Individual Breaches of Environmental Laws in Cases from Public Administration Files

The characteristics of environmental transgressions and transgressors involved in 1,505 files handled by 4 public administrations were assessed. These administrations were in charge of environmental law enforcement in a highly protected setting, across federal, state, island, and municipality jurisdictions. Special attention was given to the transgressors' written responses to administrative sanctions included in the files. These were analyzed integrating the approaches of neutralization techniques and of accounts as strategies of conflict management. Results suggest that most environmental transgressions under study were carried out by private individuals in the personal domain of everyday life, and that transgressors' accounts of environmental transgressions were short, straightforward, and questioned the legitimacy of the environmental law being broken.     

基于虚拟博弈任务对冒犯者得到宽恕后行为的研究:人格的调节作用

为探讨人格特质对得到宽恕与否与冒犯者后续行为之间关系的影响,基于虚拟的囚徒困境博弈范式,并结合人格问卷的测试,对369名大学生进行了研究。结果发现:(1)宽恕情境下的被试更倾向于不再伤害对方;(2)得到宽恕的程度与冒犯者善待对方的程度呈显著的正相关;(3)大五人格中的宜人性在得到宽恕与否与冒犯者后续行为之间关系中起调节作用,而大五人格的其他四个维度调节作用不显著;(4)特质性感恩在得到宽恕与否与冒犯者后续行为之间关系中起调节作用。据此可得出结论,冒犯者得到宽恕后更倾向于不再伤害被冒犯者,且受到部分人格特质的调节。     

Judging Yourself as You Judge Others: Moral Development and Exculpation

This study investigated two main issues: Whether people's judgments about real-life moral transgressions are affected by the role they play in them and whether self-serving biases in such judgments vary with level of moral development. One-hundred twenty university students took Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) test of moral judgment and made open-ended and rating-scale judgments about three real-life transgressions they considered moral in nature. As expected, participants made more exculpatory judgments about transgressions they committed than they did about transgressions others committed, but participants did not judge transgressions committed against them more harshly than they judged transgressions committed against others. The higher participants scored on Kohlberg's test the less they externalized and excused their moral transgressions. Contrary to expectation, this relation also applied to moral judgments about transgressions committed by others against others. These findings have important implications for models of moral development and social cognition.     

Are there different moral domains? Evidence from Mongolia

In this paper we report a study conducted in Mongolia on the scope of morality, that is, the extent to which people moralize different social domains. Following Turiel's moral‐conventional task, we characterized moral transgressions (in contrast to conventional transgressions) in terms of two dimensions: authority independence and generality of scope. Different moral domains are then defined by grouping such moral transgressions in terms of their content (following Haidt's classification of morally relevant domains). There are four main results of the study. First, since all five Haidtian domains were moralized by the Mongolian participants, the study provides evidence in favour of pluralism about moral domains. However, the study also suggests that the domain of harm can be reduced to the fairness domain. Furthermore, although the strong claim about reduction of all moral domains to the domain of fairness does not seem to hold a significant number of participants did indicate considerations of fairness across domains. Finally, a significant amount of participants moralized conventional transgressions a la Turiel, but it did not reach a statistical significance.     

Evaluations of moral and conventional intergroup transgressions

To investigate children's understanding of intergroup transgressions, children (3–8 years, N = 84) evaluated moral and conventional transgressions that occurred among members of the same gender group (ingroup) or members of different gender groups (outgroup). All participants judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. However, when asked to make a judgment after being told an authority figure did not see the transgression, younger participants still judged that moral violations were less acceptable than conventional transgressions, but judged both moral and conventional transgressions with an outgroup victim as more acceptable than the corresponding transgressions with an ingroup victim. Older children did not demonstrate the same ingroup bias; rather they focused only on the domain of the transgressions. The results demonstrate the impact intergroup information has on children's evaluations about both moral and conventional transgressions.     

