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Sean Crawford 《Synthese》2008,160(1):75-96
Quine introduced a famous distinction between the ‘notional’ sense and the ‘relational’ sense of certain attitude verbs. The
distinction is both intuitive and sound but is often conflated with another distinction Quine draws between ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’
(or higher degree) attitudes. I argue that this conflation is largely responsible for the mistaken view that Quine’s account
of attitudes is undermined by the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Quine’s system
is also supposed to suffer from the problem of ‘suspended judgement with continued belief’. I argue that this criticism fails
to take account of a crucial presupposition of Quine’s about the connection between thought and language. The aim of the paper
is to defend the spirit of Quine’s account of attitudes by offering solutions to these two problems.
See also chapters four and five of Word and Object (Quine, 1960) and ‘Intensions Revisited’ (Quine, 1977). 相似文献
3.
Nathan Stemmer 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(1):75-90
The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine’s theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that
Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his
attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine’s
theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism and realism: Universals and Scientific realism (Vol. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). In the present paper, I propose an alternative framework that accounts
for the phenomena that Quine intends to explain with his resemblance theory. The framework agrees with Quine’s austere ontology;
in particular, it does not assume the existence of properties and of possible worlds. (I will mention below Quine’s reason
for rejecting properties and possible worlds. For a theory of Universals that assumes possible worlds, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra,
G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.) Moreover, the framework is extensionalist since the abstract entities it assumes are classes and
these can be individuated extensionally, for classes are identical if their members are identical. Finally, I will refute
some of the objections to Quine’s approach that have been raised by Armstrong and Oliver [(1996). The metaphysics of properties.
Mind, 105, 1–80.] and I will argue that, contrary to what has been claimed by Oliver in a comment on Lewis [(1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.], Quine is able to specify an important set of sparse properties.
Editor’s Note: Nathan Stemmer died on 6 April 2007. Due to this, the proofreading was only done by the editors. All colleagues being acquainted
with Nathan Stemmers work are deeply concerned about the loss. 相似文献
4.
Sorin Ioan Bangu 《Synthese》2008,160(1):13-20
Arguing for mathematical realism on the basis of Field’s explanationist version of the Quine–Putnam Indispensability argument,
Alan Baker has recently claimed to have found an instance of a genuine mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon.
While I agree that Baker presents a very interesting example in which mathematics plays an essential explanatory role, I show
that this example, and the argument built upon it, begs the question against the mathematical nominalist. 相似文献
5.
This essay examines Jacques Derrida’s contribution to recent debates in animal philosophy in order to explore the critical
promise of his work for contemporary discourses on animal ethics and vegetarianism. The essay is divided into two sections,
both of which have as their focus Derrida’s interview with Jean-Luc Nancy entitled “‘Eating Well’, or the Calculation of the
Subject.” My task in the initial section is to assess the claim made by Derrida in this interview that Levinas’s work is dogmatically
anthropocentric, and to determine whether Levinas’s conception of ethics leaves a place for animals. In the second half of
the essay I turn to an analysis of Derrida’s discussion of vegetarianism and its critical relation to the humanism and anthropocentrism
that he is calling into question. The main argument that I seek to advance here is that deconstruction should not be strictly
identified with vegetarianism (as certain of Derrida’s readers have suggested), but rather that what is needed is a thorough
deconstruction of existing discourses on vegetarianism, a project that remains largely to be developed. 相似文献
6.
