment 3, even after an easy prior experience led children to think their own means would be effective, they still encoded the novel means performed by the model. When a subsequent manipulation rendered the children's means ineffective, children recalled and imitated the model's means. The research shows that children integrate information from their own prior interventions and their observations of others to guide their imitation.     

Adult age differences in memory for massed and distributed repeated actions

Adult age differences in memory for actions were investigated in 2 experiments in which actions were repeated with massed or distributed spacing. In Experiment 1, subjects received a mixed series of actions, half performed once, the others twice, with repetitions either massed or distributed. Young subjects recalled more actions than did the elderly, and more distributed actions were recalled than massed actions. However, the Age X Spacing interaction was not significant. A probable inhibitory mechanism with a mixed list was avoided in Experiment 2 by use of unmixed series. Actions were performed once only, twice only in massed repetitions, or twice only in distributed repetitions. The age difference was significant, and more actions were recalled in the distributed condition than in either of the other conditions, the results of which did not differ from one another. The Age X Conditions interaction was negligible. These results imply that elderly subjects are as likely as young subjects to encode contextual information while performing actions.     

Attributed reasons for support of the feminist movement as a function of attractiveness

Male and female subjects were shown photographs of attractive and unattractive women. They were asked to indicate, for each photograph, the main reason why they thought the woman in the photograph was a feminist. Subjects attributed more positive, flattering reasons to the attractive women than to the unattractive women. In addition, it was found that subjects who did this task after having done a filler task made a greater distinction between the attractive and unattractive women than did subjects who did this task first. Interpretations and limitations of the results are discussed.     

Spatial problem solving: The integration of independently learned cognitive maps

The process of mentally integrating separate regions of a layout into a unified representation is a critical component in generating inferred spatial information. Blindfolded subjects learned two different paths by tactual exploration. The subjects were then given information that permitted them to integrate the two cognitive maps of the paths into one map. In Experiment I, the speed and accuracy of originally learned and inferred movements within a path were equivalent, whereas inferred movements between the two paths were significantly slower and less accurate. In Experiment 2, the subjects could request additional training on the paths before they were given the integration information, and they also rated how well they knew the path on which they were tested. When the subjects judged that they remembered all or most of the path information, movements between two paths and within one path were performed with the same accuracy. The equivalent accuracy of all the movements suggests that cognitive integration can generate an accurate representation of an integrated layout when the path information is recalled.     

Interactions between presentation modality and encoding task in frequency judgements

In two experiments, presentation modality of a list of items and encoding task were varied, and subjects judged the frequency with which certain words had been presented in the list. In Experiment 1, auditory presentation led to higher judgements of frequency than did visual presentation when subjects counted the consonants in the words but not when they rated imageability or when they kept a running count of the number of presentations of each word. In Experiment 2, encoding questions about the rhyme or spelling patterns of target words produced opposite effects for auditory and visual items. The results are interpreted as indicating that cross-modal translation during encoding produces a bias towards higher-frequency judgements and may also produce better frequency discrimination.     

Comparing Children’s Memories for Negative Versus Positive Events in the Context of Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms

How well children remember negative events is not fully understood. Previous research has failed to simultaneously test memory and perceptions of memory for both negative and positive events. Children (n = 38, 7–17 years) recruited from a hospital following accidental injury were tested for their memory of an injury-producing accident (negative event) and a positive event (unexpectedly receiving a $50 gift voucher). Objective accuracy of memory, memory quality characteristics (e.g., how coherently the event was recalled), children’s judgments of their memory (meta-cognitive), and posttraumatic stress (PTS) symptoms were assessed 2 months post-injury. Children’s memories for their experiences were verified using witness/parent reports. Memory quality characteristics of children’s free recollection were coded with a previously used standardized system. Overall, children showed high levels of accuracy for both events, with little degradation over time. High PTS children showed little evidence of deficits in coherence or organization in their narratives relative to low PTS children. Although in some instances high PTS children judged their memory quality to be poor compared to low PTS children, this depended on how this was assessed (e.g., self-report questionnaire vs. coded narratives). In terms of limitations, it is unclear whether the findings will generalize for memories of repeated events. Witness verification of the accident details itself could be prone to error. In conclusion, the findings are broadly supportive of the proposal made by theorists who argue that trauma memories are recalled no less accurately than other distinctive memories. The role of meta-cognitive elements of children’s memory and reporting in PTS is less clear.     

Six does not just mean a lot: preschoolers see number words as specific

This paper examines what children believe about unmapped number words - those number words whose exact meanings children have not yet learned. In Study 1, 31 children (ages 2-10 to 4-2) judged that the application of five and six changes when numerosity changes, although they did not know that equal sets must have the same number word. In Study 2, 15 children (ages 2-5 to 3-6) judged that six plus more is no longer six, but that a lot plus more is still a lot. Findings support the hypothesis that children treat number words as referring to specific, unique numerosities even before they know exactly which numerosity each word refers to.