Expanding the topography of social anxiety. An experience-sampling assessment of positive emotions, positive events, and emotion suppression

The relation between social anxiety and hedonic activity remains poorly understood. From a self-regulatory perspective, we hypothesized that socially anxious individuals experience diminished positive experiences and events on days when they are unable to manage socially anxious feelings adequately. In this 21-day experience-sampling study, we constructed daily measures of social anxiety and emotion regulation. Greater dispositional social anxiety was associated with less positive affect and fewer positive events in everyday life. Among individuals defined as socially anxious from their scores on a global self-report measure of social anxiety, the number of positive events was lowest on days when they both were more socially anxious and tended to suppress emotions and highest on days when they were less socially anxious and more accepting of emotional experiences. Irrespective of dispositional social anxiety, participants reported the most intense positive emotions on the days when they were both least socially anxious and most accepting of emotional experiences. Possible clinical implications are discussed.     

Understanding and taking stock of positive emotion disturbance

The prevailing view on positive emotions is that they correlate with and confer psychological health benefits for the individual, including improved social, physical and cognitive functioning. Yet an emerging wave of scientific work suggests that positive emotions are also related to a range of suboptimal psychological health outcomes, especially when the intensity, duration, or context do not optimize the individual's goals or meet current environmental demands. This paper provides an overview of the “other side” of positive emotion, by describing and reviewing evidence supporting the emerging field of positive emotion disturbance (PED). We review relevant emotion processes and key themes of PED and apply this framework to example emotional disorders, and discuss implications for psychological change and future research agendas.     

The emotional self: Embodiment,reflexivity, and emotion regulation

Current dominant trends in the biological and psychological sciences tend to put emphasis on the role of the brain, cognition, and consciousness in realising emotional states and attempting to regulate them. In this article, I suggest an alternative approach with the idea that emotions emerge within social relations and give meaning and value to the situations in which we are located. Humans are understood as embodied emotional selves for who thought and emotion are intertwined. However, individuals can get caught in obsessive and compulsive thinking and feeling traps where the self loses touch with its emotions, and because of this also loses contact with the social situation and the ability to skilfully navigate it. In such circumstances, the self gets overwhelmed by emotion and loses its poise in the social setting. I consider Buddhist meditation as a technique through which people can develop a more reflexive emotional self, where reflexivity is not about control of emotion but owning one's feelings and being able to respond more sensitively and skilfully in various situations.     

Emotion Display as a Strategy for Identity Negotiation

Affect control theory provides a formal model of emotions, behavior, and identity shifts during social interaction. According to the theory, emotions provide information about both the identity of an emoting actor and how well current social events are confirming that identity. Actors can avoid or mitigate identity damage resulting from inappropriate behaviors by displaying certain emotions (e.g. remorse). Alternately, actors can expose their identities to social damage by displaying inappropriate affect while behaving otherwise normatively. Here we present experimental tests of eight hypotheses based on affect control-based simulations. We find that (1) display of emotions that are affectively congruent with behaviors can reduce damage to identity from harmful behaviors; (2) display of evaluatively incongruent emotions can actually contribute to a spoiled identity, even in the context of socially positive behaviors; and (3) emotions that are evaluatively congruent with behaviors make actors seem more powerful. Respondents feel that they understand and like actors more when they display normative, affectively congruent emotions. These results are complicated somewhat by responses to the emotion of anger. One hypothesis—that low potency emotions will make actors seem more powerful—is not confirmed. We interpret these results and suggest avenues for future research.     

Emotional clich��s and authentic passions: A phenomenological revision of a cognitive theory of emotion

This paper argues for an understanding of emotion based upon Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of embodiment and passivity. Through a critical assessment of cognitive theories of emotion, and in particular Solomon's theory, it argues (1) that there is a sense in which emotions may be judgments, so long as we understand such judgments as bodily enactments of meaning, but (2) that even understood in this way, the notion of judgment (or construal) can only account for a subset of emotions which I call "emotional clichés," and not for authentic passions. In contrast with Solomon's account which conceives the subject as constituting, this account of emotion requires us to understand subjectivity as moved by meanings in the world, and as sometimes, in an authentic passion, dispossessed by those meanings.     

