THE “COMPETENT COMMUNICATOR” AS A COGNITIVE PROTOTYPE

Past theories concerned with communicative competence have assumed that perceiver's evaluations of the competence of a communicative performance are based on a conception of the “ideal communicator.” Psychological theory on categorization implies that this assumption is most viable if conceptions of “prototypes” relevant to competence in general (“the communicatively competent person”) are rich in defining characteristics relative to their logical superordinate (“the skilled person”), yet distinct from other skill-related prototypes (such as “the artistically talented person”), and if conceptions of prototypes relevant to competence in specific interactive situations are also relatively rich in defining characteristics, but similar to one another. Analysis of freely elicited lists of characteristics for categories within a taxonomic hierarchy for skill support these implications, showing that people's conceptions of “communicative competence” are organized in the manner most conducive to their use as the basis for competence evaluation. Results also point out the critical role played by concrete, rather than abstract, characteristics in differentiating among general and situation-specific prototypes.     

Inter‐ and intra‐cultural variations in self‐other boundary: A qualitative‐quantitative approach

Past research on the theories of self‐construal and individualism‐collectivism in cross‐cultural contexts presents inconsistent and inconclusive results. Some researchers have seriously questioned the validity of major instruments measuring self‐construal across cultural groups. To address the validity issue, this study developed quantitative measures from ethnographic data. In five scenarios mapping self to close‐other boundaries, 171 Anglo‐Canadians and 224 Mainland Chinese were asked to make a decision and offer a reason for the decision. Two intriguing findings emerged from the data. (1) In comparison with Anglo‐Canadians, Mainland Chinese were more likely to share material belongings with close‐others and less likely to share their thoughts/opinions. The first part of this finding provides unequivocal support for the theories of self‐construal and individualism‐collectivism, whereas the latter part challenges an important assumption of these theories, which contends that collectivists should be more likely than individualists to share everything they own (including opinions) with close‐others. This unconventional finding proposes the division of material belongings and thoughts/opinions sharing of the self‐other boundary in future cross‐cultural self‐construal research. (2) There were significant differences in the reasons Canadians and Chinese offered for what they would or would not do in a specific situation. For example, the reasons for not telling the truth about a roommate's nonmatching outfit were “tastes differ from person to person” for a Canadian and “I don't tell others what I think of them” for a Chinese. The Canadians clearly show respect for the other's personal preference and the Chinese were thinking “what can I benefit from telling her the truth?” It was reasoned that underneath the giving and generous Chinese lies a shrewd mind, and underneath the frank Canadian lies a materialistic mind. In conclusion, this article contributes to the field in that it reports pioneering research, via both qualitative and quantitative means, on sharing material belongings and opinions/thoughts in samples from individualistic and collectivistic cultures. The findings of this study illustrate, specify, and challenge the universal utility of the theories of self‐construal and individualism‐collectivism.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

KAUFMAN'S DEBT TO KANT: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE “STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD WHICH ENVIRONS US”

Gordon Kaufman's “constructive theology” can easily be taken out of context and misunderstood or misrepresented as a denial of God. It is too easily overlooked that in his approach everything is an imaginary construct given no immediate ontological status—the self, the world, and God are “products of the imagination.” This reflects an influence, not only of theories on linguistic and cultural relativism, but also of Kant's “ideas of pure reason.” Kaufman is explicit about this debt to Kant. But I argue there are other aspects of Kant's legacy implicit in his method. These center around Kaufman's engagement with “observed patterns” in nature. With Paul Tillich's aid, I bring this neglected issue to the fore and argue that addressing it allows one to more readily capitalize upon the Kantian influence in Kaufman's method. This, in turn, encourages one to tap more deeply into the epistemic underpinnings of Kaufman's approach to the science–religion dialogue.     

On Abolishing “Death”: An Etymological Note

The distinction is made between two uses of the word “death,” specifically, your death (the death of the other) and my death (the death of the self). It makes (logical, epistemological and phenomenological) sense for me to speak of your death, but not for me to speak of my death—inasmuch as, by reasonable definition, I cannot possibly ever experience my death. Dying is experienceable—although one can never be certain. The word death is a perfectly good word for the demise of the other; the word omega is suggested to allude to that non-event (the cessation of the self) now routinely spoken of as “my death,”     

“SECOND-GUESSING”

Messages received from other social actors cannot always be taken at face value. When people have reason to question such messages, it is hypothesized that they engage in a cognitive process called “second-guessing,” wherein they reevaluate the literal interpretation of the message to determine its veridicality. Should they determine that it is not veridical, they generate an alternative, potentially more plausible interpretation. We assessed the frequency and importance of situations that might provoke reinterpretation of messages. Such situations were seen as occurring frequently and were of some importance. Social actors revealed sophisticated knowledge concerning the strengths and weaknesses of information obtained about people or events outside their direct experience. They also claimed to be able to “debias”such information, winnowing a “correct” interpretation from one judged to be “incorrect.” Preliminary data suggest that naive social actors are quite good at delecting scientifically documented sources of bias and making reasonable adjustments in their judgments to correct for those biases when plausibly present.     

