王弼"大衍义"略论

王弼易学的特点是以<老>解<易>,以他在<老子注>中所阐发的玄学本体论思想为基础来解释<周易>,这主要体现在他的<周易略例>当中.而他对"大衍之数"的解释,也使"大衍义"在其思想体系中占有重要地位.联系<周易略例>我们就能看出,"大衍义"是连接王弼玄学中老学和易学的桥梁,它体现了王弼玄学的体用观念,为王弼思想由老学向易学的过渡打下了基础.     

‘Byrne’s’ religious pluralism

“(1) All major religious traditions are equal in respect of making common reference to a single transcendent sacred reality. (2) All major traditions are likewise equal in respect of offering some means or other to human salvation. (3) All traditions are to be seen as containing revisable, limited, accounts of the nature of the sacred none is certain enough in its particular dogmatic formulations to provide the norm for interpreting the others.” P. Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism (NY: Macmillan, 1995), p. 12. In this paper, I argue that of the three claims that constitute the form of Religious Pluralism outlined by Peter Byrne in his Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism, the first is something proponents of the theory can’t think of themselves as having the resources to defend; the second is something that is in danger of being rendered trivial by the definition of religions offered; however, if one makes it non-trivial, it becomes implausible (and offering a defence of it inconsistent with other elements of the theory); and, even if the first half of the third is right, the second half is wrong.     

Assimilation and discovery

My aim in this paper is to examine a rational discovery strategy that I call “assimilation”, the attempt to understand a new domain by systematically interpreting the items it contains in terms of an established conceptual structure. The claim that this approach can lead to important new discoveries is illustrated by considering Galileo's attempt to develop a mathematical theory of the strength of materials and his discovery of mountains on the moon.     

Is the faith of faith development Christian faith?

The major research with a theological and developmental psychological perspective on the meaning and development of faith has been produced by James Fowler of Emory University and the Candler School of Theology. In this paper, I will present challenges by important critics who pose a significant question. Is this faith of the faith development research Christian faith? To provide an initial answer to the question, I will offer brief summaries of some of Fowler's writings that he has listed as most important for responding to the question. I will also present evidence from his writings and from the writings of other authors that he is indeed interpreting Christian faith.     

‘The Zone of the Carcass and the Knacker'—On Adorno's Concern with the Suffering Body

Adorno's moral philosophy is famously problematic. One of the main reasons for this is that it revolves around the moral addendum: a physical impulse of solidarity with suffering beings that, he argues, cannot and should not be rationalized. I show that, since this moral addendum remains vague and since Adorno's radical negativity forces him to dismiss as uncritical all other approaches to morality, he deliberately places his thought in danger of relapsing into irrationality. Most commentators therefore disagree about the manner in which Adorno's references to the moral addendum can be translated into a moral theory. In this paper, I bring in some often overlooked material to form a more complete overview of the issues at hand and to adjudicate this contested area. I do this by briefly discussing Schopenhauer's moral observations on Mitleid and by focusing on Adorno's references to animal cruelty and corporeality. Although this interpretation stays close to Adorno's observations on the moral addendum, it forces us to accept that his moral philosophy is rather weak. I conclude, however, that this weakness reflects a disturbing aspect of reality and in that sense has critical value.     

Inference and the taking condition

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule‐following, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking‐belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.     

A more dangerous enemy? Philo’s “confession” and Hume’s soft atheism

While Hume has often been held to have been an agnostic or atheist, several contemporary scholars have argued that Hume was a theist. These interpretations depend chiefly on several passages in which Hume allegedly confesses to theism. In this paper, I argue against this position by giving a threshold characterization of theism and using it to show that Hume does not confess. His most important “confession” does not cross this threshold and the ones that do are often expressive rather than assertive. I then argue that Hume is best interpreted as an atheist. Instead of interpreting Hume as a proto-logical positivist and arguing on the basis of Hume’s theories of meaning and method, I show that textually he appears to align himself with atheism, that his arguments in the Dialogues on Natural Religion support atheism, and that this position is most consistent with Hume’s naturalism. But, I hold that his atheism is “soft” and therefore distinct from that of his peers like Baron d’Holbach—while Hume really does reject theism, he neither embraces a dogmatically materialist position nor takes up a purely polemical stance towards theism. I conclude by suggesting several ways in which Hume’s atheistic philosophy of religion is relevant to contemporary discussions.     

