Toward a unified theory of human reasoning

This article presents a unified theory of human reasoning. The goal of the theory is to specify what constitutes reasoning, as opposed to other psychological processes, and to characterize the psychological distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning. The theory views reasoning as the controlled and mediated application of three processes— selective encoding, selective comparison, and selective combination—to inferential rules. The first two of these processes are essentially inductive in nature; the third is essentially deductive. The theory describes these three processes, specifies the kinds of inferential rules and their use in several reasoning tasks, and specifies the mediators that affect how well the processes can be applied to the rules. The theory is shown to apply to a variety of reasoning tasks and is compared to other theories as well.     

Use or misuse of the selection task? Rejoinder to Fiddick,Cosmides, and Tooby

Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (Cognition 52 (1995) 3) argued that, in Wason's selection task, relevance-guided comprehension processes tend to determine participants' performance and pre-empt the use of other inferential capacities. Because of this, the value of the selection task as a tool for studying human inference has been grossly overestimated. Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby (Cognition 77 (2000) 1) argued against Sperber et al. that specialized inferential mechanisms, in particular the "social contract algorithm" hypothesized by Cosmides (Cognition 31 (1989) 187), pre-empt more general comprehension abilities, making the selection task a useful tool after all. We rebut this argument. We argue and illustrate with two new experiments, that Fiddick et al. mix the true Wason selection task with a trivially simple categorization task superficially similar to the Wason task, yielding methodologically flawed evidence. We conclude that the extensive use of various kinds of selection tasks in the psychology of reasoning has been quite counter-productive and should be discontinued.     

Forward and backward blocking of causal judgment is enhanced by additivity of effect magnitude

When two causes for a given effect are simultaneously presented, it is natural to expect an effect of greater magnitude. However many laboratory tasks preclude such an additivity rule by imposing a ceiling on effect magnitude-for example, by using a binary outcome. Under these conditions, a compound of two causal cues cannot be distinguished from a compound of one causal cue and one noncausal cue. Two experiments tested the effect of additivity on cue competition. Significant but weak forward blocking and no backward blocking were observed in a conventional "allergy" causal judgment task. Explicit pretraining of magnitude additivity produced strong and significant forward and backward blocking. Additivity pretraining was found to be unnecessary for another cue competition effect, release from overshadowing, which does not logically depend on additivity. The results confirm that blocking is constrained when effect magnitude is constrained and provide support for an inferential account of cue competition.     

靶子的潜在位置数对辨别任务中返回抑制的影响

摘要在严格控制的条件下,以大学生为被试．采用线索一靶子模式的返回抑制范式．考察了靶子在注视点周边可能出现的位置数与辨别任务中返回抑制的关系。实验结果表明．在辨别任务中靶子的潜在位置数对返回抑制量有影响,随着位置数的增加,返回抑制量减小。该结论为返回抑制的注意性观点提供了新的证据。     

Tests of inferential reasoning by exclusion in Clark’s nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana)

We examined inferential reasoning by exclusion in the Clark’s nutcracker (Nucifraga columbiana) using two-way object-choice procedures. While other social scatter-hoarding corvids appear capable of engaging in inferential reasoning, it remains unclear if the relatively less social nutcracker is able to do so. In an initial experiment, food was hidden in one of two opaque containers. All of the birds immediately selected the baited container when shown only the empty container during testing. We subsequently examined the nutcrackers in two follow-up experiments using a task that may have been less likely to be solved by associative processes. The birds were trained that two distinctive objects were always found hidden in opaque containers that were always positioned at the same two locations. During testing, one of the two objects was found in a transparent “trash bin” and was unavailable. The birds were required to infer that if one of the objects was in the “trash,” then the other object should still be available in its hidden location. Five out of six birds were unable to make this inference, suggesting that associative mechanisms likely accounted for our earlier results. However, one bird consistently chose the object that was not seen in the “trash,” demonstrating that nutcrackers may have the ability to use inferential reasoning by exclusion to solve inference tasks. The role of scatter hoarding and social organization is discussed as factors in the ability of corvid birds to reason.     

