沉思传统与实践转向——以《确定性的追求》为中心的探索

着眼于知行哲学的研究,本文聚焦于杜威的《确定性的追求》,考察了20世纪西方哲学解构沉思传统,促进实践转向的思想努力。杜威认为,沉思传统有其人性根源、形上学预设和认识论后果。通过阐发实验探究的认识论,杜威将旁观者式的认识论、两个世界的形上学以及通过确定性的追求来寻求安全的取向,一一摧陷廓清。作为沉思传统的奠基人,亚里士多德哲学在古典三项之间建立起了等级秩序。实验探究的认识论超克了亚氏方案,其立足于实验探究来解说知识和价值的进路,蕴涵了一种重置古典三项的独特思路,即立足于提升转化了的poiesis/techne来解说theoria/episteme和praxis/phronesis。     

再论知识论的精神实质及其出路

在学术界内外,“认识论”和“知识论”概念,尤其是“认识论”这一概念的使用十分广泛和普遍。在很多人的心目中,认识论和知识论作为哲学的重要分支学科,其研究领域、问题系、理论目的等似乎都是自明的和无庸争辩的。但是,如果我们能够用心考察和分析“认识论”和“知识论”概念实际使用的状况,那么,理解上的歧义和使用上的混乱就会呈现眼前。同时,我国哲学界对于主要根源于西方哲学传统的认识论和知识论在现当代的发展及其遭遇到的挑战和批判尚未给予应有的关注,对于认识论和知识论的发展趋势和理论出路问题也缺乏必要的反省和批判…     

当代西方知识论研究的补白之作--评《知识与确证--当代知识论引论》

知识论几乎和西方哲学的历史一样古老 ,是西方哲学传统中的一种极其重要的理论。由于传统知识论研究主要集中在对认识活动及知识成果的发生学考察 ,致力于对知识起源的研究 ,因之 ,西方哲学界过去乃至现在通常把传统的知识论理解为“认识论”。但知识论的研究在当代发生了形态上的根本变革 ,“葛梯尔问题”的提出 ,使知识论的研究转变为对知识本身之所以为真的条件的研究上 ,尤其是知识的确证 (justification)问题成了当代知识论研究的中心问题。这无疑是一个范式的转换 ,而恰是此种范式的转换廓清了认识论与知识论之间的界限 ,使知识论的研…     

科学知识中的主体性和客观性

当代认识论的重大难题是主体性和客观性的关系问题。当代西方科学哲学从科学知识的角度作了比较深入的研究,在元知识论的层面上突出了主体性和客观性的对立。批判地分析他们的基本论点,对于构建马克思主义认识论研究的新框架具有提纲絜领的意义。     

金岳霖同志的哲学体系

本世纪三、四十年代,金岳霖老师创造了他的哲学体系,其中包括了本体论与知识论。《论道》一书是他的本体论。《知识论》一书是他的知识论,即通常所说的认识论。他的知识论是以他的本体论为基础的。     

中国知识论传统缺乏之原因

<正>一、为什么说"中国缺乏知识论传统"?就中国学问的传统分类来说,很难找出哪一门类为知识论,也很难说哪一学派专门研究"知识之所以为知识"。金岳霖先生说:"中国哲学的特点之一,是那种可以称为逻辑和认识论的意识不发     

《广义认识论原理》评介

近来,任平副教授的新作《广义认识论原理》一书已由江苏人民出版社出版.这部著作是作者孜孜以求十余年所得成果之精华.该书独辟蹊径,自立一说,视界开阔,颇有特色.(一)该书力图更新认识论观念,提出“主——客——主”的构架.作者认为,传统的“主——客”模式的认识论有导向知识论的倾向,使人们“想占有智慧,而不太关心追求智慧的努力”(第1页),使人们“将目光投射在作为认知结果的知识形态,将生动的认识论归结为知识论”(第1—2页),如当代科学哲学学派所做的那样.所以,我们应从知识论还原到认识论.不过,这种还原不应是简单地回归到我们所熟知的“主——客”两极模式.因为,狭义的“主体——客体”认识论框架的根本缺陷在于,“忽视、忘却了多极主体性的存在以及他     

中西形而上学建构中本体论和知识论的联系

不论是对于传统形而上学,还是对于当代西方哲学来说,在对传统形而上学进行改造的过程中,本体论和知识论都是形而上学的重要组成部分。柏拉图黑格尔主义的传统形而上学的根基是本体论,其从自明的本体论出发联系知识论。存在主义哲学家海德格尔通过批判传统形而上学来重视存在本身,他以知识论世界为确然的存在,并脱离这个世界,从而返回到存在本身;现代新儒家的代表人物牟宗三结合康德学说,借助良知的坎陷来重建中国当代道德形而上学,以完成本体论和知识论的联系。最后我们回到中国传统儒家,发现在这里本体论和知识论的关系相对于西方传统是颠倒的,知识论被收摄到本体论之中。     