Interpretive sensory-access theory and conscious intentions

It is typically assumed that while we know other people's mental states by observing and interpreting their behavior, we know our own mental states by introspection, i.e., without interpreting ourselves. In his latest book, The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge, Peter Carruthers [2011. The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues against this assumption. He holds that findings from across the cognitive sciences strongly suggest that self-knowledge of conscious propositional attitudes such as intentions, judgments, and decisions involves a swift and unconscious process of self-interpretation that utilizes the same sensory channels that we employ when working out other people's mental states. I provide an overview of Carruthers’ book before discussing a pathological case that challenges his account of self-knowledge and mentioning empirical evidence that undermines his use of a particular kind of data in his case against introspection of conscious attitudes.     

The Principle of Sufficient Reason,the Ontological Argument and the Is/Ought Distinction

Kant's attack on metaphysics consists in large part in his attack on a principle that he names the Supreme Principle of Pure Reason. This principle, it is not often noticed, is the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR]. In interpreting this principle as such, I argue that Kant's attack on the PSR (and thereby his attack on dogmatic metaphysics as a whole) depends on Kant's claim that existence is not a first‐order predicate. If existence isn't what Kant calls a real predicate, the PSR is false. While this constitutes a powerful Kantian argument against dogmatic rationalism, it also poses a problem for Kant. For, as I argue, if the PSR is true, Kant's argument that existence isn't a first‐order predicate is false. In this sense, Kant's attack on the PSR is begging the question vis‐á‐vis radical metaphysicians (e.g. Spinoza). Concluding the paper I suggest relying on Kant's 'is'/'ought' distinction in avoiding this circularity, thereby reinforcing the Kantian critique.     

AN AUGUSTINIAN PHILOSOPHER BETWEEN DUALISM AND MATERIALISM: ERNAN MCMULLIN ON HUMAN EMERGENCE

In claiming the independence of theology from science, Ernan McMullin nevertheless saw the danger of separating these disciplines on questions of mutual significance, as his accompanying article “Biology and the Theology of the Human” in this edition of Zygon shows. This paper analyzes McMullin's adoption of emergence as a qualified endorsement of a view that avoids the excesses of both dualism and materialism. I argue that McMullin's distinctive contribution is the conceptual clarification of emergence in the light of a precise understanding of matter, in light of Aristotelian metaphysics and Darwinian theory. As applied to human nature, McMullin retains an Augustinian outlook that sees spirit as emergent in the human body and which posits a credible biblical hermeneutic. I indicate briefly how McMullin's perspective could be fortified by a fuller natural theology.     

Leibniz's non-tensed theory of time

Leibniz's philosophy of time, often seen as a precursor to current forms of relationalism and causal theories of time, has rightly earned the admiration of his more recent counterparts in the philosophy of science. In this article, I examine Leibniz's philosophy of time from a new perspective: the role that tense and non-tensed temporal properties/relations play in it. Specifically, I argue that Leibniz's philosophy of time is best (and non-anachronistically) construed as a non-tensed theory of time, one that dispenses with tensed temporal properties such as past, present, and future. In arguing for this thesis, I focus on the three facets of Leibniz's philosophy most relevant for evaluating his commitment to a B-theory of time: (1) the nature of change, (2) the reality of the future, and (3) the truth-conditions for tensed temporal statements. Despite prima facie evidence to the contrary, I show that a close examination of Leibniz's views on these topics provides compelling evidence for interpreting his philosophy of time as a B-theory of time.     

The hermeneutic circle and authoral intention in divine revelation

In his recent book on revelation, Jorge Gracia rejects the authorial intention view of textual interpretation, arguing that the only interpretation that makes sense for texts regarded as divinely revealed is theological interpretation. Both his position and the authorial view face the problem of the Hermeneutical Circle. I contend that the arguments he provides in his own defense do not successfully avoid the circularity present in his own view. His thesis about expected behavior might provide resources for a solution, but this thesis in turn can be used to respond to his own objections against the authorial intention view of interpreting divinely revealed texts.     

