Casuistry and social category bias

This research explored cases where people are drawn to make judgments between individuals based on questionable criteria, in particular those individuals' social group memberships. We suggest that individuals engage in casuistry to mask biased decision making, by recruiting more acceptable criteria to justify such decisions. We present 6 studies that demonstrate how casuistry licenses people to judge on the basis of social category information but appear unbiased--to both others and themselves--while doing so. In 2 domains (employment and college admissions decisions), with 2 social categories (gender and race), and with 2 motivations (favoring an in-group or out-group), the present studies explored how participants justify decisions biased by social category information by arbitrarily inflating the relative value of their preferred candidates' qualifications over those of competitors.     

The role of risk,regret, and rejoice in non-instrumental information seeking

Standard theories suggest that humans should seek information only when it can help them make better decisions. However, recent work suggests that people choose to seek information even when it cannot influence the outcome of a choice. Across three experiments, we examined how this preference for non-instrumental information was related to the risk, regret, and rejoice associated with different choices. Experiment 1 examined how risk preference informed the appetite for non-instrumental information and tested how risk and information preference in a gamble-task related to the desire for knowledge across a range of hypothetical real-world scenarios. In Experiment 2, we tested how risk, operationalized as variance, related to non-instrumental information seeking when allowing participants to mentally simulate the potential outcomes of gambles. In Experiment 3, we provided explicit feedback about forgone options, intending to make the potential for regret or rejoice more salient. Taken together, our results show a consistent appetite for information that was robust to changes across all experimental manipulations. We found some evidence of a positive correlation between the desire for knowledge and the level of anticipated regret (Experiment 1), but overall, our data appear more consistent with the idea that non-instrumental information seeking is driven by a general aversion to uncertainty than by an attempt to regulate specific future emotions.     

How Information Availability Interacts with Visual Attention during Judgment and Decision Tasks

Decisions in front of a supermarket shelf probably involve a mix of visually available information and associated memories—and interactions between those two. Several cognitive processes, such as decision making, search, and various judgments, are therefore likely to co‐occur, and each process will influence visual attention. We conducted two eye‐tracking experiments capturing parts of these features by having participants make either judgments or decisions concerning products that had been previously encoded. Half the time, participants made their choices with full information about the available products and half the time with crucial task‐relevant information removed. By comparing participants' use of visual attention during decisions and search‐based and memory‐based judgments, we can better understand how visual attention is differently employed between tasks and how it depends on the visual environment. We found that participants' visual attention during decisions is sensitive to evaluations already made during encoding and strongly characterized by preferential looking to the options later to be chosen. When the task environment is rich enough, participants engage in advanced integrative visual behavior and improve their decision quality. In contrast, visual attention during judgments made on the same products reflects a search‐like behavior when all information is available and a more focused type of visual behavior when information is removed. Our findings contribute not only to the literature on how visual attention is used during decision making but also to methodological questions concerning how to measure and identify task‐specific features of visual attention in ecologically valid ways. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decisions,actions, and the appropriateness of confidence in knowledge

This research examines the appropriateness of confidence (i.e., subjective probability judgments) in knowledge associated with decisions and actions of social importance. One hundred and thirty seven participants completed a 50 item questionnaire assessing their knowledge of the two leading candidates in the 1988 presidential election in the U.S.A. Ninety one of the respondents completed the questionnaire one week prior to the election, whereas the other 46 completed the questionnaire on election day shortly after voting. After each item in the questionnaire, all respondents indicated whether or not the item content represented a reason why they voted (or intended to vote) for or against the candidate to whom the item referred. Within-person results indicated that, in comparison to items that were not cited as reasons for voting intentions or voting behavior, items endorsed as reasons were characterized by better accuracy and resolution, but worse overconfidence. Between groups, decision makers were significantly more accurate and better calibrated than those who had not made a decision between the candidates. Implications of inappropriate confidence on decision making effectiveness are discussed.     