批判實用主義者杜威的世界觀

金岳霖先生“批判实用主義者杜威的世界观”一文对杜威的經驗論,就作了比較詳細的揭發和批判,是批判实用主義論文中比較深入的作品。     

鲍波尔的归纳法和意义的几个问题

这篇短文的目的是就休谟可能怎样批判康德认识论的某些基本观点提出一些假设。随着这个主题的自然展开,我也要对K. 鲍波尔的归纳观点以及他对经验主义意义标准的批判提出几个问题。无疑,康德知识论的主要目的之一是要克服休谟的怀疑论,为一些实际知识的基本原则确立绝对的确实性。人们说,虽然康德承认休谟把他从“独断论的睡梦”中唤醒,但是他由于温和地接受了先     

The renewal of dewey — trends in the nineties

This article proposes that the ‘renewal’ of Dewey might contribute to filling the gap between the pedagogical commitment to contingency and plurality and the fact that the pedagogical tradition, until now, has neutralized contingency and denied its systematic meaning for education. Therefore, the main traits of the ‘renewal of Dewey’ are shown in the work of some Dewey scholars who, critically and creatively, reconstruct Dewey in the mirror of poststructural, communicational and constructive theory developments. Following Dewey, these researches balance the objective evaluation of Dewey’s work by a deliberate and overt pursuit of their own intentions and (pre-)selections by the scholars. Intersubjectivity and communication are key concepts in this renewal of pragmatism rejecting the subject-centered philosophy of consciousness, the traditional western epistemology and metaphysics. The turn to the philosophical priority of the unforeseeable also leads to an understanding of action as an essential focus. In this context Dewey’s pragmatistic view of radical democracy is received as a non-foundational theory and the concept of consensus is criticized. The scholars clarify that the boundaries of the subject are broadened by communicative destabilization. At the end of the article it is asked what the renewal-dimensions mean for education located in the public sphere.     

Dewey's philosophy and the experience of working: Labor,tools and language

Although Richard Rorty has done much to renew interest in the philosophy of John Dewey, he nonetheless rejects two of the most important components of Dewey's philosophy, that is, his metaphysics and epistemology. Following George Santayana, Rorty accuses Dewey of trying to serve Locke and Hegel, an impossibility as Rorty rightly sees it. Rorty (1982) says that Dewey should have been “Hegelian all the way” (p. 85). By reconstructing a bit of Hegel's early philosophy of work, and comparing it to Dewey's metaphysics and epistemology we can see that Dewey was indeed “Hegelian all the way” and that Rorty has constructed a false dilemma. We also gain some interesting insight into Dewey's philosophy by viewing it in terms of labor, tools and language.     

The construction of meaning: Kegan,Piaget, and psychoanalysis

Kegan's theory is discussed in terms of its relationships to Piaget and to psychoanalysis. Basing himself on Piaget's genetic epistemology, Kegan formulates a theory of human development extending throughout the life cycle. The theory postulates that individuals alternate between periods of concern with intimacy and concern with autonomy. For Kegan, what is conceived by the individual as part of the self (subject) at one stage becomes object at the next. While his work is considered to be an important contribution, Kegan is criticized on the grounds of conceptual vagueness and an overemphasis on developmental universals at the expense of the consideration of idiosyncratic aspects of individual development. Kegan is also criticized for appearing to believe that there is only one correct therapeutic approach.     

Returning to experience – Dewey’s second mission to China

ABSTRACT

In this essay, as a philosophical exercise in exploring some of the underlying assumptions that serve as an interpretive context for classical Chinese philosophy, I will first follow Dewey’s philosophical turn from a ‘knowledge paradigm’ to an ‘experience paradigm’ in which he seeks to overcome the dualism between subject and object. Secondly, I will interpret Dewey’s Darwinian challenge to the notions of Aristotelian ‘species’ (eidos) and ‘teleology’ (telos) and their ‘universality.’ In so doing, Dewey sought to restore time, change, relationality, and particularity to our philosophical agenda, ideas that are all recommended by the cosmology of the first among the Chinese philosophical canons, the Book of Changes (Yijing易经). And finally, I will try to offer an interpretation of traditional Chinese philosophy as a science in a Deweyan sense.     

Epistemology Without History is Blind

In the spirit of James and Dewey, I ask what one might want from a theory of knowledge. Much Anglophone epistemology is centered on questions that were once highly pertinent, but are no longer central to broader human and scientific concerns. The first sense in which epistemology without history is blind lies in the tendency of philosophers to ignore the history of philosophical problems. A second sense consists in the perennial attraction of approaches to knowledge that divorce knowing subjects from their societies and from the tradition of socially assembling a body of transmitted knowledge. When epistemology fails to use the history of inquiry as a laboratory in which methodological claims can be tested, there is a third way in which it becomes blind. Finally, lack of attention to the growth of knowledge in various domains leaves us with puzzles about the character of the knowledge we have. I illustrate this last theme by showing how reflections on the history of mathematics can expand our options for understanding mathematical knowledge.     