How Emotions do not Provide Reasons to Act

If emotions provide reasons for action through their intentional content, as is often argued, where does this leave the role of the affective element of an emotion? Can it be more than a motivator and have significant bearing of its own on our emotional actions, as actions done for reasons? One way it can is through reinforcing other reasons that we might have, as Greenspan (2011) argues. Central to Greenspan’s account is the claim that the affective discomfort of an emotion, as a fact about the agent’s state of being, provides an additional normative reason to act to alleviate the state. This, I argue, is not correct, nor is it the best way to understand emotions as reason-reinforcers. In this paper, I thus do two things: I provide an examination of how and why the affect of emotion could provide reasons to act to alleviate it and I propose that the real way emotions reinforce reasons is through the way they orient our attention onto things that matter, registering them as salient.     

Régulations endogène et exogène des émotions : des processus complémentaires et indissociables

Studies dealing with emotion regulation have known a fast expansion during the last twenty years. Yet, they are most often based on models centered on endogenous cognitive and behavioral processes as well as the pursuit of welfare, and do not consider the social aspect of emotions and emotion expression which elicit exogenous emotion regulation processes from social interaction partners. The goal of this article is to show that both endogenous and exogenous emotion regulation processes are complementary and indivisible, and to suggest working hypotheses about how they connect. In the first part of this document, after a quick reminder of the different theoretical approaches of (individual) endogenous emotion regulation, we emphasize works about social approach behaviors (social affiliation) in emotional situations. These studies report that social interactions are sometimes sought as they would allow for the endogenous implementation of interpersonal emotion regulation strategies, especially by means of emotion expression. Individual and interpersonal endogenous emotion regulation processes would then complementarily modify the emotions experienced by an individual faced with a critical situation. The second part of this article underlines that social interaction partners actually are operators of exogenous emotion regulation processes rather than passive reservoirs of resources an individual may pick up to regulate their emotions. For that purpose, we especially consider the ways relatives (directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly) constrain the social affiliation behaviors and emotion expressions of an individual who experiences emotions. Thus, we argue that those behaviors are strongly influenced not only by the nature and intensity of emotions, but also by: firstly, social learning about how to feel, what to express and how to regulate emotions in a specific situation; secondly, features of the social environment as well as social expectations and demands about sharing emotions versus inhibiting their expression; and thirdly, the exogenous emotion regulation strategies a partner may use to regulate an individual's emotions. This set of studies entices us to consider endogenous and exogenous emotion regulation processes as acting jointly to promote not only the adaptation to emotional situations, but also the quality of social bonds between members of a social network. Social integration is thus central in the study of emotion regulation processes.     

The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability

In order to explore how emotions contribute positively or negatively to understanding the meaning of complex socio-culturally specific phenomena, I argue that we must take into account the habitual dimension of emotions – i.e., the emotion repertoire that a feeling person acquires in the course of their affective biography. This brings to light a certain form of alignment in relation to affective intentionality that is key to comprehending why humans understand situations in the way they do and why it so often is especially hard to understand things differently. A crucial epistemic problem is that subjects often do not even enter a process of understanding, i.e., they do not even start to consider a specific object, theory, circumstance, other being, etc. in different ways than the familiar one. The epistemic problem at issue thus lies in an unquestioned faith in things being right the way they are taken to be. By acknowledging the habitual dimension of affective intentionality, I analyze reasons for this inability and suggest that being affectively disruptable and cultivating a pluralistic emotion repertoire are crucial abilities to overcome this epistemic problem.

     

Emotional Knowing: the Role of Embodied Feelings in Affective Cognition

The emotions play a crucial role in our apprehension of meaning, value, or significance — and their felt quality is intimately related to the sort of awareness they provide. This is exemplified most clearly by cases in which dispassionate cognition is cognitively insufficient, because we need to be emotionally agitated in order to grasp that something is true. In this type of affective experience, it is through a feeling of being moved that we recognize or apprehend that something is the case. And that is why our emotions are epistemically indispensable: namely, because they give us access to significant truths. In this essay, I explain how the phenomenally felt character of an emotion is intimately linked with its intentionality. Intellectual activity divorced from affective feeling is profoundly lacking — not only in its qualitative feel, but also in its epistemic import, or its ability to inform us about matters of significance. A better appreciation of how the living body is involved in affective experience should help us to understand the distinctive kind of embodied cognition that emotional responses involve. It also ought to resolve confusions about phobic responses and other “recalcitrant” emotions, which are not divorced from cognition as many have claimed.     