When the “Stakes” are Communicative

Stakeholders seek to have their “stakes” met by organizations. Organizations assess those requests and sometimes grant stakes to stakeholders. This study examines this critical function of organizations by investigating the stakeholder communication of 66 nonprofit organizations undergoing change. Implementers' self‐reports of frequency, timing, approaches, and topics of communication with 10 stakeholder groups were examined. Results indicate that implementers generally follow a quid pro quo “matching rule” wherein stakeholders' resource importance serves as the basis on which they are awarded communicative attention. However, observance of this rule was not predictive of implementers' assessments of successful change outcomes. Further, results also show that “internal” stakeholders receive the most and earliest communication, compared to stakeholders external to the organization or near the organization's boundary, and that “information dissemination” is the most prevalent communicative approach taken.     

“Theology of Presence” in African Christianity: A Transforming Missiological Factor for Women in Contemporary Pentecostal Churches in Africa

Following the independence of many African countries, Christianity has been gaining freedom through indigenizing the church. Christian churches in Africa are self‐indigenizing, self‐innovating, and self‐criticizing their practices and theologies. However, women in African churches remain in an uncomfortable zone. African, biblical, and missionary cultures have been named as sources of discrimination of women in the church. This paper deploys a “theology of presence” to claim that contemporary Pentecostal Christianity (CPC) in Africa, with some continuity in African worldview and biblical cultures, has touched upon and answered women's complex and challenging questions that for a long time have been denied by Christian missionaries. The paper shows how theology of presence, in the “witnessing” and “healing” practised by CPC, has been transforming the missiological factor for women. The paper suggests learning from other models for transformation than policies and gender mainstreaming tools, since these have had little impact. The paper recommends research on hermeneutical reading of the Bible and providing more innovative skills to help women break the silence of being violated.     

From “I” to “We”: Different forms of identity,emotion, and belief predict victim support volunteerism among nominal and active supporters

Understanding how to attract and maintain volunteers is crucial for the operation of victim support organizations. We propose that volunteerism can be understood in a similar way as collective action. Active (N = 99) and nominal supporters (N = 134) completed measures of identities (personal, social, and organizational), emotions (sympathy, outrage, and pride), and efficacy beliefs (self‐, group, and organizational). The results revealed a different pattern of predictors of volunteerism for the two samples. Among nominal supporters, commitment to volunteerism was predicted by personal identity (“I”), sympathy, and self‐efficacy; among the actively engaged, volunteerism was predicted by social identity (“we”), outrage, and self‐efficacy. These results suggest that engagement with volunteerism is associated with qualitatively different processes for those nominally versus actively supportive of volunteer efforts.     

“Be careful what you wish for…”: A quantitative and qualitative investigation of “fata1 attractions”

This study uses questionnaire data from 301 terminated romantic relationships to investigate hypotheses concerning the conditions under which a quality that is initially appealing in a partner is later disliked (i.e., a “fatal attraction”). Individuals are expected to be prone to fatal attractions when they are attracted to a quality in a romantic partner that is “different” in any of three ways: (1) different from the individual's own qualities (i.e., dissimilar); (2) different from average (i.e., extreme, or unique); or (3) different from normative expectations (i.e., gender atypical). Such attractions are less likely, however, when individuals are drawn to similarity in another. Findings from a logistic regression analysis provide support for four of the five hypotheses. Fatal attractions are significantly more likely when an individual is drawn to partner characteristics seen either as “dissimilar” from her or his own, as “unique,” or as “extreme” in nature. When these characteristics are viewed as “similar,” disenchantment is less likely. Fatal attractions are neither more, nor less, probable, however, when partner qualities contradict gender stereotypes. A qualitative analysis of open-ended questionnaire responses provides further support for these attraction patterns. The findings have implications for diverse theories, including those of mate selection and dialectics.     

Luck,Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence

There are good reasons for pursuing a theory of knowledge by way of understanding the connection between knowledge and luck. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a burgeoning of interest in “luck theories” of knowledge as well as in theories of luck in general. Unfortunately, “luck” proves to be as recalcitrant an analysandum as “knows.” While it is well worth pursuing a general theory of luck despite these difficulties, our theory of knowledge might be made more manageable if we could find a more restricted notion that captured the core phenomena of luck that are relevant to whether or not someone knows. This essay makes the attempt to delineate such a notion, called “mere coincidence.”     

