跨期选择单维占优模型的过程检验

跨期选择需要决策者在眼前与未来的损益之间做出权衡与取舍。主流跨期选择理论认为, 跨期选择是把未来价值折扣到现在, 根据折扣后的价值进行选择的过程; 而单维占优模型则认为决策者把“结果”维度上的差异和“延迟”维度上的差异进行比较(维度间差异比较), 然后根据差异更大的维度(即占优势的维度)进行决策。跨期选择众理论之争无果的原因之一或是研究者未能找到揭示其心理过程的令人信服的证据。为此, 本研究采用过程检验而非结果拟合的方法, 首创了“直观模拟天平”任务, 对维度间差异比较的大小进行测量, 从而为验证单维占优模型提供了支持性的证据。实验1A证明了维度间差异大小中介了选择结果, 被试认为“结果”维度上的差异相对于“延迟”维度上的差异越大, 越倾向于选择延迟长、结果大的选项; 反之, 被试认为“延迟”维度上的差异相对于“结果”维度上的差异越大, 越倾向于选择延迟短、结果小的选项。实验1B证明了维度间差异比较是在选择时实时(而不是在选择后)进行的。实验1C通过调整实验程序消减了共同方法偏差对结果的影响。实验2进一步证明维度间差异比较可以解释众多的跨期选择异象。通过4个实验, 本研究揭示了维度间差异比较构成了跨期选择的重要(尽管可能不是唯一)决策过程, 为支持单维占优模型提供了重要的过程验证证据。     

MAU决策辅助对个体与群体决策质量的影响

本研究用实验室研究方法对 MAU决策辅助对个体和群体决策质量的影响进行了比较研究 ,结果表明 :(1 )使用 MAU决策辅助时 ,群体决策不仅在信息利用上优于个体决策 ,而且在多数心理效标上也占优势 ;(2 )在 MAU方法的利用效率上 ,只在任务较难时 ,群体决策更优于个体决策 ,且群体决策时间明显长于个体决策 ;(3 )不使用 MAU决策辅助时 ,个体决策和群体决策在心理效标上无显著差异 ,但群体决策在信息加工效标上优于个体决策。     

先前情绪和过度自信对灾难事件后继风险决策的影响

研究考察了先前情绪和过度自信对灾难事件后继风险决策的影响。结果发现：(1)先前情绪的主效应显著, 积极情绪比消极情绪的个体在灾后风险决策时更加倾向于风险寻求;过度自信的主效应显著, 高过度自信比低过度自信个体在灾后风险决策时更加倾向于风险寻求。(2)先前情绪和过度自信水平交互影响灾难事件后继风险决策。高过度自信者在积极情绪状态下比在消极情绪状态下更倾向于风险寻求; 消极情绪状态下过度自信水平不同的个体之间没有显著差异。     

风险决策中的参照点效应研究

本研究以展望理论和社会决策范式模型为基础,着重探讨三种参照点对个体和群体风险决策产生的影响。３００名被试经实验者设置参照点后分别在个体和群体条件下对不同风险度的博弈方案进行选择。结果表明：（１）个体决策中,损失参照点的被试和无得失经验者比得益者更冒险;（２）得益被试的决策受到社会比较的影响;（３）损失参照点的被试并未对群体决策有更大影响,决定群体决策结果的主要是多数原则。     

个人影响力在群体决策整合过程中的作用：对SDS理论的扩展

以往社会决策图式理论没有考虑决策群体中成员的地位、成员的价值取向和专长知识分布等决策者影响力因素对群体决策整合过程的影响。本文在考虑上述诸因素影响的前提下构建了决策者影响力函数,通过投资决策模拟实验,综合使用决策影响力函数和个体偏好分布来预测群体决策的结果。研究表明综合运用决策者影响力函数和修改后的社会决策图式理论比传统的理论能更准确和有效的预测群体决策。     

无意识情绪对建议接受的影响

以101名大学生为被试,用掩蔽刺激启动无意识情绪,探讨无意识情绪对建议接受程度的影响,并分析自信度在其中的作用.结果表明:(1)相较于中性情绪,无意识正性情绪或无意识负性情绪会使个体更倾向于采纳他人建议,且无意识负性情绪的作用更明显;(2)个体的自信度水平在情绪和建议接受度之间具有调节作用;(3)在接受建议后,无意识负性情绪和无意识正性情绪组个体的自信度提升量高于中性情绪组,且无意识负性情绪组提高更多.     