In this essay I critique a particular reading of Bergson that places an excessive weight on the concept of the ‘virtual’. Driven by the popularity of Deleuze’s use of the virtual, this image of Bergson (seen especially through his text of 1896,
Matter and Memory, where the idea is introduced) generates an imbalance that fails to recognise the importance of concepts of actuality, like space or psychology, in his other works. In fact, I argue that the virtual is not the key concept for Bergsonism and
that there is a good deal of evidence in Bergson’s other writings, especially those connected with his actualist notion of
‘refraction’, to think of him as a perspectivist philosopher. Moreover, it will be seen that Virtualism resides within an economy of
reflection that is subsumed within the broader paradigm of Actualist refraction. Taking these optical metaphors seriously, the virtual
becomes a perspectival image seen from an actual position, or rather, an interacting set of actual positions. This interaction
is termed ‘virtualization’, denoting the substitution of a substantive conception with a processual one. In the first two parts of the essay, I direct
my remarks more towards Deleuzian readings of the actual rather than Deleuze himself (Deleuze is so open about the biases
he brings to his reading of Bergson as to be beyond criticism). In the second two sections, I pursue a philosophical argument
for the probity of a non-Virtualist position as such within philosophy, based upon the concept of refraction. This is done
not only because it is important that we remain open to other readings of Bergson that are not so heavily mediated in one
direction, but also in view of the power of refraction as a new concept for reconciling actual modes such as molar identity,
the present, and extension, with their virtual opposites. 相似文献
7.
Sascia Pavan 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):145-163
In the first exposition of the doctrine of indeterminacy of translation, Quine asserted that the individuation and translation
of truth-functional sentential connectives like ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’ are not indeterminate. He changed his mind later on, conjecturing
that some sentential connectives might be interpreted in different non-equivalent ways. This issue has not been debated much
by Quine, or in the subsequent literature, it is, as it were, an unsolved problem, not well understood. For the sake of the
argument, I will adopt Quine’s background assumption that all the semantic features of a language can be reduced to the speakers’
dispositions toward assent and dissent, as far as only the truth-conditional core of the meaning of sentences is concerned.
I will put forward an argument to the effect that the speech dispositions of most, if not all, English (French, Italian, etc.)
speakers constrain a unique translation of their connectives. This argument crucially relies on an empirical conjecture concerning
the behaviour of these operators. 相似文献
8.
James Kennedy Chase 《Synthese》2012,184(3):357-373
W.V. Quine is committed to the claim that all beliefs are rationally revisable; Jerrold Katz has argued that this commitment
is unstable on grounds of self-application. The subsequent discussion of this issue has largely proceeded in terms of the
logic of belief revision, but there is also an issue here for the treatment of Quine’s views in a doxastic modal system. In
this paper I explore the treatment of Quinean epistemology in modal terms. I argue that a set of formal revisability desiderata
can be distilled from Quine’s epistemic writings, and that there are demonstrably coherent and non-trivial systems that meet
these conditions. 相似文献
9.
Thomas Aastrup Rømer 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(5):499-506
In this essay, I argue that education should be conceived of as a thing in itself. To lift this view, I present aspects of
Graham Harman’s philosophy, a speculative realism that can be seen as a radical break with social constructivism and similar
approaches. Next, I attempt to outline a rough sketch of an educational “thing”, drawing on concepts such as protection, love,
swarm, tension and shadow. Finally, I briefly discuss some implications of this vision for philosophy of education. In particular,
I think that my discussion point to philosophy of education as the basic discipline in an educational science. 相似文献
10.
Tyrus Fisher 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):51-59
Some of Quine’s critics charge that he arrives at a behavioristic account of linguistic meaning by starting from inappropriately
behavioristic assumptions (Kripke 1982, 14; Searle 1987, 123). Quine has even written that this account of linguistic meaning is a consequence of his behaviorism (Quine 1992, 37). I take it that the above charges amount to the assertion that Quine assumes the denial of one or more of the following
claims: (1) Language-users associate mental ideas with their linguistic expressions. (2) A language-user can have a private
theory of linguistic meaning which guides his or her use of language. (3) Language learning relies on innate mechanisms. Call
an antecedent denial of one or more of these claims illicit behaviorism. In this paper I show that Quine is prepared to grant, if only for the sake of argument, all three of the above claims. I
argue that his claim that “there is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond what is to be gleaned from overt behavior in observable
circumstances” is unscathed by these allowances (Quine 1992, 38). And I show that the behaviorism which Quine does assume should be viewed as a largely uncontroversial aspect of his
evidential empiricism. I conclude that if one sets out to dismiss Quine’s arguments for internal-meaning skepticism, this dismissal should not
be motivated by the charge that his conclusions rely on the illicitly behavioristic assumptions that some have suggested that
they do. 相似文献
11.