Emotional and behavioural reactions to moral transgressions: cross-cultural and individual variations in India and Britain

Reactions to moral transgressions are subject to influence at both the cultural and individual levels. Transgressions against an individual's rights or against social conventions of hierarchy may elicit different reactions in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In the current study, affective and behavioural reactions to transgressions of autonomy (rights) and community (hierarchy) were examined in India and Britain. Results revealed that although reactions to autonomy transgressions are similar in India and Britain, Indian participants express more moral outrage than do Britons in response to transgressions of community. Results also supported the contention of emotion‐specificity in affective moral reaction: Participants in both India and Britain reported anger in response to autonomy transgressions, but contempt in response to violations of community. Importantly, these results extend previous research by demonstrating the importance of emotion specificity in moral reactions, as opposed to categorization or dilemma resolution. In addition, an individual difference measure of respect for persons was shown to moderate reactions to moral transgressions. Specifically, participants with high respect for persons were less negative to violators of the community ethic, but not the autonomy ethic. These findings highlight the importance of examining emotion‐specific responses in the moral domain and introduce a significant individual difference variable, respect for persons, into the psychology of morality.     

Letting people off the hook: when do good deeds excuse transgressions?

Three studies examined when and why an actor's prior good deeds make observers more willing to excuse--or license--his or her subsequent, morally dubious behavior. In a pilot study, actors' good deeds made participants more forgiving of the actors' subsequent transgressions. In Study 1, participants only licensed blatant transgressions that were in a different domain than actors' good deeds; blatant transgressions in the same domain appeared hypocritical and suppressed licensing (e.g., fighting adolescent drug use excused sexual harassment, but fighting sexual harassment did not). Study 2 replicated these effects and showed that good deeds made observers license ambiguous transgressions (e.g., behavior that might or might not represent sexual harassment) regardless of whether the good deeds and the transgression were in the same or in a different domain--but only same-domain good deeds did so by changing participants' construal of the transgressions. Discussion integrates two models of why licensing occurs.     

The duality of virtue: Deconstructing the moral hypocrite

The present study examined the processes giving rise to moral hypocrisy, a phenomenon in which individuals judge their own transgressions to be less morally objectionable than the same transgressions enacted by others. Two alternative models of the source of hypocrisy were compared to determine whether hypocrisy results from automatic or volitional biases. Findings demonstrated not only that participants viewed their own transgressions as significantly more “fair” than the same transgressions enacted by others, but also that this bias was eliminated under conditions of cognitive constraint. These findings support the view that hypocrisy stems from volitionally-guided justifications, and thereby suggest that at a more basic level, humans possess a negative response to violations of fairness norms whether enacted by themselves or others.     

Forgiveness and psychological adjustment following interpersonal transgressions: A longitudinal analysis

Forgiveness is often assumed to be adaptive for psychological adjustment following interpersonal transgressions. Three hundred and forty seven individuals who had experienced a recent interpersonal transgression were surveyed on four occasions over the course of six weeks. Forgiveness was assessed with scales measuring interpersonal avoidance and revenge motivation and psychological adjustment was assessed with scales measuring depression and rumination. Latent growth curve analyses showed that intraindividual changes in forgiveness were positively correlated with changes in adjustment. Latent difference score analyses indicated that adjustment predicted subsequent change in forgiveness, but that forgiveness did not predict subsequent change in adjustment. The results suggest that adjustment facilitates forgiveness, but not that forgiveness facilitates adjustment.     

Interpersonal consequences of forgiveness: Does forgiveness deter or encourage repeat offenses?

Benefits of forgiveness have been well documented, but past research has not directly addressed the crucial question of whether forgiveness deters or invites repeat transgressions. Our research indicates that expressing forgiveness typically discourages future offenses. In Study 1, participants playing a form of the prisoner’s dilemma game were more likely to repeat their transgressions against unforgiving victims than forgiving victims, especially when victims had no chance to retaliate. In response to a hypothetical scenario presented in Study 2, participants reported that they would be less likely to risk offending someone for a second time if that person had forgiven their first offense. In Study 3, participants’ autobiographical recollections of their prior transgressions revealed that receiving forgiveness predicted higher repentance motivation.     