Changing emotion dynamics: individual differences in the effect of anticipatory social stress on emotional inertia

Emotional inertia-the degree to which people's feelings carry over from one moment to the next-is an important property of the temporal dynamics of emotions. Thus far, emotional inertia has only been examined as a stable, trait-like characteristic. However, internal or external events (e.g., stress) may trigger changes in people's emotion dynamics, particularly among individuals with heightened sensitivity to such events. The current study investigated how emotional inertia is influenced by the anticipation of social stress, and how this effect is moderated by individual differences in depression, self-esteem, and fear of negative evaluation. We measured participants' (n = 71) emotional inertia in daily life using experience sampling before and after experimentally manipulating anticipatory social stress. Consistent with previous research, psychological maladjustment was associated with higher emotional inertia during "normal" daily life. However, when anticipating a socially stressful event, levels of emotional inertia dropped, particularly among participants scoring high on depression and fear of negative evaluation and low on self-esteem. These results demonstrate that emotion dynamics can vary as a function of contextual factors and identify moderators of such variation.     

Are You Really Happy? Children’s Understanding of Real vs. Pretend Emotions

This paper studies children’s capacity to understand that the emotions displayed in pretend play contexts do not necessarily correspond to internal emotions, and that pretend emotions may create false beliefs in an observer. A new approach is taken by asking children about pretend emotions in terms of pretence-reality instead of appearance-reality. A total of 37 four-year-olds and 33 six-year-olds were asked to participate in tasks where they had to pretend an emotion or where they were told stories in which the protagonists pretended an emotion. In each task children were asked: a) if the pretend emotion was real or just pretended and b) if an observer would think that the emotional expression was real or just pretended. Results showed that four-year-olds are capable of understanding that pretend emotions are not necessarily real. Overall, six-year-olds performed better than younger children. Furthermore, both age groups showed difficulty in understanding that pretend emotions might unintentionally mislead an observer. Results are discussed in relation to previous research on children’s ability to understand pretend play and the emotional appearance-reality distinction.     

独乐乐或众乐乐?不同文化下的正性情绪取向和调节研究

受到自我概念文化价值影响,中国人对正性情绪的取向和调节与西方人存在很大差异。中国人的正性情绪更多指向自己的社会关系,体现出对情绪的社会取向。而西方人的正性情绪更多与个人、内在的因素相关,体现出对情绪的个人取向。受到正性情绪的不同取向的影响,中国人对正性情绪持有非享乐主义的情绪调节模式;而西方人则持有享乐主义的情绪调节模式。在日后的研究中,研究者可从本土化视角、内隐测量、社会文化神经研究范式以及不同文化下的情绪调节策略的适应价值等角度对以往研究进行改进和拓展。     

Affective expressions in groups and inferences about members' relational well-being: The effects of socially engaging and disengaging emotions

Our findings draw attention to the interpersonal communication function of a relatively unexplored dimension of emotions—the level of social engagement versus disengagement. In four experiments, regardless of valence and target group gender, observers infer greater relational well-being (more cohesiveness and less conflict) between group members from socially engaging (sadness and appreciation) versus disengaging (anger and pride) emotion expressions. Supporting our argument that social (dis)engagement is a critical dimension communicated by these emotions, we demonstrate (1) that inferences about group members' self-interest mediate the effect of socially engaging emotions on cohesiveness and (2) that the influence of socially disengaging emotion expressions on inferences of conflict is attenuated when groups have collectivistic norms (i.e., members value a high level of social engagement). Furthermore, we show an important downstream consequence of these inferences of relational well-being: Groups that seem less cohesive because of their members' proud (versus appreciative) expressions are also expected to have worse task performance.     

What is moral about guilt? Acting "prosocially" at the disadvantage of others

For centuries economists and psychologists have argued that the morality of moral emotions lies in the fact that they stimulate prosocial behavior and benefit others in a person's social environment. Many studies have shown that guilt, arguably the most exemplary moral emotion, indeed motivates prosocial behavior in dyadic social dilemma situations. When multiple persons are involved, however, the moral and prosocial nature of this emotion can be questioned. The present article shows how guilt can have beneficial effects for the victim of one's actions but also disadvantageous effects for other people in the social environment. A series of experiments, with various emotion inductions and dependent measures, all reveal that guilt motivates prosocial behavior toward the victim at the expense of others around-but not at the expense of oneself. These findings illustrate that a thorough understanding of the functioning of emotions is necessary to understand their moral nature.     

