What Is Integral Theory?

Integral theory is a way of knowing that helps foster the recognition that disparate aspects of reality—such as biological constitution, cultural world‐views, felt‐sense of selfhood, and social systems—are all critically important to any knowledge quest. Integral theory provides an “all quadrants, all levels” (K. Wilber, 2006, p. 26) metatheoretical framework that simultaneously honors the important contributions of a broad spectrum of epistemological outlooks while also acknowledging the parochial limits and misconceptions of those perspectives. In other words, integral theory affords a perspective that allows counselors to situate diverse knowledge approaches in such a way that they synergistically complement, rather than contradict, one another.     

Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?

Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don't know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it's impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it's impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it's impossible to believe that p while having credence x in p? If so, is it possible to believe that p while having (say) credence 0.4 in p? These questions aren't standard epistemological fare—at least in part because many epistemologists think their answers are obvious—but they have unanticipated consequences for epistemology. Let ‘improbabilism’ name the thesis that it's possible to know that p while having a credence in p below 0.5. Improbabilism will strike many epistemologists as absurd, but careful reflection on these questions reveals that, if improbabilism is false, then all of the most plausible theories of knowledge are also false. Or so I shall argue in this paper. Since improbabilism is widely rejected by epistemologists (at least implicitly), this paper reveals a tension between all of the most plausible theories of knowledge and a widespread assumption in epistemology.     

Is there a ‘psychosomatogenic’ family?*

Review of the literature revealed two family theories of psychosomatic illness: the ‘enmeshed’ family of Minuchin and the family with affect disturbances. We interviewed twelve families, each containing a child with eczema. Most, but not all, of the families do fit in with one or other or both of the proposed interactional patterns, but the theory of a single family type, the ‘psychosomatogenic family’, is not supported. This complements the studies of individuals where specificity hypotheses have proved oversimplified.     

Explaining Biological Functionality: Is Control Theory Enough?

Abstract

It is generally agreed that organisms are Complex Adaptive Systems. Since the rise of Cybernetics in the middle of the last century ideas from information theory and control theory have been applied to the adaptations of biological organisms in order to explain how they work. This does not, however, explain functionality, which is widely but not universally attributed to biological systems. There are two approaches to functionality, one based on etiology (what a trait was selected for), and the other based in autonomy. I argue that the etiological approach, as understood in terms of control theory, suffers from a problem of symmetry, by which function can equally well be placed in the environment as in the organism. Focusing on the autonomy view, I note that it can be understood to some degree in terms of control theory in its version called second order cybernetics. I present an approach to second order cybernetics that seems plausible for organisms with limited computational power, due to Hooker, Penfold and Evans. They hold that this approach gives something like concepts, certainly abstractions from specific situations, a trait required for functionality in its system adaptive form (i.e., control of the system by itself). Using this cue, I argue that biosemiotics provides the methodology to incorporate these quasi concepts into an account of functionality.     

Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts?

Conceptual atomism is the view according to which most lexical concepts lack ‘internal’ or constituent structure. To date, it has not received much attention from philosophers and psychologists. A central reason is that it is thought to be an implausible theory of concepts, resulting in untenable implications. The main objective of this paper is to present conceptual atomism as a viable alternative, with a view to achieving two aims: the first, to characterize and to elucidate conceptual atomism; and the second, to dispel some misconceptions associated with it. My aim is to show that the prospect of conceptual atomism is a promising one.     

Is it inherently prejudicial to try a juvenile as an adult?*

Given only information that a youth who could have been tried as either an adult or as a juvenile was being tried as an adult for murder, 218 undergraduate mock jurors were able to form consistent impressions of the defendant. A very high percent of our mock jurors included a criminal or juvenile justice history as part of that impression. A very large majority of the mock jurors also said that knowledge of that criminal history would be relevant to their vote of guilty. Almost all mock jurors said they would be influenced toward voting guilty by knowledge of a previous criminal history. Few of the other components of the impression were so closely correlated with a judgment of relevance, or with a judgment that they would be influenced toward voting guilty by the knowledge of that component of the stereotype. The effect is relatively specific to knowledge of a previous criminal history. The study has limited ecological validity. Nonetheless, we raise questions about whether the fact that a youth is put on trial as an adult is inherently prejudicial, and violates the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.     

