Perception: a model comprising two modes of consciousness. Addendum II: Emotion incorporated

A perceptual model, described in two earlier papers, is extended to include emotion. Interaction between the perceptual and emotive systems is assumed to take place on different levels of information processing, both with and without the involvement of consciousness. This allows a considerable variability in temporal order between emotion and percept.     

Dreaming and consciousness

Abstract

Research in the second half of the twentieth century may finally have succeeded in constraining the boundaries of reasonable discussion about dreams and dreaming. Largely owing to physiological discoveries and psychophysiological methods for the representative sampling of human dreamlife, we now have a body of observations that delimits plausible explanations and theories.

For example, we now know that neither REM sleep nor its dreaming is a sporadic, fleeting response to intense psychic needs or peripheral organ states, but rather is an autonomous, cyclically recurring process which consumes relatively much of our sleep, indeed of our lives. We also know that the content of representatively sampled dreams of both adults (Snyder, 1970) and children (Foulkes, 1982) is generally realistic and mundane, rather than fantastic and bizarre. From this finding, and from direct com parisons of representatively sampled laboratory-collected dreams with spon taneously remembered home dreams (e.g. Foulkes. 1979). it has become apparent that the idea of dreaming as being full of strange and discontinuous imagery is a stereotype based on limited acquaintance with our own dreamlife. Specifically, our most ordinarily memorable dreams seem to be those relatively few that are particularly emotionally engaging, particularly unrealistic, or particularly odd in their imagery or thematic sequence. This leads us to underestimate the orderliness of a process that typically functions plausibly and coherently, in a similar if not identical manner to that which we believe (perhaps also stereotypically) characterises our non-dreaming experience.

Thus, studies of representatively sampled dreaming have shown that dream imagery itself typically is realistic or plausible (Dorus, Dorus, & Rechtschaffen, 1971). that dream speech typically is both grammatically correct and appropriate to the imagined situation in which it is embedded (Heynick, 1983). that the feelings accompanying dream imagery typically are appropriate to the imagined situations which they accompany (Foulkes, Sullivan, Kerr, & Brown, 1988), and that, overwhelmingly often, dreams progress over time in a continuous rather than a discontinuous way (Foulkes & Schmidt, 1983).

Such data indicate the need to radically revise or replace most older dream theories from the clinical tradition. Given the role that physiologists and physiological methods played in the development of these data, it was perhaps inevitable that dream theories would begin to be framed in reductionist terms. And, since the 19505, there have been many attempts to “explain” dream phenomena through their reduction to neurophysiological processes (e.g. Crick & Mitchison, 1983; Hobson & McCarley, 1977)     

Person and consciousness.

My interlocuter is Locke with his reduction of person to personal consciousness. This reduction is a main reason preventing people from acknowledging the personhood of the earliest human embryo, which lacks all personal consciousness. I show that Catholic Christians who live the sacramental life of the Church have reason to think that they are, as persons, vastly more than what they experience themselves to be, for they believe that the sacraments work effects in them as persons that can only be believed but that cannot be experienced within themselves in this life. I also show that Christians and non-Christians alike have an experience of moral good and evil in themselves that implies that they are, as moral persons, far more than they find in their conscious self-presence. It is, therefore, natural to think that if my being a person so far exceeds my consciousness, I may well have once existed as person even before the awakening of consciousness.     

The precuneus and consciousness

This article reviews the rapidly growing literature on the functional anatomy and behavioral correlates of the precuneus, with special reference to imaging neuroscience studies using hamodynamic techniques. The precuneus, along with adjacent areas within the posteromedial parietal cortex, is among the most active cortical regions according to the "default mode" of brain function during the conscious resting state, whereas it selectively deactivates in a number of pathophysiological conditions (ie, sleep, vegetative state, drug-induced anesthesia), and neuropsychiatric disorders (ie, epilepsy, Alzheimer's disease, and schizophrenia) characterized by impaired consciousness. These findings, along with the widespread connectivity pattern, suggest that the precuneus may play a central role in the neural network correlates of consciousness. Specifically, its activity seems to correlate with self-reflection processes, possibly involving mental imagery and episodic/autobiographical memory retrieval.     