Saint Thomas Aquinas’ ontological epistemology as clarified realism: The relating of subject to object for ontological knowledge

The Kantian revolution limited the possibility of ontological knowledge, severing subject from thing as is evident in its legacy in both continental and analytic philosophy. Consequently, if a thing cannot be known as it is, the philosophical status of empirical science as a study about existing natural things should be called into question. It could be construed, for instance, that a scientific theory is a construction about something to which the subjective constructor can never have ontological access. But, when empirical scientists develop evidence-based proofs for their theories the assumption of realism usually stands: scientific theories constructed by scientists are actually purported to represent natural entities back to these constructing scientists. Given that there is a danger of philosophy becoming isolated from empirical science, we attempt to bridge the gap between philosophical discourse and science-in-praxis through a recapitulation of Aquinas’ ontological epistemology. Aquinas argued for a clarified realism in which the epistemic is construed as an intersection between the thinking subject and the object. Contrary to naïve realism, then, it will be explicated how Aquinas’ realism was a precursor of “critical realism”, as he discerned the complex interaction of thinking subject and the being of the object as both bearing on the production of knowledge.     

当代知识论:出场路径及其作为方法论和认识论

<正>当代知识论(contemporary theory of knowledge)作为哲学运动,是两股支流的汇合:一是它作为关于"知识是信念"的理论,乃孕育于作为方法论的分析哲学;二是它作为关于主体之经验直观能力的理论,乃是对从笛卡尔到康德的传统认识论的延伸。这决定了它包括两个部分,分别作为方法论和认识论。     

The Problematics of Human Subjectivity: Gilles Deleuze and the Deweyan Legacy

This article is part of alarger project exploring the continuity betweentwo philosophical positions – that of Frenchpoststructuralist Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995)and John Dewey – that appear at first sight tobe separated by time, place and culture. Thescope of the present paper is necessarilylimited and focuses on one aspect of theproject, namely: the problematics ofsubjectivity, or subject formation, inDeleuze's philosophy. Deleuze's position isestablished as pragmatic by virtue of itssharing the value allotted by Dewey toexperiential and experimental inquiry inphilosophy. By drawing initial parallels with anumber of selected Dewey's excerpts, this paperaims to open up a space for the imaginarydialogue between two philosophical thoughts soas to consider a possibility for applyingDeleuze's philosophy to educational theory andpractice in the context of current debates andin a manner continuous with the Deweyan legacy.The paper concludes by affirming Deleuze'splace in the contemporary scholarship on Dewey.     

That obscure object of psychoanalysis

This essay examines how psychoanalytic conceptions of the subject and the object in the works of Freud and Lacan may contribute to a re-examination of the vexed issue of the subject–object relationship in science, philosophy and epistemology. For Freud, the ego is the essential subject, yet he regarded it as an always already objectified subject, which is objectively thinkable yet never subjectively knowable qua subject. Lacan conceptualised this Freudian principle of subjectivity with his notion of the divided (barred) subject, which he initially designated as an effect of the symbolic order of language. As to the object, both Freud and Lacan emphasized its constitutive partiality, which explains why no object is ever fully capable of providing full satisfaction and why each and every object is flawed and cracked, thus triggering desire. Extending Freud’s idea of the ‘shadow of the object,’ Lacan captured the fundamental inadequacy of the object with his concept of the object a. As such, for Freud and Lacan, the subject–object relationship is problematic, because it concerns a relationship between a divided subject and a non-object (object a). In this relationship, the subject is not purely object and the object is not merely subject (in the Kantian sense), nor is the Hegelian subject–object identity more than an idealist aspiration. For psychoanalysis, the subject is always traversed by the object, yet the object can never be fully integrated into a subjectified structure of knowledge. The only way to conceive of an adequate subject–object relationship is at the level of fantasy.     

Dewey Between the Lines: George Kelly and the Pragmatist Tradition

In his own somewhat sly and sardonic way, George Kelly always insisted that personal construct theory could not be assimilated into any other kind of psychology. We believe this was not an example of Kelly being difficult or protecting his turf, but that he resisted such efforts at categorization because he formulated personal construct psychology from an entirely different set of assumptions than those which have traditionally guided the construction of psychological theories. We begin by looking at the unusual life path Kelly took in order to enter the field of psychology and what it reveals about the independent turn of mind he brought to creating his own theory of personality. We then examine what we believe is the single most important influence on Kelly's thinking—the tradition of American pragmatism, in general, and the philosophy and psychology of John Dewey, in particular. We argue that Kelly embraced the pragmatic epistemological assumptions that guided Dewey's work, and that he used these assumptions to develop the only pragmatic theory of personality and psychotherapy. It is, in fact, the influence of Dewey and the pragmatists that makes personal construct psychology so different from and, at times, more difficult to understand than other, more traditional, “realist” theories, but it is also this pragmatic orientation that makes Kelly's theory such an important contribution.