Does Freudian Theory Resolve “The Paradoxes of Irrationality”?*

This paper consists of two related parts: I. A detailed critique of Donald Davidson's thesis—in his “The Paradoxes of Irrationality”—that “…any satisfactory [explanatory] view [of irrationality] must embrace some of Freud's most important theses” (p. 290). I argue that this conclusion is doubly flawed: (i) Davidson's case for it is logically ill‐founded, and (ii) its Freudian plaidoyer is also factually false. II. Relatedly, in the second part, I confute the recent arguments given by Marcia Cavell, Thomas Nagel, et al. to establish that psychoanalytic causal explanations of irrationality are epistemically justified, because they are extensions of the desire‐cumbelief pattern of accounting for intentional actions. As a corollary, it becomes clear that these authors have failed to undermine my epistemological strictures on the foundations of psychoanalysis.     

How Much Jungian Theory Is There in My Practice?

This non-clinical paper consists of the author's subjective and personal value judgements on theory and practice. He discusses nine topics: I) What is analysis and why do people seek therapy? 2) Dangers of reification and hypostatizing: reinforcement of narcissistic defences and schizoid unrelatedness. 3) The problems of archetypal psychology and amplification. 4) The cultural and political aspects of the unconscious psyche, and the value of studying the philosophical background to the psychodynamic approach. 5) Criticism of the classical Jungian over-emphasis of the intrapsychic at the expense of the interpersonal. 6) Psychosomatic healing through experience and interpretation of psychosomatic identity in the transference/countertrans-ference; idea of the ‘animating body’. 7) Dangers of theoretical hndamentalism and crusading among Jungian schools: envy and intolerance. 8) The need for the analyst to have enough good objects. 9) An acknowledgement of theoretical influences other than Jung on the author's practice; although Jung's ideas facilitate a personal pluralism - the spirit of Jung.     

Representing metarepresentations: Is there Theory of Mind-specific cognition?

What cognitive mechanisms underlie Theory of Mind? Some infer domain-specific Theory of Mind cognition based the pattern of children diagnosed with autism failing the False Belief test but passing the False Photograph test. However, we argue that the False Belief test entails various task demands the False Photograph task does not, including the necessity to represent a higher-order representation (a metarepresentation), thus confounding the inference of domain-specificity. Instead, a general difficulty that affects representations of metarepresentations might account for the seeming domain-specific failure. Here we find that False-Belief failing False-Photograph passing children fail the Meta Photograph test, a new photograph-domain test that requires subjects to represent a metarepresentation. We conclude that people who fail the False Belief test but pass the False Photograph test do not necessarily have a content-specific Theory of Mind deficit. Instead, the general ability to represent representations and metarepresentations might underlie Theory of Mind.     

James Fodor's Christian Theory of Truth: Is it Christian?

The 'task confronting contemporary theology', says James Fodor, 'is that of the rehabilitation or recovery of a distinctively Christian vision of truth' ( Christian Hermeneutics [Oxford, 1995] p. 72). In this paper I examine Fodor's attempt to construct a Christian or transformational theory of truth. I argue that his analysis of truth in terms of transformation leads to a concept of truth which is both subjective and relative. I argue further that Fodor's truth theory is either committed to a version of creative anti-realism, according to which the existence of basic structure of the world is determined by our linguistic activities, or it implies that although our language doesn't correspond to the world, we should go on making our theological truth claims anyway. I conclude that Fodor's Christian theory of truth is in most crucial respects not Christian at all.     

Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism?

Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.