SLOTE'S SATISFICING CONSEQUENTIALISM

The article discusses Michael Slote's Satisficing Consequentialism, which is the view that moral agents are not required to maximise the good, but merely to produce a sufficient amount of good. It is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable alternative to Maximising Consequentialism. In particular, it is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism cannot be less demanding in practice than Maximising Consequentialism without also endorsing a wide range of clearly unacceptable actions. It is then argued that Slote's inability to provide adequate reasons for moral satisficing stems from a mistaken analogy between rationality and morals. The sense of ‘good enough’ which is relevant to morality is one which focusses on the effort an agent puts in, rather than on the outcome she produces. However, replacing outcomes with efforts would undermine Slote's Consequentialist project. Finally, it is suggested that similar problems will be faced by others who seek to construct essentially Consequentialist theories which are not unduly demanding.     

How Satisficers Get Away with Murder

Traditional Consequentialism is based on a demanding principle of impartial maximization. Michael Slote's 'Satisficing Consequentialism' aims to reduce the demands of Consequentialism, by no longer requiring us to bring about the best possible outcome. This paper presents a new objection to Satisficing Consequentialism. We begin with a simple thought experiment, in which an agent must choose whether to save the lives of ten innocent people by using a sand bag or by killing an innocent person. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that, if it is to avoid making unreasonable demands, Satisficing Consequentialism must allow such an agent to kill. It is argued that this result is much more counter-intuitive than the fact that Maximizing Consequentialism permits agents to kill in order to produce the best consequences. The conclusion is that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable moral theory.     

Willpower Satisficing

Satisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as “good enough”. I propose a radical new willpower‐based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification of what counts as “good enough”.     

CONSEQUENTIALISM, GROUP ACTS, AND TROLLEYS

Abstract: Multiple‐Act Consequentialism specifies that one should only defect from a group act with good consequences if one can achieve better consequences by the defecting act alone than the entire group act achieves. It also holds that when different valuable group agents of which one is part specify roles which conflict, one should follow the role in the group act with more valuable consequences. This paper develops Multiple‐Act Consequentialism as a solution to the Trolley Problem.     

Praise,blame, and demandingness

Consequentialism has been challenged on the grounds that it is too demanding. I will respond to the problem of demandingness differently from previous accounts. In the first part of the paper, I argue that consequentialism requires us to distinguish the justification of an act \(\varphi\) from the justification of an act \(\psi\), where \(\psi\) is an act of praise or blame. In the second part of the paper, I confront the problem of demandingness. I do not attempt to rule out the objection; instead, I argue that if certain plausible empirical claims about moral motivation are true, we morally ought not to blame people for failing to meet certain very demanding obligations. With this theory, we create a space in consequentialism for intuitions questioning the plausibility of demanding obligations. I conclude the paper by showing that separate justifications for \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\) may also give us a theoretical niche for intuitions about supererogation.     

Rule consequentialism and disasters

Rule consequentialism (RC) is the view that it is right for A to do F in C if and only if A’s doing F in C is in accordance with the set of rules which, if accepted by all, would have consequences which are better than any alternative set of rules (i.e., the ideal code). I defend RC from two related objections. The first objection claims that RC requires obedience to the ideal code even if doing so has disastrous results. Though some rule consequentialists embrace a disaster-clause which permits agents to disregard some of the rules in the ideal code as a necessary means of avoiding disasters, they have not adequately explained how this clause works. I offer such an explanation and show how it fits naturally with the rest of RC. The second disaster objection asserts that even if RC can legitimately invoke a disaster-clause, it lacks principled grounds from distinguishing disasters from non-disasters. In response, I explore Hooker’s suggestion that “disaster” is vague. I contend that every plausible ethical theory must invoke something similar to a disaster clause. So if “disaster” is vague, then every plausible ethical theory faces a difficulty with it. As a result, this vagueness is not a reason to prefer other theories to RC. However, I argue, contra Hooker, that the sense of “disaster” relevant to RC is not vague, and RC does indeed have principled grounds to distinguish disasters from non-disasters.     

Equality of Opportunity and Differences in Social Circumstances

It is often supposed that the point of equality of opportunity is to create a level playing-field. This is understood in different ways, however. A common proposal is what I call the neutralization view: that people's social circumstances should not differentially affect their life chances in any serious way. I raise problems with this view, before developing an alternative conception of equal opportunity which allows some variations in social circumstances to create differences in life prospects. The meritocratic conception which I defend is grounded in the idea of respect for persons, and provides a less demanding interpretation of fair access to qualifications; it nevertheless places constraints on the behaviour of parents, and has implications for educational provision in schools.     

Love in the Time of Consequentialism

There are several powerful motivations for neutral value‐based deontic theories such as Act Consequentialism. Traditionally, such theories have had great difficulty accounting for partiality towards one's personal relationships and projects. This paper presents a neutral value‐based theory that preserves the motivations for Act Consequentialism while vindicating some crucial intuitions about reasons to be partial. There are two central ideas. The first is that when it comes to working out what you ought to do, your friends’ interests, the needs of your family, the significance of your own projects and ideals, etc. have more weight than the interests and needs of strangers. Your friends’ interests are not (thereby) more neutrally valuable than the interests of others. So there is a difference between the value of an outcome and its deontic significance. The second familiar idea is that reasons are modifiable. Reasons of partiality are reasons the weights of which are a function of the value of the relevant outcome modified by facts about the value of caring about the outcome in question. The resulting principle has various further explanatory advantages; in particular, it accounts for project‐ and relationship‐specific permissions and requirements, both at a time and across time.     

