What can law do for the development of bio-economy?

Bio-technology has become a new impeller to the development of the world economy since the 1970's. The development of bio-economy has two sides for mankind which calls for intervention by law. During the legislation of bioeconomy, some special principles should be esteemed and observed by legislators. It is necessary for the healthy development of bio-economy.     

Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment

One popular justification for punishment is the just deserts rationale: A person deserves punishment proportionate to the moral wrong committed. A competing justification is the deterrence rationale: Punishing an offender reduces the frequency and likelihood of future offenses. The authors examined the motivation underlying laypeople's use of punishment for prototypical wrongs. Study 1 (N = 336) revealed high sensitivity to factors uniquely associated with the just deserts perspective (e.g., offense seriousness, moral trespass) and insensitivity to factors associated with deterrence (e.g., likelihood of detection, offense frequency). Study 2 (N = 329) confirmed the proposed model through structural equation modeling (SEM). Study 3 (N = 351) revealed that despite strongly stated preferences for deterrence theory, individual sentencing decisions seemed driven exclusively by just deserts concerns.     

Why do they hook up? Attachment style and motives of college students

Attachment style may be related to variations in hookup experiences; however, we do not know if attachment style is associated with hookup motives. College students (N = 266) completed questionnaires that assessed attachment style and hookup motives. Avoidant attachment was negatively associated with intimacy motives, while anxious attachment was positively related to intimacy. Insecure attachment styles were positively related to coping motives and self‐affirmation motives, but gender interacted with attachment style. Anxious attachment was positively associated with peer pressure motives in men only. The role of attachment style and hookup motives in understanding young adults' hookup experiences will be discussed.     

The pull of the past: when do habits persist despite conflict with motives?

To identify the factors that disrupt and maintain habit performance, two field experiments tested the conditions under which people eat out of habit, leading them to resist motivational influences. Habitual popcorn eaters at a cinema were minimally influenced by their hunger or how much they liked the food, and they ate equal amounts of stale and fresh popcorn. Yet, mechanisms of automaticity influenced habit performance: Participants ate out of habit, regardless of freshness, only when currently in the context associated with past performance (i.e., a cinema; Study 1) and only when eating in a way that allowed them to automatically execute the response cued by that context (i.e., eating with their dominant hand; Study 2). Across all conditions, participants with weaker cinema-popcorn-eating habits ate because of motivations such as liking for the popcorn. The findings reveal how habits resist conflicting motives and provide insight into promising mechanisms of habit change.     

What can you do for me?: Attachment style and motives underlying esteem for partners

Two event-contingent diary studies investigated whether people of different attachment styles value partners for different reasons (e.g., self-esteem regulation, closeness). In Study 1, preoccupied individuals more positively regarded partners when they provided help with self-regulatory functions, and they did so to a greater extent than either secure or dismissing-avoidant individuals. In Study 2, preoccupied and fearful-avoidant individuals were more likely to want to gain approval from partners. Also, when preoccupied individuals obtained partner approval, they valued their partner more, and they did so to a greater extent than secure individuals. Continuous attachment measures produced weaker findings, but people higher in anxious-ambivalence generally showed patterns similar to those found for preoccupied individuals. Findings suggest that the process by which people come to positively view their partners may vary depending on their attachment-related goals.     