Coherence and correspondence criteria for rationality: experts' estimation of risks of sexually transmitted infections

The aim of this study is to examine both coherence and correspondence criteria for rationality in experts' judgments of risk. We investigated biases in risk estimation for sexually transmitted infections (STIs) predicted by fuzzy‐trace theory, i.e., that specific errors would occur despite experts' knowledge of correct responses. One hundred twenty professionals with specific knowledge of STI risks in adolescents were administered a survey questionnaire to test predictions concerning: knowledge deficits (producing underestimation of risks); gist‐based representation of risk categories (producing overestimation of condom effectiveness); retrieval failure for risk knowledge (producing lower risk estimates); and processing interference in combining risk estimates (producing biases in post‐test diagnosis of infection). Retrieval was manipulated by asking estimation questions that “unpacked” the STI category into infection types or did not specify infection types. Other questions differentiated processing biases from knowledge deficits or retrieval failure by directly providing requisite knowledge. Experts' knowledge of STI transmission and infection risks was verified empirically. Nevertheless, under predictable conditions, they misestimated risk, overestimated the effectiveness of condoms, and also suffered from processing biases. When questions provided better retrieval supports (unpacked format), risk estimates improved. Biases were linked to gist representations, retrieval failures, and processing errors, as opposed to knowledge about STIs. Results support fuzzy‐trace theory's dual‐process assumptions that different types of errors are dissociated from one another, and separate failures of coherence and correspondence among the same sample of experts. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Making sense of risk

Although actuarial risk prediction tools are widely used in the American criminal justice system, the lawyers, judges, and correctional workers who consult these products in making decisions often misunderstand fundamental aspects of how they work and what information they provide. This article suggests that the best way to ensure risk assessment tools are being used in ways that are just and equitable is to ensure that those who use them better understand three key aspects of what information they do – and do not – reveal. Doing so requires clarifying what risk is being predicted, explaining what risk levels signify, and enumerating how risk-related information is and is not relevant to specific criminal justice decisions.     

Reappraisal and expected value modulate risk taking

Decision making is informed by appraisals of appetitive cues and their associated opportunities for rewards. Such appraisals can be modulated by cognitive regulation strategies in order to promote goal-directed choices. Little is known about how cognitive regulation strategies, especially reappraisal, alter risk taking during decision making. To characterise the effect of reappraisal on risk taking, we systematically varied both the goal of regulation and the value of the decision options. Participants engaged in two reappraisal strategies with opposite goals, to increase (“emphasise”) or decrease (“de-emphasise”) the importance of an upcoming decision, during the presentation of cues signalling monetary decisions. The expected value of taking a risk was systematically varied across decisions such that a risky choice could be beneficial or disadvantageous. Reappraisal strategies increased or decreased risk taking in accordance both with regulation goals and expected value information. These results suggest that reappraisal can be used to flexibly alter behaviour associated with appetitive cues while maintaining value information.     

To do or not to do: desirability and consistency mediate judgements of regret.

In 4 studies, the authors demonstrated that when errors associated with action were inconsistent with decision nakers' orientation, they were undesirable and produced more regret than did errors associated with inaction. Conversely, when errors associated with action were consistent with decision makers' orientation. they were desirable and produced less regret than did errors associated with inaction. Desirability and consistency mediated this relationship, independent of mutability. These results were obtained when judgments and decisions to act or not act were made in close temporal proximity to one another as well as when participants reflected on their past decisions. The authors provide an analysis of when counterfactuals would and would not be expected to mediate judgments of normality and regret.     

Financial prospect relativity: context effects in financial decision‐making under risk

We report three studies in which methodologies from psychophysics are adapted to investigate context effects on individual financial decision‐making under risk. The aim was to determine how the range and the rank of the options offered as saving amounts and levels of investment risk influence people's decisions about these variables. In the range manipulation, participants were presented with either a full range of choice options or a limited subset, while in the rank manipulation they were presented with a skewed set of feasible options. The results showed that choices are affected by the position of each option in the range and the rank of presented options, which suggests that judgments and choices are relative. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

认知闭合需要、框架效应与决策偏好

在带有模糊性的决策情境中,决策者个人的认知特征会对其判断决策产生重要影响。通过实验的方法,考察了认知闭合需要和特征框架效应对个体决策偏好的影响。93名工商管理硕士（MBA）参与了实验,研究的结果支持了本研究的3个假设,即认知闭合需要与特征框架效应不仅对被试的决策偏好存在显著的影响,而且二者还存在显著的交互作用。具体来说,研究发现,在模糊情境中：高认知闭合需要的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而低认知闭合需要的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;接收到正向框架信息的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而接收到负向框架信息的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;认知闭合需要与特征框架对被试的决策偏好还存在显著的交互作用。研究结论为根据个体认知闭合需要的水平来选拔决策者、利用框架效应来影响个体的信息加工方式进而提高决策质量提供了理论依据     