Social cognition in simple action coordination: A case for direct perception

In this paper we sketch the outlines of an account of the kind of social cognition involved in simple action coordination that is based on direct social perception (DSP) rather than recursive mindreading. While we recognize the viability of a mindreading-based account such as e.g. Michael Tomasello’s, we present an alternative DSP account that (i) explains simple action coordination in a less cognitively demanding manner, (ii) is better able to explain flexibility and strategy-switching in coordination and crucially (iii) allows for formal modeling. This account of action coordination is based on the notion of an agent’s field of affordances. Coordination ensues, we argue, when, given a shared intention, the actions of and/or affordances for one agent shape the field of affordances for another agent. This a form of social perception since in particular perceiving affordances for another person involves seeing that person as an agent. It is a form of social perception since it involves perceiving affordances for another person and registering how another person’s actions influence one’s own perceived field of affordances.     

Group influence and the psychology of cultism within re-evaluation counselling: A critique

Re-evaluation counselling (often known as co-counselling, or simply RC) has recently been described as an ‘innovative’ form of therapy, despite the fact that it has existed for over forty years. It has also been suggested that it is, or is becoming, a psychotherapy ‘cult.’ This paper discusses the key theoretical ideas of re-evaluation counselling (RC) and assesses the extent to which some of these ideas could enable unscrupulous therapists to engineer artificial consent and impose their own belief systems on clients. RC's strong reliance on group based activities is also explored, and the extent to which this facilitates unthinking conformity is considered. Finally, guidelines are discussed which enable therapists and would-be clients to assess more clearly the potentially negative effects of involvement in groups such as RC.     

Rule-Consequentialism's Dilemma

This paper examines recent attempts to defend Rule-Consequentialism against a traditional objection. That objection takes the form of a dilemma, that either Rule-Consequentialism collapses into Act-Consequentialism or it is incoherent. Attempts to avoid this dilemma based on the idea that using RC has better results than using AC are rejected on the grounds that they conflate the ideas of a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure. Other strategies, Brad Hooker's prominent amongst them, involving the thought that RC need contain no overarching concern to maximize the good are acknowledged to avoid the original dilemma, but lead to further problems of motivating and justifying RC in the absence of such a concern. The paper argues that Hooker's attempt to deal with these problems by using a 'Reflective Equilibrium plus method is unsuccessful.     

Disambiguation and Integration in Korean Relative Clause Processing

Previous studies on Korean relative clauses (RC) show that, with respect to processing, object-extracted relative clauses (ORC) are more difficult to process at the head noun than subject-extracted relative clauses within temporarily ambiguous contexts. ORCs, however, are predicted by experience-based processing models to incur a greater processing cost during early processing stages at the RC verb, since it is a likely locus of disambiguation for RCs in Korean, and because ORCs are a less frequent structure. Consequently, the current study investigates whether processing difficulty for ORCs manifests itself at the RC verb using eye-tracking methods, a simple sentence structure and a sentential-decision task. The results revealed significantly increased go-past reading times for ORCs at the RC verb. We believe this is a result of a less frequent structure being more difficult to parse during disambiguation. Accordingly, experience-based models of processing can accurately predict difficulty for ORCs in Korean.     

Bringing (Contingent) Loss Aversion Down to Earth — A Comment on Gal & Rucker's Rejection of “Losses Loom Larger Than Gains”

Although we disagree with some of Gal and Rucker's (2018 – this issue) specific evidence and with their overstated conclusion regarding loss aversion, their overarching message makes a worthwhile contribution. In particular, loss aversion is less robust and universal than has been assumed while its most prominent empirical support — the endowment effect and the status quo bias — is susceptible to multiple alternative explanations. Instead of accepting loss aversion as true unless proven otherwise, we should treat it like other decision properties and psychological accounts that are contingent on various moderators and call for an analysis of psychological mechanisms. In this commentary, we suggest that gatekeepers, such as reviewers, tend to favor loss aversion and other widely accepted tendencies, while demanding a much higher support‐threshold for alternative or newer accounts. Although building on prior theories and concepts is of course important, the bias in favor of incumbent assumptions can impede scientific progress, bar new ideas from the literature, and reinforce well‐established but contingent notions that may apply under some conditions but not others.     

Some evidence for parallel comparisons in a letter recognition task

Subjects were asked to judge successively presented letter trigrams “same” or “different.” The different stimuli were divided into four groups; not confusable (NC), acoustically confusable (AC), visually confusable (VC), and both visually and acoustically confusable (VC & AC). Reaction times (RT) were lengthened only by the double confusability. It is argued that comparisons are normally made in both channels, so that confusability in a single channel has no effect since the alternative channel is unimpaired. RTs are only increased when both channels are slowed down. A further experiment confirms this interpretation. When the situation is manipulated so that only the visual channel is employed, the VC group shows the same increase as the VC & AC group.     