“Why do (don't) you ask?” transference and the desire (not) to know

One of the criterial distinctions of psychoanalysis is its renunciation of indoctrination through suggestion. In spite of the fact that psychoanalysis is both an organized body of knowledge and a disciplined form of interpersonal influence, it regards an analyst who tells the analysand what to think or do as essentially doing harm by substituting a new form of prejudice and alienation for the preexisting form he is attacking. Even though an analyst regards his knowledge of psychoanalytic theory as adequate at a general level, this "truth" is not an adequate mode of discourse with an individual. Why not? It is a fact that analysands often do not accept an analyst's idea. However, the fundamental problematic of clinical psychoanalysis comes precisely at the point that the analysand would accept the analyst's idea, involving the distinction between a properly psychoanalytic cure and a transference cure. Psychoanalytic theory itself holds that unreflective incorporation of another's idea about oneself comes at the expense of autonomous and spontaneous self-revelation. Despite its resolute pursuit of new truths, the aim of psychoanalysis is less concerned with attaining specific ideas about unrecognized conflicts than it is with achieving a general attitude--that self-understanding requires a capacity to admit dubious and unwanted ideas and feelings that symptoms, dreams, and free associations bring to light. This "psychoanalytic" attitude permits a new type of discourse in which the person recognizes himself or herself through expression, rather than parrotting the analyst's (or others') words, or continuing rigidly to hide the truth of desire for oneself. In the long run, psychoanalysis offers to correct a primary misunderstanding: that one can acquire a comprehensively true image of oneself. As Barratt (1988) emphasizes, this transformation is tantamount to a change in personal epistemology for the analysand and a change in epistemological theory for the culture as a whole. In our culture, most analysts and lay people alike take for granted that the ego is an agent that is to be integrated and strengthened in order to direct one's life. Likewise, the unconscious is commonly regarded as a type of savage alter ego that must be mastered by the ego. According to Lacan's critique, the ego is a snare and a delusion for the patient, however highly commended by society it may be, because its very essence is to furnish the illusion of enduring self-knowledge.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Why do you fear the bogeyman? An embodied predictive coding model of perceptual inference

Why are we scared by nonperceptual entities such as the bogeyman, and why does the bogeyman only visit us during the night? Why does hearing a window squeaking in the night suggest to us the unlikely idea of a thief or a killer? And why is this more likely to happen after watching a horror movie? To answer these and similar questions, we need to put mind and body together again and consider the embodied nature of perceptual and cognitive inference. Predictive coding provides a general framework for perceptual inference; I propose to extend it by including interoceptive and bodily information. The resulting embodied predictive coding inference permits one to compare alternative hypotheses (e.g., is the sound I hear generated by a thief or the wind?) using the same inferential scheme as in predictive coding, but using both sensory and interoceptive information as evidence, rather than just considering sensory events. If you hear a window squeaking in the night after watching a horror movie, you may consider plausible a very unlikely hypothesis (e.g., a thief, or even the bogeyman) because it explains both what you sense (e.g., the window squeaking in the night) and how you feel (e.g., your high heart rate). The good news is that the inference that I propose is fully rational and gives minds and bodies equal dignity. The bad news is that it also gives an embodiment to the bogeyman, and a reason to fear it.     

Can individualists and cooperators play together? The effect of mixed social motives in negotiations

Despite noting the likelihood of dissimilar motives in many transactions, previous negotiation research has focused on negotiations whose participants were similarly motivated (to be cooperative or individualistic). In this paper, we answer recent calls to examine “mixed dyads” (i.e. negotiators with differing social motives) in addition to homogeneous dyads. Our results showed that cooperative - and mixed - dyads both experienced significantly more positive negotiation processes and outcomes than individualistic dyads. We discuss the important roles communication and reciprocity may have in helping individualists and cooperators to reach mutually beneficial agreements.     

Spanish adaptation of the "Why worry?" questionnaire

This study presents the validation of Spanish version of Why worry? Questionnaire which assesses a variable of process related to the overestimation of the positive and negative consequences of the excessive and uncontrollable worry that is characteristic of Generalized Anxiety Disorder. 833 participants from Tenerife (Canary Island) completed this questionnaire among other psychological measures. The exploratory factor analysis yielded a two-factors structure that explained 41.34% of the total variance; both of them showed adecuate internal consistency (alpha 1 = 0.86 and alpha 2 = 0.85) and test-retest (r 1 = 0.70 and r 2 = 0.75) reliability coefficients. A confirmatory factor analysis confirmed two-factor structure. As expected, concurrent validation uncovered substantial correlation with anxiety and mood disorders. The results support a good discriminate validity. The Spanish version of why worry questionnaire provides a reliable and valid instrument, which we can use in cross-cultural studies on worry as a GAD characteristic.     