不对称情绪分享过程中情绪反应自我指向增强效应的初探

主客体之间产生不一致的情绪反应称之为不对称共情(Counterempathy)。在Decety提出的情绪分享过程两阶段及Goubert提出的“指向自己”和“指向他人”两种情绪反应指向的研究基础上, 构建不对称情绪分享过程的两阶段模型, 通过创建竞争环境, 检验在不对称情绪分享过程中是否存在情绪反应自我指向增强效应的这一假设。被试根据竞争对手的情绪表情(皱眉和笑脸)来完成情绪反应自我指向(判断被试者自己的输赢)和情绪反应他人指向(判断竞争对手的输赢)的实验任务。结果表明: 在不对称情绪分享过程中, 存在情绪反应自我指向的增强效应。被试不仅在自我指向任务中产生了不对称共情, 而且在他人指向任务中也产生了不对称共情, 这说明在有意识的不对称情绪分享过程中, 个体会分化出比他人指向更强烈的自我指向的情绪反应。并且, 相较他人指向任务, 个体在自我指向任务中产生了更强烈的不对称共情。尤其当竞争对手获利时, 个体会产生更强烈的指向自我的负性情绪。     

情绪对危机决策质量的影响

为探究情绪在危机情境下对决策质量的影响,研究通过影片诱发实验情绪,运用实验室实验考察了以情绪变量为主导、包括性别和任务难度等在内的相关因素对危机决策的作用机制。结果发现：（1）随着危机决策任务难度的增加,个体用于决策的时间显著增长,且性别与情绪类型间存在显著的二次交互作用;（2）在危机情境下,男性的产生新方案率明显高于女性;（3）男性被试对危机决策过程的自信程度显著高于女性,且情绪与难度变量之间交互作用显著;（4）个体对于自身危机决策结果的满意程度,在性别、情绪和难度变量之间存在显著的三次交互效应。     

吃亏是福：择“值”选项而获真利

主流决策理论认为人们当遵从个人利益最大化原则, 基于“价” (value)做选择—— 挑选能直接给自己带来最大获益的选项。但决策者实际上经常会基于“值” (worth)做选择—— 挑选令自己当下吃亏或损失的选项, 并认为“值得”。为探索选择吃亏的选项究竟“值”在何处, 研究1利用情境实验操纵“基于‘值’选择”, 发现选择表面吃亏的“值”选项反而能给个体带来更大的延迟获益。研究2a采用归纳法, 确定了吃亏选项会在“惠、善、义、法” 4个潜在维度上被决策者赋予更大的“值”; 研究2b利用测量4个潜在维度的情境测验, 以销售群体的销售绩效和主观幸福感为真实获益的衡量指标, 验证了“基于‘值’选择”与现实生活中的物质和精神获益间存在正向的线性预测关系。研究首次为中国文化中的“吃亏是福”提供了实证证据的支持, 揭示诱使人们选择吃亏选项的是“后福”—— 赋在潜在维度上的延迟获益。     

参照性交流中的“听者设计”

“听者设计”一直是参照性交流研究领域中的热点。参照性交流过程中交流者通常会根据对交流同伴共享信息的评估来调整自己的行为,但是这些调整什么时候以及怎样发生的机制问题仍然存在争论。重点评述了“听者设计”的已有研究角度和研究进展,并归纳总结了参照惯例视角、记忆和注意视角、交流情境视角的研究观点。未来研究应扩展已有研究设计,以深入探查“听者设计”的形成、获得、发展变化过程,以及其与参照性交流其他限制因素间的相互作用;需要结合行为证据和眼动、脑成像证据等以帮助揭示“听者设计”过程的行为特点与认知机制。     

决策信心在信息化从众中的作用

研究采用JAS范式,通过操纵群体信息的性质（支持和反对）以及一致性程度,考察了决策信心在信息化从众过程中的作用。结果表明：（1）个体仅在接收到反对信息时会发生决策的偏转,表现出从众;（2）群体参照信息能够显著影响个体的信心：支持性的群体信息使个体的信心显著增高,而反对性的群体信息使信心显著降低,且表现出一种“负性偏向”（即个体对来自群体的负性信息更加敏感）;（3）在反对条件下,个体信心降低的程度能够很好地预测其决策偏转的概率,即信息化从众行为。这说明,决策信心可能在信息化从众中起着核心的中介作用——反对性的群体信息使得决策信心下降,而决策信心的下降导致了决策的偏转,从而表现出从众行为。     