Ibsen's Nora and the Confucian Critique of the “Unencumbered Self”

Criticisms of the liberal‐individualist idea of the “unencumbered self” are not just a staple of communitarian thought. Some modern Confucian thinkers are now seeking to develop an ethically particular understanding of social roles in the family that is sensitive to gender‐justice issues, and that provides an alternative to liberal‐individualist conceptions of the “unencumbered self” in relation to family roles. The character of Nora in Henrik Ibsen's A Doll's House seemingly exemplifies such conceptions of the unencumbered self in her rejection of her housewife role for a more authentic selfhood. Drawing upon the capabilities approach to justice, and positive early Japanese bluestockings’ responses to Ibsen's play, I argue that Nora's character is better understood as exemplifying an ethically compelling disencumbered self in potentially cross‐cultural circumstances: a self criticizing and rejecting social roles that are found to be unjust according to universal, as opposed to particularist, “Confucian” ethical standards.     

Four meanings of “categorization”: A conceptual analysis of research on person perception

It is widely assumed that people tend to “categorize” other people. However, the term “categorization” has been used with qualitatively different underlying definitions in the person perception literature. We present a conceptual analysis in which we disentangle four existing definitions: (a) categorization as representing, (b) categorization as dichotomizing, (c) categorization as organizing, and (d) categorization as grouping. Subsequently, we show that seemingly antagonistic viewpoints in the literature may be reconciled by disentangling these definitions. Furthermore, we argue that disentangling these definitions is vital for theoretical interpretations of (past and future) empirical findings. Overall, our work aims to contribute to the clarity of person perception theories, provide novel perspectives on existing debates, and serve as a stepping stone for more differentiated models of person perception.     

“Putin,You Suck”: Affective Sticking Points in the Czech Narrative on “Russian Hybrid Warfare”

Using the case of the Czech narrative on “Russian hybrid warfare” (RHW), this article contributes to the broader question of why narratives succeed. Building on Lacanian psychoanalysis, narrative scholarship, and affect/emotions research in International Relations, we suggest that narrative success is facilitated also by two interrelated factors: embedding in broader cultural contexts and the ability to incorporate and reproduce collectively circulating affects. We develop a methodological framework for encircling unobservable affects within discourse via “sticking points”—linguistic phenomena infused with affective investment. We outline three categories of sticking points—valued signifiers, fantasies, and biographical narratives. Utilizing the approach in our case study, we focus on a narrative based around the notion that Russia waged a “hybrid war” against “the West” and that this should be faced with quasi‐military measures, which was successful in changing the language of Czech national security. We show that this narrative incorporated a range of sticking points, which contributed to its relative success. It utilized valued signifiers, such as “the West,” “the Kremlin,” “agents,” and “occupation,” weaved them together into a fantasy of a threat to the nation's “Western” identity, and intertwined this with the biographical narratives of history as a lens for world politics and East/West geopolitics.     

Symbolic self‐completion in academia: evidence from department web pages and email signature files

Symbolic self‐completion theory proposes that individuals use symbols of attainment to define themselves as accomplished in self‐defining areas and to communicate their accomplishments to others. The goal of the present research was to examine whether individual professors and academic departments strive for symbolic self‐completion when communicating through the Internet. We hypothesized that publications, citations, and departmental rankings by the National Research Council (NRC) represent important indicators of attainment for professors, whereas professional titles (i.e., “doctor,” “professor,” or “Ph.D.”) may serve as alternate symbols of attainment. We predicted that a lack of important indicators of attainment would motivate the display of professional titles in web pages and email signature files. In Study 1, academic departments with less prestigious NRC rankings listed more professional titles on their departmental web pages compared to departments with more prestigious rankings. In Studies 2 and 3, professors with lower annual rates of publications and citations displayed more professional titles in their email signatures compared to professors with higher publication and citation rates. These results suggest that self‐completion motives help to shape naturalistic Internet communications. The results further suggest that analyses of Internet communications can provide externally valid tests of theories concerned with motivation and self‐processes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Culture and perceptions of self—other similarity

In testing possible cultural effects of the use of the self as an habitual reference point to which others are compared, we expected that: (a) individualistic participants (i.e., those who give priority to personal goals) would rate self—other similarity higher when asked “How similar is X to you?” than when asked “How similar are you to X?”, whereas nondirectional similarity judgements (“How similar are these two people?”) would resemble the former directional comparison; (b) collectivistic participants (i.e., those who give priority to in‐group goals) would show a weaker or, possibly, reversed pattern, especially using in‐group comparison others. Neither hypothesis was upheld. However, the individualists perceived the in‐group to be relatively more similar to themselves as compared to the collectivists. This difference cannot be explained by response bias, status asymmetry, or role differentiation. We propose an explanation in terms of the differential relationship between self and other representations for people from collectivist versus individualist cultures.