论儒家伦理道德的普遍性与特殊性——以北宋理学家吕大临的思想的个案分析为例

本文试图以北宋理学家吕大临的思想的个案分析为例,探讨儒家伦理道德的普遍性与特殊性。文章通过对吕大临思想中的“性”、“仁”、“理义”、“天理”、“时中”等观念的解析,讨论了吕大临对儒家“道德法则”的普遍性和特殊性的看法以及他在处理两者之间关系方面的观点。     

Thinking About a Word—Love,for Example

What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word.     

Sabina Spielrein's Siegfried and other myths: facts versus fictions

Sabina Spielrein's life events became known to posterity through a private correspondence with Freud and Jung, and through her diaries. Based on a misinterpretation of the documents, a myth, a fiction, was created about an alleged sexual affair with Jung and a case of misconduct during treatment. Another myth was that her relationship with Jung was a cause of the historic break-up between Freud and Jung. The biographical facts described by the author in a number of publications show that her treatment ended when she left the hospital to become Jung's student in the medical school, a situation with its own ethical rules. Furthermore, the alleged “scandal” was no public matter: it turned out to be no more than a personal quarrel. Before, during, and after that turbulent episode, Spielrein and Jung maintained a long and tender friendship and correspondence that included sharing creative ideas that enriched psychoanalysis. In these exchanges, a special role was played by the myth of Siegfried and other themes in Wagner's operas.     

Critical Notice: Paul Russell's The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism,Naturalism, and Irreligion (OUP 2008)

In The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (2008), Paul Russell makes a strong case for the claim that “The primary aim of Hume's series of skeptical arguments, as developed and distributed throughout the Treatise, is to discredit the doctrines and dogmas of Christian philosophy and theology with a view toward redirecting our philosophical investigations to areas of ‘common life,’ with the particular aim of advancing ‘the science of man’” (2008, 290). Understanding Hume in this way, according to Russell, sheds light on the “ultimate riddle” of the Treatise: “is it possible to reconcile Hume's (extreme) skeptical principles and conclusions with his aim to advance the ‘science of man’” (2008, 3)? Or does Hume's skepticism undermine his “secular, scientific account of the foundations of moral life in human nature” (290)? Russell's controversial thesis is that “the irreligious nature of Hume's fundamental intentions in the Treatise” is essential to solving the riddle (11). Russell makes a compelling case for Hume's irreligion as well as his atheism. Contrary to this interpretation I argue that Hume is an irreligious theist and not an atheist.     

Explorations on the Notion of Legal Tolerance

This article builds on the notion of legal tolerance and analyzes the scope of its definition. It situates the notion in the complex set of relations occurring between the major systems of society. Generally, legal tolerance, as a concept, is understood in light of the possibilities of the legal system of influencing other major systems’ responses. On the other hand, tolerance is also the response of the legal system in respect to other major systems’ communications. Although there is a common understanding of tolerance as “under punishing bias” in criminology or as political tolerance in political science, ¹ 1. There is also a distinct field in political science, where the issue is political tolerance. In this view, political tolerance is defined as “Political tolerance typically refers to individual-level attitudes that permit groups to express opinions or maintain practices that a majority finds objectionable.” See Allison Harrell, The limits of tolerance in diverse societies: Hate speech and political tolerance norms among youth. Canadian Journal of Political Science 43 (2010), 407–432. See also C. W. Collier, A legal theory of tolerance and perspective. ARSP. Archiv. für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 84(1) (1998), 59–86. Still within criminology, an antonym for legal tolerance would be the notion of “Rationalité Pénale Moderne”; see Pires, Alvaro Pires, “Beccaria, l’utilitarisme et la rationalité pénale moderne,” in Christian Debuyst, Françoise Digneffe, Jean-Michel Labadie, and Alvaro P. Pires, eds., Histoire des savoirs sur le crime et la peine. Tome II : La rationalité pénale et la naissance de la criminologie, Première partie: “La formation de la rationalité pénale moderne au XVIIIe siècle,” (Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa, De Boeck Université, 1998), chapter 3, 83–143. Collection: Perspectives criminologiques. the focus of this article is different. The central points here are, first, the analysis of legal tolerance as part of systemic communications and, second, the historicity of the transformations of the nation-state in its ability to cope with the growth of separate, distinct and partial systems of society. Tolerance seems relational and raises questions such as: “How much can the legal system tolerate?” And also, “Which societal topics belong to the social system's domain-matter?” These questions are relevant given that the concept of legal tolerance depends on the possibilities of a given system to steer, to direct or to influence other major systems’ behavior, or to resist, respond or to address other systems, which are in its environment.

