Immediate and long-term priming effects are independent of prime awareness

Subliminal primes are assumed to produce weaker and short-lived effects on subsequent behavior compared to clearly visible primes. However, this difference in priming effect may be due to differences in signal strength, rather than level of awareness. In the present study we manipulated prime discriminability by using metacontrast masks and pseudomasks, while keeping the prime strength equal. This manipulation resulted in large differences in discriminability of the primes. However, both immediate response priming and long-term response priming (measured with conflict adaptation) was equal for the poorly discriminable and well discriminable primes, and equal for groups that differed markedly in terms of how well they could discriminate the primes. Our findings imply that discriminability of information is independent of both the immediate and long-term effects that information can have on behavior.     

Replication is not coincidence: Reply to Iverson, Lee, and Wagenmakers (2009)

Iverson, Lee, and Wagenmakers (2009) claimed that Killeen’s (2005) statistic prep overestimates the “true probability of replication.” We show that Iverson et al. confused the probability of replication of an observed direction of effect with a probability of coincidence—the probability that two future experiments will return the same sign. The theoretical analysis is punctuated with a simulation of the predictions of prep for a realistic random effects world of representative parameters, when those are unknown a priori. We emphasize throughout that prep is intended to evaluate the probability of a replication outcome after observations, not to estimate a parameter. Hence, the usual conventional criteria (unbiasedness, minimum variance estimator) for judging estimators are not appropriate for probabilities such as p and p_rep.     

The effects on priming of word frequency, number of repetitions, and delay depend on the magnitude of priming

Conflicting findings with respect to the effects of experimental manipulations on priming have been reported in previous studies. It is argued that, in many priming tasks, large amounts of task-relevant information are available from various sources, and that, therefore, the information available from a specific study episode will have only a small impact on overall performance level. Under such circumstances, high levels of baseline performance and small priming effects will be observed. The experiments reported here investigated the hypothesis that a high baseline performance in informationprocessing tasks that are used to measure priming may constrain priming effects. In a series of wordnaming experiments, perceptual difficulty and, therefore, baseline performance was manipulated. Under easy conditions, priming effects were relatively small and were not affected by word frequency, spaced repetition, or delay. Under more difficult conditions, priming effects were larger, and significant effects of all of the above-mentioned experimental manipulations were observed. Under conditions that produced the largest priming effects, a significant relationship between priming and explicit-memory performance could be observed. In the last experiment, it was shown that the characteristics of the retrieval task can substantially affect the magnitude of priming. It is argued that priming effects should be considered to reflect interactions between memory traces and the information-processing components of the priming task.     

Affective priming in the valent/neutral categorisation task is due to affective matching,not encoding facilitation: Reply to Spruyt

Spruyt obtained an affective congruency effect in a valent/neutral categorisation task, which contrasts with the absence of such an effect in the same task that was reported by Werner and Rothermund. The crucial difference between the two studies is that Spruyt presented only valent primes, whereas Werner and Rothermund presented equal amounts of valent and neutral primes and targets in their experiments. Removing the neutral primes introduces a confound of affective matches with the required response. Affective congruency effects in Spruyt's study can be explained straightforwardly in terms of such an affective matching strategy. To demonstrate the influence of matching strategies in the valent/neutral task without neutral primes, we conducted an experiment in which we induced an affective mismatching strategy. In support of our reasoning, this study revealed an affective incongruency effect in the valent/neutral categorisation task. We conclude that affective congruency as well as incongruency effects in the valent/neutral categorisation task reflect post-lexical affective (mis-)matching strategies rather than encoding facilitation.     

The (un)reliability of item-level semantic priming effects

Many researchers have tried to predict semantic priming effects using a myriad of variables (e.g., prime–target associative strength or co-occurrence frequency). The idea is that relatedness varies across prime–target pairs, which should be reflected in the size of the priming effect (e.g., cat should prime dog more than animal does). However, it is only insightful to predict item-level priming effects if they can be measured reliably. Thus, in the present study we examined the split-half and test–retest reliabilities of item-level priming effects under conditions that should discourage the use of strategies. The resulting priming effects proved extremely unreliable, and reanalyses of three published priming datasets revealed similar cases of low reliability. These results imply that previous attempts to predict semantic priming were unlikely to be successful. However, one study with an unusually large sample size yielded more favorable reliability estimates, suggesting that big data, in terms of items and participants, should be the future for semantic priming research.     