How Does the Bible Refer to Christ? Interacting with Augustine the Allegorist

Abstract: Traditional Christianity teaches that the Bible's primary referent is Jesus Christ, the Messiah, and Christians have long looked for ways to connect every passage in the Bible to the Christ. One venerable strategy is the allegorical or figurative approach of creatively interpreting any unit of biblical meaning, sometimes down to the individual words, as referencing Christ. Alternatively, we might take the biblical narrative itself as referencing Christ and find the connection of smaller units of meaning to Christ through their place in that narrative. My article clarifies this topic through interaction with an exemplary practitioner of the strategy of figurative reading, the Church Father Augustine. I will first explain Augustine's reasons for his hermeneutics, which stem largely from his focus on smaller units of reference such as the word and the sentence. Then I will argue that his reasons are not persuasive if indeed the Bible does refer to Christ at a broader level, the level of narrative.     

论牟宗三哲学中的易学研究

牟宗三的易学研究为的是从易学中发见与解析中国哲学、中国思想,旨在抉发中国的玄学与道德哲学,而不是作一种历史的研究。他从哲学上为《周易》的解释提供了一个逻辑符号论的模型,为中国古典思想的现代诠释作出了首开先河的有益尝试;他对易学的“实在论的价值论”或“超越的内在”的价值论的诠释,与康德、维特根斯坦关于道德世界的“超越的外在论”不同;他对易之道德世界的分析与解释也是极其形式化的逻辑的。在这些分析与解释中,《周易》的“逻辑世界”或“符号世界”变成了语义的价值世界,或者说,作为“数理物理”世界的《周易》变成了价值论的道德世界。无论是在叙述方式,或内容的阐释与解析上,牟氏的这项研究都是十分新颖的,为国内所未有。但是,牟氏的易学研究只是他学思的开端起步,相对于他的逻辑研究来说,易学研究构成了他的哲学思想发展进路的前逻辑起点,而非逻辑起点,具有形式的象征意义。     

On the Substantive Nature of Disagreements in Ontology

This paper concerns a fundamental dispute in ontology between the " Foundational Ontologist ", who believes that there is only one correct way of characterizing what there is, and the ontological " Skeptic ", who believes that there are viable alternative characterizations of what there is. I examine in detail an intriguing recent proposal in Dorr (2005), which promises to yield (i) a way of interpreting the Skeptic by means of a counter/actual semantics; and (ii) a way of converting the Skeptic to a position within Foundational Ontology, viz., that of Nihilism (according to which nothing composes anything and the world consists of mereological simples); this alleged conversion crucially turns on a novel notion of " metaphysical analyticity ". I argue that both components of Dorr's proposal are problematic in central ways: as a result, the Foundational Ontologist gains an indirect argument against the coherence of the Skeptic's position; and the non-Nihilist Foundational Ontologist may feel confirmed in his doubts towards the Nihilist outlook.     

Truth, Thinking, Testimony and Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and Education

In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in over-emphasizing the fostering of students' critical thinking. In this paper I take issue with these claims, and argue that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental end of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and (2) it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust, that is educationally basic.     

The analyst's body as tuning fork: embodied resonance in countertransference

Abstract: This paper examines the phenomenon of embodied countertransference: where the analyst experiences a somatic reaction rather than the more common countertransference responses of thoughts, feelings, images, fantasies and dreams. Discussion of clinical material considers neurotic and syntonic aspects. The analogy is made of resonance with a tuning fork. Several questions are posed: Why does countertransference resonate in the bodies of some analysts but not all? Why do those analysts who are sensitive to this, experience it with some patients but not with others? And what are the conditions which are conducive to producing somatic responses? It proposes that somatic reactions are more likely to occur when a number of conditions come together: when working with patients exhibiting borderline, psychotic or severe narcissistic elements; where there has been early severe childhood trauma; and where there is fear of expressing strong emotions directly. In addition another theoretical factor is proposed, namely the typology of the analyst.