The concept of legal tolerance requires an analysis of a cluster of related definitions to assess the implications of the concept. These definitions are the following: (1) The concepts that result from the historical process of structuration and that explain the emergence of social systems. (2) The definition of reflexivity and its relation with the “second order cybernetics dilemma.” This is the place where heuristic and epistemological problems are found. Such problems result from both the problem of representation and from the ontological status of the real. This analysis will show why reflexivity is a key concept to explaining the transformations suffered by such systems. Then, legal tolerance is a newer development in respect to the idea of planning. As an alternative to hard planning, legal tolerance creates a fostering environment. Instead of a single system directing other systems, legal tolerance is relational and created collectively by the organizational national state using its (limited) power of legal creation. Legal tolerance also stems from the concerned subsystems of the society (economy, law, politics, science, along with others) by means of a variety of legislative products, public policies, alliances, and legal and other scientific communications that emerge as coordinating mechanisms among the alluded major subsystems.     

L’indépendance du médecin à nouveau proclamée

In the must-known “Vincent Lambert case”, many jurisdictions have had to adjudicate on what was submitted to them. The latest decision from Châlons-en-Champagne's administrative court almost went unnoticed. However, the judgment turns out to be truly significant. It reminds that the principles of medical doctor's independence and freedom of action are simply fundamentals and unavoidable. The patient management practitioner shall not be regarded as a mere executor of an earlier decision taken by a medical colleague.     

Christology and Anti‐Humanism

This article engages the current anti‐humanist or post‐human ethos from the point of view of Christology. Invoking Alain Badiou's claim that “the man of humanism has not survived the twentieth century”, it argues that the death of “the man of humanism” ushers in a situation in which the Christian proposal can be clarified in two crucial ways: (1) Christology is the core of Christian anthropology, and therefore must be the first and last word of the Church's formulation of her answer to the question that is every human life; (2) there is no neutral “human” ground in which the Church can carry on a discourse about “humanism” or “natural law”. The current situation thus forces a theological decision: either the death of man or the God‐Man.     

Players,Characters, and the Gamer's Dilemma

Is there any difference between playing video games in which the player's character commits murder and video games in which the player's character commits pedophilic acts? Morgan Luck's “Gamer's Dilemma” has established this question as a puzzle concerning notions of permissibility and harm. We propose that a fruitful alternative way to approach the question is through an account of aesthetic engagement. We develop an alternative to the dominant account of the relationship between players and the actions of their characters, and argue that the ethical difference between so‐called “virtual murder” and “virtual pedophilia” is to be understood in terms of the fiction‐making resources available to players. We propose that the relevant considerations for potential players to navigate concern (1) attempting to make certain characters intelligible, and (2) using aspects of oneself as resources for homomorphic representation.     

Subjek en etiese verantwoordelikheidsbesef Die Idee van die Oneindige in Levinas se Totality and Infinity

Subject and the realisation of ethical responsibility - The Idea of the Infinite in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity. In Totality and Infinity Emmanuel Levinas writes about the categorical character of the ethical responsibility that the subject owes to the other. The confrontation with the suffering other puts the subject’s natural self-interest into question, and brings him/her to realise an ethical responsibility of which s/he cannot unburden himself/herself. The question arises as to what in the constitution of the subject makes him/her susceptible to the realisation of ethical responsibility. This article illustrates that in order to accentuate ethical responsibility as strongly as he does, Levinas needs to take a quasi-metaphysical step. The “trace of the infinite” that “creation” has left on the finite subject, predisposes the subject to the appeal of the other. Levinas’ use of words such as “God”, “the Good”, “creation” and “the Idea of Infinity” does not have a theological or a mystical underpinning. These metaphysical concepts are philosophical figures of speech that Levinas borrows from Plato and Descartes.     