Old processes,new perspectives: Familiarity is correlated with (not independent of) recollection and is more (not equally) variable for targets than for lures

According to dual-process models of memory, recognition is subserved by two processes: recollection and familiarity. Many variants of these models assume that recollection and familiarity make stochastically independent contributions to performance in recognition tasks and that the variance of the familiarity signal is equal for targets and for lures. Here, we challenge these ‘common-currency’ assumptions. Using a model-comparison approach, featuring the Continuous Dual Process (CDP; Wixted & Mickes, 2010) model as the protagonist, we show that when these assumptions are relaxed, the model’s fits to individual participants’ data improve. Furthermore, our analyses reveal that across items, recollection and familiarity show a positive correlation. Interestingly, this across-items correlation was dissociated from an across-participants correlation between the sensitivities of these processes. We also find that the familiarity signal is significantly more variable for targets than for lures. One striking theoretical implication of these findings is that familiarity—rather than recollection, as most models assume—may be the main contributor responsible for one of the most influential findings of recognition memory, that of subunit zROC slopes. Additionally, we show that erroneously adopting the common-currency assumptions, introduces severe biases to estimates of recollection and familiarity.     

Evolutionary psychology is compatible with equity feminism, but not with gender feminism: A reply to Eagly and Wood (2011)

I comment on Eagly and Wood's biosocial constructionist evolutionary theory (2011; DOI: 10.1007/s11199-011-9949-9). Although this gender feminist theory allows for evolved physical differences between men and women and evolved psychological similarities for men and women, it fails to consider evolutionary accounts of psychological sex differences. I hypothesize that gender feminists' reluctance to acknowledge that evolution has left different fingerprints on men's and women's bodies and brains stems from two common misunderstandings of evolutionary psychology: the myth of immutability and the naturalistic fallacy. I conclude that although evolutionary psychology is eminently compatible with equity feminism, evolutionary psychology and feminist psychology will conflict as long as the latter adheres to gender feminism and its unwillingness to acknowledge the evidence for evolved psychological sex differences. Gender feminism's dualistic view of evolution hinders the search for and understanding of the proximate and ultimate causes of inequality. Feminist psychology needs to evolve by embracing equity feminism, which has no a priori stance on the origin or existence of differences between the sexes.     

The General Factor of Personality and peer-rated social status: A rejoinder to de Vries (2011)

In a previous study we showed that self-reported Big Five scores and the General Factor of Personality (GFP) were related to peer-ratings of likeability and popularity (van der Linden, Scholte, et al., 2010). de Vries (2011a) re-analyzed our data and concluded that (i) there was no evidence of a GFP, and (ii) the GFP we used was latent factor of Extraversion. In this rejoinder I present arguments that compromise the re-analysis and conclusions as described by de Vries (2011a) and emphasize the relevance of the GFP.     

The glass ceiling is not fragile: A response to Odum (2000)

Odum (2000) criticized our recent conclusions about the participation of women in the experimental analysis of behavior (McSweeney & Swindell, 1998). We address her criticisms here. We argue against the need for statistical tests. We show that our conclusions still apply to all journals except the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior even when we include the senior editorial staff along with members of the editorial board. We argue that the data that Odum provides to show gender equity are limited, inconsistent with past findings, and hard to interpret in the absence of other data. Finally, we argue that Odum failed to address our most convincing argument for gender inequity and misinterpreted our suggestions for improvements.     

