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Science and Engineering Ethics - 相似文献
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《北京青年报》2006年12月27日报道,南京市博物馆考古队员开启了疑似秦桧墓的西边墓室。“墓室开启前,发掘现场最先映入人们眼帘的是一 相似文献
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Five experiments demonstrate that context has a powerful effect on the ease with which people can name (Experiments 1-3) or categorize (Experiments 4-5) a stimulus while ignoring another stimulus, irrelevant or conflicting with the target. Selectivity of attention to the target dimension was gauged through Stroop and Garner effects. When the stimulus values along the target dimension and the to-be-ignored dimension were correlated over the experimental trials, large effects of Stroop and Garner influenced performance. However, when random allocation of values created zero dimensional correlation, the Stroop effects vanished. These results imply that when the nominally irrelevant dimension is in fact correlated with the relevant dimension, participants then attend to the irrelevant dimension and thus open themselves up to Stroop interference. Another variable of context, the relative salience of the constituent dimensions, also affected performance with the more discriminable dimension disrupting selective attention to the less discriminable dimension. The results demonstrate the importance of context in engendering the failure of selective attention and challenge traditional automaticity accounts of the Stroop effect. 相似文献
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有一些人出于不良的目的,宣称:患病不吃药,烧香念佛好。当然,若是邪教的目的就更险恶了!曾发生过这么一件事情:辽宁省盘锦地区,在民间传出“过年吃药不吉利”的谣言,并称,吃一次药,就一年到头药离不了口,折腾一年,一年在苦海中煎熬。这种显而易见的谣言竟还有人相信,在短短的两天时间内,一家医院就先后抢救了11位心 相似文献
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The steady state of a simple reaction system has been shown to have some of the properties of a psychophysical discrimination system, including the possibility of deducing a generalized Weber-Fechner Law, both in integral form and in difference form. The Weber ratio so deduced is not constant, and its dependence on stimulus intensity is exhibited. The dependence of the difference limen on the internal threshold is discussed; it is found that in general there is a finite value of this threshold for which response is impossible. This critical threshold is lower for higher values of the reference stimulus intensity. Similarly, it is shown that the difference limen and the Weber ratio, for a fixed value of the threshold, become infinite (i.e., discrimination is impossible) for a value of the stimulus intensity which in general is finite. 相似文献
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摩尔所谓"自然主义谬误"批判的是将"善"这种非自然的属性直接等同于快乐、进化以及实存等这些非价值属性的自然物,但他并不否认可以从这些具体的善事物或手段善中推导出善本身;斯蒂文森的温和情感主义虽然强调态度分歧对于信念分析的根本性和相对独立性,但并不否认部分态度分歧对于信念分歧的依赖性和共存性;黑尔作为元伦理学向规范伦理学复归的一个重要代表,更是有意弥合事实与价值的裂痕,强调道德语言的普遍规定性,强调作为社会事实的社会制度对价值评价的决定性和基础性作用。因此,通常所认为的元伦理学关于不能从"是"推出"应该"的结论,实际上是对元伦理学观点的误读,而这种误读也同样发生在休谟身上。 相似文献
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《郭店楚简·语丛》"易,所以会天道、人道者也",大概是现存最早和最明确表达"天人合一"思想的命题。《易》的"所以会天道、人道",表明"天"、"人"之间的关系实为一内在关系,二者是不离相即的,而西方哲学则以"外在关系"立论。《周易》是中国最古老探讨"所以会天道、人道"的经典。 相似文献
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Bernard E. Rollin 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(4):425-437
The basis of having a direct moral obligation to an entity is that what we do to that entity matters to it. The ability to experience pain is a sufficient condition for a being to be morally considerable. But the ability to feel pain is not a necessary condition for moral considerability. Organisms could have possibly evolved so as to be motivated to flee danger or injury or to eat or drink not by pain, but by “pangs of pleasure” that increase as one fills the relevant need or escapes the harm. In such a world, “mattering” would be positive, not negative, but would still be based in sentience and awareness. In our world, however, the “mattering” necessary to survival is negative—injuries and unfulfilled needs ramify in pain. But physical pain is by no means the only morally relevant mattering—fear, anxiety, loneliness, grief, certainly do not equate to varieties of physical pain, but are surely forms of “mattering.” An adequate morality towards animals would include a full range of possible matterings unique to each kind of animal, what I, following Aristotle, call “telos”. Sometimes not meeting other aspects of animal nature matter more to the animal than does physical pain. “Negative mattering” means all actions or events that harm animals—from frightening an animal to removing its young unnaturally early, to keeping it so it is unable to move or socialize. Physical pain is perhaps the paradigmatic case of “negative mattering”, but only constitutes a small part of what the concept covers. “Positive mattering” would of course encompass all states that are positive for the animal. An adequate ethic for animals takes cognizance of both kinds. The question arises as to how animals value death as compared with pain. Human cognition is such that it can value long-term future goals and endure short-run negative experiences for the sake of achieving them. In the case of animals, however, there is no evidence, either empirical or conceptual, that they have the capability to weigh future benefits or possibilities against current misery. We have no reason to believe that an animal can grasp the notion of extended life, let alone choose to trade current suffering for it. Pain may well be worse for animals than for humans, as they cannot rationalize its acceptance by appeal to future life without pain. How can we know that animals experience all or any of the negative or positive states we have enumerated above? The notion that we needed to be agnostic or downright atheistic about animal mentation, including pain, because we could not verify it through experience, became a mainstay of what I have called “scientific ideology”, the uncriticized dogma taught to young scientists through most of the 20th century despite its patent ignoring of Darwinian phylogenetic continuity. Together with the equally pernicious notion that science is “value-free”, and thus has no truck with ethics, this provided the complete justification for hurting animals in science without providing any pain control. This ideology could only be overthrown by federal law. Ordinary common sense throughout history, in contradistinction to scientific ideology, never denied that animals felt pain. Where, then, does the denial of pain and other forms of mattering come from if it is inimical to common sense? It came from the creation of philosophical systems hostile to common sense and salubrious to a scientific, non-commonsensical world view. Reasons for rejecting this philosophical position are detailed. In the end, then, there are no sound reasons for rejecting knowledge of animal pain and other forms of both negative and positive mattering in animals. Once that hurdle is cleared, science must work assiduously to classify, understand, and mitigate all instances of negative mattering occasioned in animals by human use, as well as to understand and maximize all modes of positive mattering. 相似文献
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At 6 months following the death of their spouse, 37 participants reported their grief-related symptoms and thoughts, and then, approximately 4.5 years later, they attempted to recall how they felt at the time of the 6-month report. Although participants were far less distressed at recall than initially, they recalled their 6-month grief rather accurately. Participants did however overestimate prior grief-related intrusive ideation. Participant's current level of grief predicted what they recalled slightly better than the actual initial grief. Conversely, what they recalled predicted current levels of grief across various measures. Participants whose grief diminished relatively little over time tended to overestimate prior grief more. The retrospective reappraisal that one's past grief was not severe may indicate effective coping. 相似文献
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MANUEL GARCIA‐CARPINTERO 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2003,67(2):357-377
Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information‐processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitu‐tively representational in an externalist understanding of this. The core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about (minimal) qualia on which a Dennett‐like argument can be based. 相似文献
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