Predicting similarity judgments in intertemporal choice with machine learning

Similarity models of intertemporal choice are heuristics that choose based on similarity judgments of the reward amounts and time delays. Yet, we do not know how these judgments are made. Here, we use machine-learning algorithms to assess what factors predict similarity judgments and whether decision trees capture the judgment outcomes and process. We find that combining small and large values into numerical differences and ratios and arranging them in tree-like structures can predict both similarity judgments and response times. Our results suggest that we can use machine learning to not only model decision outcomes but also model how decisions are made. Revealing how people make these important judgments may be useful in developing interventions to help them make better decisions.     

A group construal account of drop-in-the-bucket thinking in policy preference and moral judgment

Decisions, both moral and mundane, about saving individuals or resources at risk are often influenced not only by numbers saved and lost, but also by proportions of groups saved and lost. Consider choosing between a program that saves 60 of 240 lives at risk and one that saves 50 of 100. The first option maximizes absolute number saved; the second, proportion saved. In two studies, we show that the influence of proportions on such decisions depends on how items at risk are mentally represented. In particular, we show that proportions have greater influence on people's decisions to the extent that the items at risk are construed as forming groups, as opposed to distinct individuals. Construal was manipulated by means of animated displays in which resources at risk moved either independently (promoting individual construal) or jointly (promoting group construal). Results support the hypothesis that (a) decision makers form mental representations which vary in the degree to which resources at risk are construed as groups versus individuals and (b) construal of resources as groups promotes the influence of proportions on decisions and moral judgments.     

Adult Age Differences in Dual Information Processes: Implications for the Role of Affective and Deliberative Processes in Older Adults' Decision Making

ABSTRACT— Age differences in affective/experiential and deliberative processes have important theoretical implications for judgment and decision theory and important pragmatic implications for older-adult decision making. Age-related declines in the efficiency of deliberative processes predict poorer-quality decisions as we age. However, age-related adaptive processes, including motivated selectivity in the use of deliberative capacity, an increased focus on emotional goals, and greater experience, predict better or worse decisions for older adults depending on the situation. The aim of the current review is to examine adult age differences in affective and deliberative information processes in order to understand their potential impact on judgments and decisions. We review evidence for the role of these dual processes in judgment and decision making and then review two representative life-span perspectives (based on aging-related changes to cognitive or motivational processes) on the interplay between these processes. We present relevant predictions for older-adult decisions and make note of contradictions and gaps that currently exist in the literature. Finally, we review the sparse evidence about age differences in decision making and how theories and findings regarding dual processes could be applied to decision theory and decision aiding. In particular, we focus on prospect theory ( Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 ) and how prospect theory and theories regarding age differences in information processing can inform one another.     

Normative and Substantive Expertise in Multiple Hypotheses Evaluation

We distinguish two criteria for evaluating the judgments of trained professionals. One criterion is conformance with a theoretical model and the other is conformance with known external criteria. Further, we label judgments that depart from a theoretical model as errors and those that depart from known external criteria as mistakes. Following this distinction, we hypothesize that auditors′ multiple hypotheses judgments will be characterized by errors but not mistakes. This hypothesis was tested by asking professional auditors to evaluate multiple hypotheses. The results confirm our expectations. Auditors′ judgments reflected ecological base rate information, and they appropriately ignored nondiagnostic evidence. Moreover, auditors did not exhibit a perseverance bias and 84% of them identified the correct hypothesis. The absence of mistakes reflect substantive expertise. Conversely, auditors′ probabilities were not additive, and, when a hypothesis was eliminated, they did not adjust beliefs for the remaining hypotheses. These errors reflect a lack of normative expertise. A second study employed inexperienced subjects to establish whether the strong substantive performance of the professional auditors was attributed to their expertise or was an artifact of the task. The results from the second study were strongly supportive of the substantive expertise explanation. Taken together, these results suggest that substantive expertise can help contain mistakes but it is not sufficient to mitigate errors. Further, lack of normative expertise can lead to errors but these errors do not translate into mistakes. The paper concludes that the distinction between normative and substantive expertise on one hand and errors and mistakes on the other is crucial to understanding when basic findings will generalize to professional settings.     

