Is scientific research driven by opportunity,problems, or observations?

With the recent rise of the philosophy of scientific practices, SSK (Sociology of Scientific Knowledge), and feminist approaches to the philosophy of science, a new perspective is gradually coming into being, holding that the starting point for scientific research is opportunity. Opportunistic features in solar neutrino experiments, Opportunistic features of complexity studies emerging from economics, and the measurement of insects’ flight can prove the above perspective from different angels. It is important and significant to determine whether the starting point for scientific research is opportunity, a problem, or an observation.     

Is perfectionism categorical or dimensional? A taxometric analysis

Considerable debate exists within the perfectionism literature regarding whether perfectionism is most accurately conceptualized as a dimensional or categorical construct. Specifically, some researchers have viewed perfectionism as a continuous construct, with extreme scores being associated with negative psychological outcomes (e.g., obsessive-compulsive disorder, eating disorders, etc.). In contrast, others have argued that two distinct forms of perfectionism exist (i.e., adaptive vs. maladaptive perfectionism) that are associated with both positive and negative outcomes. The purpose of this study was to examine the latent structure of perfectionism using taxometric procedures to determine whether perfectionism is most accurately conceptualized as taxonic (categorical) or dimensional (continuous). We applied four taxometric procedures (maximum eigenvalue [Waller & Meehl, 1998], maximum covariance [Meehl & Yonce, 1996], mean above minus below a cut [Meehl & Yonce, 1994], and latent-mode factor analysis [Waller & Meehl, 1998]) to perfectionism data collected from 2 large nonclinical samples. Results provided convergent evidence for a dimensional conceptualization of perfectionism across samples, perfectionism measures, and statistical procedures. We discuss the implications of these findings for the theory, assessment, and investigation of perfectionism are discussed.     

Is case-based reasoning a source of knowledge generalisation?

This study examines the link between case-based reasoning and knowledge generalisation. Experiment 1 showed that case-based reasoning is not in itself a source of generalisation. In this experiment, subjects were able to adapt knowledge acquired during analysis of an example in order to successfully solve a very similar problem. But immediately afterwards, they failed on a problem symmetrical to the one they had just solved. Experiments 2A and 2B showed, in this same situation, that it is possible to lead subjects to generalise simply by stating that the practice problems were similar to the examples. These findings suggest that knowledge generalisation accompanying case-based reasoning is the result of a process that must be actively implemented by the subject, and not an automatic outcome of the source-to-target transfer.     

Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts?

Conceptual atomism is the view according to which most lexical concepts lack ‘internal’ or constituent structure. To date, it has not received much attention from philosophers and psychologists. A central reason is that it is thought to be an implausible theory of concepts, resulting in untenable implications. The main objective of this paper is to present conceptual atomism as a viable alternative, with a view to achieving two aims: the first, to characterize and to elucidate conceptual atomism; and the second, to dispel some misconceptions associated with it. My aim is to show that the prospect of conceptual atomism is a promising one.     

Is knowledge a natural kind?

The project of treating knowledge as an empirical object of study has gained popularity in recent naturalistic epistemology. It is argued here that the assumption that such an object of study exists is in tension with other central elements of naturalistic philosophy. Two hypotheses are considered. In the first, “knowledge” is hypothesized to refer to mental states causally responsible for the behaviour of cognitive agents. Here, the relational character of truth creates a problem. In the second hypothesis “knowledge” is hypothesized to refer to mental states causally responsible for the evolutionarily successful behaviour of cognitive agents. Here, the problem lies in the fact that evolution by natural selection is not necessarily conducive to truth. The result does not necessarily amount to eliminativism, however, since the naturalist may consistently reject the condition of truth that lies behind these problems.     

Is research painting a biased picture of implicit learning? The dangers of methodological purity in scientific debate

The properties of implicit learning in natural settings are contrasted with those found in research. It is suggested that the search for pure cases and the necessity of finding features that clearly discriminate the two types of learning lead to bias in our estimation of the power of implicit processes. In more natural settings, such as face recognition, object perception, and natural language processing, implicit processes operate with flexibility and adapt to changes in environmental conditions. It is suggested that the search for pure cases of implicit processes has led to focusing on relevant but atypical examples of these processes. Additional research that emphasizes high levels of skill in control of complex systems may reveal greater adaptive power of implicit processes. However, such research may require less methodological purity and more emphasis on synthesis of theoretical ideas rather than analysis into pure cases.     