Representational and executive selection resources in 'theory of mind': evidence from compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age

Effective belief-desire reasoning requires both specialized representational capacities-the capacity to represent the mental states as such-as well as executive selection processes for accurate performance on tasks requiring the prediction and explanation of the actions of social agents. Compromised belief-desire reasoning in a given population may reflect failures in either or both of these systems. We report evidence supporting this two-process model from belief-desire reasoning tasks conducted with younger and older adult populations. When task inferential complexity is held constant, neither group showed specific difficulty with reasoning about mental state content as compared with non-mental state content. However, manipulations that systematically increase executive performance demands within belief-desire reasoning caused systematic decreases in task performance in both older and younger adult groups. Moreover, the effect of increasing executive demands was disproportionately greater in the older group. Regression analysis indicated that measures of processing speed and inhibition contributed most to explaining variance in accuracy and response times in the belief-desire reasoning tasks. These results are consistent with the idea that compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age is likely the result of age-related decline in executive selection skills that supplement core mental state representational abilities, rather than as a result of failures in the representational system itself.     

Acquisition of route and survey knowledge in the absence of vision

The ability of sighted, blindfolded individuals to navigate while walking was assessed in two types of tasks, one requiring knowledge of a route that previously had been navigated and another requiring more complex spatial inference or computation. A computerized measurement system monitored spatial position. The route tasks included maintenance of a heading, distance and turn reproduction and estimation, and turn production. The inferential task required completion of a multisegment pathway by returning directly to the origin. pathways were replicated at two different scales. Measures for the route-knowledge tasks indicated a substantial ability to navigate in the absence of visual cues. Route reproduction performance was particularly accurate despite intrinsic veering tendencies. A substantial increase in error was observed in the pattern-completion task. Errors in pathway completion increased with pathway complexity and were quite similar in the two scales. Correlational data suggested that performance on different route-knowledge tasks reflected differing underlying representations. The completion task led to a high correlation between absolute turn and distance error but had minimal correlations with the route tasks. The data suggest that a survey representation with some degree of scale independence was constructed for use in the pathway completion task.     

Using TD learning to simulate working memory performance in a model of the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia

Delayed-response tasks (DRTs) have been used to assess working memory (WM) processes in human and nonhuman animals. Experiments have shown that the basal ganglia (BG) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) subserve DRT performance. Here, we report the results of simulation studies of a systems-level model of DRT performance. The model was trained using the temporal difference (TD) algorithm and uses an actor-critic architecture. The matrisomes of the BG represent the actor and the striosomes represent the critic. Unlike existing models, we hypothesize that the BG subserve the selection of both motor- and cognitive-related information in these tasks. We also assume that the learning of both processes is based on reward presentation. A novel feature of the model is the incorporation of delay-active neurons in the matrisomes, in addition to DLPFC. Another novel feature of the model is the subdivision of the matrisomal neurons into segregated winner-take-all (WTA) networks consisting of delay- versus transiently-active units.Our simulation model proposes a new neural mechanism to account for the occurrence of perseverative responses in WM tasks in striatal-, as well as in prefrontal damaged subjects. Simulation results also show that the model both accounts for the phenomenon of time shifting of dopamine phasic signals and the effects of partial reinforcement and reward magnitude on WM performance at both behavioral and neural levels. Our simulation results also found that the TD algorithm can subserve learning in delayed-reversal tasks.     

Awareness of action: Inference and prediction

This study investigates whether the conscious awareness of action is based on predictive motor control processes, or on inferential "sense-making" process that occur after the action itself. We investigated whether the temporal binding between perceptual estimates of operant actions and their effects depends on the occurrence of the effect (inferential processes) or on the prediction that the effect will occur (predictive processes). By varying the probability with which a simple manual action produced an auditory effect, we showed that both the actual and the predicted occurrence of the effect played a role. When predictability of the effect of action was low, temporal binding was found only on those trials where the auditory effect occurred. In contrast, when predictability of the effect of action was high, temporal binding occurred even on trials where the action produced no effect. Further analysis showed that the predictive process is modulated by recent experience of the action-effect relation. We conclude that the experience of action depends on a dynamic combination of predictive and inferential processes.     

