What is happening in the world of therapeutic communities?

This overview of the contributions to the special edition illustrates something of how the collection of papers reflects the marginal nature of therapeutic communities, and makes parallels as to how they are forever struggling to survive, yet generate a passion of ideas and intellectual resilience that no project-managed health service can extinguish. It briefly describes the theoretical and geographical terrain covered, and signals how the cross-disciplinary incorporation of congruent ideas can be added to the traditional bedrock of therapeutic community practice. It ends by stating the context of the new, and seemingly successful, organization which assembled these contributions into its inaugural conference – and suggests that the journey could, and ultimate should, go further.     

What is folk psychology?

Eliminativism has been a major focus of discussion in the philosophy of mind for the last two decades. According to eliminativists, beliefs and other intentional states are the posits of a folk theory of mind standardly called “folk psychology”. That theory, they claim, is radically false and hence beliefs and other intentional states do not exist. We argue that the expression “folk psychology” is ambiguous in an important way. On the one hand, “folk psychology” is used by many philosophers and cognitive scientists to refer to an internally represented theory of human psychology exploited in the prediction of behavior. On the other hand, “folk psychology” is used to refer to the theory of mind implicit in our everyday talk about mental states. We then argue that sorting out the conceptual and terminological confusion surrounding “folk psychology” has major consequences for the eliminativism debate. In particular, if certain models of cognition turn out to be true, then on some readings of “folk psychology” the arguments for eliminativism collapse.     

What memory strategy is best for examinations in psychology?

This study examines the memory strategies used by psychology students during their finals examinations. The strategies used, as evidenced by exam plans at the front of their answers, were related to actual examination performance. The results of the present study showed that, when students' worst marks were considered, those not showing evidence of having used any strategy performed significantly worse than those using a strategy. The strategy which involved listing researchers names proved to be better than a no‐strategy approach. However, when students' best marks were considered, no differences were apparent in examination marks as a result of the strategies which students employed. This suggests that the type of strategy used is more important when students' knowledge of a topic is weak in comparison to when students have a good knowledge of a topic area. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What is learned in sequential learning? An associative model of reward magnitude serial-pattern learning

A computational model of sequence learning is described that is based on pairwise associations and generalization. Simulations by the model predicted that rats should learn a long monotonic pattern of food quantities better than a nonmonotonic pattern, as predicted by rule-learning theory, and that they should learn a short nonmonotonic pattern with highly discriminable elements better than 1 with less discriminable elements, as predicted by interitem association theory. In 2 other studies, the model also simulated behavioral "rule generalization," "extrapolation," and associative transfer data motivated by both rule-learning and associative perspectives. Although these simulations do not rule out the possibility that rats can use rule induction to learn serial patterns, they show that a simple associative model can account for the classical behavioral studies implicating rule learning in reward magnitude serial-pattern learning.     

What next in the psychology of musical measurement?

The Psychological Record -     

What is the role of the cerebellum in motor learning and cognition?

The exact role of the cerebellum in motor learning and cognition is controversial. Nonetheless, recent ideas and facts have prompted an attempt at building and testing a more unified and coherent conceptualization. This article will suggest that the cerebellum might indeed participate in both motor control and cognition, and in motor adaptation, motor learning, and procedural learning. The proposed process would entail stimulus-response linkage through trial and error learning, and would consist of groupings of single-response elements-motor and cognitive-into large combinations. After practice, the occurrence of a sensory or experiential `context' would automatically trigger the combined response. The parallel fiber is the proposed agent of stimulus-response linkage and of combining the response elements. The attempt here is to focus on the role of the parallel fiber as a possible combiner of downstream motor and cognitive elements.     

Feature frequency in concept learning: What is counted?

Frequency theories of concept learning assume that people count how often features occur among instances of a concept, but different versions make various assumptions about what features they count. According to the basic feature model, only basic features are counted, whereas according to the configural model, basic features and configural features (all combinations of basic features) are counted. Two experiments assessed the predictions of both versions of frequency theory. Subjects viewed schematic human faces, which included both positive and negative instances of the concept to be learned, and then provided typicality ratings, classification responses, and frequency estimates of configural features, basic features, and whole exemplars. Because both models assume that basic features are counted, they make the same predictions in many situations. Here, the basic feature estimation and whole exemplar tests were designed such that both models make the same predictions, whereas the typicality rating, classification, and confignral feature estimation tests were designed to distinguish between the models. The pattern of results clearly supported the basic feature version of frequency theory.     

What is learning? On the nature and merits of a functional definition of learning

Learning has been defined functionally as changes in behavior that result from experience or mechanistically as changes in the organism that result from experience. Both types of definitions are problematic. We define learning as ontogenetic adaptation—that is, as changes in the behavior of an organism that result from regularities in the environment of the organism. This functional definition not only solves the problems of other definitions, but also has important advantages for cognitive learning research.     

What is The Red Book for analytical psychology?

Abstract: The Red Book enters the field of analytical psychology belatedly, yet presents itself as a foundational text. In this paper, I try to estimate how it will affect the field and to reflect on how it can be used by contemporary readers and clinicians. Jung's own works remain the baseline for theorizing and teaching the fundamental perspectives of analytical psychology, and yet the field has grown far beyond his own contributions. Is this late inheritance of central value or only of peripheral interest for the field? It can be used in various ways and certainly shows many interesting features that link it to Jung's later works, but does it detract or does it add? And if it adds, what does it add? In The Red Book, Jung is speaking to us from the grave. What is he saying? In this paper, I explore how it can be used as an inspirational text for keeping alive the spirit of the ancestors in the field and for linking the present to the deep past.     