Moral and Group‐based Criteria in Children's Evaluation of Peers after Transgressions

The present study investigated how group membership criteria and moral understanding can affect children's evaluations of peers after different types of transgressions. In all, the study included 47 participants attending a junior school in Cornwall. All participants were allocated to an in‐group and responded to a number of questions which tested intergroup bias and the differential evaluation of norm‐violating peers from the in‐group and the out‐group. Overall, moral transgressions (physical and relational aggression) were evaluated more negatively than a social‐conventional transgression. However, those who violated group norms by expressing positive attitudes towards the out‐group were viewed differently depending on both moral and group‐based criteria. These different criteria for evaluating peers were uncorrelated. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Blushing May Signify Guilt: Revealing Effects of Blushing in Ambiguous Social Situations

Although blushing after a social infraction can function as a remedial gesture, people generally consider blushing as an undesirable response. To address this apparent inconsistency, we tested the idea that blushing has remedial properties after clear-cut antecedent behaviors, but can undermine the actor's image in ambiguous situations. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 49) read vignettes referring to prototypical mishaps, transgressions, and ambiguous situations. In Experiment 2 (N = 58), we specifically varied the actor's intentionality while keeping the actor's behavior constant. In support of its alleged face-saving properties, blushing had remedial effects after obvious mishaps and voluntary transgressions. However, in ambiguous social situations and after transgressions that are ambiguous with respect to the actor's intentionality, blushing undermined the actor's trustworthiness.     

Neural correlates of conventional and harm/welfare-based moral decision-making

The degree to which social norms are processed by a unitary system or dissociable systems remains debated. Much research on children’s social-cognitive judgments has supported the distinction between “moral” (harm/welfare-based) and “conventional” norms. However, the extent to which these norms are processed by dissociable neural systems remains unclear. To address this issue, 23 healthy participants were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they rated the wrongness of harm/welfare-based and conventional transgressions and neutral vignettes. Activation significantly greater than the neutral vignette baseline was observed in regions implicated in decision-making regions including rostral/ventral medial frontal, anterior insula and dorsomedial frontal cortices when evaluating both harm/welfare-based and social-conventional transgressions. Greater activation when rating harm/welfare-based relative to social-conventional transgressions was seen through much of ACC and bilateral inferior frontal gyrus. Greater activation was observed in superior temporal gyrus, bilateral middle temporal gyrus, left PCC, and temporal-parietal junction when rating social-conventional transgressions relative to harm/welfare-based transgressions. These data suggest that decisions regarding the wrongness of actions, irrespective of whether they involve care/harm-based or conventional transgressions, recruit regions generally implicated in affect-based decision-making. However, there is neural differentiation between harm/welfare-based and conventional transgressions. This may reflect the particular importance of processing the intent of transgressors of conventional norms and perhaps the greater emotional content or salience of harm/welfare-based transgressions.     

Race‐Based Social Judgment by Minority Perceivers1

The present study investigated processes of social judgment from the perspective of a minority group. Black participants evaluated either Black or White law‐school applicants who possessed either strong or weak credentials. Consistent with predictions of the shifting‐standards model (Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991), a significant pattern of out‐group polarization emerged when judgments were made on subjective, but not objective response scales. Importantly, results revealed that out‐group polarization on subjective response scales was moderated by participants' stereotypes. In line with shifting‐standards predictions, only participants who viewed Blacks relatively favorably, compared to Whites, on the dimension of school performance showed a significant pattern of out‐group polarization. The shifting‐standards model is discussed in relation to other judgment models.     

