共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Daniel D. Novotny 《Axiomathes》2007,17(1):41-51
According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are
compatible and true—“the world is one”. The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between
mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity
and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle’s defence of the ontological
irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility
is unsuccessful. Third, I defend Nagel’s argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle’s
objections to it.
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Daniel D. NovotnyEmail: |
2.
Neal Judisch 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):299-318
Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued
that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have
claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I
argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism
does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification that the physical is non-mental is irrelevant to the task
of formulating physicalism as a substantive, controversial thesis.
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Neal JudischEmail: |
3.
Charles B. Cross 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):173-188
In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the
subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative
world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity
of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive
conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.
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Charles B. CrossEmail: |
4.
Jens Johansson 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):87-89
Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble.
I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.
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Jens JohanssonEmail: |
5.
Greg Janzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):355-366
According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's
intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called
change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it
should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist
strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores
an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can
vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.
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Greg JanzenEmail: |
6.
Peter A. Graham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):65-82
David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with
anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is
untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on
to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
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Peter A. GrahamEmail: |
7.
Alba Papa-Grimaldi 《Axiomathes》2008,18(3):339-358
Kant, in various parts of his treatment of causality, refers to determinism or the principle of sufficient reason as an inescapable
principle. In fact, in the Second Analogy we find the elements to reconstruct a purely phenomenal determinism as a logical and tautological truth. I endeavour in this
article to gather these elements into an organic theory of phenomenal causality and then show, in the third section, with
a specific argument which I call the “paradox of phenomenal observation”, that this phenomenal determinism is the only rational
approach to causality because any logico-reductivistic approach, such as the Humean one, would destroy the temporal order
and so the very possibility to talk of a causal relation. I also believe that, all things said, Kant did not achieve a much
greater comprehension of the problem than Hume did, in his theory of causality, for he did not free a phenomenal approach
from the impasse of reductivism as his reflections on “simultaneous causation” and “vanishing quantities” indeed show, and
this I will argue in Sect. 4 of this article.
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Alba Papa-GrimaldiEmail: |
8.
Kelly Trogdon 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):147-165
A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Kim’s disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain
issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses of priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part
of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on
the assumption that priority monism is instead true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable
problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that what I call ‘fine-grained reductionism’, a particular version
of which Kim proposes as an alternative to non-reductive physicalism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist
one. I conclude that issues in sparse ontology, therefore, are more relevant to the debate about physicalism than one may
have thought.
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Kelly TrogdonEmail: |
9.
Glen A. Hoffmann 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):161-170
According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition
that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2)
it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by
conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to
pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints of a non-reductive physicalism and a holism concerning the concepts of truth,
reference and meaning, conceding Field’s physicalistic inadequacy conclusion while rejecting his conceptual deficiency conclusion
is a promising reply to the incompleteness objection.
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Glen A. HoffmannEmail: |
10.
Giolo Fele 《Human Studies》2008,31(3):299-322
The aim of my paper is twofold. First, I show how the notion of phenomenal field can be used to examine, describe and understand
particular collective patterns pertaining to the everyday domain of our common social experience. Secondly, I outline the
role of the notion of “phenomenal field” in ethnomethodology. I briefly discuss Gurwitsch’s notion of functional meaning. After presenting the argument, I show “the locally achieved ordinariness of a common task”, that is the lining up of the
player of the two teams in the pitch, as an embodied coherence of figural contexture in its empirical perceptual details, as Garfinkel says.
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Giolo FeleEmail: |
11.
André Juthe 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):133-169
This paper discusses the method when an argument is refuted by a parallel argument since the flaw of the parallel argument
is clearly displayed. The method is explicated, examined and compared with two other general methods.
相似文献
André JutheEmail: |
12.
Joel Thomas Tierno 《Sophia》2008,47(2):223-230
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning
the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately
explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques,
is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free
will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.
相似文献
Joel Thomas TiernoEmail: |
13.
Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):509-529
It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive,
intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose
of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all,
they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach of
psychology, so that they may be said to lie beyond the reach of science.
相似文献
Hilla Jacobson-HorowitzEmail: |
14.
Michael Martin 《Sophia》2007,46(1):75-77
In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence
conflicts with his omniscience.
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Michael MartinEmail: |
15.
Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly
stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we
reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge
from prior knowledge by deduction.
相似文献
Levi Spectre (Corresponding author)Email: |
16.
Nathan Salmon 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):263-280
Jeffrey King’s principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded
with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory
of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.
相似文献
Nathan SalmonEmail: |
17.
Chris John Daly 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):423-440
This paper distinguishes revolutionary fictionalism from other forms of fictionalism and also from other philosophical views.
The paper takes fictionalism about mathematical objects and fictionalism about scientific unobservables as illustrations.
The paper evaluates arguments that purport to show that this form of fictionalism is incoherent on the grounds that there
is no tenable distinction between believing a sentence and taking the fictionalist's distinctive attitude to that sentence.
The argument that fictionalism about mathematics is ‘comically immodest’ is also evaluated. In place of those arguments, an
argument against fictionalism about abstract objects of any kind is presented in the last section. This argument takes the
form of a trilemma against the fictionalist.
相似文献
Chris John DalyEmail: |
18.
Simon Critchley 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(1):5-34
As a way of thinking through the bleakness of the political present through which we are all too precipitously moving, this
essay attempts to demonstrate the interconnections between three concepts: politics, law and religion. By way of a detailed
reading of Rousseau, I try to show how any conception of legitimate politics and law requires a conception of religion at
its base and as its basis. In my view, this is highly problematic and in the conclusion an argument is presented for a politics
of the supreme fiction, which attempts to show how poetry might take the place of religion.
相似文献
Simon CritchleyEmail: |
19.
Scott Hill 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):277-283
Toomas Karmo claims that his taxonomy of ethical sentences has the result that there does not exist a sound argument with
all non-ethical premises and an ethical conclusion. In a recent paper, Mark T. Nelson argues against this claim. Nelson presents
a sound argument that he takes to be such that (i) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s single premise as non-ethical
and (ii) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s conclusion as ethical. I attempt to show that Nelson is mistaken about
(ii). For any possible world at which the premise of Nelson’s argument is true, Karmo’s taxonomy classifies the conclusion
of Nelson’s argument as non-ethical.
相似文献
Scott HillEmail: |
20.
Jens Johansson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):247-256
Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable
in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic
value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to
the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.
相似文献
Jens JohanssonEmail: Email: |