The effect of comparative context on evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is a change in the evaluation of a stimulus after the stimulus co-occurred with affective stimuli. The present research examined whether EC of one stimulus depends also on the co-occurrence of another stimulus with positive or negative stimuli. We paired two target people with affective stimuli. We found that a person who appeared eight times with positive stimuli and eight times with negative stimuli was liked more when the other person appeared always (16 times) with negative stimuli than when the other person appeared always with positive stimuli. The manipulation did not change the US evaluation or the general standard on the value dimension of what a positive or negative stimulus is. We suggest that like other evaluative traits (e.g., evil, pretty) co-occurrence with affective stimuli is sensitive to temporary standards. The manipulation changed the standard of what co-occurrence with affective stimuli is considered positive versus negative.     

Can I trust you? Negative affective priming influences social judgments in schizophrenia

Successful social interactions rely on the ability to make accurate judgments based on social cues as well as the ability to control the influence of internal or external affective information on those judgments. Prior research suggests that individuals with schizophrenia misinterpret social stimuli and this misinterpretation contributes to impaired social functioning. We tested the hypothesis that for people with schizophrenia, social judgments are abnormally influenced by affective information. Twenty-three patients with schizophrenia and 35 healthy control participants rated the trustworthiness of faces following the presentation of neutral, negative (threat-related), or positive affective primes. Results showed that all participants rated faces following negative affective primes as less trustworthy than faces following neutral or positive primes. Importantly, this effect was significantly more pronounced for participants with schizophrenia, suggesting that schizophrenia may be characterized by an exaggerated influence of negative affective information on social judgment. Furthermore, the extent that the negative affective prime influenced trustworthiness judgments was significantly associated with patients' severity of positive symptoms, particularly feelings of persecution. These findings suggest that for people with schizophrenia, negative affective information contributes to an interpretive bias, consistent with paranoid ideation, when judging the trustworthiness of others. This bias may contribute to social impairments in schizophrenia.     

Is the sunny side up and the dark side down? Effects of stimulus type and valence on a spatial detection task

In verbal communication, affective information is commonly conveyed to others through spatial terms (e.g. in “I am feeling down”, negative affect is associated with a lower spatial location). This study used a target location discrimination task with neutral, positive and negative stimuli (words, facial expressions, and vocalizations) to test the automaticity of the emotion-space association, both in the vertical and horizontal spatial axes. The effects of stimulus type on emotion-space representations were also probed. A congruency effect (reflected in reaction times) was observed in the vertical axis: detection of upper targets preceded by positive stimuli was faster. This effect occurred for all stimulus types, indicating that the emotion-space association is not dependent on sensory modality and on the verbal content of affective stimuli.     

Effects of level of processing on memory for affectively valenced words

In this study we tested whether subjects remember affectively valenced stimuli better than neutral stimuli when their attention is not focused on the affective charge of the stimuli during encoding. We tested memory for positive, negative, and neutral words in three memory tasks and using two encoding conditions (physical and semantic). Our results show that subjects remember affectively valenced stimuli better than neutral stimuli when they encode them according to their emotional content as well as to other features of the stimuli. However, although both positive and negative words are better remembered than neutral ones when semantically encoded, only positive words are better remembered than neutral ones when physically encoded. These results suggest that the affective charge of a stimulus (especially when positive) can affect retention even when a subject's attention has not focused on it during encoding.     

Aging and motivated cognition: the positivity effect in attention and memory

As people get older, they experience fewer negative emotions. Strategic processes in older adults' emotional attention and memory might play a role in this variation with age. Older adults show more emotionally gratifying memory distortion for past choices and autobiographical information than younger adults do. In addition, when shown stimuli that vary in affective valence, positive items account for a larger proportion of older adults' subsequent memories than those of younger adults. This positivity effect in older adults' memories seems to be due to their greater focus on emotion regulation and to be implemented by cognitive control mechanisms that enhance positive and diminish negative information. These findings suggest that both cognitive abilities and motivation contribute to older adults' improved emotion regulation.     