WITTGENSTEIN AND DEFINING CRITERIA

Let us introduce two antithetical terms in order to avoid certain elementary confusions: To the question “How do you know that so-and-so is the case?”, we sometimes answer by giving ‘criteria’ and sometimes by giving ‘symptoms. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case “Why do you say this man has got angina?” then the answer “I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood” gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, “His throat is inflamed”, this might give us a symptom of angina, I call “sympton” a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion, Then to say “A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him” is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of “angina”. But to say, “A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat” is to make a hypothesis. (BB, pp. 24–25)¹     

Further Reflections on “The Divine Action Project”

It is now a communis opinio that Newton's metaphysics was highly theologically inspired. I will refer to this intertwinement by using the word “onto-theology,” i.e. a metaphysical system that is mainly derived from some fundamental theological assumptions. I will present the constituents of Newton's onto-theology. One important, but often neglected stratum of Newton's metaphysics is the “secularization of God.” Newton, then, was not only a reformer in science, he also was a defender of a more rationalized, i.e. secularized, conception of God. As we will see, God and all other existing entities exist on the same ontological level. Newtonian metaphysics can thus be seen as the expression of how religious attitudes adapted themselves to or secularized themselves in a world of growing complexity wherein the scientific outlook became more and more central. This analysis has implications for the secularization-debate. It will be argued that the secularization-process not only involved differentiating tendencies between the profane and the secular (as is widely accepted by the differentiation-thesis), but that unifying tendencies (exemplified by Newton's unified onto-theology) were equally important.     

A DEFENSE OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION: REFLECTIONS ON PETER HARRISON'S “AFTER SCIENCE AND RELIGION” PROJECT

Recent scholars have called into question the categories “science” and “religion” because they bring metaphysical and theological assumptions that theologians should find problematic. The critique of the categories “science” and “religion” has above all been associated with Peter Harrison and his influential argument in The Territories of Science and Religion (2015). This article evaluates the philosophical conclusions that Harrison draws from his antiessentialist philosophy in the two volumes associated with his “After Science and Religion Project.” I argue that Harrison's project is too skeptical toward the categories “science” and “religion” and places too much emphasis on naturalism being incompatible with Christian theology. One can accept the lessons of antiessentialism—above all, how meanings of terms shift over time—and still use the terms “science” and “religion” in responsible ways. This article defends the basic impulse of most scholars in science and religion who promote dialogue and argues for a more moderate reading of the lesson of Territories.     

MERE SCIENCE: MAPPING THE LAND BRIDGE BETWEEN EMOTION,POLITICS, AND ETHICS

Lisa Sideris's Consecrating Science: Wonder, Knowledge, and the Natural World (2017) proposes that the call by some science advocates for a new moral framework based on scientific wonder is flawed. Sideris develops a typology of “wonder” with two separate affective axes: “true wonder” that is the prerogative of a sort of dwelling with the overwhelming mystery of life, and “curiosity” that presses to resolve puzzles and break through into a space of total clarity. The former, Sideris writes, is an ethical resource that, by placing the human self against the backdrop of the unknowable cosmic expanse, prompts humility and genuine admiration for nature. The latter is the theater of “mere science.” This essay follows suit with Sideris's line of questioning, but also pushes back on the correlation of wonder with ethical attentiveness and proposes ways that science in its puzzle‐solving mode can be brought back into the ethical conversation.     

The Needle in the Haystack

Summary

Despite the significant damages in sexual abuse cases, the plaintiff's ability to collect the money awarded in settlement or judgment is often precluded by the limited financial resources of the defendant(s). In this chapter, practicing attorney Julian Hubbard introduces the basics of individual and corporate insurance coverage and reviews the development of very limited coverage in sexual abuse cases in statutory and case law. While direct coverage for sexual abuse injuries is as rare as a “needle in a haystack,” indirect coverage can be found in some cases, especially those in which the acts of negligent individuals other than the perpetrator facilitated the abuse and thus the plaintiff's injuries. After an overview of relevant insurance issues and law, Mr. Hubbard delineates a practical model for research and legal strategies to ensure reaching any available insurance coverage, and explores the benefits and drawbacks of drawing on administrative resources to help pay for survivors' medical and mental health care.     

The Challenges of Extreme Moral Stress: Claudia Card's Contributions to the Formation of Nonideal Ethical Theory

This essay argues that Claudia Card numbers among important contributors to nonideal ethical theory (NET), and it advocates for the worth of NET. Following philosophers including Lisa Tessman and Charles Mills, the essay contends that it is important for ethical theory, and for feminist purposes, to carry forward the interrelationship that Mills identifies between nonideal theory and feminist ethics. Card's ethical theorizing assists in understanding that interrelationship. Card's philosophical work includes basic elements of NET indicated by Tessman, Mills, and others, and further offers two important and neglected elements to other nonideal ethical theorists: (i) her rejection of the “administrative point of view,” and (ii) her focus on “intolerable harms” as forms of “extreme moral stress” and obstacles to excellent ethical lives. The essay concludes that Card's insights are helpful to philosophers in developing nonideal ethical theory as a distinctive contribution to, and as a subset of, nonideal theory.     

