Recollecting the Religious: Augustine in Answer to Meno’s Paradox

Studies in Philosophy and Education - Philosophers of education often view the role of religion in education with suspicion, claiming it to be impossible, indoctrinatory or controversial unless...     

Peirce-Suit of Truth – Why Inference to the Best Explanation and Abduction Ought Not to be Confused

It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof abduction with Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, however, is to show that this distinction is most relevant with respect to current problems in philosophy of science and epistemology (like attempts to supply suitable notions of realism and truth as well as related concepts like coherence and unification). In particular, I also try to show that (and in what way) Peirce's inferential triad can function as a method that ensures both coherence and correspondence. It is in this respect that his careful distinction between abduction and induction (or IBE) ought to be heeded.     

Ignorant Cognition: A Response to Copeland,Ervas, and Osta-Vélez

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

Three Kairoi – Three Aions. Paul Tillich,Ultimate Concern and Pedagogy of Radical Hope

Studies in Philosophy and Education - For contemporary critical philosophers of education, the thought of Paul Tillich, a protestant theologian, does not seem to be a very likely point of...     

The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation

In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen in The scientific image, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own “positive argument” for CE by their own lights.     

“Minding the Gap”: Imagination,Creativity and Human Cognition

Inquiry into the nature of mental images is a major topic in psychology where research is focused on the psychological faculties of imagination and creativity. In this paper, we draw on the work of L.S. Vygotsky to develop a cultural-historical approach to the study of imagination as central to human cognitive processes. We characterize imagination as a process of image making that resolves “gaps” arising from biological and cultural-historical constraints, and that enables ongoing time-space coordination necessary for thought and action. After presenting some basic theoretical considerations, we offer a series of examples to illustrate for the reader the diversity of processes of imagination as image making. Applying our arguments to contemporary digital media, we argue that a cultural-historical approach to image formation is important for understanding how imagination and creativity are distinct, yet inter-penetrating processes.     

Protecting Human Health and Security in Digital Europe: How to Deal with the “Privacy Paradox”?

This article is the result of an international research between law and ethics scholars from Universities in France and Switzerland, who have been closely collaborating with technical experts on the design and use of information and communication technologies in the fields of human health and security. The interdisciplinary approach is a unique feature and guarantees important new insights in the social, ethical and legal implications of these technologies for the individual and society as a whole. Its aim is to shed light on the tension between secrecy and transparency in the digital era. A special focus is put from the perspectives of psychology, medical ethics and European law on the contradiction between individuals’ motivations for consented processing of personal data and their fears about unknown disclosure, transferal and sharing of personal data via information and communication technologies (named the “privacy paradox”). Potential benefits and harms for the individual and society resulting from the use of computers, mobile phones, the Internet and social media are being discussed. Furthermore, the authors point out the ethical and legal limitations inherent to the processing of personal data in a democratic society governed by the rule of law. Finally, they seek to demonstrate that the impact of information and communication technology use on the individuals’ well-being, the latter being closely correlated with a high level of fundamental rights protection in Europe, is a promising feature of the socalled “e-democracy” as a new way to collectively attribute meaning to large-scale online actions, motivations and ideas.     

Academia, Aristotle, and the Public Sphere – Stewardship Challenges to Schools of Business

In this paper we suggest that the ethical duties of business schools can be understood as representing stewardship in the Aristotelian tradition. In Introduction section we briefly explain the nature of ethical stewardship as a moral guideline for organizations in examining their duties to society. Ethical Stewardship section presents six ethical duties of business schools that are owed to four distinct stakeholders, and includes examples of each of those duties. Utilizing this Framework section identifies how this framework of duties can be used in the process of self-examination and transformation within business schools. Why It Matters section concludes by explaining why the process of examining ethical duties at business schools is vitally important for both business schools and the larger communities that they serve.

On the distinction between Peirce’s abduction and Lipton’s Inference to the best explanation

I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peircean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peircean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning. In particular, I claim that Peircean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses, while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton’s thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific inference.     

Diminishing Returns to Income, Companionship – and Happiness

From philosophical and intuitive sources, I find three goods that should serve as ultimate ends in assessing a high quality of life: subjective well-being, human development, and justice. With acknowledged plural ends (we use them whether we acknowledge them or not), each takes its value from its scarcity relative to the other two – a version of diminishing marginal utility. Contrary to economists' belief that income (together with leisure) is the source of all utility, evidence shows that companionship, which does not pass through the market, has higher utility and contributes more to well-being than does income. But if money income has diminishing marginal utility, so does this competing good, companionship. With arguments drawn from the meaning of happiness, I show that happiness, too, may have diminishing marginal utility and that often it must rely for its hedonic and social value on such other goods as human development and justice.     