Inferences about predictable events: eye movements during reading

 Eye fixations were recorded to assess whether, how, and when readers draw inferences about predictable events. Predicting context sentences, or non-predicting control sentences, were presented, followed by continuation sentences in which a target word referred to a predictable event (inferential word) or an unlikely event (non-predictable word). There were no effects on initial target word processing measures, such as launch and landing sites, fixation probability, first-fixation duration, or first-pass reading time. However, relative to the control condition, the predicting context (1) speeded up reanalysis of the inferential word, as revealed by a reduction in second-pass reading time and regressions, and (2) interfered with processing of the non-predictable word, as shown by an increase in regressions. These results indicate that predictive inferences are active at late text integration processes, rather than at early lexical-access processes. The pattern of findings suggests that these inferences involve initial activation of rather general concepts following the inducing context, and that they are completed or refined with delay, after the inferential target word is read. Received: 4 January 2000 / Accepted: 23 October 2000     

Implicit person theories influence memory judgments: the circumstances under which metacognitive knowledge is used

This work focuses on the influence of implicit theories on recognition judgments. We argue that to understand how a recognition task is solved, it is necessary to study inferential processes because individuals might use their metamnestic knowledge (‘I would have known that!’) as a basis for replacing missing recollective experiences with inferential processes (Strack & Bless, 1994 ). In the present study, individuals' preexisting implicit personality theory (Dweck, 1996 ) was measured and was identified as a moderating variable for the use of metamnestic knowledge. After participants had studied word lists their metamnestic knowledge concerning these lists was manipulated. The results of a subsequent recognition task revealed that individuals used these metacognitively based inferences only when they assumed personal stability (‘entity theory’). Participants who believed in personal variability (‘incremental theory’) did not draw similar inferences when recollective experiences were missing. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Neural correlates of inference-driven attention in perceptual and symbolic tasks: An event-related potential study

The inferential system anticipates the external environment by building up internal representations of its regularities. To that purpose, two sources of information are especially important and attract attentional resources: expected and unexpected events, which are useful for checking the accuracy of internal representations. In the present study, we investigated the behavioural properties and the neural mechanisms underlying the strategic allocation of attention triggered by those events. To that end, event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded during the performance of two tasks requiring detection of predictable and unpredictable response events embedded in a visuospatial or numeric sequence. The behavioural results in the two tasks mirror each other, suggesting the recruitment of similar attentional allocation processes between the two domains. The ERPs showed partially similar effects. In both tasks, a P3a-like component signalled the capture of attention by events clashing with previous expectations, whilst a P3b-like component marked the focusing of attention on predicted events and its redistribution among all possible response events occurring after the detection of an unexpected event.     

Children's representation of symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude examined with the priming paradigm

How people process and represent magnitude has often been studied using number comparison tasks. From the results of these tasks, a comparison distance effect (CDE) is generated, showing that it is easier to discriminate two numbers that are numerically further apart (e.g., 2 and 8) compared with numerically closer numbers (e.g., 6 and 8). However, it has been suggested that the CDE reflects decisional processes rather than magnitude representation. In this study, therefore, we investigated the development of symbolic and nonsymbolic number processes in kindergartners and first, second, and sixth graders using the priming paradigm. This task has been shown to measure magnitude and not decisional processes. Our findings revealed that a priming distance effect (PDE) is already present in kindergartners and that it remains stable across development. This suggests that formal schooling does not affect magnitude representation. No differences were found between the symbolic and nonsymbolic PDE, indicating that both notations are processed with comparable precision. Finally, a poorer performance on a standardized mathematics test seemed to be associated with a smaller PDE for both notations, possibly suggesting that children with lower mathematics scores have a less precise coding of magnitude. This supports the defective number module hypothesis, which assumes an impairment of number sense.     

Reasoning rats: forward blocking in Pavlovian animal conditioning is sensitive to constraints of causal inference

Forward blocking is one of the best-documented phenomena in Pavlovian animal conditioning. According to contemporary associative learning theories, forward blocking arises directly from the hardwired basic learning rules that govern the acquisition or expression of associations. Contrary to this view, here the authors demonstrate that blocking in rats is flexible and sensitive to constraints of causal inference, such as violation of additivity and ceiling considerations. This suggests that complex cognitive processes akin to causal inferential reasoning are involved in a well-established Pavlovian animal conditioning phenomenon commonly attributed to the operation of basic associative processes.     

The impact of raters' cognition on judgment accuracy: An extension to the job analysis domain

Eighty-six incumbents of three different jobs produced job-analytic ratings using either a decomposed (task-based) or a holistic (job-based) rating strategy. Approximately half of them received rater training in making inferential decisions. When tasks were less complex than the job as a whole, rating decomposition generally had positive effects on ratings' quality. Similarly, when the number of tasks rated was low to moderate, rater training was effective. A contingency approach, where limitations concerning the use of rating decomposition and inferential training were outlined, should serve to inform future uses and theories of rating aids in job analysis.We would like to acknowledge David Dorsey for his significant contribution to the rater training program. This article is a summary of the doctoral dissertation of Juan Sanchez, which was conducted under the supervision of Edward Levine.     