Integration of Positive and Negative Affective Stimuli

The research reported in this article examines how multiple affective stimuli of differing valence (i.e., both positive and negative) are integrated into an overall affective response. Prior research on the integration of positive and negative information has not focused on affect, and previous affect integration research has not considered both positive and negative feelings. Two experiments investigate how positive and negative affective stimuli combine to influence overall affective responses to an advertisement, content‐specific beliefs, and overall ad evaluations. Both recency and contrast effects were observed on positive affective response and positive beliefs, but comparable effects on negative affective response and negative beliefs were not evident. The results support a motivational influence of affect on judgments.     

"How long will I suffer?" versus "How long will you suffer?" A self-other effect in affective forecasting

This research presents evidence that people predict longer durations of negative affect for others than for themselves. It is argued that this self-other effect is based on the asymmetric availability of knowledge about psychological strategies that reduce negative affective experiences. Specifically, because people have available knowledge about their own coping strategies, they use this information when making predictions about their affect. The lack of information about others' coping strategies leads to longer predictions of affect duration for others, creating the self-other effect. A series of studies demonstrated this self-other effect, its source, and its boundary conditions. Specifically, the self-other effect occurred for negative but not for positive events, it was stronger when participants predicted affect duration for unfamiliar others than when participants predicted affect duration for familiar others, and the impact of the self versus other focus on affective forecasts was mediated by the availability of knowledge about coping strategies. In addition, alternative explanations for the self-other effect were ruled out. The implications for biases in affective forecasting are discussed.     

The affective consequences of cognitive inhibition: devaluation or neutralization?

Affective evaluations of previously ignored visual stimuli are more negative than those of novel items or prior targets of attention or response. This has been taken as evidence that inhibition has negative affective consequences. But inhibition could act instead to attenuate or "neutralize" preexisting affective salience, predicting opposite effects for stimuli that were initially positive or negative in valence. We tested this hypothesis by presenting trustworthy and untrustworthy faces (Experiment 1), strongly positive and negative photographs (Experiment 2), and monetary gain- and loss-associated patterns (Experiment 3) in a Go/No-Go task and assessing subsequent affective ratings. Evaluations of prior No-Go (inhibited) stimuli were more negative than of prior Go (noninhibited) stimuli, regardless of a priori affective valence. Ratings of No-Go stimuli also became increasingly negative (vs. increasingly neutral) when preexisting salience was increased via stimulus repetition (Experiment 4). Our results suggest inhibition leads to affective devaluation, not affective neutralization.     

Motivated prediction of future feelings: effects of negative mood and mood orientation on affective forecasts

This article examines the role of motivational factors in affective forecasting. The primary hypothesis was that people predict positive emotional reactions to future events when they are motivated to enhance their current feelings. Three experiments manipulated participants' moods (negative vs. neutral) and orientation toward their moods (reflective vs. ruminative) and then assessed the positivity of their affective predictions for future events. As hypothesized, when participants adopted a reflective orientation, and thus should have been motivated to engage in mood-regulation processes, they predicted more positive feelings in the negative than in the neutral mood condition. This pattern of mood-incongruent affective prediction was not exhibited when participants adopted a ruminative orientation. Additionally, within the negative mood condition, generating affective forecasts had a more positive emotional impact on reflectors than on ruminators. The findings suggest that affective predictions are sometimes driven by mood-regulatory motives.     

Cognitive-versus-affective positivity asymmetries in thought systems

Positive-negative asymmetry in thought can involve both cognitive asymmetry, (thinking about characteristics that a stimulus has versus does not have), which we predict will be large and preponderantly a positivity bias, and affective asymmetry (thinking about desirable versus undesirable characteristics that the stimulus has or has not), predicted to be small and to fluctuate predictably in direction. The first four of the 10 studies reported here investigate asymmetries in thinking ability, measured by giving people directed-thinking tasks specifically asking them to generate positive versus negative thoughts. We predicted and found no affective asymmetry and a moderate-sized cognitive positivity bias that declines with practice. The second four of the 10 studies investigate asymmetries in proclivity (or preference beyond ability) that appear when people free associate on a variety of stimuli. As regards proclivity, we predicted and found a large, uniformly positive cognitive bias (that declines somewhat as children mature), but only a slight affective bias that is positive when autistic needs are dominant and negative when realistic needs dominate. A final pair of studies show that the cognitive and affective variables interact as regards how directed positive versus negative thinking about a stimulus affects evaluation of that stimulus.     