Freud's Ironically Jewish Science: Commentary on Paper by Jill Salberg

In his commentary on Jill Salberg's integrative and contextualizing article, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Freud's Jewish Identity Revisited,” Aron examines several ideas related to Freud's ironically “Jewish science.” First, this commentary takes up the question of what it has meant to speak of a “Jewish science” historically, and what it might mean today. Shockingly, Aron shows that the rise and fall of psychoanalysis has been traced to Jewish influence. He then expands on Salberg's article by reviewing the relationship between circumcision and castration and considers the impact of Freud's Jewish identity and his anxiety about anti-Semitism on the structure of the psychoanalytic method and specifically on Freud's discovery of the “royal road.”     

The Poetry of Genetics: On the Pitfalls of Popularizing Science

The role genetic inheritance plays in the way human beings look and behave is a question about the biology of human sexual reproduction, one that scientists connected with the Human Genome Project dashed to answer before the close of the twentieth century. This is also a question about politics, and, it turns out, poetry, because, as the example of Lucretius shows, poetry is an ancient tool for the popularization of science. “Popularization” is a good word for successful efforts to communicate elite science to non‐scientists in non‐technical languages and media. According to prominent sociobiologist E. O. Wilson, “sexual dominance is a human universal.” He meant, of course, that men dominate women. Like sociobiology, genetic science is freighted with politics, including gender politics. Scientists have gender perspectives that may color what they “see” in nature. As the late Susan Okin Miller suggested in an unpublished paper tracing the detrimental impact of Aristotle's teleology on Western thought, scientists accustomed to thinking that men naturally dominate women might interpret genetic discoveries accordingly. Biologists have good, scientific reasons to fight the effects of bias. One must be critical of how scientists and popularizers of science, like Genome author Matt Ridley, frame truth and theory. Ridley's “battle of the sexes” metaphor and others have a doubtful place in serious explanations of science.     

The Suffering of Passion: Metamorphoses and the Embrace of the Stranger

In this paper I use the concept of the “suffering of passion” to explore how human beings endure personal metamorphoses. I suggest that the affirmation of passion, which is both self-interested and self-surrendering, is necessary in order to embark on the journey from self-sameness to otherness. Inasmuch as this transitional path simultaneously entails the “embrace of the stranger” of one's own growth and of the subjectivity of another person, the suffering of passion is both a developmental and ethical achievement. The mutual interchange of giving and receiving, mediated by gratitude and generosity, inspires the passion necessary to construct a relational bridge of conscience from self-sameness to otherness. When the mutuality of giving and receiving breaks down, shame may lead to the negation and disowning of one's passion. The resulting inversion of passion into passivity may then culminate in a narcissistic loyalty to “one's own kind.” A case vignette of a young man is presented to illustrate the difficulty of suffering the passion of one's own growth.     

THE CONFESSING ANIMAL IN FOUCAULT AND WITTGENSTEIN

In The History of Sexuality, Foucault maintains that “Western man has become a confessing animal” (1990, 59), thus implying that “man” was not always such a creature. On a related point, Wittgenstein suggests that “man is a ceremonial animal” (1996, 67); here the suggestion is that human beings are, by their very nature, ritualistically inclined. In this paper I examine this crucial difference in emphasis, first by reconstructing Foucault's “genealogy” of confession, and subsequently by exploring relevant facets of Wittgenstein's later thinking. While there are significant correlations between Foucault and Wittgenstein, an important disparity emerges in relation to the question of the “natural.” By critically analyzing this, I show how Wittgenstein's minimal naturalism provides an important corrective to Foucault's more extravagant claims. By implication, we see why any radical relativist, historicist, and/or constructivist position becomes untenable on Wittgensteinian grounds, even though Wittgenstein himself is often read as promoting such views.     

The Crucial Importance of Nancey Murphy’s Deployment of Lakatos’s Methodology for Theology and Science

Russell's paper explores the astonishing fruitfulness of Nancey Murphy’s use of Imre Lakatos’s philosophy of science in the field of “theology and science.” Murphy’s work can be used to choose between competing theologies according to the theologians’ willingness to engage with science, their ability to continue the engagement as scientific theories change, and their ability to make empirical predictions based on this engagement. Topics range from creation and cosmology, the “cosmic Christ”, and non-interventionist objective divine action in quantum mechanics and evolution. Russell has followed Murphy’s lead and used Lakatos to place theology and science into “creative mutual interaction” (CMI).