Is it culture or is it language? Examination of language effects in cross-cultural research on categorization

Differences in reasoning styles between Chinese and European Americans held even when controlling for the language of testing. Bilingual Chinese organized objects in a more relational and less categorical way than European Americans, whether tested in English or in Chinese. Thus, culture affects categorization independent of the testing language. Nevertheless, language affected some Chinese bilinguals' categorization. The responses of Chinese from the Mainland and Taiwan were more relational when tested in Chinese than when tested in English. Responses of Chinese from Hong Kong and Singapore were equally relational when tested in Chinese and in English. Age and context of learning English are discussed to explain the differential language effects among different Chinese groups. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed.     

A note: Is it a catch or a fumble?

Following Whiting' (1986) comments on Fischman and Schneider (1985) and Smyth and Marriott (1982), this note addresses the questions of expertise in catching, the effects of sight of the hand on timing and positioning, and the difficulties of comparing performance in different experiments on catching.     

Why do schools of thought fail? Neo-Freudianism as a case study in the sociology of knowledge

A full account of the social production of knowledge requires an understanding of how schools of thought fail, as well as succeed. This paper offers a sociology of knowledge analysis of the collapse of neo-Freudianism as a separate school of psychoanalysis and influential intellectual current. While the existing literature stresses personal conflicts between Karen Horney, Erich Fromm and Harry Stack Sullivan as a major cause of the failure of cultural psychoanalysis, my analysis highlights the sect-like nature of Freudian institutes, the professionalizing dynamics of American psychoanalysis, the contribution of the celebrity-dominated book market and culture, and the highly controversial nature of Erich Fromm's writings and intellectual activity. Neo-Freudianism is conceptualized as a hybrid system that is a combination of a literary phenomena, intellectual movement, faction of a sect, theoretical innovation and therapy. This analysis of hybrid intellectual systems raises larger sociology of knowledge questions about schools of thought and intellectual movements. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

But is it sociology of knowledge? Wilhelm Jerusalem’s “sociology of cognition” in context

This paper considers the charge that??contrary to the current widespread assumption accompanying the near-universal neglect of his work??Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854?C1923) cannot count as one of the founders of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. In order to elucidate the matter, Jerusalem??s ??sociology of cognition?? is here reconstructed in the context of his own work in psychology and philosophy as well as in the context of the work of some predecessors and contemporaries. It is argued that while it shows clear discontinuities with the present-day understanding of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge, Jerusalem??s sociology of cognition was not only distinctive in its own day but also anticipated in nuce a much-discussed theme in current history of science.     

Weltanschauung as a priori: sociology of knowledge from a ‘romantic’ stance

In this paper I reconstruct the central concept of the young Lukács??s and Mannheim??s sociology of knowledge, as they present it in their writings in the early decades of the twentieth century. I argue that this concept, namely Weltanschauung, is used to refer to some conceptually unstructured totality of feelings, which they take to be a condition of possibility of intellectual production, and this understanding is contrasted to an alternative construal of the term that presents it as logically structured, quasi-theoretical background knowledge. This concept has Kantian reminiscences: it is a condition of possibility of intellectual production in general. The young Mannheim and Lukács rely on ??Weltanschauung?? so understood as a phenomenon mediating between the facts of society and individual intellectual production and reception: it is seen as being conditioned by sociological facts and therefore as a historical and sociological category through which, and therefore indirectly, society enters into intellectual production.     

Is culture a problem for social psychology?

Culture has been regarded as an anathema to psychology as an empiricist research tradition. Despite the explosive growth of research on culture and psychology over the last decade of the 20th century and its importance in Asian social psychology, the ontological and epistemological tension between psychology as a science and psychology as a cultural/historical discipline introduced in the writings of the thinkers of the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment still lingers on in the contemporary discourse of psychology. Clifford Geertz once ominously suggested that cultural psychology may have chewed more than it can. In the present paper, the interpretive turn in social science as exemplified by writings of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur is reviewed and how it may impinge on the practice of Asian social psychology as an empirical science in methodological, epistemological, and ontological respects is discussed. It is argued here that the current practice of Asian social psychology is largely, though not entirely, free of the challenges mounted by these theorists, and that Asian social psychology has an advantage of not being encumbered by this traditional tension due to a monist ontology that is prevalent in Asia.     