群际情绪理论及其研究

群际情绪理论认为, 群际情绪是当个体认同某一社会群体, 群体成为自我的一部分时, 个体对内群体和外群体的情绪体验。群际情绪借用社会认同方法, 采用集体自我的概念作为其理论的源点, 认知评价、情绪、行为倾向是群际理论的三件套; 群际水平的情绪不同于个体水平的情绪; 群际情绪取决于群体认同水平; 群际情绪弥散于整个群体; 群际情绪有助于激发和调节群内、群际态度和行为。新近的研究也为群际理论提供了一定的证据, 群际情绪理论为消解偏见和改善群际关系提供了一个崭新的框架。     

Are Emotions Natural Kinds?

ABSTRACT— Laypeople and scientists alike believe that they know anger, or sadness, or fear, when they see it. These emotions and a few others are presumed to have specific causal mechanisms in the brain and properties that are observable (on the face, in the voice, in the body, or in experience)—that is, they are assumed to be natural kinds. If a given emotion is a natural kind and can be identified objectively, then it is possible to make discoveries about that emotion. Indeed, the scientific study of emotion is founded on this assumption. In this article, I review the accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature. I then consider what moving beyond a natural-kind view might mean for the scientific understanding of emotion.     

The spontaneous facial expression of differential positive and negative emotions

This research examines the expression of positive and negative emotions under minimally social conditions. Male and female encoders were covertly videotaped while they viewed and made written ratings of their responses to a number of slides, using a list of emotion terms derived from members of the same subject pool. Results show that, even when the social nature of the situation is reduced to a minimum, the experience of some emotions is reflected on the face, and there is clear evidence for differential expression of certain positive emotions. However, the reduced social nature of the situation removes the usual female encoding advantage, supporting the suggestion that this reflects the operation of display rules. The ability to recognize the minimal expressions in this study is related to both gender and emotion type in ways that may be explained by a socialization hypothesis.I wish to thank Gill Thorpe and Eiko Mori for running the decoding subjects of this study, and Sylvie Collins, Tony Manstead, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

Rage Against the Machine: The Case for System‐Level Emotions

Although psychologists have generally conceptualized emotions in light of individual‐ and group‐ level approaches, in the current paper we propose that there are also system‐level emotional events, including both system‐based emotions (experienced as a direct or indirect consequence of system‐level characteristics) and system‐targeted emotions (reflecting evaluations that support or oppose the overarching social system). We begin by discussing how emotions are embedded in the social system and what system‐level functions they serve. We draw on system justification theory to understand the reciprocal relations between emotional life and ideologies that justify or challenge social systems. We then focus on three empirical propositions concerning the dynamics of system‐level emotions: (I) System‐based emotions reflect one’s subjective as well as objective standing in the social order; (II) System‐based emotions reflect one’s subjective appraisal of the social order; and (III) System‐level emotions affect action tendencies and behaviors, including behaviors that promote system stability versus change. The investigation of system‐level emotions promises to deepen our scientific understanding of the motivational dynamics of social stability and social change and to uncover the affective dimension of system justification processes. Extending the social psychological analysis of emotions to include contextual features at the level of social systems builds a much‐needed bridge between emotion research in psychology and sociology.     

The role of self-aspects in emotions elicited by threats to physical health

In two studies, we examined the relationship between self-aspects and socially engaging and socially disengaging emotions elicited by imagined and real physical health problems. In Study 1, participants imagined themselves experiencing a health problem described in a hypothetical scenario and rated the extent to which they would experience a list of emotions. The experience of socially engaging emotions such as shame and embarrassment was predicted by the endorsement of collective self. In Study 2, participants recalled a past health problem and emotions they experienced during its course. Again, collective self predicted the extent to which people mentioned socially engaging emotions in their free recall of emotions. Independent self was not related to the imagined experience of socially disengaging emotions in Study 1 or the recollection of such emotions in Study 2.