专业背景、主观印象和情绪对量刑决策的影响

为了考察司法决策者对案件当事人的主观印象如何影响刑罚决策及情绪在其中的作用,本研究要求法律与非法律专业被试对案情相同但对案件当事人的主观印象不同的刑事案件进行刑罚强度决策,并要求被试对犯罪行为所引发的情绪强度进行评定。研究结果发现,被试对施害人的消极印象比积极印象条件下产生更强的愤怒和厌恶情绪,更少的同情情绪,同时,给予的刑罚更重;被试对受害人的积极印象比消极印象条件下,低年级组被试对施害人给予的刑罚更重,但在高年级组被试中不存在显著差异,两组被试在情绪强度上也没有显著差异。法律专业比非法律专业被试对犯罪行为所产生的情绪强度更低。被试的专业背景对量刑决策没有显著影响。中介效应检验发现,在施害人的主观印象对刑罚决策的影响过程中,愤怒和同情表现出部分中介效应,厌恶情绪表现出完全中介效应。     

Self‐regulation principles underlying risk perception and decision making within the context of genomic testing

Advances in theory and research on self‐regulation and decision‐making processes have yielded important insights into how cognitive, emotional, and social processes shape risk perceptions and risk‐related decisions. We examine how self‐regulation theory can be applied to inform our understanding of decision‐making processes within the context of genomic testing, a clinical arena in which individuals face complex risk information and potentially life‐altering decisions. After presenting key principles of self‐regulation, we present a genomic testing case example to illustrate how principles related to risk representations, approach and avoidance motivations, emotion regulation, defensive responses, temporal construals, and capacities such as numeric abilities can shape decisions and psychological responses during the genomic testing process. We conclude with implications for using self‐regulation theory to advance science within genomic testing and opportunities for how this research can inform further developments in self‐regulation theory.     

Age differences in financial decision making: The benefits of more experience and less negative emotions

The emerging literature on aging and decision making posits that decision‐making competence changes with age, as a result of age differences in various cognitive and noncognitive individual‐differences characteristics. In a national life‐span sample from the United Kingdom (N = 926), we examined age differences in financial decisions, including performance measures of sunk cost and credit card repayment decisions, and self‐report measures of money management and financial decision outcomes. Participants also completed four individual‐differences characteristics that have been proposed as relevant to financial decision making, including two cognitive ones (numeracy and experience‐based knowledge) and two noncognitive ones (negative emotions about financial decisions). First, we examined how age was related to the four financial decision‐making measures and the four individual‐differences characteristics. Older age was correlated to better scores on each of the four financial decision‐making measures, more experience‐based knowledge, less negative emotions about financial decisions, whereas numeracy and motivation were not significantly correlated with age. Second, we found that considering both the two cognitive and the two noncognitive individual‐differences characteristics increased predictions of financial decision making, as compared with considering either alone. Third, we examined how these four individual‐differences characteristics contributed to age differences in financial decision making. Older adults' higher levels of experience‐based knowledge and lower levels of negative emotions seemed to especially benefit their financial decision making. We discuss implications for theories on aging and decision making, as well as for interventions targeting financial decisions.     

The variable influence of confession inconsistencies: How factual errors (but not contradictions) reduce belief in suspect guilt

Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession evidence when making verdict decisions. However, recent research indicates that confession inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision‐making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of inconsistencies: self‐contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock‐jurors generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.     

Stress in telephone helpline nurses is associated with failures of concentration,attention and memory,and with more conservative referral decisions

Nurses working for telephone‐based medical helplines must maintain attentional focus while quickly and accurately processing information given by callers to make safe and appropriate treatment decisions. In this study, both higher levels of general occupational stress and elevated stress levels on particular shifts were associated with more frequent failures of attention, memory, and concentration in telephone nurses. Exposure to a stressful shift was also associated with a measurable increase in objectively assessed information‐processing errors. Nurses who experienced more frequent cognitive failures at work made more conservative decisions, tending to refer patients on to other health professionals more often than other nurses. As stress is associated with cognitive performance decrements in telephone nursing, stress‐reduction interventions could improve the quality and safety of care that callers to medical helplines receive.