On medicine as a human science

All the powerful influences exertedby the subjective-interpersonal dimension onthe organic or technical-functional dimensionof sickness and health do not make anintersubjective test concerning medicaltherapeutic results impossible. Theseinfluences are not arbitrary; on the contrary,they obey laws that are de facto sufficientlystable to allow predictions and explanationssimilar to those of experimental sciences.While, in this respect, the rules concerninghuman action are analogous to the scientificlaws of nature, they can at any time be revokedby becoming aware of them. Law-like andreproducible regularities in the sciences ofman are by no means separated from a patient'spersonal-hermeneutic mediation. This makes itpossible for human beings to modify, improve orsometimes even entirely (or better almostentirely) suspend these psychological,sociological, ethnological, medical,regularities. For this reason the sciences ofman including medicine are under the obligationof constantly inspecting the continuingvalidity of the rules on which theirpredictions and explanations are based, namelyby indirect, statistical methods. Thisrequires a synergistic collaboration ofextra-clinical and clinical tests through whichmedicine can obtain a good level ofintersubjective testability.     

Justice as a basic human need

A stark encounter with some of the hostages and their families at the time of a parliamentary coup brought to mind the significance of justice for human development and community discourse. The evidence is presented, the concept of justice explored, human needs defined, and the argument advanced for more psychologists to extend their present academic and professional concerns with aspects of civil and criminal justice to include a concern with the social. The suggestion is that together all three components of justice are sufficiently compelling a component of human welfare to feature in any list of basic needs. Epistemologically they could also be construed as presenting a combined orthogonal domain to be integrated with moral values and be recognised as a stream of the emerging scientist-practitioner-metaphysician model. In raising the topic, attention is paid to the contributions of constitutional and international lawyers, moral philosophers, and a few pioneer psychologists. The hope is that others in such realms as child development, forensic services, industrial/organisational psychology, pastoral psychology, political psychology, and social psychology, might be sufficiently inspired to consider its relevance, undertake requisite training, and redesign their research accordingly.     

A defense of peace as a human right

Abstract

Recent years have seen increased debate about the contributions that human rights make to the creation of conditions of peace. However, less attention has been paid to the claim that peace itself is a genuine human right. Whereas some critics argue that a focus on rights results in an overly formal juridical account of peace at the expense of a more robust notion of positive peace, others contend that a legal framework of rights is all that is needed to eliminate violent conflict. In this paper I strike a position between these two arguments and articulate a normative defense of the human right to peace embedded within a broader discourse of social justice. I do so by demonstrating that a right to peace is a genuine human right because it satisfies appropriate justificatory tests, including those concerning its scope, the duties it generates, and its economic feasibility.     

The leg-to-body ratio as a human aesthetic criterion

There are surprisingly few empirical studies on the aesthetic appeal of human legs, examining such variables as length or shape. The human legs are conspicuous in erotic contexts, but few studies have experimentally tested preferences for longer legs. This study examined the utility of the human leg-to-body ratio (LBR) as a specific aesthetic criterion among 71 British undergraduates. Participants rated for physical attractiveness line drawings that varied in five levels of LBR. The results showed that a longer LBR was preferred as maximally attractive in women, whereas a shorter LBR was preferred in men. Evolutionary psychological and socio-cultural explanations for this aesthetic preference are discussed, and the study's limitations are considered.     

The human operator as a single channel information system

A further experiment is reported on reaction times to stimuli separated by short intervals. On this occasion an auditory stimulus was followed by a visual stimulus. Results indicate that the pattern of delays at short intervals is the same as the pattern of delays when the stimuli are presented in one modality only. This suggests a model of the human operator functioning as a single channel through which information from both sense modalities has to pass before appropriate responses are organized. An attempt is also made to reconcile data with the known facts about the peripheral and central components of reaction time and the possibility that delays are the result of occupation of the channel for a central time plus a central refractory time is suggested.     

Self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy source: willpower is more than a metaphor

The present work suggests that self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy source. Laboratory tests of self-control (i.e., the Stroop task, thought suppression, emotion regulation, attention control) and of social behaviors (i.e., helping behavior, coping with thoughts of death, stifling prejudice during an interracial interaction) showed that (a) acts of self-control reduced blood glucose levels, (b) low levels of blood glucose after an initial self-control task predicted poor performance on a subsequent self-control task, and (c) initial acts of self-control impaired performance on subsequent self-control tasks, but consuming a glucose drink eliminated these impairments. Self-control requires a certain amount of glucose to operate unimpaired. A single act of self-control causes glucose to drop below optimal levels, thereby impairing subsequent attempts at self-control.     

Historical relations of psychology as an object-science and a subject-science: toward psychology as a human science

Textbooks and other teaching of psychology's history oversimplify to the point of presenting it as the evolution of an exclusively object-science--despite general familiarity with integral extrascientistic practices and assumptions. Representative examples are presented, along with an overview of object-psychology's cultural/practical routes to dominance. The purpose of highlighting these facets of psychology's development is to call for psychology to take explicit account of humans' subjecthood as well as objectness, on the way rereading our history toward an integrated science.     

A problem of scope for the free energy principle as a theory of cognition

Those who endorse the free energy principle as a theory of cognition (as well as a theory of biological homeostasis) are committed to three propositions that are jointly incompatible but which will cohere if one of them is denied. The first of these is that the free energy principle gives us a self-sufficient explanation of what all cognitive systems consist in: a specific computational architecture. The second is that all adaptive behavior is driven by the free energy principle and the process of model-based inference it entails. The third is that cognition is not ubiquitous. These three incompatible propositions together comprise a problem of scope for the free energy principle as a theory of cognition. The prospects for rejecting each of these propositions are considered. To drop either the first or the second would limit the explanatory success of the principle. However, there are plausible ways to bite the bullet on denial of the third proposition. In particular, I argue that it is possible for the free energy theorist to admit that cognition is ubiquitous in biological systems while reserving conceptual space exclusively for human cognitive capacities.