Teleological behaviorism.

A psychological science of efficient causes, using internal mechanisms to explain overt behavior, is distinguished from another psychological science, based on Aristotelian final causes, using external objects and goals to explain overt behavior. Efficient-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of how a particular act is emitted; final-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of why a particular act is emitted. Physiological psychology, modern cognitive psychology, and some parts of behaviorism including Skinnerian behaviorism are efficient-cause psychologies; final-cause psychology, a development of Skinnerian behaviorism, is here called teleological behaviorism. Each of these two conceptions of causality in psychology implies a different view of the mind, hence a different meaning of mental terms.     

Probability and radical behaviorism

The concept of probability appears to be very important in the radical behaviorism of Skinner. Yet, it seems that this probability has not been accurately defined and is still ambiguous. I give a strict, relative frequency interpretation of probability and its applicability to the data from the science of behavior as supplied by cumulative records. Two examples of stochastic processes are given that may model the data from cumulative records that result under conditions of continuous reinforcement and extinction, respectively.     

A transpersonal critique of behaviorism

Behavioral psychology has been neglected by pastoral psychologists to the hurt of both. An examination of the principles of behaviorism and some of the data on the behavioral treatment of the neuroses is followed by an analysis of B.F. Skinner's philosophy of science. A critique is developed from the perspective of transpersonal psychology, concluding with a possible reconciliation of the opposites of behavioral and transpersonal ways of knowing.     

Pavlov's position toward American behaviorism

Pavlov's development of the conditional reflex theory coincided with the rise of American behaviorism. Substituting an objective physiology for a subjective psychology, Pavlov saw in the rise of American behaviorism a clear confirmation of his method and theory. But in the early 1930s, Lashley attacked Pavlov's theory of specific cerebral localization of function, proposing instead the concept of an internal cerebral organization; Guthrie objected to Pavlov's centralist interpretation of conditioning, proposing instead a peripheralist interpretation; while Hull challenged Pavlov's theory of sleep and hypnosis as the manifestations of inhibition. Pavlov replied with critiques of Lashley's, Guthrie's, and Hull's views, and, convinced that Lashley and Guthrie misunderstood his position, repeated his method's and theory's basic propositions. Yet, Pavlov never gave up the expectation that American behaviorism would accept his conditional reflex theory and saw in Hunter's 1932 statements a support of his assumptions.     

Phenomenology,behaviorism and psychotherapy

Abstract

t “Everything begins with subjective states,” is the basic position of Phenomenology, and only through subjectivity imate reality be reached. Behaviorism, on the contrary, sees “mind” as part of the material world—the and behavior as determining man's essence (man is what he does). “Change,” which is the goal of every therapy, is attend by altering behavior which leads to changes in attitudes. The best way to alter beliefs is by controlling the behavioral cognition itself.     

From mechanistic to functional behaviorism.

A shift from mechanistic behaviorism to functional behaviorism is presented against the background of two historical traditions, one with an emphasis on form, the other with an emphasis on function. Skinner's work, which made more contributions to a functional behaviorism than to a mechanistic behaviorism, exemplifies this shift. The two traditions and an account of Skinner's development of functional relations are presented in order to show Skinner's contributions to aligning modern behavior analysis with the functional tradition.     

Psychological behaviorism and behaviorizing psychology

Paradigmatic or psychological behaviorism (PB), in a four-decade history of development, has been shaped by its goal, the establishment of a behaviorism that can also serve as the approach in psychology (Watson's original goal). In the process, PB has become a new generation of behaviorism with abundant heuristic avenues for development in theory, philosophy, methodology, and research. Psychology has resources, purview and problem areas, and nascent developments of many kinds, gathered in chaotic diversity, needing unification (and other things) that cognitivism cannot provide. Behaviorism can, within PB's multilevel framework for connecting and advancing both psychology and behaviorism.     

Epistemological barriers to radical behaviorism

The historian and philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard proposed the concept of epistemological barriers to describe the intellectual challenges encountered by scientists in their work. In order to embrace novel ways of approaching a problem in science, scientists must overcome barriers or obstacles posed by their prior views. For example, Einsteinian physics presents scientists with claims that space is curved and that time and space are on the same continuum. We utilize Bachelard's concept of epistemological barriers to describe the differences between the intellectual journeys students pursuing advanced studies face when attempting to accept cognitive psychology or radical behaviorism. We contend that the folk psychological beliefs that students typically hold when entering these studies pose less challenge to cognitive psychology than to radical behaviorism. We also suggest that these barriers may also partly be involved in the problematic exegesis that has plagued radical behaviorism. In close, we offer some suggestions for dealing with these epistemological barriers.     

Radical behaviorism and the subjective-objective distinction

The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus-organism-response neobehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective-objective distinction. For radical behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.     

Integrating humanism and behaviorism: toward performance

The current emphasis on performance criteria in training programs and in professional services poses a threat to the humanistically oriented helper. Having been trained in the self-actualizing psychology of Maslow and Rogers, humanists equate competence-based education and counseling with behaviorism and therefore resist the demand for performance criteria and the adjunct behavioral principles. This article suggests a behavioral humanism as the desired solution to the dilemma and proposes some guidelines for formulating and implementing such a synthetic system without jeopardizing one's personal-professional integrity.