Flanker effects with faces may depend on perceptual as well as emotional differences

Do threatening or negative faces capture attention? The authors argue that evidence from visual search, spatial cuing, and flanker tasks is equivocal and that perceptual differences may account for effects attributed to emotional categories. Empirically, the authors examine the flanker task. Although they replicate previous results in which a positive face flanked by negative faces suffers more interference than a negative face flanked by positive faces, further results indicate that face perception is not necessary for the flanker-effect asymmetry and that the asymmetry also occurs with nonemotional stimuli. The authors conclude that the flanker-effect asymmetry with affective faces cannot be unambiguously attributed to emotional differences and may well be due to purely perceptual differences between the stimuli.     

Adaptation to (non)valent task disturbance

The cognitive system adapts to disturbances caused by task-irrelevant information. For example, interference due to irrelevant spatial stimulation (e.g., the spatial Simon effect) typically diminishes right after a spatially incongruent event. These adaptation effects reflect processes that help to overcome the impact of task-irrelevant information. Interference with (or interruption of) task processing can also result from valent (i.e., positive or negative) stimuli, such as in the ??affective Simon?? task. In the present study, we tested whether the resolution of valence-based task disturbances generalizes to the resolution of other cognitive (spatial) types of interference, and vice versa. Experiments 1 and 2 explored the interplay of adaptation effects triggered by spatial and affective interference. Incongruent spatial information modified the spatial Simon effect but not affective interference effects, whereas incongruent affective information modified affective interference effects to some extent, but not spatial Simon effects. In Experiment 3, we investigated the interplay of adaptation effects triggered by spatial interference and by the interruption of task processing from valent information that did not overlap with the main task (??emotional Stroop?? effect). Again we observed domain-specific adaptation for the spatial Simon effect but found no evidence for cross-domain modulations. We assume that the processes used to resolve task disturbance from irrelevant affective and spatial information operate in largely independent manners.     

Negative affective reactions reduce perceived likelihood of risk

This investigation examined the influence of negative affective reactions on the perceived likelihood of experiencing a health risk. Concepts related to formaldehyde exposure were paired with negative stimuli to create affective reactions. In Study 1, perceived risk was reduced when the thought of formaldehyde exposure elicited negative affective reactions compared to a control condition and participants were less interested in information on the risk and recommended spending less money to alleviate the hazard. The potential boundary condition of emotional states was examined in Study 2. Sad or neutral emotion was elicited before learning about the hazard, which was again paired with negative stimuli or no affective stimuli. Sadness increased perceived risk; negative affective reactions reduced perceived risk only when participants were in a neutral incidental state. These findings suggest that negative affective reactions reduce the perceived likelihood of risk, but only in the absence of alternative emotional information.     

Affective priming as an indirect measure of food preferences acquired through odor conditioning

The present study aimed at investigating affective priming for originally neutral food stimuli that recently acquired their affective meaning through odor conditioning. In a first phase, pictures of different brands of yogurts (CSs) were contingently presented with a positive or negative odor (US). In a subsequent phase, the yogurt CSs were used as primes in an affective priming procedure. Rating data showed that the acquisition procedure resulted in a reliable evaluative learning effect. This could be corroborated by the results of the priming task. Participants responded faster to positive target words and made fewer errors when they were preceded by a CS that had been associated with a positive odor, as compared to a CS that was associated with a negative odor. A reversed pattern was present for negative targets. Based on these findings, it is suggested that affective priming might be used as a demand-free measure of evaluative learning.     

Incongruency effects in affective processing: automatic motivational counter-regulation or mismatch-induced salience?

Attention is automatically allocated to stimuli that are opposite in valence to the current motivational focus (Rothermund, 2003; Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008). We tested whether this incongruency effect is due to affective-motivational counter-regulation or to an increased salience of stimuli that mismatch with cognitively activated information. Affective processing biases were assessed with a search task in which participants had to detect the spatial position at which a positive or negative stimulus was presented. In the motivational condition, positive or negative affective-motivational states were induced by performance feedback after each trial. In the cognitive activation condition, participants memorised the word "good" or "bad" during the search task. The affective incongruency effect was replicated in the motivational condition, whereas an affective congruency effect obtained in the cognitive activation condition. These findings support an explanation of affective incongruency effects in terms of automatic counter-regulation that is motivational in nature.     