Decision Strategies and the Confidence–Accuracy Relationship in Face Recognition

The decision strategy used to select a choice set from an array of alternative options is known to affect the composition of the final choice set. Specifically, individuals incorporate more answers into their choice set when it is created by eliminating implausible items than when the set is created through the inclusion of plausible options. This difference is accounted for in a decision framework that posits a general reluctance to change the status quo (i.e., actively include or exclude an item). We extended this work to investigate, not only the decisions themselves, but also metacognitive judgments (i.e., confidence in the accuracy of the choice set). In two face recognition experiments, we tested the impact of decision strategy (Experiment 1) and confidence judgment strategy (Experiment 2) on the confidence–accuracy relationship. In Experiment 1, participants completed two blocks of recognition trials, one under inclusion (marking previously seen faces) and one under elimination (marking previously unseen faces) instructions. We observed superior resolution (i.e., discrimination between correct and incorrect) for inclusion trials, but only when they were completed prior to use of the elimination strategy. In Experiment 2, all participants completed face recognition trials under inclusion instructions, but we manipulated the strategy used to assess confidence. Again, we observed a significant impact of strategy on confidence–accuracy resolution. Thus, we observed that both the strategy employed to reach a decision and that employed to assess confidence affected the confidence–accuracy relationship. We discuss theoretical and applied (particularly for eyewitness identification and multiple‐choice testing) implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is!’: Effects of Streaks on Confidence and Betting in a Binary Choice Task

Human choice under uncertainty is influenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. In simple binary choice tasks, such as red/black predictions in roulette, long outcome runs (e.g. red, red, red) typically increase the tendency to predict the other outcome (i.e. black), an effect labeled the “gambler's fallacy.” In these settings, participants may also attend to streaks in their predictive performance. Winning and losing streaks are thought to affect decision confidence, although prior work indicates conflicting directions. Over three laboratory experiments involving red/black predictions in a sequential roulette task, we sought to identify the effects of outcome runs and winning/losing streaks upon color predictions, decision confidence and betting behavior. Experiments 1 (n = 40) and 3 (n = 40) obtained trial‐by‐trial confidence ratings, with a win/no win payoff and a no loss/loss payoff, respectively. Experiment 2 (n = 39) obtained a trial‐by‐trial bet amount on an equivalent scale. In each experiment, the gambler's fallacy was observed on choice behavior after color runs and, in experiment 2, on betting behavior after color runs. Feedback streaks exerted no reliable influence on confidence ratings, in either payoff condition. Betting behavior, on the other hand, increased as a function of losing streaks. The increase in betting on losing streaks is interpreted as a manifestation of loss chasing; these data help clarify the psychological mechanisms underlying loss chasing and caution against the use of betting measures (“post‐decision wagering”) as a straightforward index of decision confidence. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

The role of desires in sequential impulsive choices

The present research provides evidence for a sequential mitigation effect, which is the phenomenon that participation in a prior impulsive choice task significantly reduces the decision maker’s likelihood of choosing impulsively in a subsequent task. The results of five experiments: (a) provide evidence for the Sequential Mitigation Effect using different study materials and contexts (Experiments 1–3), (b) show that prior impulsive (as opposed to non-impulsive) choice is required for the effect to occur (Experiment 4), and (c) find that the decision maker’s chronic sensitivity to positive and negative outcomes moderates the effect (Experiment 5). The results support the notion that desire for impulsive options functions as a limited motivational resource, and being consumed in the first task, is experienced to a lesser extent in the second task. The sequential mitigation effect may be characterized as a motivational contextual influence on decision making, complementing existing research showing that cognitive context effects influence sequential choices.     

“先扬后抑”vs.“先抑后扬”:反馈顺序对决策信心建构的影响

本研究采用2×3被试内设计,通过操纵不同性质信息的反馈比例和反馈顺序,重点考察了反馈顺序对决策信心动态建构的影响。结果表明:(1)在不同反馈比例条件下,当个体接收到的正性反馈多于负性反馈时,个体的决策信心上升,反之则下降;当个体接收到的正性反馈等于负性反馈时,个体的决策信心下降,表现出"负性偏向";(2)"先扬后抑"与"先抑后扬"的信息反馈顺序对决策信心的动态建构产生了不同影响,表现出类似于"近因效应"的现象,"惊讶假设(surprise hypothesis)"可为此提供解释。本研究表明,在决策信心的动态建构过程中,信息的反馈顺序发挥着重要作用。     