Why won’t you do what I want? The informative failures of children and models

Computational models are powerful tools – too powerful, according to some. We argue that the idea that models can “do anything” is wrong, and we describe how their failures have been informative. We present new work showing surprising diversity in the effects of feedback on children's task-switching, such that some children perseverate despite this feedback, other children switch as instructed, and yet others play an “opposites” game without truly switching to the newly instructed task. We present simulations that demonstrate the failure of an otherwise-successful neural network model to capture this failure. Simulating this pattern motivates the inclusion of updating mechanisms that make contact with a growing literature on frontostriatal function, despite their absence in theories of the development of cognitive flexibility. We argue from this and other examples that computational models are more constrained than is typically acknowledged and that their resulting failures can be theoretically illuminating.     

Why and when do motives matter? An integrative model of motives,role cognitions,and social support as predictors of OCB

We extend prior thinking about citizenship behavior by integrating employee motives, social support, and role cognitions as predictors of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Drawing on trait activation and situated self theories, we provide insights into why and when motives predict OCB using multi-source data from two field samples. In Study 1, we demonstrate that the quality of social support functions as a boundary condition that qualifies relations of motives with OCB. In Study 2, we introduce role cognitions as a proximal motivational factor that mediates the motives by social support interactions with OCB. Our results support the hypothesized moderated mediated model and enhance understanding of OCB by integrating the OCB motive and role cognition literatures, which to date have developed separately. As our results demonstrate, role cognitions, which are domain-specific felt obligations to perform OCB, mediate relations of more distal predispositions to perform OCB with helping and voice citizenship behaviors.     

Why do people give? The role of identity in giving

Why do people give to others? One principal driver involves one's identity: who one is and how they view themselves. The degree to which identities are malleable, involve a readiness to act, and help make sense of the world have significant implications determining whether and how much people give. Drawing on the Identity-Based Motivation model (IBM; Oyserman, D. (2009). Identity-based motivation: Implications for action-readiness, procedural-readiness, and consumer behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19.), we provide a tripartite framework to help advance the research on the psychology of giving.     

How smart do you need to be to get it wrong? The role of cognitive capacity in the development of heuristic-based judgment

We examined the relationship between cognitive capacity and heuristic responding on four types of reasoning and decision-making tasks. A total of 84 children, between 5 years 2 months and 11 years 7 months of age, participated in the study. There was a marked increase in heuristic responding with age that was related to increases in cognitive capacity. These findings are inconsistent with the predominant dual-process accounts of reasoning and decision making as applied to development. We offer an alternative explanation of the findings, considering them in the context of recent claims concerning the role of working memory in contextualized reasoning.     

Why do women underperform under stereotype threat? Evidence for the role of negative thinking

This study investigated the role of negative thinking as a potential mediator of performance deficits under stereotype threat. After being assigned to a stereotype-threat or a no-threat condition, 60 female participants were asked to complete a difficult math task. Using the thought-listing technique, women under stereotype threat reported a higher number of negative thoughts specifically related to the test and to mathematics compared with women in the no-threat condition. Moreover, women under stereotype threat also showed a sharp decrease in performance that (a) was most pronounced in the second half of the test and (b) was mediated by the increase in negative thinking.     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.     

Why Are You Doing Things for the Environment? The Motivation Toward the Environment Scale (MTES)1

This paper presents 4 studies which were conducted for the purpose of constructing and validating a new measure of people's motivation for environmental behaviors, namely the Motivation Toward the Environment Scale (MTES). The MTES consists of subscales that measure an individual's level of intrinsic, extrinsic, and a motivation for environmental behaviors. These subscales correspond to the different forms of motivation identified by Deci and Ryan in their self-determination theory (SDT, 1985, 1991). Results from the first study supported the factor structure of the scale and revealed a satisfactory level of internal consistency. Consistent with the SDT, the more self-determined forms of motivation were associated with more positive responses on the related variables. Implications for the manner in which the public could be encouraged to do environmental behaviors are discussed.