Emotion and intuition

We investigated effects of emotional states on the ability to make intuitive judgments about the semantic coherence of word triads. Participants were presented word triads, consisting of three clue words that either were weakly associated with a common fourth concept (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). In Experiment 1, participants in a neutral mood discriminated coherent and incoherent triads reliably better than chance level even if they did not consciously retrieve the solution word. In Experiment 2, the induction of a positive mood reliably improved intuitive coherence judgments, whereas participants in a negative mood performed at chance level. We conclude that positive mood potentiates spread of activation to weak or remote associates in memory, thereby improving intuitive coherence judgments. By contrast, negative mood appears to restrict spread of activation to close associates and dominant word meanings, thus impairing intuitive coherence judgments.     

Utopia and heightened consciousness

Utopia should not be seen as the end‐point of a continuum of material progress, but as a society whose members enjoy a consciousness raised to its highest attainable level of intensity and value. The urge towards heightened consciousness is seen as a primary, pleasure‐driven human impulse, comparable in scope and intensity to the sex drive and perhaps still more fundamental, in that it emanates from the primordial human organ, the brain. The article explores ways in which an ‘inhibition barrier’ at present limiting the intensity of individual and general consciousness and arising from survival‐orientated modes of perception and feeling, might be raised or removed by a specific modification both of basic mental structures governing perception and conceptualization, and of economic structures, enabling a more efficient but non‐competitive mode of generating and distributing wealth. Insights derived from the psychology of art are thus applied more widely to the process of social living, to generate a concept of an attainable Utopia which would redirect human motivation away from ecologically destructive preoccupations.     

Neural Darwinism and consciousness

Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the 'dynamic core'). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized properties of consciousness, both physiological (for example, consciousness is associated with widespread, relatively fast, low amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical system), and phenomenal (for example, consciousness involves the existence of a private flow of events available only to the experiencing subject). While no theory accounts fully for all of these properties at present, we find that ND and its recent extensions fare well.     

Egoism and Emotion

Recently, the idea that human beings may be totally egoistic has resurfaced in philosophical and psychological discussions. But many of the arguments for that conclusion are conceptually flawed. Psychologists are making a conceptual error when they think of the desire to avoid guilt as egoistic; and the same is true of the common view that the desire to avoid others’ disapproval is also egoistic. Sober and Wilson argue against this latter idea on the grounds that such a desire is relational, but a deeper reason stems from the fact that it places such intrinsic importance on other human beings. And other basic human desires, like the desire for love, the desire for revenge, the impulse to imitate others, and the desire to belong, also treat others as important and on those grounds cannot count as egoistic. Another line of recent argument for egoism stems from the work of Robert Cialdini et al., and claims that the way we identify and feel one with those other people we empathize with and seek to help shows us to be thinking of those others as part of or identical with ourselves. This is supposed to show that our putative altruism is basically self-centered and egoistic, but Cialdini arguably misinterprets what we mean when we speak of feeling one with someone else, and the phenomena he mentions don’t therefore stand in favor of psychological egoism. More generally, many of the positive and negative emotions we feel toward others are best interpreted as non-egoistic, and there is no reason at this point to doubt that humans are capable of altruistic motivation.     

Imagination and Emotion

A study was conducted for the purpose of determining whether or not the addition of one or both of the supplementary WISC subtests, Digit Span of the Verbal Scale—and Mazes of the Performance Scale, materially affected the obtained IQs for high achieving fifth grade subjects. All 12 subtests of the WISC were individually administered to 44 Ss, and IQs were then calculated in such a manner that specific comparisons could be made. These comparisons were between Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs composed of the maximum number of subtests, and Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs exclusive of Digit Span, Mazes, or both subtests. Analyses by use of t tests for correlated means revealed highly significant differences. The addition of Digit Span and Mazes in the WISC battery served to depress the Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQs of the high achieving Ss.