决策信心校准水平对元认知监控作用的影响

决策信心是个体对自身决策正确性的主观评价,是对决策过程的元认知体验。决策信心校准指决策信心水平与实际的决策正确率之间的匹配程度,其指标有信心水平和决策正确率的相关系数及Type II信号检测论中的ROC曲线下面积（Aroc）等。已有研究发现进行决策信心评估能够增强对当前或后续决策的元认知监控作用,但目前尚不清楚这种效应是否依赖于个体的决策信心校准水平。本研究通过设置知觉决策后是否进行决策信心评估（有信心评估与无信心评估）两种条件,考察个体决策信心的校准水平（Aroc）对元认知监控作用的影响。结果显示：1）与无信心评估条件相比,有信心评估的决策反应时显著增长,决策正确率显著提高（p<0.005）;2）Aroc与有、无信心评估条件下决策正确率的增加值显著正相关（r=0.25,p=0.034）,且高Aroc组的决策正确率增加值显著高于低Aroc组（p<0.05）。结果表明,在知觉决策过程中加入决策信心评估具有增强元认知监控作用的效应,体现为决策时间的增长和决策正确率的提高。并且,这种效应的大小依赖于个体的决策信心校准水平,校准水平越高元认知监控作用越好。     

Choosing what to choose from: Preference for inclusion over exclusion when constructing consideration sets from large choice sets

Decision making is a two‐stage process, consisting of, first, consideration set construction and then final choice. Decision makers can form a consideration set from a choice set using one of two strategies: including the options they wish to further consider or excluding those they do not wish to further consider. The authors propose that decision makers have a relative preference for an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when choosing from large choice sets and that this preference is driven primarily by a lay belief that inclusion requires less effort than exclusion, particularly in large choice sets. Study 1 demonstrates that decision makers prefer using an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when faced with large choice sets. Study 2 replicates the effect of choice set size on preference for consideration set construction strategy and demonstrates that the belief that exclusion is more effortful mediates the relative preference for inclusion in large choice sets. Studies 3 and 4 further support the importance of perceived effort, demonstrating a greater preference for inclusion in large choice sets when decision makers are primed to think about effort (vs. accuracy; Study 3) and when the choice set is perceived as requiring more effort because of more information being presented about each alternative (vs. more alternatives in the choice set; Study 4). Finally, Study 5 manipulates consideration set construction strategy, showing that using inclusion (vs. exclusion) in large choice sets leads to smaller consideration sets, greater confidence in the decision process, and a higher quality consideration set.     

Effects of group decision rules on decisions involving continuous alternatives: The unanimity rule and extreme decisions in mock civil juries

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and unanimity decision rules on group decisions involving continuous alternatives. Each experiment used mock civil juries to test three hypotheses related to the claim that when the distribution of group members’ initial preferences is skewed, the group’s decision will be influenced more by the presence of outlier members under unanimity rule than under majority rule. Experiment 1 tested the hypotheses using a punitive damages case and positively skewed preference distributions. Experiment 2 tested the hypotheses using a compensatory damages case and manipulating the skewness of preference distributions in a 2 (group decision rule) × 2 (valence of skewness) factorial design. In both experiments, the extreme (outlier) member’s individual preference was significantly correlated with the group decision only under unanimity rule. A simple thought experiment based on the experimental results is suggested regarding the implications of using unanimity or majority rule for making decisions in civil juries.     

情绪和认知方式对个体建议采纳的影响*

通过电影诱发被试的情绪,利用两个实验探讨了情绪和认知方式对个体建议采纳的影响。实验一采用选择任务,实验二采用估计任务,研究发现:(1)愉快情绪状态下的被试建议采纳程度高于愤怒的被试,场依存型被试建议采纳程度高于场独立型被试,女性比起男性更易采纳他人建议;(2)在估计任务中,无论场依存者还是场独立者,在愤怒状态下建议采纳程度无显著差异,且均低于愉快状态下。     

The transience of constructed preferences

A large body of research suggests that preferences are constructed rather than merely accessed in the course of making decisions. The current research examines the stability of constructed preferences over time. Preferences for various factors relevant to a job choice were measured prior to presentation of the job‐choice task, at the point of decision, and again following a delay. It was found that relative to baseline pre‐decision levels, preferences shifted to provide stronger support for the emerging decision. Preference changes proved to be transient, receding to baseline after 1 week (Experiment 1), and even within 15 minutes (Experiment 2). These findings, which can be interpreted in terms of decision‐making by constraint satisfaction, suggest that preferences are constructed to serve the decision at hand, without constraining the decision maker in future decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.