Alexithymia and automatic affective processing

According to recent theories of emotion evaluative information is activated automatically in the associative network on the observation of a stimulus. This study investigates the relationship between alexithymic personality dimensions and automatic affective facilitation effects. The 20-Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) was administered to 32 subjects along with two sequential word–word priming tasks (a pronunciation and an evaluation task). The TAS-20 scale ‘Difficulties Describing Feelings’ showed a correlation with affective facilitation based on negative stimuli, whereas the scale ‘Externally Oriented Thinking’ as well as the TAS-20 sum score correlated with affective facilitation based on positive stimuli. Thus, some evidence was found that individuals with difficulties verbalizing their emotions are especially sensitive to the negative valence of stimuli at a pre-attentive level. It is argued that the scale ‘Difficulties Describing Feelings’ might assess aspects of social anxiety or shame. Individuals who report a pragmatic and externally oriented cognitive style seem to be characterized by a heightened perceptual sensitivity for positive information. Methodological problems in measuring affective priming effects are discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Control of impulsive emotional behaviour through implementation intentions

Past research has established that people can strategically enhance or override impulsive emotional behaviour with implementation intentions (Eder, Rothermund, & Proctor, 2010). However, it is unclear whether emotional action tendencies change by intentional processes or by habit formation processes due to repeated enactment of the intention (or both). The present study shows that forming implementation intentions is sufficient to modulate emotional action tendencies. Participants received instructions about how to respond to positive and negative stimuli on evaluation trials but no such trials were actually presented. Results showed that merely intending to approach and avoid affective stimuli influenced emotional action tendencies in a modified affective Simon task in which affective valence was irrelevant. An affective Simon effect (i.e., faster reactions when the valence of the stimulus corresponded with the valence of the movement) was observed when participants intended evaluations with affectively congruent responses (i.e., positive–approach, negative–avoid); in contrast, the effect was reversed in direction when participants planned evaluations with incongruent responses (i.e., positive–avoid, negative–approach). Thus, implementation intentions can regulate implicit emotional responses even in the absence of possible habit formation processes. Implications for dual-system accounts of emotion regulation are discussed.     

Mood and memory: Mood-congruity effects in absence of mood

Themood-congruity effect refers to facilitated processing of information when the affective valence of this information is congruent with the subject’s mood. In this paper we argue that mood may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition to produce the mood-congruity effect of selective learning. Two experiments are presented in which subjects learned lists of words with neutral, positive, and negative affective valences. In the learning task the subjects were instructed to behave as if they were depressed or happy. The mood-congruity effect was indeed obtained. The effect was stronger with subjects who “predicted” the relationship between mood and affective word valence than with subjects who were unaware of this relationship. The results are not simply attributed to task demands, but are interpreted in terms of a model of cognitive processes and people’s knowledge about mood states.     

Enhanced memory for emotional pictures: A product of increased attention to affective stimuli?

The current experiment addressed the question, is enhanced memory for emotional pictures due to increased attention to affective stimuli? Participants viewed pairs of pictures (emotional-neutral or neutral-neutral) whilst their eye movements were recorded; participants had to decide which picture out of each pair they preferred. There was increased attention to positive pictures and decreased attention to negative images during picture viewing. Despite this, when a recognition test was given 1 week later, memory enhancements were found for negative pictures only. Moreover, although there was a general correlation between total inspection time and memory performance, this reliability was clear only for neutral pictures, and not for emotional images. The results suggest that memory advantages for emotional pictures can occur without increased attention to such images.     

Automatic influence of arousal information on evaluative processing: Valence–arousal interactions in an affective Simon task

Previous research showed that evaluation speed is faster for negative stimuli that are high in arousal and for positive stimuli that are low in arousal. The present study investigated whether arousal and valence analogously interact in automatic stimulus evaluations, i.e., if stimulus valence is irrelevant for the task. One sample of participants switched randomly between an evaluation task and an affective Simon task that assessed stimulus evaluations indirectly. Another sample completed a pure Simon task. In all conditions, the influence of affective stimuli on task performance was enhanced when valence and arousal were congruent (i.e., high-arousing negative and low-arousing positive stimuli) than when both stimulus dimensions were incongruent (i.e., low-arousing negative and high-arousing positive stimuli). These findings suggest that evaluative implications of stimulus arousal and valence are automatically inferred even when stimulus evaluation is irrelevant for the task at hand.