Refugee Discrimination – The Good,the Bad,and the Pragmatic

This article addresses three questions. To what extent does the current refugee regime discriminate among refugees? When is such discrimination wrong? Could discrimination ever be justified pragmatically, for the sake of admitting more refugees given political constraints? In answer to the first question, it finds discrimination is rampant. There is the kind of discrimination that gets noticed: discrimination that states choose to enact within the refugee regime. But there is also a kind of discrimination that is missed: discrimination that is a product of the regime itself. The second question proves tricky. Matters are clear at the extremes. Discrimination based on need is permissible. Discrimination based on race or religion is not. In between, we have a set of hard cases that are more difficult to judge. The article searches for relevant criteria. Finally, on the last question, the article concludes that a political leader could be justified in enacting discrimination as a pragmatic response to political constraints but that, even on such occasions, discrimination remains wrongful.     

Inference to the best explanation: does it track truth?

In the form of inference known as inference to the best explanation there are various ways to characterise what is meant by the best explanation. This paper considers a number of such characterisations including several based on confirmation measures and several based on coherence measures. The goal is to find a measure which adequately captures what is meant by ‘best’ and which also yields the truth with a high degree of probability. Computer simulations are used to show that the overlap coherence measure achieves this goal, enabling the true explanation to be identified almost as often as an approach which simply selects the most probable explanation. Further advantages to this approach are also considered in the case where there is uncertainty in the prior probability distribution.     

Introduction to the Special Section on the Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale–Global Rating Method: From Research to Practice

There continues to be a need in the field of psychology for measures that quantify qualitative data in dynamically rich and clinically meaningful ways. The Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale–Global Rating Method (SCORS–G; Westen, 1995) is a clinician-rated measure with a strong theoretical foundation that assesses sophisticated underlying constructs, specifically 8 dimensions of object relations (Stein &; Slavin-Mulford, 2018 Stein, M. B., &; Slavin-Mulford, J. (2018). The Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale–Global Rating Method (SCORS–G): A comprehensive guide for clinicians and researchers. New York, NY: Routledge. [Google Scholar]). The SCORS–G has steadily increased in popularity and this special section of the Journal of Personality Assessment reflects this growing interest. In this introduction, we provide readers with a brief overview of the 5 articles in this special section and note ways in which they reflect and build on the existing SCORS–G empirical literature. Contextualizing these articles within the broader literature allows us to highlight how the measure is employed in clinical and research settings. Each of these 5 articles also highlights areas and opportunities for future research that would address gaps in the SCORS–G literature and strengthen the utility of the measure. We close by noting how each of studies can be seen as a model for future lines of research.     

Character Strengths – Stability,Change, and Relationships with Well-Being Changes

Character strengths are positively valued personality traits that are assumed to be stable across time and situations, but also malleable due to cultivation or deliberate intervention. Also, studies showed that character strengths are robustly related to well-being. Consequently, character strengths have often been used in interventions aimed at increasing well-being. However, the stability of character strengths and the longitudinal relationships with well-being are widely unexplored: First, previous reports on the stability of character strengths have mainly focused on one assessment instrument only and second, they did not consider other indicators of stability (and malleability) besides rank-order stability, (i.e., mean-level stability). In this longitudinal study, we assessed character strengths and well-being at two time points and examined the stability and malleability of character strengths and the convergence of changes in character strengths and well-being by means of correlation analyses. Two samples (n₁ = 601, n₂ = 1162) completed different measures of character strengths and instruments for the assessment of well-being, ill-being, and health within up to three and a half years. Results showed that character strengths are stable over longer time periods (test-retest reliabilities ranging from r_tt = .60–.83) and that relationships between changes in strengths and well-being are highly parallel to what has been reported in cross-sectional studies (strongest relationships for zest, hope, curiosity, and love). Furthermore, results suggest that some strengths, most predominantly humor, but also spirituality and prudence might be more amenable for change than others. These results might bear important information for selecting character strengths in interventions.

     

The sacred and the holy – from around 1917 to today

ABSTRACT

This editorial introduces a thematic issue on the sacred and related concepts, in honour of the 100th anniversary of the first publication of Rudolf Otto’s Das Heilige and the death of Émile Durkheim. It highlights key themes and provides brief synopses of the six articles.     

Leveraging Fourth and Sixth Graders’ Experiences to Reveal Understanding of the Forms and Features of Distributed Causality

Research has focused on students’ difficulties understanding phenomena in which agency is distributed across actors whose individual-level behaviors converge to result in collective outcomes. Building on Levy and Wilensky (2008 Levy, S. T., &; Wilensky, U. (2008). Inventing a "mid-level" to make ends meet: Reasoning through the levels of complexity. Cognition &; Instruction, 26(1), 1–47. [Google Scholar]), this study identified features of distributed causality students understand and that may offer affordances for instruction. Students displayed more distributed reasoning than anticipated, used hybrid and flexible reasoning, and reasoned about additive effects of collections of agents and their interactions, even when intent was unaligned.