Is science like a crossword puzzle? Foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant

This paper argues that the crossword puzzle analogy is great for scientific rationality, but not scientific warrant. It provides a critical analysis of foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant, especially that of Susan Haack, and closely related positions, such as non-doxastic coherentism. Foundherentism takes the middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism. The main idea is that warrant, including that of scientific theories, is like warrant of crossword entries: the degree to which a theory is warranted depends on one’s observations, the extent to which it coheres with one’s other scientific theories and whether one’s evidence includes a sufficiently large portion of the relevant evidence. I identify three problems for a foundherentist conception of scientific warrant, two of which are also problems for the image of science as a crossword puzzle. First, Haack’s conceptions of personal and social warrant of scientific theories are incompatible. Second, the notion of warrant defeaters is crucial to any account of warrant, but foundherentism cannot accommodate certain warrant defeaters. Third, Haack’s treatment of inconsistent evidence renders her account of social warrant for scientific theories implausible. Finally, I suggest that switching from the objective notion of warrant to the subjective notion of rationality might save foundherentism about scientific theories and the image of science as a crossword puzzle. I also draw lessons for social epistemology generally by applying the distinction between warrant and rationality to non-doxastic coherentism and Paul Faulkner’s hybrid theory of testimonial warrant.     

Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?

Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don't know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it's impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it's impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it's impossible to believe that p while having credence x in p? If so, is it possible to believe that p while having (say) credence 0.4 in p? These questions aren't standard epistemological fare—at least in part because many epistemologists think their answers are obvious—but they have unanticipated consequences for epistemology. Let ‘improbabilism’ name the thesis that it's possible to know that p while having a credence in p below 0.5. Improbabilism will strike many epistemologists as absurd, but careful reflection on these questions reveals that, if improbabilism is false, then all of the most plausible theories of knowledge are also false. Or so I shall argue in this paper. Since improbabilism is widely rejected by epistemologists (at least implicitly), this paper reveals a tension between all of the most plausible theories of knowledge and a widespread assumption in epistemology.     

Is synaesthesia one condition or many? A large-scale analysis reveals subgroups

Synaesthesia is a broadly defined neural phenomenon in which stimulation of a sense or concept triggers a second perception not normally associated with the stimulus. For example, letters or numbers may trigger a colour experience, sounds may trigger a taste sensation, or tastes may trigger a feeling of touch. Dozens of forms of synaesthesia have been reported, but the relationship between the different forms has not been studied: is someone with a particular form of synaesthesia likely to possess other types? If so, which ones? As an inroad to illuminating underlying mechanisms, we here examine which different synaesthesia types tend to co-occur. We analyzed reports of the forms of synaesthesia experienced by 19,133 participants who completed the Synaesthesia Battery (Eagleman, Kagan, Nelson, Sagaram, & Sarma, 2007), using correlation analysis, exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and multidimensional scaling (MDS). Our analyses converged on the finding of five distinct groupings of synaesthesia forms. We label these coloured sequence synaesthesias (CSSs), coloured music synaesthesias, non-visual sequela synaesthesias, spatial sequence synaesthesia (SSS), and coloured sensation synaesthesias. Collectively, our findings reveal that synaesthesia is an umbrella term that encompasses several distinct groups with independent probabilities of expression, and this may in turn suggest distinct underlying mechanisms and the possibility of different genetic bases.     

Is depression best viewed as a continuum or discrete category? A taxometric analysis of childhood and adolescent depression in a population-based sample

The authors examined the latent structure of depression in a population-based sample of children and adolescents. Youth's self-reports and parents' reports of the youth's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) major depressive symptoms were assessed via a structured clinical interview. The authors used Meehl's (1995) taxometric procedures to discern whether youth depression is dimensional or categorical. Taxometric analyses that explicitly took into account the skewness of depressive symptoms suggested that depression is a dimensional, not categorical, construct. The dimensional structure of depression was obtained for all of the DSM-IV major depressive symptoms as well as for different domains of depression (emotional distress symptoms and vegetative, involuntary defeat symptoms), youth and parent reports, and different subsamples (i.e., boys vs. girls and younger vs. older youth).