Effects of outcome and trial frequency on the inverse base-rate effect

The inverse base-rate effect is a bias in contingency learning in which participants tend to predict a rare outcome for a conflicting set of perfectly predictive cues. Although the effect is often explained by attention biases during learning, inferential strategies at test may also contribute substantially to the effect. In three experiments, we manipulated the frequencies of outcomes and trial types to determine the critical conditions for the effect, thereby providing novel tests of the reasoning processes that could contribute to it. The rare bias was substantially reduced when the outcomes were experienced at equal rates in the presence of predictive-cue frequency differences (Exp. 2), and when the predictive cues were experienced at equal rates in the presence of outcome frequency differences (Exp. 3). We also found a consistent common-outcome bias for novel cue compounds. The results indicate the importance of both cue and outcome frequencies to the inverse base-rate effect, and reveal a combination of necessary conditions that are not well captured by appealing to inferential strategies at test. Although both attention-based and inferential theories explain some aspects of these data, no existing theory fully accounts for these effects of relative novelty.     

A critique of the usefulness of inferential statistics in applied behavior analysis

Researchers continue to recommend that applied behavior analysts use inferential statistics in making decisions about effects of independent variables on dependent variables. In many other approaches to behavioral science, inferential statistics are the primary means for deciding the importance of effects. Several possible uses of inferential statistics are considered. Rather than being an objective means for making decisions about effects, as is often claimed, inferential statistics are shown to be subjective. It is argued that the use of inferential statistics adds nothing to the complex and admittedly subjective nonstatistical methods that are often employed in applied behavior analysis. Attacks on inferential statistics that are being made, perhaps with increasing frequency, by those who are not behavior analysts, are discussed. These attackers are calling for banning the use of inferential statistics in research publications and commonly recommend that behavioral scientists should switch to using statistics aimed at interval estimation or the method of confidence intervals. Interval estimation is shown to be contrary to the fundamental assumption of behavior analysis that only individuals behave. It is recommended that authors who wish to publish the results of inferential statistics be asked to justify them as a means for helping us to identify any ways in which they may be useful.     

LOCAL AND GLOBAL PROCESSES IN VISUAL COMPLETION

In the natural environment, objects are frequently occluded, and people continuously complete partly occluded objects Do local processes or global processes control the completion of partly occluded objects? To answer this question, most previous studies simply asked subjects to draw the completions they "saw" Such drawing tasks are highly subjective, and they provide equivocal results Our studies are the first to use an objective, implicit paradigm (primed matching) to determine the extent to which local or global processes underlie the visual completion of partly occluded objects Our results suggest that global processes dominate perceptual completion, whereas local processes do not play a large role Therefore, local theories of completion, or theories in which local processes dominate, cannot be entirely correct     

The task-specific nature of domain-general reasoning

This paper develops a theory of how interpretative processes constrain inferential performance on conditional reasoning tasks. Experiment 1 investigated the hypothesis that performance on common reasoning tasks is mediated by different interpretive variables. Necessity and sufficiency relations predicted performance on the conditional arguments task, whereas on the Wason task, performance was predicted by whether the conditional statement instantiated a deontic or a factual relation. Performance on the truth-table task was predicted by both sets of variables. Experiment 2 explored the mapping relation between interpretation, representation, and inference. It was observed that conditional responses to the Wason and arguments tasks were based on different representations of the conditional relationship. These data rule out a simple model of the interplay between interpretation and reasoning in which the interpretation of a statement is driven solely by its content, and instead, indicate that the interpretation of conditional relations is task-specific.     

Erroneous knowledge of results affects decision and memory processes on timing tasks

On mental timing tasks, erroneous knowledge of results (KR) leads to incorrect performance accompanied by the subjective judgment of accurate performance. Using the start-stop technique (an analogue of the peak interval procedure) with both reproduction and production timing tasks, the authors analyze what processes erroneous KR alters. KR provides guidance (performance error information) that lowers decision thresholds. Erroneous KR also provides targeting information that alters response durations proportionately to the magnitude of the feedback error. On the production task, this shift results from changes in the reference memory, whereas on the reproduction task this shift results from changes in the decision threshold for responding. The idea that erroneous KR can alter different cognitive processes on related tasks is supported by the authors' demonstration that the learned strategies can transfer from the reproduction task to the production task but not visa versa. Thus effects of KR are both task and context dependent.