Reimagining gender in psychology: What can critical psychology offer?

In this article, I argue that gender is a complex sociocultural construct, yet how gender is accounted for in psychological research is limited. Specifically, psychologists conflate sex with gender, rely on quantifying gender differences and, by implication, conceptualise gender as merely a participant characteristic. To illustrate, I apply this viewpoint to the topic of gender differences in tobacco use/cessation using on a feminist quality appraisal tool. I show how these three issues promote the narrow study of sex/gender differences, despite problems surrounding this inquiry, and reduce insights into the intersection of gender and behaviour. To offer a way forward for psychology, I describe how a critical psychology perspective attends to the complexities of gender and its influence on behaviour. I showcase diverse ways of attending to gender as a sociocultural construct, inviting psychologists to engage with, and reflect on, their gender analyses.     

Evolutionary perspectives on imitation: is a comparative psychology of social learning possible?

Studies of imitation in animals have become numerous in recent times, but do they contribute to a comparative psychology of social learning? We review this burgeoning field to identify the problems and prospects for such a goal. Difficulties of two main kinds are identified. First, researchers have tackled questions about social learning from at least three very different theoretical perspectives, the "phylogenetic", "animal model", and "adaptational". We examine the conflicts between them and consider the scope for integration. A second difficulty arises in the methodological approaches used in the discipline. In relation to one of these - survey reviews of published studies - we tabulate and compare the contrasting conclusions of nine articles that together review 36 studies. The basis for authors' disagreements, including the matters of perceptual opacity, novelty, sequential structure, and goal representation, are examined. In relation to the other key method, comparative experimentation, we identify 12 studies that have explicitly compared species' imitative ability on similar tasks. We examine the principal problems of comparing like with like in these studies and consider solutions, the most powerful of which we propose to be the use of a systematic range of task designs, rather than any single "gold standard" task.     

What is learned when concept learning fails?—A theory of restricted-domain relational learning

Two matching-to-sample (MTS) and four same/different (S/D) experiments employed tests to distinguish between item-specific learning and relational learning. One MTS experiment showed item-specific learning when concept learning failed (i.e., no novel-stimulus transfer). Another MTS experiment showed item-specific learning when pigeons’ novel-stimulus transfer decreased because they chose familiar training comparisons instead of matching novel comparisons. In 8-item and 3-item S/D tasks, pigeons and monkeys were accurate with unfamiliar training-stimulus pairings, stimulus inversions, and distorted stimuli, suggesting relational learning within a domain restricted to the training stimuli (i.e., no novel-stimulus transfer). In 32-item S/D tasks, pigeons with previous 8-item training showed less transfer than those without prior training, suggesting a carryover of restricted-domain relational learning. Pigeons shifted from 1024-item to 8-item S/D tasks showed reinstatement of restricted-domain relational learning. These findings are important in specifying which types of learning occur in these tasks, showing that subjects failing novel-stimulus transfer are not required to switch from item-specific to relational learning as a training set is expanded, and demonstrating that concept learning failure is not proof of item-specific learning.     

Decomposing serial learning: What is missing from the learning curve?

Our current understanding of serial learning relies on the form of the learning curve and on changes in the serial position curve over repeated study-test trials (Ward, 1937). The averaging of data that produces these functions obscures the detailed history of memory for individual items over the course of study-test trials. Extending Tulving’s (1964) analysis of free recall learning, we present a new analysis of serial learning that tracks the acquisition and forgetting of item and order information at the level of individual items. Applying this analysis to two large data sets on serial list learning allows us to discern among hypotheses that are indistinguishable solely on the basis of the learning curve.     

What in the world is weakness of will?

At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia—i.e. acting, or having a disposition to act, contrary to one’s judgments about what is best for one to do. However, there has been some recent debate about whether this captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will. Richard Holton claims that it doesn’t, while Alfred Mele argues that, to a certain extent, it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about an ordinary concept here is one apt for empirical investigation. We evaluate Mele’s studies and report some experiments of our own in order to investigate what in the world the ordinary concept of weakness of will is. We conclude that neither Mele nor Holton (previously) was quite right and offer a tentative proposal of our own: the ordinary notion is more like a prototype or cluster concept whose application is affected by a variety of factors.     

How international is psychology?

Psychology claims to be an international discipline. This claim has been based upon subjective estimates of attendance at international congresses, status reports from selected countries published within edited volumes, and a survey of the member countries of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS) (Rosenzweig, 1992). However, to be truly international, the work of psychologists in countries around the world must be internationally disseminated. Systematic examination of international congress presentations and abstracts of published psychological literature indexed on widely available electronic databases (e.g., PsycLIT) provides a more objective means of documenting the international presence of psychology. In this article, counts by country were made of research contributions reported within PsycLIT and on the programs of International Congresses of Applied Psychology over the five years in which the congresses were held from 1982 to 1998. Analyses of these data revealed PsycLIT to be more international in scope than previously assumed—45% of its entries were by authors from outside the US. Coverage of research from developing countries was even more limited within PsycLIT (4.67%), but proportionally greater within international congresses (10%). PsycLIT entries not in the English language were found noticeably to have declined from approximately 12–14% levels in the 1980s to only about 6% in the 1990s. An index of the presence of psychology in each country, based upon presentations at IAAP congresses, memberships in international associations, and the extent of PsycLIT entries over the previous three decades, provided an objective, empirically‐based answer to the question ‘How International is Psychology?' This index indicated that psychology has a significant presence in 47 countries, a presence in another 22 countries, but minimal or no presence in 82 other countries. The meaning of these data for the discipline and ways in which psychology's worldwide presence might be strengthened and extended were discussed.