Nathaniel Jason Goldberg 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2009,40(2):259-276
W. V. Quine famously argues that though all knowledge is empirical, mathematics is entrenched relative to physics and the
special sciences. Further, entrenchment accounts for the necessity of mathematics relative to these other disciplines. Michael
Friedman challenges Quine’s view by appealing to historicism, the thesis that the nature of science is illuminated by taking
into account its historical development. Friedman argues on historicist grounds that mathematical claims serve as principles
constitutive of languages within which empirical claims in physics and the special sciences can be formulated and tested,
where these mathematical claims are themselves not empirical but conventional. For Friedman, their conventional, constitutive
status accounts for the necessity of mathematics relative to these other disciplines. Here I evaluate Friedman’s challenge
to Quine and Quine’s likely response. I then show that though we have reason to find Friedman’s challenge successful, his
positive project requires further development before we can endorse it. 相似文献
12.
T. Parent 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):103-112
It is a consequence of Quine’s confirmation holism that the logical laws are in principle revisable. Some have worried this
is at odds with another dictum in Quine, viz., that any translation which construes speakers as systematically illogical is
ipso facto inadequate. In this paper, I try to formulate exactly what the problem is here, and offer a solution to it by (1)
disambiguating the term ‘logic,’ and (2) appealing to a Quinean understanding of ‘necessity.’ The result is that the different
theses in Quine’s philosophy of logic are to be situated within different contexts of inquiry.
相似文献
T. ParentEmail: |
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Jonathan Y. Tsou 《Synthese》2010,176(3):429-445
In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem
of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views.
I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a
sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis
of the history of physics and geometry. In the remainder of the paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s account of relativized
a priori principles and contemporary views. In particular, I situate Putnam’s account in relation to analyses advanced by
Michael Friedman, David Stump, and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I address issues concerning whether a priori scientific
principles are appropriately characterized as “constitutive” or “entrenched”. I argue that these two features need to be clearly
distinguished, and that only the constitutive function is essential to apriority. By way of conclusion, I explore the relationship
between the constitutive function a priori principles and entrenchment. 相似文献
14.
Keith Ansell-Pearson 《Continental Philosophy Review》2011,44(2):179-204
In this essay I seek to show that a philosophy of modesty informs core aspects of both Nietzsche’s critique of morality and
what he intends to replace morality with, namely, an ethics of self-cultivation. To demonstrate this I focus on Dawn: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, a largely neglected text in his corpus where Nietzsche carries out a quite wide-ranging critique of morality, including
Mitleid. It is one of Nietzsche’s most experimental works and is best read, I claim, as an Epicurean-inspired critique of the present
and an exercise in moral therapy. In the opening sections I draw attention to the wider social dimension of the text and its
concern with a morality of compassion, which is rarely done in the literature. I then turn to highlighting Nietzsche’s “Epicurean
moment,” followed by two sections on Nietzsche on the self in which I aim to bring to light his ethics of self-cultivation
and show in what ways his revaluation makes central to ethics a modest egoism and care of self. In the conclusion to the essay
I provide a contrast between Nietzsche and Kant and deal with reservations readers might have about his ethics. Overall, the
essay seeks to make a contribution to an appreciation of Dawn as a work of moral therapy. 相似文献
15.
Manfred Kupffer 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):225-238
Markus Werning attempts to refute Quine’s thesis that meaning is indeterminate. To this purpose he employs Hodges’ theorem
about extensions of cofinal meaning functions. But the theorem does neither suffice to solve Quine’s problem nor the problem
Werning mistakenly identifies with Quine’s. Nevertheless it makes sense to employ the methods used in Werning’s paper with
regard to Quine’s thesis, only that they tell in favour of the thesis instead of against it.