The belief bias effect is aptly named: a reply to Klauer and Kellen (2011)

In "Assessing the Belief Bias Effect With ROCs: It's a Response Bias Effect," Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) examined the form of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for reasoning and the effects of belief bias on measurement indices that differ in whether they imply a curved or linear ROC function. We concluded that the ROC data are in fact curved and that analyses using statistics that assume a linear ROC are likely to produce Type I errors. Importantly, we showed that the interaction between logic and belief that has inspired much of the theoretical work on belief bias is in fact an error stemming from inappropriate reliance on a contrast (hit rate-false alarm rate) that implies linear ROCs. Dube et al. advanced a new model of belief bias, which, in light of their data, is currently the only plausible account of the effect. Klauer and Kellen (2011) disputed these conclusions, largely on the basis of speculation about the data collection method used by Dube et al. to construct the ROCs. New data and model-based analyses are presented that refute the speculations made by Klauer and Kellen. We also show that new modeling results presented by Klauer and Kellen actually support the conclusions advanced by Dube et al. Together, these data show that the methods used by Dube et al. are valid and that the belief bias effect is simply a response bias effect.     

Effects of social context, reinforcer probability, and reinforcer magnitude on humans' choices to compete or not to compete.

In the first two experiments, subjects' choices to earn points (exchangeable for money) either by competing with a fictitious opponent or by not competing were studied. Buskist, Barry, Morgan, and Rossi's (1984) competitive fixed-interval schedule was modified to include a second response option, a noncompetitive fixed-interval schedule. After choosing to enter either option, the opportunity for reinforcers became available after the fixed-interval's duration had elapsed. Under the no-competition condition, points were always available after the interval had elapsed. Under the competition condition, points were available based on a predetermined probability of delivery. Experiments 1 and 2 examined how reinforcer probabilities and reinforcer magnitudes affected subjects' choices to compete. Several general conclusions can be made about the results: (a) Strong preferences to compete were observed at high and moderate reinforcer probabilities; (b) competing was observed even at very low reinforcer probabilities; (c) response rates were always higher in the competition component than in the no-competition component; and (d) response rates and choices to compete were insensitive to reinforcer-magnitude manipulations. In Experiment 3, the social context of this choice schedule was removed to determine whether the high levels of competing observed in the first two experiments were due to a response preference engendered by the social context provided by the experimenters through instructions. In contrast to the first two experiments, these subjects preferred the 60-s fixed-interval schedule (formerly the no-competition option), indicating that the instructions themselves were responsible for the preference to compete. This choice paradigm may be useful to future researchers interested in the effects of other independent variables (e.g., drugs, social context, instructions) on competitive behavior.     

Recall,recognition, and the hippocampus: Reply to Yonelinas et al. (2004)

Two recent studies disagree about whether recall is more impaired than recognition (and recollection more than familiarity) in patients with damage limited to the hippocampus (Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire, 2003; Yonelinas et al., 2002). Wixted and Squire (2004) pointed out that the disagreement about recall and recognition stems entirely from an outlying recognition score obtained by 1 of 55 control subjects in Yonelinas et al. (2002). In their comment on our paper, Yonelinas et al. (2004) minimize the importance of this result and argue that the role of the hippocampus in recollection and familiarity is best studied using different methods that attempt to measure these processes directly. Here, we argue that the recall versus recognition comparison is the strongest test because it relies on the fewest controversial assumptions, and that the other approaches explored by Yonelinas et al. (2002) rely on questionable, theory-laden assumptions. We also rehearse the reasons for concluding that the patients studied by Manns et al. (2003) have damage limited to the hippocampal region (hippocampus proper, dentate gyrus, and subiculum), and we emphasize that important questions remain about the patients studied by Yonelinas et al. (2002), inasmuch as no neuroanatomical information and minimal neuropsychological information has been provided.     

On the role of bias in dissociated phonological priming effects: A reply to Goldinger (1999)

Phonological priming studies have revealed two dissociated effects: low-similarity facilitation and highsimilarity interference (Hamburger & Slowiaczek, 1996; Slowiaczek & Hamburger, 1992). Because these two effects are influenced by different variables, they most likely reflect different processes that occur during auditory word recognition. Goldinger (1999) suggests that one bias is responsible for all phonological priming effects. In this reply, we argue against such a position. Although low similarity facilitation is likely the product of this bias, the data on phonological priming indicate that the dissociated highsimilarity interference cannot be produced by the same mechanism. Instead, the data indicate that high-similarity interference may reflect lexical processes.