Fabrication Puts Suspects at Risk: Blindness to Changes in Transgression‐related Statements

Based on the finding that deceptive and misleading interrogation techniques are not uncommon, we investigated to what extent participants may be blind to alterations introduced to their accounts of past transgressions. Drawing from the source‐monitoring framework, we hypothesized that participants' truthfulness and whether they had committed a transgression in the past (transgression history) would be predictive of blindness. When filling out a questionnaire about their past transgressions, 80 participants fabricated some of their answers. Prior to an interview 1 week later, two previously fabricated and two truthful answers were covertly altered by the experimenter. We found substantial blindness rates, and, as hypothesized, blindness was more pronounced for (1) fabricated than truthful responses and (2) alterations with transgression history compared with no transgression history. Possible consequences may include the creation of guilt presumption and increasing pressure to obtain a confession. Both can be hazardous for suspects and the legal decision‐making process. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's understanding of embarrassment: Integrating mental time travel and mental state information

The current study investigated 4‐ to 8‐year‐olds’ (N = 81) understanding of embarrassment and their ability to integrate temporal and mental state information to predict and explain emotions. Participants heard stories describing characters commit trivial social transgressions, and then the next day, characters found themselves in the same situation that led to the previous transgression. For some story endings, participants were asked to predict and explain how the character felt, and for others, participants were told the character started to feel embarrassed and they were asked to explain why. Participants’ responses were coded and analysed using nonparametric statistical tests. Kruskal–Wallis analyses revealed significant developments occur between 6 and 8 years in children's understanding of embarrassment and their ability to explain individual's emotion as caused by anticipating the reoccurrence of a previous embarrassing event. Younger children demonstrated a basic knowledge of embarrassment but failed to demonstrate more advanced understanding of the emotion. Findings from the current study indicate children reach a more mature understanding of embarrassment and the implications of committing social transgressions between 7 and 8 years. Finally, the current study contributes to the literature on children's ability to infer mental states and temporally connect experiences.     

Entitlement,exploitativeness, and reasoning about everyday transgressions: A social domain analysis

Social domain theory was used to examine the role of entitlement and exploitativeness in reasoning about everyday transgressions in two studies. Exploitativeness was positively associated with believing that transgressing was acceptable, whereas entitlement was negatively associated. Exploitive participants justified these judgments using personal (e.g., appeal to choice) and less moral (e.g., appeal to welfare of others) reasoning, whereas highly entitled people used more prudential but less personal reasoning. Exploitive participants were less likely to acknowledge the relevance of non-personal concerns (i.e., morality, conventions, and prudence) when considering transgressions. The association between exploitativeness and acceptability of transgressing was mediated by the degree to which issues were believed to involve a concern for others. Implications for narcissistic behavior and decision-making are discussed.     

« Dire une chose et en faire une autre » : de la déclaration de liberté dans le paradigme de l'hypocrisie induite

According to induced hypocrisy paradigm, participants were led to advocate a pro-attitudinal position (commitment step), such as to respect the driving rules. Subsequently they were made mindful of their own transgressions (mindfulness step). Afterwards, the target-behavior was administered: spending time in a safety road association. We manipulated the declaration of freedom either within the mindfulness step (study 1), either at the twice steps (study 2). Results indicated that declaration of freedom increased the hypocritical effect. Implications for further research in the area of hypocrisy are discussed.     

“I have paid my dues”: When physical pain reduces interpersonal justice motivations

In this study we show that experiencing physical pain interacts with justice related cognition and serves to reduce justice-restoring behavior in the context of interpersonal moral transgressions. This is because concepts of punishment and justice are embodied within the experience of pain, allowing for a sense of atonement from one’s wrongdoings. Two thirds of the participants were induced to feel that their performance in a two player game was unfair. Half of those participants were then asked to engage in a physically painful task, and were afterwards less likely to make amends for past poor performance compared to players who completed a similar, but non-painful task. This effect was only evident for participants who are particularly sensitive to personal injustices and therefore sensitive to the justice restoring qualities of pain.