相似文献
Manfred KupfferEmail: |
16.
Stefano Predelli 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2012,41(3):547-562
This essay proposes a novel semantic account of demonstratives, aimed at clarifying the sense in which demonstratives are
semantically dependent on demonstrations. Its first two sections summarize the main views currently on the market. Section 3
argues that they are all vitiated by the same shortcomings, and yield incorrect results of ‘truth in virtue of character’
and entailment. Section 4 proposes a different account of the relationships between demonstratives and demonstrations, grounded
on the idea of truth-conditionally irrelevant aspects of the meaning of certain expressions. The resulting view of demonstratives
is consonant with the so-called ‘bare boned’ account of their truth-conditional role, but is also in the position to recognize
that the dependence of a demonstrative on a demonstration is, in some sense of the term, meaning-governed. The final section
of this essay discusses the distinction between ‘vacuous’ and ‘incomplete’ uses of demonstratives, and cases involving multiple
occurrences of these expressions. 相似文献
17.
Rogério Passos Severo 《Synthese》2008,161(1):141-165
Quine’s thesis of underdetermination is significantly weaker than it has been taken to be in the recent literature, for the
following reasons: (i) it does not hold for all theories, but only for some global theories, (ii) it does not require the
existence of empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible theories, (iii) it does not rule out the possibility that all perceived rivalry between empirically equivalent theories might
be merely apparent and eliminable through translation, (iv) it is not a fundamental thesis within Quine’s philosophy, and
(v) it does not carry with it the anti-realistic consequences often associated with the thesis in recent debates. The paper
analyzes Quine’s views on the matter and the changes they underwent over the years. A conjecture is put forth about why Quine’s
thesis has been so widely misrepresented: Quine’s writings up to 1975 tackled primarily the formulation and justification
of the thesis, but afterwards were concerned mostly with the question whether empirically equivalent rivals to the theory
we hold are to be considered true also. When this latter discussion is read without bearing in mind Quine’s earlier formulation
and justification of the thesis, his thesis seems to have stronger epistemic consequences than it actually does. A careful
reading of his later writings shows, however, that the formulation of the thesis remained unchanged after 1975, and that his
mature and considered views supported only a very mitigated version of the thesis. 相似文献
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James Harold 《Dao》2011,10(1):71-84
In this essay I argue that if Kantian and consequentialist ethical theories are vulnerable to the so-called “problem of alienation,”
a virtue ethics based on Xunzi’s ethical writings will also be vulnerable to this problem. I outline the problem of alienation,
and then show that the role of ritual (li) in Xunzi’s theory renders his view susceptible to the problem as it has been traditionally understood. I consider some replies
on Xunzi’s behalf, and also discuss whether the problem affects other Confucian and eudaimonian approaches to virtue ethics.
I close by considering some solutions to the problem and the affect that this result has on the argumentative dialectic between
the three major ethical traditions. 相似文献
20.
Charles Chihara 《Synthese》2010,176(2):153-175
The present paper will argue that, for too long, many nominalists have concentrated their researches on the question of whether
one could make sense of applications of mathematics (especially in science) without presupposing the existence of mathematical objects. This was, no doubt, due to the enormous
influence of Quine’s “Indispensability Argument”, which challenged the nominalist to come up with an explanation of how science
could be done without referring to, or quantifying over, mathematical objects. I shall admonish nominalists to enlarge the
target of their investigations to include the many uses mathematicians make of concepts such as structures and models to advance
pure mathematics. I shall illustrate my reasons for admonishing nominalists to strike out in these new directions by using Hartry Field’s
nominalistic view of mathematics as a model of a philosophy of mathematics that was developed in just the sort of way I argue
one should guard against. I shall support my reasons by providing grounds for rejecting both Field’s fictionalism and also
his deflationist account of mathematical knowledge—doctrines that were formed largely in response to the Indispensability
Argument. I shall then give a refutation of Mark Balaguer’s argument for his thesis that fictionalism is “the best version
of anti-realistic anti-platonism”. 相似文献