Implementation and Dissemination of Military Informed and Evidence-Based Interventions for Community Dwelling Military Families

Community dwelling military families from the National Guard and Reserve contend with deployment-related stressors in relative isolation, living in communities where mental health providers may have little knowledge of military culture. When they are community residents, active duty service members and families tend to live in close proximity to their military installations. This article will focus primarily on the challenges to quality mental health care for reserve component (RC) families. Where studies of RC families are absent, those of active component (AC) families will be highlighted as relevant. Upon completion of a deployment, reintegration for RC families is complicated by high rates of symptomatology, low service utilization, and greater barriers to care relative to AC families. A paucity of providers skilled in evidence-based treatments (EBTs) limits community mental health capacity to serve RC military families. Several emergent programs illustrate the potential for better serving community dwelling military families. Approaches include behavioral health homes, EBTs and treatment components, structured resiliency and parent training, military informed schools, outreach methods, and technology-based coping, and psychoeducation. Methods from implementation science to improve clinical skill acquisition and spread and sustainability of EBTs may advance access to and quality of mental health treatment and are reviewed herein. Recommendations related to research methods, military knowledge and treatment competencies, and transition to a public health model of service delivery are discussed.     

Health care and the prospective Pareto principle

Issues of social justice in access to health care are examined from the standpoint of the "prospective," or "ex ante," Pareto principle, an ethical principle which holds that one policy is to be preferred over another if it betters the prospects of some persons while the alternative betters no one's prospects. It is suggested that this principle may validate a form of utilitarianism in health policy decisions, with equity demanding that everyone have access to a decent minimum of care but not necessarily to all highly expensive treatments.     

Impartial Reasons,Moral Demands

Consequentialism is often charged with demandingness objections which arise in response to the theory’s commitment to impartiality. It might be thought that the only way that consequentialists can avoid such demandingness objections is by dropping their commitment to impartialism. However, I outline and defend a framework within which all reasons for action are impartially grounded, yet which can avoid demandingness objections. I defend this framework against what might appear to be a strong objection, namely the claim that anyone who accepts the theory will be practically irrational.     

Attention, emotion, and deactivation of default activity in inferior medial prefrontal cortex

Attention deactivates the inferior medial prefrontal cortex (IMPC), but it is uncertain if emotions can attenuate this deactivation. To test the extent to which common emotions interfere with attention, we measured changes of a blood flow index of brain activity in key areas of the IMPC with positron emission tomography (PET) of labeled water (H(15)2O) uptake in brain of 14 healthy subjects. The subjects performed either a less demanding or a more demanding task of attention while they watched neutral and emotive images of people in realistic indoor or outdoor situations. In the less demanding task, subjects used the index finger to press any key when a new image appeared. In the more demanding task, subjects chose the index or middle finger to press separate keys for outdoor and indoor scenes. Compared to the less demanding task, in a global search of all gray matter, the more demanding significantly lowered blood flow (rCBF) in left IMPC, left and right insula, and right amygdala, and significantly raised blood flow in motor cortex and right precuneus. Restricted searches of rCBF changes by emotion, at coordinates of significant effect in previous studies of the medial prefrontal and temporal cortices, revealed significant activation in the fusiform gyrus, independently of the task. In contrast, we found no effect of emotional content in the IMPC, where emotions failed to override the effect of the task. The results are consistent with a role of the IMPC in the selection among competitive inputs from multiple brain regions, as predicted by the theory of a default mode of brain function. The absent emotional interference with the deactivation of the default state suggests that the inferior prefrontal cortex continued to serve the attention rather than submit to the distraction.     

Adapting to an initial self-regulatory task cancels the ego depletion effect

The resource-based model of self-regulation provides a pessimistic view of self-regulation that people are destined to lose their self-control after having engaged in any act of self-regulation because these acts deplete the limited resource that people need for successful self-regulation. The cognitive control theory, however, offers an alternative explanation and suggests that the depletion effect reflects switch costs between different cognitive control processes recruited to deal with demanding tasks. This account implies that the depletion effect will not occur once people have had the opportunity to adapt to the self-regulatory task initially engaged in. Consistent with this idea, the present study showed that engaging in a demanding task led to performance deficits on a subsequent self-regulatory task (i.e. the depletion effect) only when the initial demanding task was relatively short but not when it was long enough for participants to adapt. Our results were unrelated to self-efficacy, mood, and motivation.     

A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism

We best understand Rule Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the same type of circumstances. Plausible forms of Rule Consequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However, Rule Consequentialist theories are distinguished from other pluralist theories of pattern-based reasons by implausible claims about the relative importance of act-based and pattern-based reasons in different cases. Rule Consequentialists should give up these claims. They should either embrace some other pluralist pattern-based view, or reject pattern-based reasons altogether. Note, though, that these arguments apply only to compliance-based, rather than acceptance-based, versions of Rule Consequentialism. This suggests that these two kinds of theory are more different from each other than we might previously have realised.