The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle

Book Information The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle. The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann, ed. Gordon Baker, London : Routledge, 2003, 528, US$100 (cloth) Edited by Gordon Baker. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. and Friedrich Waismann. Routledge. London. Pp. 528. US$100 (cloth:),     

The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle

Book reviewed:
The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle – Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann (Transcribed, Edited and with an Introduction by Gordon Baker; Translated by Gordon Baker, Michael Mackett, John Connolly and Vasilis Politis); Routledge; London and New York, 2003 (Pp xlviii + 558. German and English Texts on Facing Pages.)     

Coherence,anti-realism and the Vienna Circle

Some members of the Vienna Circle argued for a coherence theory of truth. Their coherentism is immune to standard objections. Most versions of coherentism are unable to show why a sentence cannot be true even though it fails to cohere with a system of beliefs. That is, it seems that truth may transcend what we can be warranted in believing. If so, truth cannot consist in coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna Circle's coherentists held, first, that sentences are warranted by coherence with a system of beliefs. Next they drew upon their verification theory of meaning, a consequence of which is that truth cannot transcend what can be warranted. The coherence theory of knowledge and verificationism together entail that truth cannot transcend what can be warranted by coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna Circle's argument for coherentism is strong and anticipates contemporary anti-realism.     

维也纳学派在中国的命运

洪谦先生是维也纳学派在中国的主要传人,但在历史上,第一个向国内学术界介绍维也纳学派的哲学家是张申府及其胞弟张岱年.洪谦对维也纳学派思想在中国的传播起到了关键作用.冯友兰也曾对维也纳学派做过介绍和分析,并试图利用逻辑分析的方法处理形而上学问题.金岳霖及其学生殷海光从逻辑学研究的角度对维也纳学派哲学在中国的传播发挥了作用.洪谦与冯友兰之间在20世纪40年代发生的学术争论,反映了中西两种哲学思维方式的差异.虽然经历了政治上的磨难,但正是由于洪谦先生毕生坚持了对维也纳学派思想的研究和发展,最终成为国际著名的哲学家.洪谦与冯友兰之间的思想交锋也反映了他们对哲学性质的不同理解.     

Wittgenstein and the Dream Hypothesis

The paper deals with Wittgenstein’s treatment of radical skepticism. He holds from his earliest work to his last that skepticism is senseless and therefore no rebuttal, such as G.E. Moore offered, is necessary.     

Wittgenstein and criteria

An essay to develop some of Wittgenstein's remarks about the notion of ‘criteria’ and to give the concept clarity even at the expense of some features Wittgenstein claimed for it. This effort was made because of the important role ‘criteria’ plays in Wittgenstein's discussions of feelings and mental states, and it is hoped that a defense of ‘criteria’ will make those discussions more coherent. An attempt is made to relate this notion of ‘criteria’ to the definition and expression of mental states, following some of Wittgenstein's suggestions, and to rebut skepticism about other minds.     

维特根斯坦和传统

维特根斯坦在奥地利-维也纳传统中长大,并坚定地植根于这一传统之中。任何理解他的人格的尝试都必须设法把他置于这一背景中加以考察。但维特根斯坦作为哲学家的工作,几乎完全是在他并不分享其文化传统、并且对他本人是非常不相宜的环境中完成的。     

Wittgenstein and the naming relation

The thesis of this paper is that the Tractatus and the Investigations can be related as follows. Wittgenstein attempted in the Tractatus to avoid the conceptual realism of Frege and Russell with respect to propositions. He solved his problem by developing the picture‐theory of language. This solution assumed that the units of language are words which arc names of simple objects. Because of this assumption the solution has the undesirable consequence that examples oi genuine names, atomic facts and atomic propositions cannot be given although their existence is logically required by the solution. Wittgenstein had, therefore, eventually to examine the idea of a name. Thus the Philosophical Investigations in which this examination is conducted.     

维特根斯坦与宗教

维特根斯坦是一个伟大的分析哲学家,但是一生与宗教有非常密切的联系。本文分为两部分。第一部分从维特根斯坦的家庭背景、成长经历、性格特征、所受影响等方面分析了维特根斯坦与宗教(基督教)的联系;第二部分从“关于宗教的本质是否可以言说”、“为什么会有宗教?”“宗教与激情”、“上帝是谁?”“信仰上帝是为了给人生寻找意义”等五个方面分析和评论了维特根斯坦的宗教观点。     

Wittgenstein and logic

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) presents the concept of order in terms of a notational iteration that is completely logical but not part of logic. Logic for him is not the foundation of mathematical concepts but rather a purely formal way of reflecting the world that at the minimum adds absolutely no content. Order for him is not based on the concepts of logic but is instead revealed through an ideal notational series. He states that logic is “transcendental”. As such it requires an ideal that his philosophical method eventually forces him to reject. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is more dialectical than transcendental.